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9Foreword by the editors
The Hungarian Labour Market Yearbook series was launched in 2000 with the sup-
port of the National Employment Foundation (OFA). The yearbook presents the 
main characteristics of Hungarian employment policy and each year features an in-
depth analysis of a topical issue. The editorial board has striven, from the beginning, 
to provide up-to-date results of labour market research and useful information on the 
Hungarian labour market tendencies as well as the legislative and institutional back-
ground of the employment policy of the GO and NGO organizations of the public 
employment services, local governments, the public administration, educational and 
research organisations and – last but not least – for both the press and the electronic 
media. This year we have also created a clearly structured and easily accessible volume 
that presents the main characteristics and trends of the Hungarian labour market on 
the basis of available statistics, conceptual research and empirical analysis. Continu-
ing our previous editorial practice, we selected an area that we consider especially im-
portant from the perspective of understanding labour market trends in Hungary and 
effective evidence-based policy making. The book has four main sections.
The Hungarian labour market in 2011–2012
The economic recovery from the crisis slowed down in the middle of 2011 and by the 
start of 2012 the performance of the Hungarian economy – similarly to the other Eu-
ropean countries – once again declined. In addition to the unfavourable long-term 
economic prospects, demand for labour also persistently declined, thus the employ-
ment rate is below its pre-crisis level. As a result of government measures aimed at in-
creasing activity, the activity rate reached a level unprecedented since the early 1990s. 
Another related issue is that people who become unemployed are least likely to exit 
the labour market and that keeps the rate of unemployment high in an unfavourable 
economic environment. Although this is worrying, it is a more favourable situation 
than, for example, expanding the possibilities of retirement. The increased intensity of 
public works programmes in the past two years helped to prevent the further growth 
of unemployment although it could not reduce it. There is no reliable information 
on the impact of recent changes in public works programmes, namely the lengthier 
employment opportunities, on entry into the open labour market. There were also 
considerable regional disparities in the development of employment. At the begin-
ning of the crisis, the situation of the central and Transdanubian regions which had 
been characterised by higher economic activity deteriorated relatively quickly and 
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the unemployment rate stabilised at a much higher level than the average of previous 
years. Public works programmes aimed at alleviating the further deteriorating situa-
tion of the Northern and Eastern regions that had been affected by high unemploy-
ment even prior to the crises.
Companies adjusted to the low economic output of previous years not only through 
levels of employment but also through wages. The dynamics of gross average wages in 
the business sector slowed down, and the level of less rigid real wages stagnated over 
recent years. At the same time the public sector was forced to cut wages and non-salary 
benefits. There were significant changes in the tax burden on labour in recent years. 
In 2012 the personal income tax effectively became dual-rate, which increased the 
tax burden on those earning less than the average wage, while it reduced the burden 
on those earning above the average wage: to offset the net loss of income among the 
low-paid, the Government increased the minimum wage by 20%. To date there is 
insufficient information on the impact of tax realignment on labour supply because 
further changes are expected in labour taxation in 2013.
In Focus
This year’s In Focus consists of two parts. Part I focuses on the impact of taxes and 
transfers on the labour market. Although the primary purpose of taxes and transfers 
is to create revenues to fund public expenditures and redistribute income, their impact 
on the labour market is also crucial because they influence, and in some cases jeop-
ardise, the sustainability of the system. Therefore it is very important to understand 
these effects as much as possible. Current Hungarian research in this area – building 
on our rich heritage of labour economics research – produced some interesting find-
ings and perspectives and generated exciting debates. An important development has 
been that this was not limited to academic circles, but there have been also numerous 
attempts to communicate the results to policymaking and to emphasize the impor-
tance of evidence-based policymaking.
Meanwhile there has been a boom in the international literature on public econom-
ics – inspired by the works of Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez. The fifth volume of 
the Handbook of Public Economics provides a detailed overview of this process. This 
exciting period – when a “new consensus” is emerging on the empirical assessment 
of the elasticity of labour supply to taxation – also brought normativity, optimal tax 
rate and tax system considerations back into the picture. It certainly involves serious 
debates – mostly about the taxation of the top 1% of the income distribution, or that 
of capital income. We would like to make this diverse, innovative and active litera-
ture more widely known in Hungary. The chapters in the first part of In Focus provide 
further references and a starting point for this.
The first, introductory chapter – written by the editors, Péter Benczúr and László 
Sándor – sets out the common conceptual framework of this section, with particu-
lar focus on the role of transfers and taxes in the static model of labour supply and 
demand. In addition it provides a detailed and comprehensive overview of the recent 
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empirical literature on labour supply elasticities. The second part of the introduction 
reviews the main results and the open questions of international academic research 
on income taxation drawing heavily on reviews in the Mirrlees Review and the forth-
coming fifth volume of the Handbook of Public Economics. The Appendix (by Móni-
ka Bálint) provides a description of Hungarian databases that are used in the impact 
assessment of taxes and transfers, to date less well-known in labour market research.
Chapter 2 examines the intensive margin of labour supply, more precisely the elas-
ticity of taxable income (written by Péter Benczúr, Áron Kiss and Pálma Mosberger). 
First, it gives an overview of the international literature on the subject – in greater 
detail than other overviews already available in Hungarian – focusing on aspects rel-
evant from the perspective of economic policy. Then the chapter presents the find-
ings of two previous studies that used data from Hungary to estimate the elasticity of 
taxable income. Finally, it demonstrates the use of estimated elasticities in “optimal 
tax rate” model simulations.
Chapter 3 looks at employment, more precisely: the labour market participation 
decision, also known as the extensive margin of labour supply (authors: Gábor Kátay 
and Ágota Scharle). It considers two main issues: on the one hand it examines the im-
pact of the tax and transfers system on decisions about labour market participation 
based on the findings of a recent empirical study. And on the other hand it summa-
rises how the system of unemployment assistance encourages or deters efficient job 
search and job take-up.
Chapter 4 presents the utilization of a heterogeneous household microsimulation 
model for assessing the impact of the tax and transfer reforms on the economy (au-
thors: Dóra Benedek, Gábor Kátay and Áron Kiss). It starts with a brief overview of 
the application of microsimulation methods abroad and in Hungary. Then it brief-
ly presents a microsimulation model developed in the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the 
central bank in Hungary) that can be used to assess the long-term employment and 
macro-economic impacts of hypothetical and real changes in taxation and transfers.
Chapter 5 shifts the focus from labour supply and employees to employers and la-
bour demand. Following a brief general introduction (written by Árpád Földessy and 
Ágota Scharle) it gives an overview of previous findings and experiences related to the 
impact of wage subsidies (authors: Péter Galasi and Gyula Nagy), and then presents 
the results of a recent study on the impact of the “START card” wage subsidy scheme 
(authors: Zsombor Cseres-Gergely, Árpád Földessy and Ágota Scharle). The fourth 
sub-chapter explores another large area of state intervention – minimum wages (au-
thors: Ágota Scharle and Balázs Váradi). It summarises the potential impact of the 
targeted reduction of the minimum wage as a tool to increase employment based on 
Hungarian and international literature. The final, fifth sub-chapter reviews the in-
ternational literature on the long-run equivalence of employee and employer contri-
butions (by Árpád Földessy).
The final chapter, Chapter 6 of In Focus – I analyzes the issue of labour market 
related tax avoidance and evasion (authors: Dóra Benedek, Péter Elek and János 
the hungarian labour market
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Köllő). Following a brief conceptual introduction to the international literature 
on the prevalence of the shadow economy and undeclared work, the chapter goes 
on to examine undeclared employment and tax evasion among businesses in Hun-
gary using detailed micro-level data. Finally, the last sub-chapter analyses the in-
come redistribution aspects of tax evasion using micro-level data. The chapter also 
contains three special topic boxes: István János Tóth and Mihály Fazekas preview 
their recent results from a survey on envelope wages, providing a first evaluation of 
the impact of the crisis on income underreporting. Mirco Tonin reviews his earli-
er research results on the link between minimum wage regulation and tax evasion. 
And finally, Árpád Földessy and Ágota Scharle analyze the impact of temporary em-
ployment booklets (alkalmi munkavállalói könyv) on black and grey employment.
In Focus – Part II provides a summary of studies exploring the impact of company 
characteristics on workers’ wages and employment opportunities. The introduction 
briefly discusses potential reasons why company characteristics can influence work-
ers’ wages. Then it presents the main methodological features of databases suitable 
for the analysis of this topic and finally presents the subject of the chapters: collective 
agreements, participation in international trade, foreign ownership and privatisation.
Chapter 1 on collective agreements (by Mariann Rigó) shows that the uncondition-
al wage gap between workers in companies with or without collective agreements is 
relatively large (over 20%) and it is not reduced substantially if individual differences 
are taken into account. However, controlling for observed company characteristics 
significantly reduces the wage gap to 3–3.5%. If unobserved company characteristics 
are also controlled for then this is further reduced to 2–2.5%.
Chapter 2 (by John Sutherland Earle and Álmos Telegdy) examines how workers’ 
wages change following the acquisition of a local business by a foreign company. For-
eign-owned companies pay 46–60% higher wages to their workers, however if ob-
served and unobserved characteristics are controlled for, this effect is halved. The ef-
fect is heterogeneous: younger and skilled workers receive higher pay increases than 
their less skilled colleagues; nevertheless wages go up for all categories of workers fol-
lowing acquisition.
Chapter 3 (by John Sutherland Earle and Álmos Telegdy) explores how privatisation 
alters workers’ wages and the employment level of companies. This is a very important 
question because a widely shared view among policy makers and the public is that pri-
vatisation will lead to redundancy and lower wages. The first part of the study looks at 
the employment outcomes of privatisation using databases from five Central Eastern 
European countries (Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia and Ukraine). Despite 
fears privatisation did not lead to substantial redundancies, at least not when they 
were compared to companies that remained in state ownership. The second part of 
the chapter focuses on Hungary and examines how wages change when state-owned 
companies are privatised. When the buyer is a local company, workers’ wages typi-
cally decline, while if the buyer is foreign then they tend to go up. In terms of demo-
graphic characteristics, the wages of women and younger workers decline least if the 
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buyer is local, while foreign buyers are much more likely to increase the pay of highly 
qualified workers.
Chapter 4 (by Miklós Koren and Péter Tóth) examines the impact of international 
trade on the labour market. The authors compare the wages paid by export and im-
port companies with wages paid by businesses that were not involved in international 
trade. Both export and import companies paid higher wages than businesses operat-
ing on the national market, however the effect is stronger and much greater among 
import companies. The higher wages paid by export companies can be explained pri-
marily by selection: these businesses had been paying higher wages for years before 
they started exporting. On the contrary, higher wages paid by import companies in-
creased gradually after they started importing. Nevertheless, not all workers benefit-
ed from the growth of trade. The analysis of Hungarian food and textile industries 
shows that the wages of workers whose production was replaced by imported goods 
declined compared to non-importing companies. The distribution of wage increases 
was uneven among workers, the management of the company and highly qualified 
employees saw higher rises.
Institutional environment of the labour market  
between September 2010 and August 2011
Possibly the most important change in the institutional environment of the labour mar-
ket was the entry into force of the new Labour Code, which is discussed in a separate 
sub-chapter. Nonetheless, there other important changes too. The personal income tax 
system practically became dual-rate with a lower rate of 16% of the gross wage. At the 
same time tax credit was completely abolished. From 2012 all forms of early retirement 
were abolished and this marked the end of a long era that started in the early 1990s – 
early retirement can no longer be used to ease tensions on the labour market. Exist-
ing entitlements continue as non-pension assistance. At the same time public works 
employment had a further impetus. The new system launched in 2012 offers longer 
working hours and employment opportunities lasting for months to public workers.
The discussion of the new Labour Code focuses on the main dimensions of labour 
flexibility. The new law mainly facilitates quantitative changes in the workforce, in 
terms of labour market transitions (rules on hiring and dismissal) on the one hand, 
and the performance of existing employees (working time arrangements) on the oth-
er. Not only did the conditions of flexibility change but it also became less costly for 
employers (lower wage supplements, lower cost of dismissal) and even the financial 
risks associated with employing people (indemnity and guarantees) were reduced. Al-
though the rules of employment outside the scope of the employment contract were 
simplified, workplace training – crucial for functional flexibility in a modern work-
place – is even more marginalised in the new law than it had been before. Despite 
the fact that the justification of the act stipulates that the legislation would allow a 
greater scope for collective agreements, overall – through the revised regulation of 
the hungarian labour market
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local trade unions and collective bargaining – it weakened the bargaining position 
of local trade unions, particularly in the public sector, often considered the strong-
hold of trade unions.
2012 was the first year when national wage negotiations were entirely conducted 
in the new negotiation structure, in which the Government, following consulta-
tions with social partners, decides independently on the level of the minimum wage 
and the minimum wage for skilled workers. Considering wages in public works, a 
wage-tariff type minimum wage system with four categories continued to exist. The 
Government also specified the “expected rate of pay increase” for low-paid workers 
in 2012, and provided incentives through contribution discounts and grant fund-
ing for employers implementing the wage compensation. As a result the number and 
coverage of company-level wage agreements is expected to decline. Although the pay 
freeze remained in effect in the public sector, the nominal pay of lower paid workers 
rose due to the wage compensation. There were larger pay increases in the health care 
sector where new occupational and sectoral pay scales entered into force following 
the action of junior doctors. A new development in social dialogue was the establish-
ment of a new national forum in the business sector that has fewer partners than its 
predecessor and lacks legal guarantees in its operation.
Statistical data
This section gives detailed information on the main economic trends, population, la-
bour market participation, employment, unemployment, inactivity, wages, education, 
labour demand, regional disparities, migration, labour relations and social welfare as-
sistance as well as an international comparison of selected labour market indicators 
following the structure developed in previous years. As in previous years, additional 
data related to the topic of In Focus is also presented in this section. Tables 12.1–12.4 
give information on time span of wage related taxes in Hungary. All tables and fig-
ures in this chapter can be downloaded in Excel format following the links provided. 
All tables with labour market data published in the Hungarian Labour Market Year-
book since 2000 are available for download.
* * *
The editorial board would like to thank staff at the Institute of Economics – CERS 
MTA, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the Department of Human Resources 
Corvinus University of Budapest, the National Labour Office, the Central Adminis-
tration of National Pension Insurance, the Ministry for National Economy, Ministry 
of Human Resources, the Budapest Institute of Policy Analysis Ltd., and the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank for their help in collating and checking the necessary information and 
preparing this publication. We would also like to thank the board of the National 
Employment Non-Profit Public Company Ltd. and their experts for comments and 
recommendations on previous and current volumes and last but not least for support-
ing financially the publication of the yearbook series.
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The economic environmenT and employmenT
The global economic recovery that started in the middle of 2009, continued in 
2011. The outlook has gradually improved and the majority of the European econ-
omies expanded (Figure 1); however, budgetary responses to the crisis and the 
immediate aid to the banking sector have led to a significant hike in debt levels. 
The European banking crisis gradually transformed into a sovereign debt crisis, 
affecting mainly Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, i.e. the peripheral 
EU member countries. As a consequence, most of the European countries have 
followed a restrictive fiscal policy; however, initial budgetary positions and the 
size of the fiscal adjustments differ from country to country. The impact of the 
budget cuts on aggregate demand and the concerns about the debt crisis weak-
ened confidence in the recovery and the economic outlook has been deteriorating 
since the beginning of 2011. In the second half of 2011, international economic 
activity decelerated significantly and at the beginning of 2012 several countries’ 
economic output declined. In early 2012, with uncertainty surrounding the 
sustainability of sovereign debt levels, the tight credit conditions and the fiscal 
consolidation measures, economic growth came to a halt in the Eurozone, while 
data on industrial production point towards a recession. Hungary’s most impor-
tant trade partner, Germany – despite the slowdown of the Eurozone – is likely 
to maintain its higher growth rate. However, in line with the global debt delev-
eraging, the engine of growth may shift from exports to domestic consumption, 
which could affect the Central and Eastern European region’s export demand 
negatively (MNB, 2012a).
Figure 1: Gdp-growth in the region, annual change (%)
Source: Eurostat.
–9
–6
–3
0
3
6
9
12
15
EU27
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
2012201120102009200820072006
%
cseres-gergely, káTay & szörfi
18
In line with the economic performance of their European trade partners, the 
economic growth of the countries in the Central and Eastern European region 
gained momentum in the first half of 2011, but is still below the pre-crisis growth 
rates. Debt deleveraging of Hungary and Romania, countries which were char-
acterised by severe indebtedness prior to the crisis, was stronger and as a conse-
quence, domestic demand and economic growth was lower than that of other 
countries in the region. The growth rate in the Czech Republic has been gradu-
ally deteriorating in the last two years due to declining domestic demand and fis-
cal consolidation measures; the economy even declined in early 2012. In Poland, 
the least open economy in the region, therefore the least exposed to fluctuations 
in foreign demand, domestic demand is able to positively contribute to growth, 
which is also due to a lower level of household indebtedness. Therefore, Poland 
is the most dynamic country of the region; however, the growth rate lags behind 
its pre-crisis level. With the introduction of the single currency in 2009, Slova-
kia avoided problems arising from foreign currency lending, while the structure 
and scale of the car industry supported the rapid recovery.
In Hungary, the outbreak of the crisis hit the exporting sector the hardest in 
the short run, but as external demand picked-up in 2009 and 2010, this sector’s 
recovery launched first. With high debt levels accumulated earlier, the consump-
tion and the investment of households declined. In the course of firms’ adjustment, 
falling real wages and rising unemployment lowered disposable income. Mean-
while, the exchange rate, weaker as it was than prior to the crisis, raised the pay-
ments of households with foreign exchange denominated debt. As a consequence 
of these factors, domestic demand permanently fell back: consumption has been 
stagnating even in 2012 and investments decreased further. As a result, the out-
put of firms producing for the domestic market still lags behind its pre-crisis trend.
Labour demand is subdued in all countries of the region. Labour hoarding 
characterised all countries to a greater or lesser extent: firms laid off less workers 
than would follow from the drop of output and tried to reserve the more skilled 
and more productive workers. This practice was supported in several countries 
by government programs: firms received support if they committed to keeping 
their employees. During the recovery, firms previously hoarding labour increased 
their labour demand more slowly, while using the existing labour force more in-
tensively. As a result, employment rates in the Central and Eastern European re-
gion as well as in the whole of the EU lag behind their per-crisis levels. The only 
exception is Poland where economic activity did not fall and is still relatively dy-
namic. In Hungary, the employment rate is still behind its 2005–2006 level, in 
spite of the fact that intensifying public working schemes counterbalanced the 
drop in private sector employment to a large extent (Figure 2).
Over crisis periods, labour supply might be influenced by two counteracting 
cyclical phenomena. On the one hand, facing permanently low labour demand, 
those who lose their jobs may give up job search after a while and exit the labour 
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market. This in turn decreases the participation rate. On the other hand, in or-
der to substitute for the absent income of the household, previously inactive sec-
ondary earners of a household might return to the labour market as the primary 
earners lose their job. In Hungary and Poland, structural measures also contrib-
uted to the rise in the participation rate: both countries tightened the conditions 
of retirement; Hungary in addition applies stricter conditions to disability pen-
sions and also revises the status of the current disability pensioners. In Poland, 
those who were born in the baby boom of the early eighties are just entering the 
labour market (OECD, 2012).
Figure 2: employment rates in the central and eastern european region  
(15 to 64 age group, percent)
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 3: participation rates in the central and eastern european region  
(15 to 64 age group, percent)
Source: Eurostat.
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economies. The prolonged crisis also leads to a permanent fall in labour demand, 
and as a result, the job finding probabilities of the unemployed remain low. As 
a consequence, the number of long-term unemployed, i.e. those who have been 
looking for a job for more than one year, also rises. In the case of the long-term 
unemployed, there is a risk that they lose their skills and competencies and will 
not be able to find a job even when the crisis is over. This increases the equilib-
rium unemployment rate as well (see e.g. Ball, 2009).
Hungary differs considerably from the other countries of the region in a sense 
that in the past few years, a significant positive labour supply and negative la-
bour demand shocks have been prevailing at the same time. Labour supply in-
creases as an effect of tightening conditions of disability pensions, and as a re-
sult by early 2012, the participation rate increased to a level not seen since the 
transition. Economic restructuring in the 2000s (depression of textile industry 
and construction, upswing of manufacturing) and weak economic activity since 
the outbreak of the crisis, caused a shift and then a fall in labour demand. As a 
consequence, the unemployment rate has been continuously increasing since 
the middle of the 2000s (Figure 4). The issue of unemployment was deepened 
further by the crisis, and as a result – despite the intense public working scheme 
programs –, since 2009 Hungary has the second highest unemployment rate in 
the region behind that of Slovakia.
Figure 4: Unemployment rate in the central and eastern european region  
(15 to 64 age group, percent)
Source: Eurostat.
In the following chapters, we introduce the labour demand and supply shocks, 
and additionally the analysis is also extended to wage developments.
laboUr sUpply
The increase in the participation rate has gained new momentum over recent years. 
By early 2012, the participation rate of the 15 to 64 age group almost reached 64 
percent, a value last seen in early 1993. By decomposing the change in participa-
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tion using the method of Kátay and Nobilis (2009), it is evident that since 2009, 
the rise in participation was mainly caused by a severity of social transfers and by 
change in the composition of the active population. During the crisis, the residual 
component – which mainly contains the cyclical component of labour market 
participation – contributed negatively to participation. According to data on 
flows between different groups, the flow directly from employment rather than 
from unemployment into inactivity strengthened (Figure 5). The sharp rise in the 
flow from subsidised employment into inactivity might be a consequence of the 
restructuring of the public working schemes. Those who temporarily lost their 
fostered worker status in the 2011 short term programs and were not working 
and seeking for another job during the period in which they were waiting to be 
placed into the program again, were counted as inactive according to the ILO 
methodology (Figure 6).
Figure 5: inflow rates into inactivity
Note: Public workers include all types of subsidised public workers and not only fos-
tered workers.
Source: Own calculations based on the Labour Force Survey of the HCSO.
Figure 6: outflow rate from inactivity
Source: Own calculations based on the Labour Force Survey of the HCSO.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Fostered worker, 
employed
Not employed, 
registered
Non-fostered worker, 
employed
2012201120102009200820072006
%
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Fostered worker, 
employed
Not employed, 
registered
Non-fostered worker, 
employedk
2012201120102009200820072006
%
cseres-gergely, káTay & szörfi
22
In recent years, demographic developments also decreased participation: the so 
called Ratkó-children are now reaching retirement age and their outflow from the 
labour market might have already begun. In the short run, the effect of schooling 
and education offset each other. Since the early 2000s, more and more individu-
als extend their studies and this temporarily decreases participation. However, 
after completing school, the higher educational level leads to a higher participa-
tion in the long run. It is worth noting that the change in the educational level 
changes participation only over a limited horizon. According to Hermann and 
Varga (2012), the change in the average educational level slowed down over the 
past two years and they forecast that until the end of the decade its growth will 
be even slower, and it is likely that education will contribute less to the rise in 
participation. However, a more favourable average level of education increases 
the participation rate permanently.
Since the early 2000s, the continuous severity of social transfers affected par-
ticipation positively, and this process accelerated considerably since 2008, the 
reasons being the rise in the retirement age and the restrictions of entitlement 
for disability pensions. According to flow data, the rise in activity is due to the 
fact that while in 2006, 6–7 percent of the unemployed became inactive, this 
rate decreased to 3 percent by the end of 2008. In spite of the intention of the 
government, outflow from inactivity into activity has not yet changed consid-
erably; restrictions of entitlement for disability pensions only resulted in a slow-
down of inflow into inactivity. It is worth noting that with the restructuring of 
the public working programs towards a shortened period and part-time employ-
ment, a large number of fostered workers flow into inactivity. The reason might 
be that fostered workers knew that within a short period of time, they would 
become employed again in the program, and they neither worked nor searched 
actively for jobs whilst being temporarily inactive. Due to the methodology of 
the Labour Force Survey, they are considered as inactive. Figures 7–9 present the 
decomposition of the change in activity.
Figure 7: decomposition of the change in the participation rate
Source: Own calculations based on the Labour Force Survey of the HCSO.
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Figure 8: decomposition of the composition effect
Source: Own calculations based on the Labour Force Survey of the HCSO.
Figure 9: decomposition of the transfer-effect
Source: Own calculations based on the Labour Force Survey of the HCSO.
Developments in the participation rate are rather heterogeneous amongst the 
regions (Figure 10). In the regions with the highest 65–66 percent participation 
rates amongst the 15 to 64 age group – Central Hungary and Southern Trans-
danubia – participation did not increase in recent years. The aggregate increase 
in the participation is due to the rise in the labour supply in those regions with 
less favourable conditions. In 2011, the number of inactive persons rose consid-
erably in the Southern Transdanubian region, which might be the consequence 
of the restructuring of the public working schemes. Southern Transdanubia had 
the most fostered workers in 2010 and flow data indicate a large outflow from 
public work into inactivity.
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Figure 10: participation rates in the hungarian regions (15 to 64 age group, percent)
Source: Labour Force Survey of the HCSO; MNB.
laboUr demand
In Hungary, employment had already started to decline in early 2007, prior to 
the crisis. Taking this fact into account, by mid-2009, at the trough of the crisis, 
output had fallen more than employment, as firms hoarded labour, i.e. tried not 
to lay off their more productive and more skilled workers. The reason behind la-
bour hoarding might be that firms projected the fall in demand to be only tem-
porary and tried to save on hiring and firing costs, especially of skilled workers 
who are more difficult to find on the labour market. In 2009, labour hoarding, 
part-time employment and training was also subsidised by the government.
Labour demand in the public sector was influenced by two factors. Debt accu-
mulated earlier and the aim to fulfil deficit targets made it necessary to rationalise 
public sector employment (Figure 11). As a consequence, the number of public 
and civil servants has been continuously decreasing since the outbreak of the crisis.
Figure 11: employment in the public sector (thousand persons)
Source: HCSO institutional statistics.
In line with the above, public working schemes gained importance. The public 
working program of 2011, which replaced the “Pathway to work” program of 
2009, unified the former three types of community work. The new program of-
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fered employment for a short period, in general for 2–4 months and typically part 
time. The social benefits related to the programs were also modified. During 2011, 
about 300 thousand persons were involved in the restructured programs and the 
highest number of workers employed at any one time was about 70–80 thousand.
In 2012, the programs changed again. More emphasis was put on full time em-
ployment and the average duration of employment increased to eight months. The 
government calculates that in 2012, about 200 thousand persons are involved 
in the programs, while the number of those employed at the same time exceeded 
100 thousand by the middle of the year.
According to the flow data of the Labour Force Survey of the HCSO, the num-
ber of permanent fostered workers is considerable. Those who exit community 
work, mostly become fostered workers again or turn into unemployed; however, 
from 2011, the number of those leaving the labour market also increased – pre-
sumably only temporarily until they get back into the program. It is favourable 
that about 5 percent of the fostered workers are able to find a job outside of the 
programs. This ratio is similar to the one observed in the early 2000s, but includes 
many more people given the nature of the current programs. As labour demand 
improves, a rise in this job finding rate can be expected, thus the programs be-
come of significant importance (Figures 12–13).
Figure 12: outflow rate from community working
Source: Labour Force Survey of the HCSO, own calculations.
The labour demand of the private sector can be characterised by the same hetero-
geneity as economic developments. In line with the recovery from the crisis, man-
ufacturing firms affected positively by the rebound of external demand started to 
expand their employment. Several one-off investments, mainly in the automotive 
industry (the establishing of the Mercedes factory, expansion of Audi, Opel and 
Hankook) contributed to this development, which working through the sup-
ply chain could also have had a positive effect on the labour demand of smaller 
0
10
20
30
40
50
Not employed, registered
Not employed, not registered
Non-fostered worker, employed
2012201120102009200820072006
%
40
50
60
70
80
Fostered worker, employed (right hand scale)
%
cseres-gergely, káTay & szörfi
26
manufacturing firms. Employment in those market services closely related to 
domestic demand is stagnating and some improvement can only be observed in 
tourism and in transport. The decline in construction has been continuous and 
as a result, the number of those employed in this area decreased considerably. The 
number of those employed in agriculture is on the other hand increasing, and 
the earlier downward trend in the ratio of employed in agriculture to the total 
private sector employment seems to have reverted (Figure 14).
Figure 13: inflow rate into community working
Source: Labour Force Survey of the HCSO, own calculations.
Figure 14: value added in different branches of the economy (2006 Q1 = 100)
Source: HCSO.
According to the institutional statistics employment in the private sector de-
creased sharply in early 2012 by about 30 thousand persons (Figure 15). The 
National Bank of Hungary (NBH) pointed out in its analysis that the sharp 
fall in employment affected firms with less than 50 employees, while employ-
ment amongst firms with more than 50 employees diminished only moderately 
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(MNB, 2012a). Looking at disaggregated data, the fall in employment seem to 
be independent of the wage developments of early 2012, thus it is unlikely that 
the rise in the minimum wage caused sudden lay-offs. The NBH shows that the 
presented fall in employment might cover the annual change in the sample of 
firms with 5–49 employees in the HCSO’s institutional statistics. This does not 
mean that the fall in employment is not a real development; it rather implies that 
smaller firms in the private sector might have already decreased their employ-
ment in 2011. However due to statistical properties, the fall in employment ap-
peared suddenly in the statistics.
Figure 15: employment in the private sector (2006 Q1 = 100)
Source: Institutional statistics of the HCSO.
Data from the Labour Force Survey of the HCSO show a somewhat different 
picture. Total employment has been increasing since the trough of the crises in 
2009, and according to the LFS data, this was not only caused by the public work-
ing schemes but also by private sector employment. The difference in the two sta-
tistics can be explained by the fact that the LFS also covers firms with less than 5 
employees, self-employed persons and those employed in the grey economy. Be-
sides, developments in the LFS-employment generally lag behind economic de-
velopments and the changes in employment in the institutional statistics. As a 
consequence, it is possible that the rise in the LFS employment is a result of the 
recovery of 2009 and 2010 and does not reflect a deteriorating economic outlook 
of the second half of 2011 (MNB, 2012b).
As a consequence of the crisis, falling labour demand affected all regions of 
Hungary (Figure 16). However the employment rate decreased the most in the 
most developed regions. Public working schemes concentrating on less developed 
regions with less favourable employment rates contributed to more favourable 
employment trends in these regions.
Since early 2010, the size of mass lay-offs fell back to its pre-crisis level. However, 
at the end of 2011 – early 2012, bankruptcy and a cut-back in the production ca-
pacities of some large firms (Malév, Budapest Airport, Nokia) led to significant 
mass lay-offs. The number of non-subsidised vacancies increased somewhat in 
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2010; however from mid-2011, as the economic outlook worsened, the labour 
demand of firms once again started to decrease (Figure 17). By early 2012, the 
vacancy inflow fell back to a level experienced at the trough of the crisis. Mean-
while, despite the public working programs, the number of unemployed did not 
diminish. As a result of the two, the Beveridge-curve – based on the relationship 
between vacancies and unemployment – shifted inwards (Figure 18).
Figure 16: employment rates in the hungarian regions (percent)
Source: Labour Force Survey of the HCSO.
Figure 17: developments in mass lay-offs and vacancies
Source: National Employment Office, NBH.
According to labour theory, if a negative cyclical productivity shock hits the econ-
omy, the Beveridge-curve first shifts towards the origin (the number of newly 
posted vacancies are not increasing, but unemployment still does not increase 
either), then we move downward along the curve (the number of vacancies is de-
creasing while unemployment is increasing – see the period 2008–2009). Positive 
productivity shocks result in the opposite (see 2009 and the first half of 2010). 
The shift of the curve towards the origin might be also a sign of unfavourable 
structural processes, when the number of vacancies and labour demand decrease 
permanently and unemployment also stays permanently high. It is hard to tell 
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yet if developments in 2011–2012 are of cyclical or structural origin, neverthe-
less, the Beveridge-curve signals unfavourable developments (see e.g. Mortensen 
and Pissarides, 1994, Shimer, 2000).
Figure 18: The beveridge-curve
Source: National Employment Office, NBH.
Besides the developments in non-subsidised vacancies, more factors indicate that 
labour demand is not only low because of cyclical reasons but also has fallen back 
permanently. The decline of construction has been present for years and no re-
versal can be seen so far (see Figure 14). Corporate investment rates are remark-
ably low, which means that no future production capacities are being built up. 
More average-sized companies disappear than are born. The permanent decrease 
in labour demand in line with the rise in trend labour supply implies that the 
unemployment rate might remain high for an extended period and an improve-
ment can be only brought about by the public working programs (MNB, 2012b).
The outbreak of the crisis reinforced atypical employment. Part-time employ-
ment spread first in manufacturing but then grew dynamically in market services 
as well. According to the institutional statistics, amongst firms with more than 
5 employees, the ratio of part-time employment in the total employment figure 
rose from 8 percent prior to the crisis to above 11 percent by early 2012 (Figure 19).
Temporary staffing has become more and more popular: amongst firms with 
more than 5 employees the ratio of temporary staff increased to above 7 percent 
by 2011. According to the 2012 publication of the National Employment Office, 
more than 7 thousand firms contracted with companies which offer temporary 
staffing, 3,900 of them operating in manufacturing. The average number of tem-
porary staff at companies was 16; temporary staffing was the most intense in the 
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Eastern part of the country: in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, temporary staff reached 
146 persons per company on average. In 2011, about 111 thousand employees 
had legal contracts with companies organising temporary staffing; however, only 
one third of them was actually hired at the same time. About two thirds of the 
employees were hired in manufacturing. Within market services, information 
and communication technologies (5.8 percent) and administrative services (4.9 
percent) used temporary staffing intensively as means of hiring (NSZF, 2012b).
Figure 19: The ratio of part time workers and temporary staff in full time employment
Source: HCSO institutional statistics.
Since 2011, companies offering temporary staffing have the opportunity to place 
fostered workers into private companies. The opportunity has not been taken ad-
vantage of so far: only five companies have gained the permit, but none of them 
mediated fostered workers (NSZF, 2012b).
UnemploymenT
As a result of increasing labour supply in recent years and of the falling labour de-
mand during the crisis, the unemployment rate as defined by the ILO rose steeply 
to 11% in 2008 and 2009, and has not diminished since. (Figure 20). As a result 
of government policies to expand participation, less and less unemployed leave 
the labour market, and in turn, public working schemes only hinder the rise in 
unemployment, but fail to lower it.
The number of registered unemployed rose similarly to the number of unem-
ployed in the HCSO’s Labour Force Survey; however, the former proved to be 
more volatile. With the annual restructuring of the public working schemes, 
the number of fostered workers drops to its lowest in the first months of the year, 
while the previous fostered workers re-registered at the labour offices, which in 
turn leads to an increase in the number of unemployed. By the middle of the 
year, as public working schemes wind down, the number of registered unem-
ployed drops again.
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Figure 20: The number of registered and ilo-unemployed
Source: National Employment Office; HCSO Labour Force Survey.
Although with significant differences, the unemployment rate increased in all 
regions (Figure 21). Prior to the crisis, Central Hungary had the lowest unem-
ployment rate (4–5%), but the rate rose sharply in 2009 and is still stuck around 
6–7%. In the central region, the underlying reason for the non-decreasing un-
employment – despite the economic recovery – is the fact that the number of 
public – but not fostered – workers is the highest in the capital and the lay-offs 
in public administration affected this region the most. In Western and Central 
Transdanubia – due to the geographical concentration of the car and manufac-
turing industry – unemployment rose rapidly from 6–7% in 2008 to nearly 10%; 
however, with the fast recovery of the industry, unemployment decreased in 2011. 
In the Southern Great Plain, Southern Transdanubia, and in the regions with 
the highest unemployment – the Northern Great Plain and Northern Hungary, 
unemployment rates have been increasing since the early 2000s, which was rein-
forced by the outbreak of the crisis. Since 2010, public working schemes focused 
on these regions; however, as labour market participation was also increasing, the 
unemployment rate could not diminish and even increased in Northern Hun-
gary and Southern Transdanubia.
Figure 21: Unemployment rate in the hungarian regions
Source: HCSO Labour Force Survey.
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As the fall in labour demand proved to be permanent, the long-term unemploy-
ment rate has also been continuously increasing. In 2011, the number of long-
term unemployed dropped, which was due to the nature of the public working 
programs, since the long-term unemployed entered the short-term programs. In 
2012, as the programs were again restructured, the number of unemployed in-
volved in the programs dropped by about a hundred thousand and those losing 
the opportunity to participate in these programs have even less chances to find 
jobs in the private sector. As a consequence, long term unemployment has been 
rising again since the beginning of 2012. The duration of unemployment showed 
an increasing trend even before the crisis, while the crisis first shortened dura-
tion as the inflow into unemployed status intensified. By 2011, the duration of 
unemployment increased significantly, signalling that those who lost their job 
during the crisis are not able to find a job for an extended period. In 2011, due to 
the short term community work programs that involved a large number of un-
employed, duration fell (Figure 22).
Figure 22: average duration of unemployment and the long-term unemployment rate
Source: HCSO Labour Force Survey.
One of the most important changes of 2011 was the change in unemployment 
benefits. The effect of these changes on unemployment is less well known today. 
Before September 2011, the registered unemployed were entitled to a job seeker’s 
allowance for 270 days, then for another 90 days (in the case of the unemployed 
above age 50 for 180 days) to job seeker’s assistance. Then the current form of 
social care and public working scheme commenced. Since September 2011, the 
unemployed are entitled to job seeker’s allowance only for three months, while 
unemployment benefit is only available for unemployed persons not more than 
5 years younger than the retirement age. After this point, the unemployed must 
participate in either the public working scheme or in active labour market pro-
grams in order not to lose the entitlement to future unemployment benefits. Thus 
changes in the regulation did not only cover the duration of benefits but also the 
period after the benefits expire and the conditions of the benefits.
60
65
70
75
80
Average duration 
of unemployment
20122011201020092008200720062005
Week
2
3
4
5
6
Long term unemployment rate 
(right hand scale)
%
The hungarian labour markeT in 2011–2012
33
The narrowing conditions of unemployment benefits might affect unemploy-
ment through several channels. The shortening of the period covered uncondi-
tionally and spent on job search might deteriorate the chances of job finding; on 
the other hand, this could be offset by the cut in the benefits. Not only the dura-
tion of job search, but also the quality of the job obtained might change. If the 
duration of job search is shorter, there are higher chances that the unemployed 
person would take up a job with a salary less than optimal or with worse working 
conditions. Finally, the change in the complete unemployment benefit system 
might have selection effects. If job seekers are almost certain that they will not 
receive any help in the job search during the registration period, are entitled to 
low benefits and do not want to participate in the public work programs, it can 
happen that they do not want to register at the labour offices at all.
Figure 23 again illustrates the fact that the yearly average stock of the regis-
tered unemployed stabilised around 580 thousand persons after 2010. With-
in the year, this number varies due to the winding up or down of the public 
working programs and the inflow into, and outflow from, the stock of regis-
tered unemployment.
Figure 23: The number of registered unemployed (persons, monthly data)
Source: National Employment Office.
As the figure shows, the changes in the number of unemployed cover the inflow 
of unemployed who were already registered at the National Employment Office 
previously (although not necessarily shortly before the re-registration), while 
the ratio of the new entrants is low. There is a noticeable correlation between the 
change in the stock of the registered unemployed and the duration of the registra-
tion. However, due to the lack of micro data, one cannot draw safe conclusions 
based on this correlation, as fostered employment breaks the continuity of the 
registration and restarts the calculation of the duration. After September 2011, 
none of the indicators show noticeable changes in the developments observed 
earlier. The outflow as a ratio of the total stock increases every month when com-
pared to the previous year, this does include several effects though.
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The effects of the above mentioned changes are better reflected in the data on 
the ratio of those unemployed who receive unemployment benefits. As Figure 24 
shows, this ratio was earlier well above 20 percent (and even reached 30 percent 
in early 2011), but decreased to 10 percent by the summer of 2012. Although 
the decrease affected mainly those without any benefits, the ratio of those who 
receive other kinds of social care also decreased.
Figure 24: The distribution of registered unemployed by the type of entitlement  
(per cent, monthly data)
Source: National Employment Office.
WaGes and earninGs
The outbreak of the financial crisis also broke the previously high nominal wage 
dynamics. Real wages also decreased in the total economy; however, different 
branches of the economy experienced heterogeneous wage dynamics. In the pub-
lic sector, wage adjustment has been stronger as real wages have been falling con-
tinuously since the outbreak of the crisis. Real wages in the private sector though 
did not diminish when compared to their pre-crisis levels (Figure 25).
Figure 25: Gross real wages (2006 Q1 = 100)
Source: HCSO institutional statistics.
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minished and nominal wages have been practically unchanged since 2008. As a 
consequence, by early 2012, real wages fell by about 25 percent when compared 
to 2007 (Figure 25). Data on nominal gross wages are biased by the restructur-
ing of the public working scheme in 2011. Institutional statistics measures the 
average wages of full-time workers and in 2011, a large number of low income 
fostered workers fell out of the sample of the statistics, causing an upward bias 
in the public sector average wages. Disregarding fostered workers, a one-off com-
pletion of public workers’ earnings in 2010 led to a somewhat higher wage index, 
but in general, wage dynamics in the public sector were significantly lower than 
in the private sector (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Gross wages in the public sector with and without fostered workers  
(year-on-year change, percent)
Source: HCSO institutional statistics.
Given the slack labour market, nominal wage dynamics in the private sector have 
been more moderate since the outbreak of the crisis than they were before. As 
opposed to the public sector, gross nominal wages proved to be rigid and they 
did not decrease. In 2011 and 2012, gross wages were also influenced by changes 
in personal income taxation.
Broadening labour supply in the past few years ceteris paribus would put a 
downward pressure on wage dynamics; however, this process evolves only over the 
long run. After the moderation of the wage index during the crisis, an improving 
economic outlook in 2010 accelerated wages. The dual structure of the recovery 
from the crisis is reflected also in wages. Wages in the relatively well perform-
ing manufacturing sector accelerated in line with the improving productivity. 
In market services, wage dynamics remained at historically low levels until the 
first half of 2011 and only accelerated somewhat in the second half of the year 
(Figure 27). Due to the sharpening heterogeneity in the structure of economic 
developments, average wage level in manufacturing has been converging to the 
average wages in market services (Figure 28).
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Figure 27: Gross average wages in the private sector (year-on-year change, percent)
Source: HCSO institutional statistics.
Figure 28: The ratio of wages in manufacturing to wages in market services
Source: HCSO institutional statistics.
In 2011, the government introduced tax allowances for families as well as a flat 
tax rate of 16 percent. However, the 27 percent grossed up tax rate remained 
leaving the effective tax rate at 20.3 percent. The tax deduction of the lower in-
come workers also stayed in effect, but was decreased. The pension contribution 
of the employees was also raised. These changes in the taxation system dimin-
ished the tax burden of families with more than one child and those above the 
average wage, while increased the tax burden of those without children or below 
the average wage. According to economic theory, a decrease in the taxes of the 
high-income workers would lead to an increase in their supply of labour and 
thus a decrease in gross wages. However, according to disaggregated statistics 
this did not happen in 2011: wage increases in economic branches with a higher 
average wage were only slightly below increases in low-wage branches. There 
might be several reasons behind the lack of wage moderation. It could happen 
that firms used the decrease in taxation to whiten “wages” paid: actually paid 
gross wages did not change or even diminish, but firms declared higher gross 
wages. Due to the decrease in income taxes, net wages of the employed would 
be able to increase even with unchanged or diminished gross wages. The lack of 
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moderation could also be a sign of significant structural mismatches between 
labour demand and supply. During the crisis and the recovery, labour demand 
of the firms was shifted towards more skilled workers who in general demand 
higher wages. As the recovery from the crisis began, most skilled workers were 
the first to be able to find jobs and later on, firms were less able to find skilled 
workers. Based on these observations, the labour market might be tighter than 
suggested by the common indictors of tightness, which would explain higher 
wage dynamics (MNB, 2012a).
In 2012, personal income taxation changed again. Tax deduction was abol-
ished, and the grossed up tax base was also erased up to about the average wage. 
In practice this means a two bracket tax system with tax rates of 16 percent and 
20.3 percent. As the abolition of tax deduction would have considerably decreased 
the net wages of low-income workers, the government increased minimum wages 
by 20 percent and announced a system of “expected” wage increases. Firms that 
raise wages as expected by the government and meet the supplementary condi-
tions could apply for a wage compensation covering the rise in wage costs.
Figure 29: The level and change of wages in the private sector
Source: HCSO institutional statistics.
As presented in Figure 29, due to the administrative measures of the government, 
gross wages in the private sector increased by nearly 10 percent when compared 
to the previous year. In line with the rise in the minimum wage and the system 
of the “expected” wage increases, gross wages of low-income workers increased 
the most, while wage increases amongst high-income workers – affected posi-
tively by the changes in taxation – were more moderate. The 5–6 percent rise 
in gross wages of high-income workers can still be considered as high, especially 
when one takes into account that tax changes in 2012 favoured employees with 
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higher than average wages. There is still little information on the reasons for this 
considerable increase in gross wages; besides structural mismatches, high infla-
tion expectations also might have played a role.
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Editor’s ForEword
Péter Benczúr
My 2007 review article in the Hungarian Review of Economics started with 
the following words: “Our recent and distant past is rich in hot debates about 
the macroeconomic impact, budget revenue implication, or social desirability 
of various tax, social contribution or transfer reforms. This is natural, and not 
specific to Hungary. One crucial element, however, is usually missing from 
these often fierce debates: the objective quantification of the particular re-
form’s detailed impact on household and corporate behaviour. This would 
involve drawing lessons from past events and assessing the likely impacts of 
current reforms. It is usually the former that creates the opportunity for the 
latter.” (Benczúr, 2007, p. 125.)
Since then, this research program has generated many new results, view-
points and interesting debates: building on the rich heritage of Hungarian la-
bour economics research, we saw important advances especially in the analysis 
of the labour market impact of taxes and transfers. Moreover, the discussion 
was not restricted to academic circles. Rather, there were numerous attempts 
to communicate the results to policymaking and to emphasize the importance 
of evidence-based policymaking.
These new results were often “echoing” the general lessons the original re-
view article drew: “(1) Elasticities or behavioural responses that appear to 
be small can still lead to important consequences. (2) Thus it is key to esti-
mate them precisely, using micro-level datasets (of households, individual 
taxpayers, corporations). Macro approaches and arguments may easily lead 
us astray. (3) We often need even more: a typical cross-section analysis is in-
sufficient to estimate the impact of taxes on labour market participation or 
corporate investment. In such cases, the solution is to utilize tax reform epi-
sodes, calling for sophisticated micro-econometric analyses on appropriate 
(panel) datasets. (4) Behavioural Responses can substantially influence out-
put […], social welfare, and budget revenue developments after the reform.” 
(Benczúr, 2007, p. 139.)
Meanwhile, there was a rapid acceleration in international public econom-
ics research as well, driven to a large degree by the activity of Raj Chetty and 
Emmanuel Saez. This will be demonstrated in the overview offered by the forth-
coming fifth volume of the Handbook of Public Economics. The compilation 
of the new volume is happening so much in real time that new excerpts kept 
being posted publicly as we were finalizing the chapters of In Focus – I. These 
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drafts were then enthusiastically forwarded to us by US-based public economics 
graduate students. No surprise that the Introduction of In Focus – I has become 
a review article in its own right, filling an important gap for the Hungarian 
readership: its focus was broadened from the originally intended conceptual 
framework to an overview of the most relevant ideas and results of the corre-
sponding Handbook chapter drafts.
Besides producing new, more and more precise and inventive empirical es-
timates, this new literature was consistently attempting to communicate its 
results to the policy world. The most representative example is the UK-based 
Mirrlees Review, created by leading international and UK researchers and 
experts, and edited by the Nobel laureate James Mirrlees. The two-volume 
book first reviews the state-of-the-art empirical and theoretical knowledge 
about practically all components of a modern tax system. Then, in light of 
the lessons, it evaluates the current UK tax code and proposes a potential di-
rection for reform.
Good empirical studies require good quality datasets – which are more and 
more frequently obtained by gaining access to administrative data. The last 
thirty years has witnessed a two third decline in the number of survey-based 
empirical studies published in leading economics journals, while the number 
of similarly placed studies using administrative data has doubled (Chetty, 2012). 
It is no accident that a large number of influential studies use data from Scan-
dinavian countries, where statistical offices are assembling and maintaining 
linked databases which cover the entire population – and the data are actively 
shared with researchers. Fearing that the United States would be lagging be-
hind, David Card, Raj Chetty, Martin Feldstein and Emmanuel Saez – four 
key researchers in empirical labour and public economics – were calling for in-
creased and facilitated electronic access to such databases in the US (Card et al. 
2010). A research group, led by Chetty and Saez, has voluntarily cleaned – and 
made publicly accessible – the raw data of all US tax declarations (see Chetty, 
2012 for details). Such databases have many exceptional advantages: (i) there are 
almost no missing data or attrition problems, (ii) both the filer and the main-
tainer is interested in good quality data and cross-checking, (iii) long-horizon 
longitudinal studies are possible, (iv) the large (complete) sample size allows for 
convincing, non-parametric quasi-experimental setups (and requires less theo-
retical assumptions). Besides the academic advantages, let me emphasize again 
that good public policy decisions also hinge on such detailed impact studies.
This exciting period – when, for example, a “new consensus” is emerging re-
garding the empirical assessment of the elasticity of labour supply to taxation – 
also brought normativity, optimal tax rate and tax system considerations back 
into the picture. It certainly involves serious debates – mostly about the taxa-
tion of the top 1% of the income distribution, or that of capital income. One 
should not be thus surprised to learn that in our preparatory and informal 
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Symposium on In Focus – I, the most lively discussions all involved normative 
conclusions. It sometimes happens that even authors of the same chapter have 
somewhat diverging views on normative issues.
This is natural, since normative conclusions always involve some social welfare 
criteria – which is a value judgement, and thus belongs to the sphere of political 
decision making. The most recent international results and the emerging “new 
consensus” highlights, however, that one can make certain important norma-
tive statements based on a small number of well-defined and well-measured 
parameters. This is of utmost importance for economic policy debates, since 
it allows the shift from “faith debates” into disputes about questions like the 
size and interpretation of certain parameters. For example, the key issues for 
the optimal top personal income tax rate – discussed in depth in Chapter 2 – 
are the shape of the income distribution, the elasticity of taxable income, the 
margins of adjustment it does and does not capture (shifting between various 
tax bases versus long-run reactions, human capital accumulation), and obvi-
ously the social welfare function.
We would like to bring this diverse, innovative and active literature to a broad 
Hungarian readership. The chapters of In Focus – I all bring a multitude of ad-
ditional aspects and starting points for the reader. The number of contribut-
ing authors has probably exceeded that of any previous volume, representing 
almost all local research groups that are active in the topic. We hope that our 
compilation will serve as a useful benchmark for Hungarian academic and 
public policy circles, giving them valuable and thought-provoking reading, 
which can also be utilized in their everyday work.
* * *
In Focus – I consists of six chapters. The introductory first chapter (authors: 
Péter Benczúr and László Sándor) sets up the common conceptual framework 
for the role of taxes and transfers in the static determination of labour supply 
and demand. In addition, the chapter provides the Hungarian audience with 
a new, more comprehensive review of the empirical literature on labour supply 
elasticities, with in-depth coverage for some selected issues.
The second part of the Introduction surveys the major results and open ques-
tions from the recent academic literature on income taxation, drawing heav-
ily on the Mirrlees Review and the forthcoming Volume 5 of the Handbook of 
Public Economics. It first presents the classical setup of income taxation, then 
it proceeds with results and considerations about the “optimal tax base”, and 
finally, it discusses tax differentiation along other aspects than income (tag-
ging). From this collection, many issues will reappear in later chapters, with a 
more detailed treatment, and often adapted to Hungarian data.
The Appendix of Chapter 1 (written by Mónika Bálint) enlists a set of Hun-
garian databases, which are particularly useful in the analysis of labour mar-
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ket impacts of taxes and transfers but not yet widely employed by researchers. 
These are: personal income tax files, the Hungarian Central Statistical Of-
fice’s (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal) Household Budget and Living Condi-
tions Survey (HKÉF), and the linked administrative database of the Central 
Administration of National Pension Insurance (Országos Nyugdíjbiztosítási 
Főigazgatóság), National Health Insurance Fund (Országos Egészségpénztár), 
Hungarian State Treasury (Magyar Államkincstár), and the National Labour 
Office (Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal).
Chapter 2 looks at the intensive margin of labour supply, more precisely: at 
the elasticity of taxable income (authors: Péter Benczúr, Áron Kiss and Pálma 
Mosberger). It first surveys the results of the international literature – at greater 
depth than previous Hungarian reviews –, mostly from a policy applicability 
aspect. The authors find that international taxable income elasticity estimates 
tend to be smaller than those in the US. Its most likely cause is that the tax base 
can be influenced by much more deductions and exemptions in the US than in 
most other countries. The chapter then proceeds by presenting the results of 
the two studies that use Hungarian data, partly updating previous estimates 
of Bakos et al. (2008). The results are broadly in line with the international ex-
perience: elasticities are not large in general, but they are sizeable for certain 
subgroups. Relative to the original results of Bakos et al. (2008), the new esti-
mates suggest smaller elasticities overall. High income taxpayers are typically 
more responsive to the marginal tax rate, while – unlike in the international 
evidence – there is often a significant estimate for the average tax rate, both in 
the positive and the negative.
Finally, the chapter demonstrates the use of estimated elasticities in “optimal 
tax rate” model simulations. Based on the corresponding theory, the optimal 
top income tax rate depends on three parameters: the elasticity of taxable in-
come, a parameter describing the shape of the (top of the) income distribution, 
and a parameter representing social preferences. According to the calculations, 
the pre-2010 top marginal tax rate was optimal under a strongly redistribu-
tive social welfare function, while the post-2010 top tax rate is consistent with 
optimality under a less redistributive social welfare function, or a much larg-
er elasticity than the estimates suggest. Such elasticities cannot be supported 
by existing results. Moreover, the income effect would point towards an even 
larger revenue-maximizing top tax rate.
Chapter 3 looks at employment, more precisely: the labour market partici-
pation decision, also known as the extensive margin of labour supply (authors: 
Gábor Kátay and Ágota Scharle). It covers two main topics: mostly based on 
results from a recent study, it first explores whether the tax and transfer system 
affects labour market participation; and second, it reviews the impact of un-
employment benefits on efficient labour market search and job take-up. The 
empirical analysis of the participation decision suggests that both taxes and 
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transfers significantly reduce labour supply; while studies of particular types 
of transfers indicate that it is rather the tightening of eligibility and not the 
cut of the transfers themselves that could increase labour market activity. Re-
sults are similar for job finding rates: when looking at the impact of a cut on 
unemployment benefits on the timing of taking up a job, no study has found 
substantial positive effects.
Chapter 4 presents the utilization of a heterogeneous household microsimu-
lation model for assessing the impact of tax and transfer reforms on the econo-
my (authors: Dóra Benedek, Gábor Kátay and Áron Kiss). Heterogeneity can 
mean that a reform impacts different households differently, or that different 
households respond differently to a common change.
The chapter first reviews the use of microsimulation methods both in an in-
ternational and a national context. Then it describes a microsimulation model, 
developed recently in the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hun-
gary), and uses the model to assess the long-run impact of hypothetical and 
actual tax and transfer reforms on the labour market and the macroeconomy.
Let me briefly list and summarize the simulation exercises. The first one 
compares three alternatives of reforms that are aimed at increasing the la-
bour market participation of low income, and typically also low activity 
groups. The second part evaluates some revenue-neutral tax restructuring 
proposals. According to the results, an across-the-board personal income 
tax cut, financed by an increase in capital income taxes, would boost effec-
tive employment. Its impact on GDP, however, is negative, due to the highly 
elastic response of capital. Cutting transfers brings about positive long-run 
effects: it leads to lower government expenditures and higher labour market 
incentives for those who are affected. It is important to note, however, that 
the simplifications of the model are likely to cause an overprediction of the 
true long-run effects.
Finally, the authors present an attempt to use the model for quantifying the 
long-run impact of the most relevant reforms of the last two years. Broadly 
speaking, the tax and transfer changes enacted (or planned) since 2010 lead 
to an increase in output, through the intensive margin of labour supply. Their 
impact on employment is much smaller though still positive: the slight nega-
tive impact of all tax changes is reversed by the cut in unemployment bene-
fits. A permanent increase in the required rate of capital can easily turn all the 
gains negative.
Chapter 5, consisting of many independent subchapters by different authors, 
shifts the focus from labour supply (employees) to labour demand (employers). 
According to the most basic framework, labour demand is determined by the 
price the company can get for its products, wages and labour productivity. In 
reality, labour markets are more complex, and there are many channels of state 
intervention: taxes and contributions, minimum wages, firing restrictions and 
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regulations on the length of working hours. The main topic of the chapter is 
the impact of payroll taxes, or more precisely: the impact of payroll tax exemp-
tions and wage subsidies.
After a brief introductory part (authors: Árpád Földessy and Ágota Scharle), 
subchapter 5.2 summarizes previous results and experiences concerning wage 
subsidies (authors: Péter Galasi and Gyula Nagy). It draws two main conclu-
sions. 1) According to the single program evaluation study looking at the wage 
subsidy programs in the mid-90s, those programs did not increase employment 
probabilities. 2) The impact of similar programs in the 2000s shows a marked 
heterogeneity, along gender, age and education.
Subchapter 5.3 (authors: Zsombor Cseres-Gergely, Árpád Földessy and 
Ágota Scharle) describes a recent study on the impact of the wage subsidy 
scheme “Start card”. It finds that even a temporary wage subsidy can be ef-
ficient, if it is well-designed and targeted. In particular, the program “Start 
Extra”, which was offered to jobseekers above 50 and with at least a secondary 
education, was cost-efficient for men, even when one only looks at short-run 
benefits. The overall efficiency of the program could be increased by restrict-
ing its target group to the less-than-secondary education group, and by adding 
extra job search incentives for women.
Subchapter 5.4 analyses another main type of government intervention: min-
imum wages (authors: Ágota Scharle and Balázs Váradi). It first reviews the 
international and Hungarian evidence and experience about the use of differ-
entiated minimum wage cuts as a tool to increase employment. Then the au-
thors summarize the main arguments they had in a previous proposal, calling 
for regional differentiation in minimum wages.
The last subchapter summarizes the literature on the long-run equivalence of 
employer and employee contributions (author: Árpád Földessy). Though there 
is sufficient empirical evidence for the equivalence, there are some assumptions 
of the theoretical reasoning which can be violated in reality. The theoretical 
result may not hold under strong union influence, progressive taxation, if the 
minimum wage is close to the equilibrium wage, or if unemployment bene-
fits are proportional to gross wages or are taxed. Another departure can come 
from the possibility that net wages are not the only determinant of employ-
er attitudes, but social norms are also important. Though it is not obvious to 
analyse the impact of social norms by standard economic techniques, there is 
evidence for their influence. It nevertheless does not lead to a violation of the 
equivalence of employer and employee contributions.
The last chapter of In Focus – I analyses the issue of labour market related 
tax avoidance and evasion (authors: Dóra Benedek, Péter Elek and János 
Köllő). In other words, it looks at black and grey employment patterns. These 
topics get a central stage in Hungarian economic policy debates, and for a 
good reason. Their prevalence crucially influences the total economic ef-
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fect of a minimum wage increase, a tax cut for low earners and many other 
policy actions.
After a short introduction, the chapter first presents an overview of existing 
international evidence on the importance of the shadow economy and employ-
ment. Then it proceeds with a detailed, micro-based analysis of employment-
related tax evasion in Hungary, looking at black and grey employment, and the 
self-employed. Finally, its last subchapter uncovers the (re)distribution aspects 
of tax evasion, also building on microdata.
Based on studies comparing the Hungarian Labour Force Survey and admin-
istrative data, the estimated share of unreported (black) employment was be-
tween 10 and 17 percent over the time period of 2001–2007. The results vary 
with the estimation method and the particular subsample considered, but they 
show no clear time pattern. Black employment is particularly relevant for men, 
the self-employed, in the central region of Hungary, and in certain professions 
like structural architecture and personal services.
Looking at grey employment, the authors present evidence that disguised 
minimum wage earners tend to be concentrated in certain subgroups: they are 
more frequent in the construction and retail sector, and in very small enter-
prises. In other sectors, also exhibiting high rates of minimum wage earners 
– such as the cleaning industry and unskilled labour in general – the degree 
of income under-reporting is much smaller. An important result is that more 
than half of the total unreported income bill comes from the top quintile of 
the (true) wage distribution.
Consequently, a minimum wage increase has a limited impact on the amount 
hidden from the tax base; while it adversely impacts the employment of the un-
skilled, who are true minimum wage earners. A well-designed differentiation 
of the minimum wage (for example, a higher minimum wage for university 
graduates), on the other hand, can perform well as a whitening device.
Finally, the chapter presents estimates about the full amount of income un-
derreporting. By comparing income data from the Household Budget Survey 
and personal income tax files, average income underreporting is estimated to 
be in a range of 9–13%. Its incidence is higher among low and high earners. 
Income distribution patterns of income underreporting broadly coincide with 
those of black and grey employment: tax evasion is higher among men and the 
self-employed, and in the central region of Hungary.
The chapter also contains three special topic boxes. István János Tóth and 
Mihály Fazekas preview their recent results from a survey on envelope wag-
es, providing a first evaluation of the impact of the crisis on income underre-
porting. Mirco Tonin reviews his earlier research results on the link between 
minimum wage regulation and tax evasion. And finally, Árpád Földessy and 
Ágota Scharle analyse the impact of temporary employment booklets (alkalmi 
munkavállalói könyv) on black and grey employment.
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1. introduction
Péter Benczúr & László Sándor
In this introductory chapter we sketch the common conceptual framework of 
this In Focus – I. Foremost, we show what roles taxes and transfers play in de-
termining labour supply and demand.1 Several other reviews are already avail-
able in Hungarian, e.g. the survey of Benczúr (2007) and the comprehensive 
tax reform study of Scharle et al. (2010). In order to facilitate the reading of 
the ensuing chapters, we repeat here the basics from these two prior studies. 
Occasionally, we make significant extensions and updates, in which cases we 
also flesh out some insights in more detail. The second half of the introduc-
tion briefly reviews the international literature of income taxation, its corner-
stone results and open questions, largely relying on the extensive Mirrlees Re-
view2 of the British tax system and the fifth volume of the Handbook of Public 
Economics now under preparation. Finally, the Appendix (written by Mónika 
Bálint) describes Hungarian databases which allow microempirical analysis 
of labour taxation, and summarizes their availability.3
The conceptual framework
Labour supply
The (static) approach to labour supply supposes that each individual chooses 
how much to work according to the utility derived from leisure and consump-
tion.4 When the net wage falls, they can afford less leisure (this is the income 
effect), while the income forfeited when not working also falls, and the sub-
stitution effect drives the worker to buy more of the now-cheaper leisure. The 
compound effect of these two forces has an ambiguous sign even in theory: at 
high wages a pay raise (tax cut) can drive a person to lower their labour sup-
ply, as their higher income increases their demand for leisure more than how 
much the higher wage incentivizes extra work. This is the phenomenon of the 
backward bending labour supply curve.
Two fundamental aspects of the labour supply decision can be distinguished: 
first, the decision whether one works or not (the extensive margin); second, the 
amount the person works (the intensive margin). In the latter case, not only 
hours worked but also the quality and intensity of work is a choice of the worker. 
Though this can be observed less directly, one can assume that total earnings 
are intimately related to work intensity – think of performance pay, bonuses, 
promotions, or human capital accumulation.
1 We are grateful for comments 
from Peter Hudomiet, Attila 
Lindner, and Áron Tóbiás. All 
remaining errors are our own.
2 Two excellent critical reviews 
of Mirrlees et al. (2011) came 
from Atkinson (2012) and Feld-
stein (2012). A similar project 
for France was completed by 
Landais et al. (2010). The link of 
theoretical results and practical 
policy is reviewed by Boadway 
(2012), looking both back and 
forward in time.
3 The appendix primarily sur-
veys databases newly available 
for labour market research. 
Well-known databases such as 
the Hungarian Wage Rate Sur-
vey or the Labour Force Survey 
are described in detail in the 
Statistical Data section.
4 The dynamic approach is 
similar, yet part of the decision 
concerns the allocation of la-
bour supply and consumption 
over time. In Focus – I. follows 
basically the static approach. 
On the dynamic case, see for 
instance Keane (2011).
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The incentive effects of tax systems have two key indicators. Average tax rates 
indicate the fraction of the total income a taxpayer pays as taxes, while mar-
ginal tax rates measure how much more they would pay in taxes, should they 
earn a unit more, all levies combined.
In this regard, it is important to treat taxes together with various, often 
income-dependent (means-tested) benefits5 – the real question is how much 
one can take home from one’s income after paying taxes and getting transfers 
(which is the effective tax rate, see Scharle, 2005). The take-home share (net rate) 
is also called the tax price.6
Marginal tax rates have only substitution effects on decisions about hours 
worked and work intensity (or together: the effective amount of labour): a tax 
rise that affects only the last dollar earned induces a reduction in the effective 
amount worked. This is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1.1: the decrease of 
the net wage from w to w’ (a rise in the marginal tax rate) with utility kept con-
stant (a rise in the marginal tax rate) decreases hours worked from le to l’e . The 
sign of the substitution effect (for a consistent, “rational” worker) is thus always 
negative: a higher marginal tax rate decreases the amount of labour supplied.
Figure 1.1: Labour supply incentives of average and marginal tax rates
Legend: l: amount of labour, w: wage, T: non-labour (unearned) income, c: consump-
tion, Ui ,  U'i:  indifference curves.
Raising average tax rates, in contrast, can even raise the amount of labour sup-
plied, as it also decreases disposable income. This is basically the income effect 
of a tax change: without changing the (local) slope of the budget constraint 
(the net wage), this tax rise shifts the line downwards, changing labour from 
le’ to lf  (left panel of Figure 1.1.).
The magnitudes of the effects are usually measured as elasticities, which 
show the percentage response to a percentage change in the average or mar-
ginal net rate of hours worked (the intensive margin) or the propensity to 
work (the extensive margin). The uncompensated labour supply elasticity shows 
5 Some transfers are lost with 
basically the first earned forint, 
resulting in a discrete, discon-
tinuous jump in the budget set 
at zero hours of labour. Potential 
remedies of this effect are dis-
cussed in detail Chapter 3.
6 Which is thus one minus the 
corresponding tax rate.
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the total effect of a wage change (the sum of the substitution and the income 
effects), while the substitution effect itself is measured by the compensated 
elasticity.7
For the decision to enter work the fall in the average tax rate is a positive in-
centive, since this increases the return on entering relative to inactivity. In the 
simplest case a tax rise can push one into inactivity (i.e. a corner solution: the 
indifference curve would be tangent to the budget line at some negative amount 
of labour). The more typical mechanism works through the fact that most 
jobs have a minimum amount of labour (you cannot work less than a certain 
threshold – think of part-time or full-time work), which means that in spite 
of working only for a short period being optimal for the worker, this is impos-
sible in practice.8 In this case, a tax rise can suddenly make the worker choose 
inactivity, which of course can mean schooling, child care or retirement too.
This is shown in the right panel of Figure 1.1. For the initial net wage w, the 
worker works le hours (for instance, full time). By a lower net wage w’, having 
to choose between zero and le hours, they choose lf = 0 (the interior solution at 
the point of tangency is unavailable because of minimal job size). This choice 
is driven by the average tax rate on the monthly gross wage; i.e. the earnings 
difference between full-time work and inactivity. For this reason, the average 
tax rate is also called the participation tax rate.
All the various taxes levied on earnings combined constitute the full tax 
wedge. This shows the deviation from a world without intervention, when the 
marginal product of labour would equal the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween leisure and consumption. On top of taxes levied directly on the worker, 
employer-paid contributions also feature prominently in the full tax wedge, as 
they also affect the relation between the full labour cost to the employer and 
the net wage received by the worker. Furthermore, consumption taxes also 
affect the consumption-labour trade-off, as they also change the amount of 
goods one can get in exchange for working.9 Thus the average effective rate of 
consumption taxes also shows up in the full tax wedge.
In practice, different types of labour income can face different tax rates: for 
non-employment assignment contracts in Hungary, for instance, only 90% 
of earnings are taxable. Tax treatment also differs for fringe benefits such as a 
corporate car, phone or cafeteria. We can weigh these taxes by the fraction of 
these benefits in the total income to get at the effective average tax rate – for 
marginal rates the question becomes in what form the worker would receive 
an extra unit of income. Moreover, various tax benefits, allowances, credits 
and deductions can change tax rates; average tax rates necessarily, but also 
marginal tax rates (e.g. if eligibility is phased out above a certain income level). 
And in case there is a connection between some amount paid and some bene-
fit in return (in Hungary, mainly pension contributions worked this way), the 
worker’s valuation of the extra benefit decreases the net amount taxed away.
7 In the dynamic approach, one 
version of the compensated elas-
ticity, the so-called Frisch elastic-
ity, is one of the most important 
indicators. This measures the 
labour supply response under 
the condition that wealth has 
constant marginal utility, thus 
instantaneous labour supply 
can also change because of in-
tertemporal substitution (tak-
ing advantage of a temporary 
earnings opportunity, without 
future wages changing).
8 Under such “practical reasons” 
underlie the general argument 
that employers have concave 
costs of employment and thus 
there is no such labour demand, 
or some employees face concave 
costs and thus such individual 
labour supply is rare (which, 
through firm-level coordination 
problems imply that there is no 
such firm-level labour demand 
either).
9 Under some conditions (e.g., 
no savings or capital income) 
labour income taxes and con-
sumption taxes are equivalent 
to each other. In general, there 
is little long-run difference be-
tween a tax system taxing purely 
labour (but not consumption or 
savings) or one taxing consump-
tion only. For details, see Scharle 
et al. (2010).
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Labour Demand
While labour supply is determined by the preferences of the (potential) work-
er, labour demand is a function of labour’s productivity – assuming perfect 
competition in both product and labour markets. This increases with high-
er levels or lower costs of general technology and development, capital, and 
other factors of production (e.g. complementary skilled labour). In classical 
economic models with perfect competition, the employer pays its employ-
ees the level of wages which correspond to how much they contribute to its 
revenues through the production process (the value of the marginal prod-
uct of their labour). Even with the employer taking wages as given, we can 
distinguish short-term and long-term labour demand (the latter allows a 
change in capital and other factors of production, the spread of all relevant 
information, etc.). It is easy to prove that the long-term elasticity of labour 
demanded with respect to unit labour costs is equal to the elasticity of sub-
stitution between labour and capital.10
Scharle et al. (2010) briefly survey the empirical literature on labour demand 
in Hungary. Studies of direct personnel demand using individual-level observa-
tions find elasticities close to the international average, between –0.5 and –0.8 
(Kőrösi, 2005). Estimating the elasticity of labour-capital substitution from an 
empirical investment equation, Kátay and Wolf (2004) find a long-term value 
of –0.8, close to the estimates from personnel demand equations.
Numerous government programs and interventions aim to change labour 
demand. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 analyse the effects of various wage subsidies in de-
tail. Though in the long run these are supposed to work through the tax wedge 
(i.e. when employer and employee contributions are equivalent and they have 
an effect through labour supply), in the short run they can have a direct effect 
on labour demand and can be more effective countercyclical incentives (we 
discuss this in detail in Section 5.5).
The other well-known, primarily demand-side intervention on the labour 
market is the institution of minimum wages. This introduces a lower bound 
for wages, thence firms have no more incentive to employ some workers, since 
their contribution would be less than the legislated minimum wage. So in this 
way the minimum wage can decrease employment. Yet if there is no perfect 
competition in the labour market, or where companies can affect wages for 
other reasons, raising the minimum wage might even increase employment.
Meanwhile the minimum wage can be socially beneficial because it does not 
allow wages of subsidized low-income people to fall in line with their increased 
labour supply. This can reinforce the power of the subsidy and the scope for re-
distribution – besides which it is necessarily inefficient (even self-contradicto-
ry) to levy any taxes on minimum wage earners (Lee and Saez, 2012). Section 
5.4 discusses these aspects as well.
10 To be precise, the proposi-
tion assumes a constant returns 
to scale, two-factor, constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) 
production function.
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Labour market equilibrium
The equilibrium of labour demand and supply can be seen on Figure 1.2. The 
horizontal axis shows the effective amount of labour, the vertical the wage. The 
demand curve is downward sloping: firms hire fewer workers amid higher unit 
labour costs (“super-gross wages”). The supply curve is upward sloping: work-
ers are ready to work more for higher net (“take-home”) pay.
Figure 1.2: Equilibrium of labour demand and supply with a unit tax on labour
The two panels differ in the wage elasticity of labour demand: the same wage 
change increases the amount of labour demanded less on the right-hand side 
(smaller elasticity). The market equilibrium with no taxes is at the wage level 
where quantity demanded and supplied are equal (L0 of point A). Here the 
full cost of labour equals the net wage (w0).
Let us introduce now a unit tax of T (among labour taxes, such is the health 
care contribution). The new equilibrium arises at an employment level (L1) 
where the difference between the gross wage of the labour demand curve and 
the net wage of the labour supply curve equals the tax. It is important to note 
that this result does not depend on whom the tax is levied (in the long run). We 
can check this in the figure by plotting demand and supply in terms of gross 
and net wages, respectively.
What will happen to tax revenues? With no behavioural response (no change 
in the quantity demanded or supplied), we could expect revenues T × L0. The 
introduction of the tax will decrease employment though, and actual revenues 
will only equal the light grey area, T × L1 < T × L0. What is happening to so-
cial welfare in the meantime? As a potential measure, let us look at the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus. In Figure 1.2 the triangle shaped area 
between the demand curve and the equilibrium wage shows the size of the con-
sumer surplus (in the labour market this goes to the employer), i.e. the sum by 
which employers value the employed labour above the actual wage. The producer 
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surplus (in the labour market this belongs to employees) is the area between the 
supply curve and the horizontal line corresponding to the given wage, which 
shows how much more employees value their income above their forfeited leisure.
At the introduction of the tax, both surpluses decrease: consumer surplus 
by the area of the trapezoid between segments w0 – A and w1gross – B1, producer 
surplus by the area of the trapezoid between segments w0 – A and w1gross – B2. 
But not all of this is a loss, as the government also collects revenues – exactly 
in the amount corresponding to the area of the light grey rectangle. The sum 
of consumer and producer surplus on the one hand, and government reve-
nue on the other, decreased thus by the area of the darker triangle. Its area is 
1/2 × T × (L0 – L1).
Both the missing tax revenue relative to the case without behavioural respons-
es, and the deadweight loss of the tax, are a function of how much employment 
decreased. A comparison of the right and left halves of the figure also reveals 
that this is larger when supply and demand curves are flatter, or employment 
changes more for any wage change. In other words, when demand and supply 
are more elastic.
Finally let us see how the burden of the introduced tax is shared between em-
ployees and employers. This is called tax incidence in the literature. We again 
stress that this is not about the legal split but about who is contributing to the 
tax revenue. It is easy to see in the figure that gross wages go up by w1gross – w0 
while net wages decline by w0 – w1net. We can easily see that their relative size 
depends on the relative slope of the supply and demand curves.
The elasticity of labour supply
Are there segments of the labour market which exhibit a significant supply elas-
ticity? The traditional labour economics literature analysing US data found 
essentially zero elasticity of hours worked with respect to wages11 (Pencavel, 
1986); i.e., wage changes lead to basically no changes in labour supply. Simi-
larly low elasticities were found in Hungarian data by Galasi and Nagy (2003) 
and in Czech data by Bicakova et al. (2006). The pioneering studies taking 
the nonlinearities of the tax system into account could find much higher elas-
ticities (Hausman, 1981), yet the methodology applied did not prove reliable 
enough. Subsequent studies could not show a significant effect of the tax sys-
tem on the labour supply of primary earners12 (Heckman, 1993, Blundell and 
MaCurdy, 1999). For secondary earners, however, multiple studies found ro-
bust and large effects, especially on the extensive margin (Eissa, 1995, Eissa 
and Liebman, 1996).
In Hungary, we can expect larger effects among the less educated, lower-in-
come, or otherwise disadvantaged workers. This is reinforced by the fact, as 
shown by Scharle (2005), that effective marginal tax rates are especially high 
for certain low ranges of earnings.13 The results of Benczúr et al. (2012) on 
11 The wage elasticity here is the 
ratio of the percentage change 
in hours worked or the propen-
sity to work and the percentage 
change in the wage.
12 By primary earners the lit-
erature basically means prime-
age men. Among them, labour 
market participation is close 
to complete, so their extensive 
margin (participation) decision 
is often ignored.
13 The labour market incentives 
embedded in the public pension 
system have been extensively 
analysed for Hungary. For exam-
ple, Cseres-Gergely (2005) found 
that the generous text treatment 
of pensions is a significant dis-
incentive for labour market 
activity, because net earnings 
decrease much less after retire-
ment than gross earnings.
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Hungarian data also show that taxes affect labour market activity especially 
in these groups. (We take a closer look at this question in Chapter 3.)
The elasticity of taxable income
Empirical studies took a significant turn when they started to look at the effects 
of income taxes not only on hours worked but on taxable income altogether. 
The seminal study of Feldstein (1995) on US data found very high elasticities, 
in excess of 1. This decreased with the refinement of the data and methodol-
ogy used, and the current consensus is around values of between 0.12 and 0.4 
(Gruber and Saez, 2002, Saez et al. 2012). Chapter 2 covers this literature in 
detail, adding the corresponding Hungarian estimates, and discussing the 
policy relevance of the results.
The impact of tax rates on taxable income has been in the focus of recent 
studies, because it is a sufficient statistic14 for the effects of the taxes: it encom-
passes the compound effect of all potential responses, be they more overtime, 
less tax evasion, more work effort, a quick training, or delayed child-bearing. 
Moreover because tax shocks are exogenous changes in the price of labour – in-
dependent of individual choices, demand and supply, and other unobserved 
factors –, more general studies of labour supply also turned to analyzing tax 
changes, and this literature is rich in methodological innovations. More and 
more, the studies use robust, nonparametric methods, extensive databases of 
all taxpayers over multiple years, with data collected and scrutinized for ad-
ministrative purposes.
Some types of responses can still be missing from the estimated response of 
taxable income. In what follows, we discuss two main cases, with two subcas-
es and main examples of each. All this is covered in more detail than above, to 
introduce the issues and approaches to the Hungarian audience.
Underestimated elasticities. First, one rarely observes collective responses, es-
pecially for changes that affect only a small fraction of taxpayers. The distor-
tionary costs of taxes could be summarized by the frictionless changes of labour 
supply, independent from any other constraint or factor – but factors such as 
labour demand, especially work organization and the labour supply of other 
colleagues do not allow full adaptation in the short run. The limited response 
of taxable income could mistakenly lead to an underestimation of the real costs 
according to true preferences. In the long run, with new collective agreements 
or job switches one could observe sharper, larger responses reflecting the true 
valuation of employees. This is shown by Chetty et al. (2011) for example, who 
document collective income movements following the shifts of tax brackets 
in Denmark. This coordination problem, similarly to the misunderstanding 
or the ignorance of taxes, is essentially a friction (a false rigidity), which can 
improve over time – or even spreading in space, as Chetty et al. (2012b) docu-
ment for the United States.
14 An excellent review of the sig-
nificance and widespread use 
of such measures of composite 
effects is given by Chetty (2009a).
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Both studies use the nonparametric methodology allowed by rich, “large 
datasets”, where the concentration of taxpayers around the kinks of their budget 
constraints (the spike in the density of earnings or taxpayers, bunching) helps 
to measure responses,15 or in the US case the salience of incentives. Saez (2010) 
derived that such concentrations are larger with more elastic responses: when 
workers are more sensitive to deviations from their expected effort, more of 
them would work more on the side of the kink that is taxed less, but less on 
the other side of the kink taxed more, thus the kink is the optimal choice for 
more people. The Danish study of Chetty et al. (2011) found that earnings con-
centrate around kinks of the majority of colleagues even for whom the kink 
would be somewhere else individually. The US study of Chetty et al. (2012) 
meanwhile identifies the local familiarity with the earned income tax credit by 
the degree of bunching of the self-employed who apparently adapt (or evade) 
conspicuously well.
Another example of frictions due to employers and co-workers comes from 
Saez et al. (2012), and goes against the theory of tax incidence discussed above. 
A Greek reform raised contributions only for a fraction of workers. One could 
expect that employers shifted the burden onto those affected, but this is not 
what happened: employers kept the burden of higher employer contributions 
for themselves, but shifted to workers in the case of higher employee contribu-
tions. It is a cautionary tale that norms of justice (discrimination at the work-
place or different gross wages being unacceptable) can override the most basic 
economic (incidence) expectations that we derived from individual incentives, 
even in such a transparent case. In a Hungarian example, this could mean that 
a subsidy of young mothers will not necessarily be shifted on raising their wages 
if the differentiation between mothers and their colleagues would prove too 
controversial or cumbersome.
Second, long-term responses are rarely observable, and on a short timescale 
of a study, adaptation to transaction costs could prevent responses from reflect-
ing true preferences. This is where Chetty (2012) has made progress when he 
looked at the information content of studies following large tax changes. He 
assumes that even an ignorant or inert employee, when facing large enough 
utility losses, would get over the frictions. The size of the tax change affects 
the cost of an imperfect response. Thus from every study we can infer what 
the true elasticities are that can correspond to the documented imperfect re-
sponses. According to Chetty (2012), among the estimates of the most influ-
ential studies of the last three decades, various though they may be, there is 
still an overlap for the underlying structural elasticities they allow: an inten-
sive margin compensated wage elasticity of 0.3 is consistent with most of the 
important results from the modern empirical literature. This can be seen as 
the new professional consensus according to the surveys of Saez et al. (2012) 
and Piketty and Saez (2013) as well.
15 Nonlinear budget constraints 
are treated in more detail in the 
review of Benczúr (2007).
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Adaptation costs might be the prime remaining rea-
son why one could still expect high social costs of 
taxation – even in spite of numerous studies find-
ing small responses and thus small costs from pre-
cise estimates in rich data, but only in the short run. 
Convincing measurements of the really long-run re-
sponses, like counterfactual careers or school choic-
es, still await even the international literature. Such 
calculations are only available from macroeconomic 
calibrations.
That said, long-run expectations about future 
taxes can have important effects in the short run, 
which is neglected even by the best available em-
pirical labour supply elasticity estimates – Kueng 
(2012) meanwhile calculates (surprisingly realistic) 
tax expectations from the spread between taxable 
and tax-exempt bonds, and documents significant 
forward-looking consumption responses to them.
The empirical literature of extensive margin elas-
ticities is reviewed by Chetty et al. (2012a). The study 
also tries to reconcile the results with the macroeco-
nomic literature of indivisible labour, which arrives 
at different elasticities from calibration. Because 
the extensive margin is more intimately related to 
decisions over the lifecycle (intertemporal substi-
tution), the dynamic treatment is appealing, hence 
the connection. Moreover, the substitution between 
time periods or risk aversion, which are so impor-
tant for finance or dynamic decisions, are similarly 
a function of the curvature of utility functions, as 
is the substitution between consumption and lei-
sure. This determines how quickly the marginal util-
ity of consumption is decreasing. This intimate but 
somewhat neglected connection has been exposed 
by Chetty (2006).
The long run, steady-state elasticity of labour sup-
ply corresponds to the compensated, Hicksian no-
tion, and the empirical results from individual-level 
studies of 0.3 on the intensive and 0.25 on the ex-
tensive margin are consistent with standard macro 
models. However, microempirical studies are also 
able to estimate Frisch elasticities, which incorpo-
rate intertemporal substitution, and the consensu-
al estimates of 0.5 on the intensive and 0.25 on the 
extensive margin are definitely smaller than what 
could explain the employment fluctuations over the 
business cycle in developed economies in current 
macro models.
Elasticities affected by the tax system. In two important cases, the tax system itself 
affects the size of elasticities. With precise and unbiased estimates on the latter, 
the elasticity of taxable income is a correct and sufficient statistic to evaluate 
the current tax system. It offers less guidance, however, on what effects, distor-
tions and costs we could expect from (thought) experiments of other reforms.
First, the tax system with its too narrowly defined rules can generate new, ar-
tificial, and often quite elastic responses: tax evasion, geographic mobility, or 
shifting income. In these cases, though studies correctly estimate the composite 
response, it is still not a sufficient statistic for assessing the damaging or distor-
tionary effect of another tax with fewer loopholes or better enforcement. A tax 
levied on a broader base, with fewer exemptions and deductions, which taxes 
easily transformable forms of income the same way, might be able to generate the 
previous levels of government revenue with smaller rates, and distortions would 
further decrease because the remaining responses show smaller elasticities.16
The (international) mobility of the wealthy and thus the amount of mobile 
income can be significant,17 though usually the emigration elasticity of the na-
tive rich is lower (~0.15) than that of immigrant foreigners (~1). This limits 
only tax systems with a significant number of wealthy immigrants. Kleven el 
16 A robust model and an em-
pirical calibration of such fiscal 
externalities of taxes is given by 
Piketty et al. (2011). Kopczuk 
(2005) showed empirically that 
the 1986 tax reform in the United 
States with its uniform rates and 
closing of loopholes led to a de-
crease of the measured elasticity 
of taxable income.
17 In this regard, Keen and Kon-
rad (2013) give a good review of 
the literature on international 
tax competition and coordina-
tion.
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al. (2012) document significant mobility for soccer players in Europe, while 
Kleven et al. (2011b) analyse a Danish immigrant tax exemption, and find very 
high tax elasticity of moving (1.5).
This phenomenon is similar to the fact that the relevant elasticity can be 
higher because of potential tax evasion or simple income shifting. This is now 
the mainstream interpretation of the estimates of Feldstein (1995): some of the 
large effects after the 1986 cut of American income taxes followed from the 
fact that labour was suddenly taxed less than capital income, which changed 
the form in which business-owners took value out of their company. Also, 
Goolsbee (2000) showed something similar for the 1993 US tax increase; that 
its apparent big effect came largely from the corporate executives in question 
rearranging their remuneration in the short run: they took their money out 
before the tax rise, which then implied surprisingly large income drops with 
the higher taxes.
Second, the salience of taxes (and benefits) is crucial: a misunderstood tax 
obviously has different effects than a clearly understood system. It is an impor-
tant lesson though, that the tax distortions can even decrease this way, and of 
course the corresponding elasticity estimates may also change accordingly. If 
labour supply drops less after a tax hike than if gross wages had decreased by 
the same amount, the distortionary costs of the tax are smaller (Chetty, 2009b). 
The worker would miss the lost income even after an ignored tax, yet the income 
effect is unavoidable even under an ideal sharing of the burden, and a forgot-
ten tax causes no deadweight loss on top of that. Of course, a misunderstand-
ing can also induce completely pointless responses (high elasticities), when 
the distortion is an unnecessary cost. A particularly important example for 
the latter can come from pension contributions. The closer a pension system 
resembles individual savings, i.e. the more direct is the perceived connection 
between in-payments and the present value of future benefits, the less there is 
for the worker to react to. Their performance, their value added can stay what 
they would choose according to their preferences and their productivity, hence 
efficient and just.18 Yet if the taxpayer thinks that their pension contribution is 
lost – or at least it is unrelated to their future benefits – they would work less, 
since the (perceived) returns to work decreased.19
The previously discussed concentration-bunching method has been advanced 
in this regard by Kleven and Waseem (2012). They measure and quantify igno-
rance, errors, or frictions from the extent that Pakistani employees reported 
earnings which no preferences could rationalize, because they could have taken 
home more pay with less work.
It is an important practical aside that relieving-solving informational prob-
lems can be a much cheaper way of guiding agents towards more efficient solu-
tions and choices than ramping up ill-understood incentives. Chetty and Saez 
(2013) conducted a field experiment among Americans eligible for the earned 
18 This is also the main argument 
for a French reform of Bozio and 
Piketty (2008).
19 Liebman, Luttmer and Seif 
(2009) document that incomes 
change significantly with pen-
sion benefit rules. On the con-
trary, Friedberg (2000) found 
significant effects even where 
American pensioners would 
have actually got back their 
benefits lost due to higher in-
come – which must have been 
a misunderstood, unnecessary, 
costly response.
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income tax credit, where they find that a cost-effective explanation had as large 
an effect on the next two years’ earnings as if they had increased the subsidy 
itself to a large extent.
Tax evasion
Tax evasion is important for all taxes, including labour income taxes. It is par-
amount to distinguish tax evasion, which breaks the rules explicitly, from tax 
avoidance, which follows the letter of the law, if not its spirit. The problem is 
not only that they decrease government revenues, but also that they distort 
the redistributive effects of the tax system in many ways. On the other hand, 
when the tax system prices out otherwise legitimate economy activity, it might 
be beneficial for social welfare if the transaction still takes place after some tax 
evasion.20
The canonical deterrence model says that tax evasion is driven by its rela-
tive return, i.e. how much one can save on the tax relative to paying it in full 
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). The real-world willingness to pay taxes cannot 
be completely explained by the probability of getting caught and penalties, as 
many more pay more taxes than what the standard model would predict. In 
the baseline model, however, the rational comparison of evaded taxes and ex-
pected penalties does not take into account social norms and interactions, like 
some respect for rules, some need for belonging and conformity, learning from 
others, or fairness.21 These factors can drive people towards paying more taxes, 
yet they can also prove a social cost of tax evasion: if the tax system is known 
to lead to evasion, the knowledge of rules being broken leads to losses of indi-
vidual utility and thus social welfare.
Indicators of redistribution
One of the main features of tax systems, and income taxes in particular, is 
their progressivity. This means that someone with a higher income contrib-
utes more to public funds. Chapter 2 discusses the connection between the 
earnings distribution and progressivity in more detail, but we lay down some 
general aspects here.
It is a general feature that the upper deciles of the income distribution, let it 
be labour or capital income, accrue a disproportionate share of total income.22 
This is not at all surprising: all members of the top 10% have incomes much 
larger than the average income, so their total income is bound to be more than 
the tenth of the population’s total income. This also means at the same time 
that a 1% increase in the economic activity of the top 10% will result in a much 
larger increase in total income than the same for the bottom 10%.
Measures of this disproportionality, which many say erode social welfare, can 
describe the entire distribution, like the Gini coefficient, or compare differ-
ent points of the distribution, like the ratio of the top 10% and the median. A 
20 Some elements of tax evasion 
waste resources (e.g. when we 
carry around cash needlessly, 
or we choose a product not re-
ally of our fancy), but this loss 
is captured by taxable income 
as a sufficient statistic. The lat-
ter can still be upwardly biased, 
towards excessively strong re-
sponses, if tax evasion did not 
fully destroy value added, it only 
transferred some income. A suf-
ficient statistic for the efficiency 
loss in this case has been derived 
by Chetty (2009c) and applied 
to the flat tax reform of Russia 
by Gorodnichenko et al. (2009), 
finding much smaller welfare 
gains from the f lat tax than 
what was apparent otherwise. 
The fiscal externalities of Piketty 
et al. (2011) can be interpreted 
similarly.
21 The canonical model also ig-
nores the issue of practical meth-
ods for tax evasion or hiding in-
come. In this regard, the finding 
of Kleven et al. (2011a) is espe-
cially interesting: in Denmark, 
employer-reported income data 
is much more reliable than self-
reports. According to their ex-
planation, at larger workplaces 
there is no stable equilibrium 
of hushing up and letting each 
other hide some income. Kumler 
et al. (2012) find something else 
for Mexico: in less developed 
countries even corporate income 
reports can be improved by bet-
ter incentivized reporting. In ad-
vanced economies, it was partly 
the result of technical progress 
that they could improve the in-
stitutional efficiency of the tax 
system by collecting reported 
earnings (resulting in smaller fis-
cal externalities and elasticities).
22 It is important to add that 
here we talk about the distribu-
tion of annual snapshots, and 
part of the big differences come 
from the lifecycle, temporary 
shocks, or the entry of more 
productive generations. This 
sheds a different light on these 
differences and how just they are.
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progressive tax system decreases inequality, yet it makes the distribution of tax 
payments even more disproportionate: in Hungary the top 10% of the income 
distribution has 35–38% of total income, but 55–59% of all tax receipts come 
from them (considering only earnings of employees, 2000–2010, see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 shows the evolution of the distribution of earnings and personal 
income tax contributions of Hungarian employees’, based on individual in-
come tax records from 2000 to 2010.23 The table confirms the unequal distri-
bution of both income and tax receipts: the bottom three deciles get roughly 
7–9% of income and pay 1–3.5% of personal income taxes,24 the income share 
of the middle five deciles is 38–42%, with a tax share of 16–19%. The ratio of 
the top 10% of incomes and the median income stayed roughly constant, be-
tween 2.5–3; while ratios involving the bottom 10% are unstable due to the 
cell size of the database.
23 As we mentioned before and 
will discuss in more detail in the 
next section, in the ideal case, 
the true distribution of goods 
could only be seen from a ho-
listic, systematic analysis of all 
income, all taxes, and all benefits. 
We cannot venture to do so here, 
yet we still think that this par-
tial information on the income 
distribution is still interesting 
news for most readers.
24 2004 and 2005 values are 
biased downward by the im-
precision of income cells in the 
database.
table 1.1: distribution of income from personal income tax records, 2000–2010  
(annual income, in thousand forints)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bottom three deciles
Income cut-off 405 505 585 595 575 625 775 875 925 925 925
Average income 261 349 336 391 341 365 495 541 550 551 539
Income share 8.01 9.15 6.99 8.31 4.97 5.03 8.58 7.81 7.67 7.98 8.01
Tax share 2.91 3.51 2.11 1.35 0.61 0.68 1.26 1.32 1.27 1.24 1.20
Middle five deciles
Income cut-off 1,150 1,350 1,550 1,850 1,925 2,125 2,275 2,475 2,625 2,575 2,575
Average income 751 872 950 1,109 1,088 1,184 1,359 1,498 1,582 1,572 1,588
Income share 38.84 38.33 40.04 40.44 42.53 41.89 39.24 41.05 41.36 41.01 40.29
Tax share 26.89 27.05 25.86 23.59 21.89 21.00 22.76 25.67 25.42 24.33 22.81
Ninth decile
Income cut-off 1,650 1,950 2,125 2,375 2,775 3,050 3,250 3,550 3,750 3,650 3,750
Average income 1,412 1,654 1,881 2,170 2,311 2,554 2,728 2,967 3,140 3,074 3,112
Income share 15.70 15.64 15.64 12.97 16.19 16.51 15.99 15.72 15.34 15.02 16.53
Tax share 17.33 17.29 17.85 16.00 19.71 19.63 19.29 18.85 18.66 18.13 17.11
Top decile
(Ceiling of 99th percentile) 4,875 5,500 5,500 6,500 7,750 8,250 9,250 9,750 10,250 10,250 10,250
Average income 3,170 3,720 4,128 4,512 5,189 5,747 6,131 6,566 6,930 6,788 6,939
Income share 37.45 36.88 37.33 38.28 36.31 36.57 36.18 35.41 35.63 35.99 35.17
Tax share 52.86 52.16 54.18 59.07 57.78 58.70 56.69 54.16 54.65 56.30 58.89
Inequality measures
p90/p50 2.48 2.55 2.59 2.73 2.85 2.98 2.89 2.78 2.83 2.75 2.83
p50/p10 2.96 2.59 2.88 2.95 3.55 3.73 3.46 3.00 3.53 3.53 3.53
p90/p10 7.33 6.61 7.46 8.05 10.09 11.09 10.00 8.35 10.00 9.73 10.00
Note: Thresholds can only be determined at 50,000 forint resolution for lower in-
comes, at 100,000 forints for higher incomes, and at 250,000 forints for the highest 
incomes. This introduces artificial fluctuations in inequality measures involving 
the bottom decile (p90/p10, p50/p10). In 2004 and 2005 there is particularly large 
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error in the cutoff for the bottom three deciles in all rows, and the middle five 
deciles’ average income, income share, average tax and tax share. The income share 
shows the fraction of total income the group has. The tax share shows how much of 
the sample’s total tax receipts come from the group. The annual average exchange 
rate was approximately 243–265 Forint per euro in years 2000–2008, 298 in 2009 
and 272 in 2010.
Source: The authors’ calculations, using APEH (NAV) data by income groups, for 
employees only.
The theory of optimal income taxation
All the previous concepts describing and evaluating tax systems lead us nat-
urally to the literature on optimal interventions and tax schedules. In what 
follows, we briefly summarize the theoretical results and guidelines most 
relevant to subsequent chapters of In Focus I.
The fundamental problem of income taxation
Members of a political community finance their public goods (such as pub-
lic safety or healthier and more educated neighbours) from their tax pay-
ments, which can alleviate free-riding problems and lead to higher public 
good consumption for all.25 Most citizens probably value this in excess of 
their individual contribution: the value created benefits all, while its cost 
can be pooled, spread, shared, and paid only once, so the generated value 
added is multiple. Because a unit of public funds can be reallocated one-
to-one independently from its payer (it is fungible), even without direct 
income transfers (a conspicuous form of redistribution), the question of 
sharing the burden optimally would still remain.26
The fundamental problem of the unequal burden (or just share) is that we 
have only imperfect observations of the characteristics underlying the ideal 
redistribution. If we only infer these characteristics from observed behav-
iour (value creation, consumption), we are bound to distort this behaviour. 
The canonical case is the following. We would like to put more of the bur-
den on people born of higher ability, but we can only differentiate between 
people according to the compound effect of ability and effort (i.e. earnings). 
As a result, we will also distort (hinder) efforts, which is needless and costly. 
Ideally, taxes would only differ by ability (with the inevitable, even efficient, 
income effects); all other solutions can be compared to this baseline. On the 
other hand, the substitution effect, due to the changing returns on effort (viz. 
marginal tax rates) is a pure loss.27
In the basic case, to establish an optimal income tax scheme, we only need 
a few major statistics. First, the empirical distribution of income,28 second, 
the social weighting of citizens of different ability, third, labour supply elas-
ticities at different income levels, which determine distortions (Diamond, 
1998; Saez, 2001; Diamond and Saez, 2011).29 Chapter 2 discusses these 
questions in detail.
25 Besley and Persson (2013) give 
an overview of the so-called fiscal 
capacity of political communities, 
and the proportionally bigger gov-
ernments that advanced economies 
can maintain.
26 The iron logic of fungible tax 
payments implies that any income 
tax scheme corresponds to social 
weights that could rationalize it 
from the empirical income distri-
bution and preferences (i.e. welfare 
inferred from elasticity estimates). 
This is how Saez and Stancheva 
(2012) endogenize social weights, 
in order to allow us to move for-
ward in tax reform dilemmas even 
without assuming a social welfare 
function, or just to describe what 
social preferences and weighted 
individual marginal uti l it ies 
could correspond to existing tax 
schedules.
27 A magisterial review of the re-
cent literature is given by Piketty 
and Saez (2013), always paying at-
tention to link the theory of opti-
mal (but realistic) tax and benefit 
schemes to empirics. They also 
discuss tax evasion and income 
shifting, international migration, 
and rent seeking, with special at-
tention to issues of relative incomes, 
the taxation of couples and children, 
as well as in-kind benefits. Finally 
the authors summarize which non-
utilitarian alternatives we might 
move towards from the clashes 
between utilitarian conclusions 
and practice, intuition or consensus.
28 It is essential to know how many 
people would be affected by a tax 
rate change at a given income level, 
and how large changes for how 
many people would be allowed by 
a revenue-neutral change elsewhere.
29 Lockwood and Weinzierl (2012) 
make a remarkable aside: if some 
income differentials reflect differ-
ences in preferences (e.g. like in-
grained drive), which the political 
community would respect (and not 
punish those who value material 
goods more and leisure less than 
others, e.g.), then the canonical 
recommendation would yield a too 
progressive tax schedule.
Werning (2007) conducts a useful 
exercise instead of solving the utili-
tarian optimization program: he 
derives robust tests of the minimum 
requirements of Pareto efficiency 
for tax schedules, with flat taxes as 
a special case.
in Focus – i. taxes, transFers and laBour market
62
The tax base
It is a valid question why an unequal burden (a just split) is practical and com-
mon to accomplish by the taxation of income in particular. While incomes are 
relatively easy to register and aggregate by person, the purchase-by-purchase 
taxation of consumption would make it really cumbersome to levy different 
burdens on different transactions. This is why it is recommended to tie the un-
equal burden to incomes, with income taxes.30 Because tax law can rarely dis-
tinguish goods the way the proposed redistribution (burden sharing) requires 
to distinguish their consumers, it is usually hopeless to achieve just redistri-
bution with differential taxation of goods and services.31 All in all, its admin-
istrative advantages32 notwithstanding, value-added or consumption taxes 
(even with multiple rates) are unable to differentiate to a large extent, let alone 
aligned with the aims of the political community33 (see Chapter 6 of Mirrlees 
et al. 2011, and Scharle et al. 2010).
The connection between earnings on the one hand and the most important 
characteristics for redistribution on the other is imperfect but tight and well 
documented in modern states. In comparison, even the most advanced bureau-
cracies do not link consumption data to citizens. Even in the realm of incomes, 
the state makes insufficient effort to link incomes with taxes and benefits, and 
the political community barely knows how it shares its burden and goods. The 
Mirrlees Review also recommends wholeheartedly the joint treatment of tax-
es and benefits, not only for administration but also for design and planning 
(Chapter 5 of Mirrlees et al. 2011). The linking should start with the registration 
of data already collected and opening it up for research (on databases already 
available in Hungary, see the Appendix of this chapter). Yet it would also be 
important to document transfers and in-kind benefits throughout the lifecycle.
Another classic question of the tax base concerns family taxation. If spouses 
share resources, including their income, this cannot be neglected by a just and 
efficient tax system either. Among corresponding optimal tax recommenda-
tions, the work of Kleven et al. (2009) stands out. It shows that observing the 
spouse’s income on top of one’s own improves the inference on ability. The 
solution also depends on whether two-earner families differ mainly by hav-
ing lower fixed costs on the second earner’s market work. This would justify 
a higher marginal burden on two-earner families, though to an extent which 
is declining in the income of the first earner. This actually lines up well with 
widespread practice of individual taxation, as in the United Kingdom, where 
joint family income is the basis for (means-tested) benefits, which are then 
faced out gradually. Since second earners’ labour supply elasticity is higher 
empirically, they should still face lower average tax rates.
On the empirical side, Gelber (2012) conducted a thorough study of earn-
ings reacting to a spouse’s income and taxes. Investigating a large-scale Swed-
30 It is important to keep in 
mind that the main difference 
between the literature of opti-
mal income taxes and optimal 
commodity taxes lies in the con-
vention that the latter only as-
sumes linear taxes with a single 
rate, while the problems of the 
former have always been more 
general, according to practice.
31 An exception could be the case 
of categorically distinguished 
luxury taxes, yet they cannot be 
expected to significantly change 
the share of the burden.
32 Pomeranz (2011) documents 
how the self-controlling, en-
forcing effect of value-added 
taxes spreads upwards in sup-
ply chains.
33 Kaplow (2011), in his com-
ments on the Mirrlees Review, 
also uses the example of a uni-
form value added tax to high-
light how right the authors were 
to argue for efficiency improv-
ing reforms in a redistribution-
neutral fashion. In a systematic, 
holistic approach a reshuffling 
of income taxes and monetary 
transfers can always implement 
an arbitrary redistribution of 
resources.
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ish reform, he found that a compensated tax cut would have (substitution) 
effects increasing both spouses’ earnings. Yet he also points out that sim-
pler measurements (not taking compensating changes or simply using to-
tal family income) would overestimate these elasticities; it is not true that 
for a spouse the other’s earning would simply count as unearned income.
Taxes on capital income (e.g. interest, dividend or corporate taxes) distort 
choices between time periods, and as taxes on an important intermedi-
ate good, they needlessly distort production too (Diamond and Mirrlees, 
1971a, 1971b).34 This can be necessary only if higher ability people save more 
(probably because of self-control or patience) at any income level.35 The dis-
tortion from capital taxes is enormous (Chamley, 1986, Judd, 1985), since 
such a tax leaves a compounding burden year over year on the same initial 
saving, eventually taxing infinitely the creation of this useful factor of pro-
duction (initially saving and then accumulation).36 This is why economic 
theory prefers the taxation of consumption instead of savings-inclusive 
labour earnings or total income. A tax on consumption (or expenditure) 
does not need to be linear or proportional though: only a tax collected on 
purchases (e.g. a VAT) needs to take the same proportion on each unit and 
consumer for administrative reasons. But a conventional income tax could 
also be viewed as a consumption tax if savings were tax exempt: then the 
remaining (spent) income can still be taxed individually, even progressively 
(see Chapters 13 and 14 of Mirrlees et al. 2011).37
It is particularly relevant to the labour market effects of the tax system 
that human capital accumulation is similarly punished by conventional la-
bour income taxes.38 Best and Kleven (2012) also showed that allowing for 
learning and human capital investment results in a less progressive optimal 
tax system. Remarkably, they recommend age-dependent tax rates and an 
easier burden on older workers for the same reason. Gelber and Weinzierl 
(2012), however, derive and calibrate opposite results because of the inter-
generational nature of this accumulation: even at the cost of larger redis-
tribution and static distortions it is beneficial to incentivize the investment 
in the skills of children in low-income families.39
Distinctions beyond income?
We can give two main justifications for differential taxation (in addition 
to income). First, more directly, the political community can deem other 
types of differential burdens just. For instance, it can support values or pref-
erences on top of ability; like certain consumption bundles (merit goods), 
rural residence, or childbearing.40 Nonetheless, the tax authority is just as 
unlikely to observe the other characteristic perfectly, thus the inference or 
filtering problems become multidimensional, which can be rather compli-
cated and counterintuitive.
34 More generally, the recommenda-
tion is uniform intermediate taxation.
35 The general argument of Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1976) has been adapted 
to this case by Saez (2002) and recent-
ly calibrated by Golosov et al. (2012).
36 Saez (2013) makes an important 
clarification though. A progressive 
capital income tax would only tax 
large incomes highly until they fall 
back to the tax-exempt bracket. This 
implies no infinite burden. Such 
capital taxes can have a place in an 
optimal tax system (even without the 
lump-sum redistribution of initial 
wealth).
It is still an empirical question wheth-
er capital accumulation responds 
to this distorted price. Long-term 
measurement is very difficult. Piketty 
and Saez (2012) rationalize capital 
taxes with expecting small responses 
in reality.
37 Or a progressive tax system en-
tirely on labour can still be equivalent 
to such a system, if we can determine 
the fraction of returns to capital that 
depended on effort (like the profit 
of small enterprises being labour 
income). Feldstein (2012) argues 
against the tax on “consumed income” 
preferred by Mirrlees et al. (2011) with 
its more complicated accounting.
38 Equally for physical as well as hu-
man capital, it would be paramount 
to separate pure interest from returns 
to effort, both at times of investment 
and later. Effort generates original 
income and should be taxed by labour 
income taxes.
39 Kopczuk (2013) reviews inherit-
ance and related taxes. Piketty and 
Saez (2012) discuss capital taxes jus-
tified as annuities on redistributed 
wealth that would compensate for 
the good or bad luck of more or less 
generous forebears.
40 Distinction not by need (e.g. 
sickness) or resources (e.g. income, 
wealth) but by some choice is often 
labeled paternalistic. For in-kind 
benefits, these are sometimes de-
fensible as corrections of externali-
ties or so-called internalities. It is an 
internality for example if the citizen, 
admitting his own frailty and igno-
rance, wishes to substitute for his 
self-control with mandatory savings 
of the pension system or compulsory 
schooling. For more detail on this, see 
Bernheim (2013) on the applications 
of behavioral economics to public 
economics.
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Second, some other observable characteristics can simply help with the origi-
nal inference problem: if other information (gender, age, or height) can make 
the inference from income to ability more precise, only practical reasons can 
justify their negligence.41 The filtering problem can be improved in two differ-
ent cases. First, if the observable factor drives changes in the ability distribu-
tion, e.g. the labour market values the skills of the middle-aged or tall people 
more highly. Second, if different preferences change how the same skills will 
be turned into earnings in different groups, e.g. mothers of young children, 
the elderly, or the disabled are more sensitive to income in giving up their lei-
sure, and thus have a more elastic labour supply. This kind of tagging can be so 
efficient that the main question of this literature is why the state does not use 
it more.42 Labour market effects can be seen as the mirror image of the same 
reasoning: without this optimal tagging, some people work too much, while 
others work too little.
Abilities also change sharply over one’s career. This has been discussed more 
boldly in the literature, perhaps because most of us visit both the peaks and 
troughs sooner or later. The canonical model of optimal income taxation 
(Mirrlees, 1971) is static, and can at best correspond to taxing overall lifetime 
earnings differentially. But for the calibration of such a system, short-term 
measurements are misleading. Not only are measurements of such responses 
(thus elasticities, thus preferences) dubious, lifetime incomes are simply rarely 
collected; so they could not constitute a tax base in practice, nor could their 
distribution help calibrate an admittedly imperfect annual income tax system. 
Though it has been  know since Vickrey (1939) that the current annual income 
tax system is not neutral in the timing of earned income (e.g. it underincentiv-
izes work over shorter careers), this is a significant distortion even today: a time-
neutral tax could have 11% less deadweight loss (Liebman, 2003). Moreover, 
savings can help to game the annual income tax system at older ages – or as a 
precaution, society is bound to design a weaker filter, a less efficient tax system. 
Meanwhile, earning abilities genuinely change over one’s lifetime, and some 
insurance against career risks would surely be valuable.43 Early retirement or 
disability insurance is already one form of this; its current forms though are 
ripe with perverse incentives.44
Among the most important proposals, Farhi and Werning (2011) approxi-
mate an optimal earnings history-dependent income tax system with one where 
labour taxes change with earnings and consumption (saving). Their impor-
tant finding is that a simple age- (but still not history-) dependent labour and 
capital income tax scheme can be a fairly good approximation to the optimal 
system, while still offering significant welfare improvements over the current 
practice. Even more, the relatively high (optimal) capital taxes they derive have 
only second-order benefits relative to those of age-dependent correction of la-
bour taxes. The biggest welfare gain relative to a simple tax system would come 
41 The line continues with the 
income or wealth of family mem-
bers, or age.
42 The moral reasoning for the 
absence of tagging have been 
translated into a transparent 
economic model by Weinzierl 
(2012). Here the political com-
munity also puts some weight 
on the principle of equal sacri-
f ice (originating at least from 
John Stuart Mill), not only on 
utilitarianism, thence only the 
obviously informative tags im-
plying significant productivity 
loss (disability, blindness, old 
age) will be used, weaker ones 
(height, gender, skin color) not. 
Without this, the standard utili-
tarian social welfare function 
would yield a so-called inverse 
Euler equation: all distinguish-
able groups should have their 
expected value of the reciprocals 
of marginal utility of consump-
tion equalized – which is just the 
cost of increasing the utility of 
each group.
43 On the reasons and recom-
mendations for dynamic taxes, 
see the review of Diamond and 
Werning (2013).
44 Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) 
calculated significant welfare 
gains from means-tested dis-
ability benefits.
mónika Bálint: Hungarian dataBases...
65
from an upward-sloping age profile of personal income tax rates. Though the 
authors of the Mirrlees Review would only tag because of different elasticities, 
an age-dependent tag is their only recommended complication too: an extra 
lower rate for the young and those before retirement in an otherwise simple 
(broad-based, low-rate) tax proposal (Chapters 3 and 4 of Mirrlees et al. 2011).
Finally, we need to mention an important spatial effect of taxation, the dis-
tortion of amenity levels and corresponding mobility rates and house prices 
(Albouy, 2009). Because income taxes are uniform in nominal income within 
a country, the local price level introduces differences in the real burden, which 
can be not only unjust, but also represent a costly distortion of real estate prices 
and residential choice.45 What is more, uniform taxation of real earnings (some 
cost indexation) would not be a perfect solution either: it would not overtax 
productivity differences in space anymore, but undertax regions which are 
recognised as having lower real wages because of their more pleasant environ-
ment. Albouy (2009) calculates that the welfare losses of the current system 
can be as much as 0.23% of incomes; though it is questionable how relevant 
this calculation is for Hungary.46
AppEndix
Hungarian databases used for empirical research
Mónika Bálint
The state covers most of its expenses through the collection of taxes. Taxation 
changes the behaviour of economic actors (it has an impact on labour demand 
and supply, consumption and saving) and re-allocates income between differ-
ent groups. The implications of changes in taxation and welfare provisions are 
complex: they are best quantified by empirical research using micro-level data. 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the characteristics of databases with 
individual-level data, their analytical possibilities, limitations and accessibility.
Data from personal income tax returns, National Tax  
and Customs Administration
According to the provisions of Act CXVII of 1995 on personal income, in 
Hungary individuals must declare their income to the tax authorities each 
year, using the form xx53.47 The income tax database of the National Tax and 
Customs Administration (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal, NAV, 
before 2010: Tax and Financial Control Administration, in Hungarian: Adó- 
és Pénzügyi Ellenőrzési Hivatal, APEH). includes information from tax re-
turn forms – in the same format – namely: personal identification (sex, date 
of birth, place of residence), total income (combined tax base), tax liability on 
45 Free choice of residence is a 
key issue of urban public finance, 
reviewed by Glaeser (2013).
46 Albouy’s US results might be 
hard to extrapolate to Hungary, 
due to larger mobility in the US. 
Yet with the wide range of urban 
and rural final goods and real 
estate prices, it still seems imagi-
nable that the uniform nominal 
tax and benefit system generates 
mobility which significantly re-
arranges the labour market. And 
the tax treatment (exemption) 
of owner-occupied homes (the 
implicit rent) distorts housing 
demand, while building regu-
lation affects housing supply: 
both distort real estate prices 
and mobility.
47 “xx” indicates the last two 
digits of the tax year for which 
the tax return was submitted.
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the combined tax base, any deductions and allowances reducing tax liability on 
the combined tax base, other data, tax liability for the given year, calculation 
of public contributions (simplified contributions), any overpayment of health 
care or pension contributions, and special tax payments.48
The advantages of the database compared to survey-type databases is that it 
includes all tax payers – in this case 4.3–4.6 million people49 – and therefore 
with the appropriate sampling techniques it is possible to obtain an unbiased 
sample. Using the tax and the social insurance numbers – which identify each 
individual tax payer – it is possible to create longitudinal datasets by integrat-
ing data from various tax years or even integrating different databases that use 
the same identification (such as contribution payments, family and other ben-
efits etc.) (Benedek, 2008).
Limitations, disadvantages. The fact that the database is based on self-re-
ported information and does not have any information on amendments by 
the taxpayer or amendments following an inspection by the NAV makes data 
cleaning for the study of behavioural implications more difficult and it might 
bias results when computing real income. A further limitation is that the tax 
return forms provide no information about the occupation or the industry of 
the tax ayer (only the self-employed are required to indicate this), and it is not 
possible to identify employment that lasted less than a year. Forms prior to 2008 
did not include information about gender; the tax authority addressed this by 
adding a new variable that deducted gender using the first name (however this 
did not provide complete coverage). Another disadvantage of the database is 
that it does not show the real income of tax payers: it only includes taxable in-
come that is reported to the authorities. Furthermore it does not provide in-
formation about the characteristics of families or households (Benedek, 2008).
Access. Before Act CI of 2007 (on access to data) personal income tax data 
was not easily accessible. Although the Ministry of Finance (in Hungarian: 
Pénzügyminisztérium, PM), as a supervisory body, usually had access to the 
requested information, nevertheless it was not possible to integrate the in-
formation with data from other sources (Benedek, 2008). However the Act 
strengthened the rights of those requesting data and it stipulated that data 
must be made available for impact assessment and research aimed at facilitat-
ing decision-making. In the case of databases covering the whole population, 
the maximum size of the sample can be one half of the total population and 
once information has become public data, it must be freely available to anyone. 
The dataset used by Kiss and Mosberger (2011) will soon be available from the 
National Info-communication Agency (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Infokom-
munikációs Szolgáltató Zrt., NISZ); however other datasets have not yet been 
turned into public data.
Publications using the NAV database. Bakos, Benczúr and Benedek (2008) 
examined the impact of average and marginal tax rates on the elasticity of in-
48 Based on the tax return form 
for 2011.
49 Source in Hungarian: NAV.
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come – and in the same study – assessed the potential implications of the in-
troduction of a flat-rate tax system. The study used a five per-cent sample of in-
come tax returns submitted for the tax year 2004, and merged this with 2005 
tax return information for each individual in the sample. Kiss and Mosberger 
(2011) assessed the impact of the “extraordinary tax” introduced in 2007 on 
the taxable income of high earners using income tax data from NAV: out of the 
total population of tax payers in 2005 they selected a 10% sample – excluding 
the self-employed – and integrated this with data from 2006–2008. Benedek 
and Kiss (2011) integrated a 10% random sample of income tax returns from 
2008 with the Household Monitor Survey (in Hungarian: Háztartásmoni-
tor-felvétel) of Tárki and used a microsimulation method to estimate the im-
pact and cost of tax reform measures. Benedek and Scharle (2006), Benedek 
and Lelkes (2005) and Ecostat (2009) also applied microsimulation methods 
using income tax databases.
Household Budget and Living Conditions Survey,  
Hungarian Central Statistical Office
The history of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s Household Budget 
and Living Conditions Survey (in Hungarian: KSH Háztartási költségvetési és 
életkörülmények adatfelvétel, HKÉF)50 goes back to many decades: until 1983 
it was carried out on a yearly basis, then every odd year between 1983–1993, 
and again yearly since 1993. The HKÉF is a representative survey of Hungarian 
households and aims to provide information about – financial and in-kind – 
income and expenditure. Thus the survey provides a wide range of informa-
tion about work, social and capital income, as well as the amount and value of 
goods and services consumed by households. However it has limited informa-
tion about educational attainment, economic activity and even more limited 
information about savings, indebtedness and wealth. The datasets – depend-
ing on the year – contain information about 20–26 thousand individuals liv-
ing in 7.5–10 thousand households. Data is collected using a retrospective in-
terview and a diary or log method. Since 1993 approximately one third of the 
households in the sample is replaced each year (however in practice this does 
not always happen), therefore about one third or one fourth of the households 
remains in the survey for three years (Molnár, 2011).
Limitations, disadvantages. The survey does not include marginal groups (the 
homeless, the poorest and the richest) therefore the database in its “raw” form 
does not provide a complete and accurate picture of the whole income distri-
bution. Some economic and social changes had negative implications for the 
validity of HKÉF, both in terms of response rates and underreporting of in-
come and in some cases consumption. When working with the data, it must be 
taken into account that young people, Budapest residents, people with higher 
50 Until recently KSH used the 
title Household Budget Survey 
(HBS in Hungarian: KSH Ház-
tartási költségvetési adatfelvétel, 
HKF).
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education, the economically active and the self-employed are under-represent-
ed in the sample. People of pension age, pensioners and the unemployed are 
over-represented (Molnár, 2011).
Access. Anonymous datasets can be obtained from the KSH for research pur-
poses or accessed in the HCSO’s research room51 following registration and 
approval of the data request.
Publications using the HKÉF. Cserháti et al. (2007, 2009), and then Benedek, 
Elek and Szabó (2009) and Benczúr et al. (2011) used the database for micro-
simulation modelling. Benczúr et al. (2012) used it for a structural labour sup-
ply model.
Integration of databases managed by the Central Administration of 
National Pension Insurance, National Health Insurance Fund, the 
Hungarian State Treasury, and the National Labour Office (Ministry 
for National Economy; Institute of Economics, Research Centre for 
Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
The relevant data integration was initiated by the Ministry of Finance (in Hun-
garian: Pénzügyminisztérium; the predecessor of the Ministry for National 
Economy, in Hungarian: Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium, NGM): a sample 
of 200,000 individuals was selected from the 2001 Population Census that 
included information on gender, age and place of residence, then using these 
parameters a random sample was selected from the Social Insurance Num-
ber database of the National Health Insurance Fund (in Hungarian: Orszá-
gos Egészségpénztár, OEP). Then using anonymous codes data on the use of 
health services, sick leave and child care allowance52 from the databases of the 
OEP, data on employment history, income and pension from the database 
of the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance (in Hungar-
ian: Országos Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság, ONYF) and information on 
child care benefit,53 maternity allowance54 and child benefit were linked. The 
sample includes longitudinal data from 200,000 individuals for the period 
between 2000–2007 (Elek et al. 2008).
The Institute of Economics (the predecessor of the Research Centre for Eco-
nomic and Regional Studies, in Hungarian: Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tu-
dományi Kutatóközpont, KRTK) proposed the creation of a database that 
covered less information, however with a larger sample size than the database 
of the Ministry of Finance for research on labour market forecasting in 2010. 
The sample was selected by the OEP from the Social Insurance Number data-
base using random sampling: the sample consisted of half of the total popula-
tion aged between 15–74 years in 2002. The dataset created by the OEP con-
tains demographic information, the code for health insurance status and its 
duration, duration of any benefits or services and their code for the period of 
51 KSH research room.
52 This is a contribution-based 
maternit y pay that can be 
claimed up to the second birth-
day of the child.
53 Contribution-based benefit 
paid for the first six months of 
the maternity leave.
54 This is a universal benefit that 
can be claimed up to the third 
birthday of the child.
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2000–2009. The dataset from ONYF includes, in addition to demographic in-
formation, pension qualifying service (code and duration), any periods without 
contribution payment and occupation groups (in Hungarian: FEOR). Infor-
mation from the job seekers’ register of the National Labour Office (in Hun-
garian: Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal, NMH) as well as data on unemployment 
assistance and information on family benefits (child care allowance etc.) and 
the number of children from the Hungarian State Treasury (in Hungarian: 
Magyar Államkincstár, MÁK) were integrated in the database.
Limitations, disadvantages. Research possibilities are limited by the fact that 
information on educational attainment is only available for the unemployed 
and the FEOR code (from which information on education could be inferred 
to some extent) is missing for people with certain status codes. The reliability 
of the databases is somewhat compromised by the fact that different datasets 
– or sometimes even the same dataset – provide inconsistent information about 
individuals, and these problems cannot always be resolved. A further uncer-
tainty in the analysis is that the dataset of the OEP contains information about 
many insurance relationships that have already ended, but without informa-
tion concerning their end date. Finally, the usability of the KRTK dataset is 
also limited by the fact that the sample has not been supplemented since its 
creation and it has no information about those aged under 15 or over 75 years.
A disadvantage of the KRTK dataset compared to the dataset of the Minis-
try of Finance is that while the latter had information about the children for 
whom family benefits were claimed, the KRTK dataset computed the num-
ber of children from eligibility for child benefit at a given time point that is 
not reliable due to the algorithm used. The OEP databases have only included 
all people claiming contribution-based maternity allowances since after 2006.
Finally, the possibility of the renewal of datasets is limited by the law: it is 
not possible to link additional data to anonymous dataset, therefore to extend 
data longitudinally sampling and the resource-intensive data cleaning must 
be repeated.
Access. The Ministry of Finance’s database can be accessed through the 
Ministry for National Economy, the successor of the Ministry of Finance. 
In order to access the database approval must be obtained from the head of 
the Department for Macroeconomy in the State Secretariat for Taxation 
and Financial Policy Affairs. The “raw” KRTK database can be accessed by 
anyone through the National Info-communication Agency. The cleaned 
version is available from the Data Bank of KRTK – as a general rule for col-
laborative research projects with KRTK staff and upon approval by the di-
rector of the Data Bank.
Publications using institutional databases and areas for future research. The 
aim of the creation of the Ministry of Finance’s database was to assess the tar-
geting of social insurance assistance. Moreover – due to its panel structure 
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which provides longitudinal information about individuals over a period of 
6–8 years – it is also suitable for the analysis of the flow between different la-
bour market statuses, eligibility for different assistance and their relationship 
(Scharle, 2008). Furthermore, information about the total taxable income 
also makes it suitable for the analysis of income distribution and trends in in-
dividuals’ wages. Compared to other administrative databases, the main ad-
vantage of the ONYF database is that it not only provides information about 
people who have worked for at least one day regardless of the duration of the 
total employment period; however, information about the duration of employ-
ment also allows the computation of the average number of people in employ-
ment on any given day.
Comparing the data of those employed lawfully with population surveys – us-
ing a discrepancy method – it is possible to estimate the prevalence and char-
acteristics of grey and black employment (see for example: Augusztinovics and 
Köllő, 2007, and Chapter 6). In addition the KRTK database, due to its large 
size, is especially suitable for the selection and analysis of smaller sub-samples 
(for example to study the impact of the duration of labour market statuses on 
income/transfers).
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2. thE ELAsticity oF tAxAbLE incomE
Péter Benczúr, Áron Kiss & Pálma Mosberger
The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, it surveys the relevant internation-
al literature, focusing on its most policy relevant aspects. Second, it reviews 
the results of two previous estimations of the elasticity of taxable income us-
ing Hungarian data (Bakos et al. 2008, Kiss and Mosberger, 2011). Finally, it 
investigates how the estimated elasticities can be used in simulations of the 
“optimal tax system”.
The state of the international literature
The original literature
The literature on the elasticity of taxable income was initiated by the seminal 
paper of Feldstein (1995) analyzing the 1986 US tax reform. Saez et al. (2012) 
provide a review of the development of the literature. The elasticity of taxable 
income is the parameter that quantifies by how much an individual’s taxable 
income increases if their marginal net-of-tax rate (their “tax price” or 1 mi-
nus the marginal tax rate) increases by one percent. While Feldstein’s results 
suggested that this parameter can exceed one, later works like that by Gruber 
and Saez (2002) suggest that the elasticity is most likely to be around 0.4 for 
the United States. It is worth noting that calculations by Kiss and Mosberger 
(2011) suggest that an elasticity of 0.4 in Hungary would imply that an in-
crease in the actual top personal income tax rate in 2010 would have resulted 
in decreased tax revenue, that is, Hungary would have been on the “wrong 
side” of the Laffer curve.
The major part of the literature, following Feldstein (1995), uses variants of 
the “difference-in-differences” method to estimate the elasticity of taxable in-
come. His study was the first to use anonymous individual income tax returns 
to analyse whether the taxable income of groups who experienced the most 
significant tax cut grew at the highest rate. The methodology saw improve-
ments in proportion to the quantity and quality of available data: Auten and 
Carroll (1999), and Gruber and Saez (2002) conducted a regression analysis 
comparing individuals rather than raw group means, and were able to control 
for demographic characteristics of individual taxpayers. Still, their method, 
like Feldstein’s, is based on the difference-in-differences methodology focused 
on whether taxpayers who are affected differently by the tax reform also show 
a differential response.
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The difference-in-differences method would work ideally in an experimen-
tal setup: in that case, the researcher would divide the sample randomly into 
a treated group and a control group in a way that the two groups are perfectly 
indistinguishable from each other before treatment. When assessing tax re-
forms we can almost never reach this ideal setup because the tax system always 
differentiates between taxpayers based on observable criteria.
When, for instance, the researcher estimates the effects of the introduction 
of a new tax bracket by comparing the change of the behaviour of taxpayers 
above and below the relevant income threshold, one can raise the criticism that 
taxpayers in both groups behave differently simply due to their original income 
differences: the group above the threshold behaves differently because they 
had a higher income in the first place. The literature formulates this criticism 
in terms of two econometric issues. The first issue is “regression to the mean”, 
which is thought to affect mostly taxpayers with very high (or very low) income. 
In every year, some of the high-income individuals are just experiencing a one-
time windfall, which is most likely be followed by a decrease in income in the 
following year. It is possible that the income growth of two income groups 
differ only because of this phenomenon and not because of the different tax 
changes affecting them. The second econometric issue (having the opposite 
effect) occurs if the income distribution becomes more dispersed due to the 
nature of economic-technological developments and we wrongly attribute 
this development to a tax reform. The literature, following Auten and Carroll 
(1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002), deals with this problem by including (log) 
initial income (i.e., taxable income in the period before the tax change) as a 
control variable in the regression explaining income growth. This method, at 
least in principle, properly deals with gradual changes in the income distribu-
tion as well as gradual differences between groups related to the phenomenon 
of regression to the mean.
There is another reason why the analysis of tax reforms does not conform to 
the ideal experimental setup: individuals can switch from the control group to 
the treated group, and vice versa, as a consequence of their decisions or chance. 
This happens if a low-income tax payer becomes a high-income taxpayer (or the 
other way round) independently from the changes in the tax code. Such events 
are common as taxpayers get promoted, switch jobs, move, or experience oth-
er changes in their work conditions due to reasons unrelated to tax reforms. 
These switches between the treated and control groups introduce a bias into 
the estimation procedure. If an individual’s income increases and, due to this 
fact, a higher tax rate applies to them, then we may wrongly conclude that their 
income increased as a consequence of the higher tax rate. The literature solves 
this so-called “reverse-causality problem” by using the instrumental-variable 
(IV) estimation procedure. The instruments are constructed by applying the 
after-change tax rules to the individual’s original income (inflated by the av-
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erage wage growth). This tax rate, based on the so called “synthetic income”, 
is only dependent on the changes of the tax system and not on the taxpayers’ 
random income fluctuations or decisions.
Although the literature – including the two studies on Hungary we present 
in detail – typically uses the difference-in-differences estimation method, it 
is worth breafly summarizing a second method that employs a different strat-
egy. (A third type of strategy which uses “kink points” and “notches” of the 
tax function to identify the elasticity will be discussed later on in the chap-
ter.) This second estimation methodology is based on the simple statistic of 
the share of total income earned by the top one (or five) percent of taxpayers. 
If this statistic is available for a long time period then it can be related to the 
marginal tax rate of top earners during this period. In the United States, for 
example, the top one percent earned an almost constant 8 percent of total in-
come during the period before 1980. The income share of the top one percent 
started to increase during the period of two tax reforms that decreased the 
marginal tax rates for top earners during the Reagan administration to reach 
12 percent of total income by 1990. This, as Saez et al. (2012, p. 19) highlight, 
is an indirect, but quite persuasive argument for the existence and significance 
of the taxable income elasticity.
Studies using this methodology cannot ignore the question of how the top in-
come share would have evolved if the tax system had remained unchanged. The 
importance of this question can be well illustrated with an example from the 
US: top marginal tax rates were increased during the Clinton administration 
but top income shares continued to climb in the 1990’s following a temporary 
drop, reaching 16 percent in 2000. Saez et al. (2012) show that the method of 
controlling for the time trend significantly affects the estimated elasticity: the 
time-series method, without controlling for the trend, gives a parameter esti-
mate of 1.7 while the estimate is only 0.6–0.8 when the trend is controlled for.
Saez and Veall (2005) obtain a high elasticity parameter (0.8–1) by apply-
ing the same time series method to eight decades of Canadian data. The inter-
esting result of the paper is that they obtain a much lower elasticity (approx. 
0.3–0.5) when they include as an explanatory variable the top income share 
in the United States. According to the authors it is possible that the surge in 
top incomes in Canada in the last decades of the 20th century was influenced 
by similar developments in the US, due to the threat of the brain drain: firms 
may have had to offer higher wages in some specific occupations in Canada to 
prevent workers from taking up work in the US.
Another version of the top income share method gives a different answer 
to the question of what benchmark the growth in the top income share can 
be compared to. Brewer et al. (2008) analyse the development of top income 
shares and its relationship with tax changes on four decades of British data. 
Their study compares the income share of the top one percent to the income 
Benczúr, kiss & mosBerger: tHe elasticity oF taxaBle income
77
share of the next four percent (taxpayers belonging to the 95th to 99th percen-
tiles) taking into account the respective tax rates of both groups. The estimat-
ed elasticity is 0.46 (approximately one-third lower than estimated without a 
control group). This method is accurate only if we can assume that the income 
share of the top one percent and the next four would have increased at an equal 
rate absent any tax changes. If technological change favoured the top one per-
cent compared to the other high earners, then the estimation will be biased 
upwards (Saez et al. 2012).
Other countries
Following the seminal papers analyzing US data, a large number of estima-
tions have been conducted on other countries. In most countries the esti-
mated elasticity of taxable income is lower compared to the parameter esti-
mated for the United States. Most economists think this is due to differences 
between the tax systems rather than differences in preferences or behaviour 
between countries.
The argument that the elasticity of taxable income is a function of the tax 
system and, in particular, the definition of the tax base, has been theoretically 
established by Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), and was empirically supported 
by Kopczuk (2005) in his analysis of US tax reforms. If there are many types 
of deductions in the tax system, then taxpayers have many opportunities to 
influence their tax base – either through an adjustment in real activities or 
through relabeling unchanged activities. In this case we will find a high esti-
mated taxable-income elasticity parameter. As Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) 
highlight, this manipulation of the tax base is a social waste since it is unpro-
ductive. This means that, in general terms, a tax system with fewer deductions 
and exceptions to its tax base (i.e., a tax system with a “broader” tax base) is less 
distortive and is therefore better for social welfare.
International studies give support to this assumed relationship between the 
tax system and the elasticity of taxable income. There are relatively many types 
of deductions in the German tax system. The only existing estimate of the elas-
ticity of taxable income on German data (Gottfried and Witczak, 2009) finds a 
relatively high taxable income elasticity (between 0.4 and 1, depending on the 
specification). But most studies on other countries obtain an estimated elas-
ticity parameter between 0 and 0.3. For example in a recent study on Danish 
data, Kleven and Schultz (2012) estimate an elasticity of 0.05 for wage income 
and 0.01 for the income of the self-employed. In Denmark the tax base is very 
broad, the possibility of tax base allowances and deductions is restricted, and 
double income reporting is widespread (both employers and banks report the 
individuals’ income to tax authorities). This interpretation is supported by the 
fact that US studies find that broader definitions of income (e.g., before deduc-
tions) react less sensitively to tax rates than taxable income. Gruber and Saez 
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(2002), for example, estimated the elasticity of taxable income to be about 0.4, 
while they found an elasticity of about 0.1 for a broader concept of income.
Further patterns can be deduced from the international literature. The esti-
mated elasticities may, for example, differ between different groups. Accord-
ing to a few studies the income elasticity is higher for those groups who have 
more possibilities to shift their income either between time periods or income 
sources (entrepreneurs, high income individuals). This is supported by estima-
tions of Sillamaa and Veall (2001) on Canadian data, Pirttilä and Selin (2011) 
on Finnish data and Ljunge and Ragan (2004) on Swedish data. Another study 
on Swedish data, Blomquist and Selin (2010) provides estimates separately for 
men and women. They can observe not only the taxpayers’ annual income, but 
also their hourly wage. According to their estimates the hourly wage elasticity 
of males is around 0.15, while it is around 0.5 for women. When the authors 
analyse the elasticity of wage income, the income elasticity of males is around 
0.2, while it is above 1 for women.
The estimated elasticity may also depend on the time horizon of the analy-
sis. On the one hand it is possible that the adjustment of taxpayers takes time. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that taxpayers merely shift the timing of 
some of their activities: in this case there is a short-run elasticity but the real 
long-run effect is zero. Holmlund and Söderström (2007) use Swedish tax rate 
changes from 1995 and 1999 to differentiate between the short and long run 
elasticities by including the tax rate changes of the current year and the previ-
ous year as control variables. While the estimated coefficient of the current tax 
change is not significantly different from zero, the effect of the previous year’s 
changes is between 0.22–0.32, suggesting that the long run elasticity is higher 
than the immediate one. Giertz (2010) obtained similar results, while Heim 
(2009) found only short run elasticities. However, the results should be inter-
preted with caution, because – mainly due to the way of controlling for the ini-
tial income – they are typically sensitive to the specification (Saez et al. 2012).
Finally, the magnitude of the estimated elasticity may depend on the extent 
of the tax reform. According to Kleven and Schultz (2012) the estimated elas-
ticity is larger in the case of larger tax reforms, probably because smaller tax 
changes go unnoticed by many taxpayers, and also because there is more to be 
gained by adjusting optimally to a larger tax change. Taxpayers’ inattention 
or adjustment costs may thus create frictions in the adjustment process. The 
availability of tax return data encompassing a quarter of a century makes it 
possible for Kleven and Schultz to compare the effects of large and small tax 
reforms. The estimated elasticities support the theoretical predictions: the es-
timated elasticity of wage income is 0.12 for the 1980’s, while for the 1990’s 
– the period of smaller tax changes – the same elasticity parameter is only 0.02. 
If the decision-friction assumption is correct, then the effect of the larger tax 
reforms is closer to the actual long-run taxable-income elasticity.
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Decision frictions and mistakes
A recent strand of the literature devotes special attention taxpayers’ (either 
rational or irrational) inattention and mistakes. This line of research prom-
ises to reconcile two conflicting notions, both of which are persuasive in their 
own right: on the one hand, economists think that taxpayers in general do 
react to material incentives, while on the other hand most taxpayers do not 
make time-consuming calculations in order to re-optimize their taxable in-
come to new tax regulations each year. This may have two reasons: lack of 
information and lack of control. On the one hand, not all taxpayers know 
important details of the tax system (most people probably do not know even 
their marginal or average tax rate). But even if all taxpayers had all the infor-
mation, the majority would not have total control over their taxable income 
and its composition.
The so called kinks and notches of the tax function provide a great oppor-
tunity to analyse the behavioural patterns behind the estimated elasticities. 
Kinks of the tax function – and the taxpayer’s budget line – appear when the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate changes at a given income level. Rarer in modern 
tax systems are notches: income levels at which there are discrete jumps in 
the  tax payable. Saez (2010) made an early attempt to identify the taxable-
income elasticity from the “bunching” of taxpayers at kink points of the tax 
function. The more taxpayers bunch at kink points, the more optimizing tax-
payers there are and the higher is the elasticity. The results show a relatively 
limited bunching behaviour of taxpayers, suggesting a lower elasticity than 
that which researchers find when analyzing tax reforms. The result is consist-
ent with the concept that taxpayers do not consider the kinks of the tax func-
tion as important enough to pay attention to them.
Probably Kleven and Waseem (2013) are the first to have analysed taxpayer 
behaviour at notches of the income tax function. They exploit a rare feature 
of the tax system of Pakistan: when an individual passes the threshold of a 
higher tax bracket, their new tax rate is not only applied to income above the 
threshold but to their total income. This means that at each bracket threshold 
the average tax rate of taxpayers increases; thus at each threshold, the net in-
come of an individual is reduced. Notches create a strong incentive for taxpay-
ers to remain just below the next bracket threshold. Accordingly, tax return 
data from Pakistan reveals more significant bunching below the thresholds 
than is observed below kink points in other countries. At the same time the 
proportion of taxpayers who could increase their net income by reducing their 
gross income is not negligible. Their presence suggests that there are several 
taxpayers who are not, or at least not in every year, able to optimize their tax-
able income according to the tax system.
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There are several factors that may hamper the adjustment of taxpayers. Ac-
cording to Chetty et al. (2010), optimal behavioural responses to tax changes 
are hampered, among other things, by the costs related to switching jobs, and 
restrictions on working time set by employers. They find support for this hy-
pothesis on Danish data. Besides these factors, lack of information may also 
induce frictions as not all taxpayers are aware of the opportunities offered by 
the tax system. Based on an experiment involving tens of thousands of individ-
uals in the US, Chetty and Saez (2012) showed that those who received advice 
from consultants on their tax declaration took advantage of more deductions 
than their counterparts who received no such advice. Chetty et al. (2012) find 
that even the location of residence of taxpayers might affect the extent of their 
tax optimization behaviour. The authors detected significant territorial differ-
ences in the bunching density at the kink points of the tax function which ap-
pears to be related to how well-informed taxpayers are in different geographic 
areas about the details of the US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The au-
thors find that the tax deductions of those people who moved from a “less in-
formed” area to a “more informed” one increase, while in the reverse case the 
claimed amount of deductions does not decrease. This lends further support 
to the explanation that the effects are generated by the changes in the taxpay-
ers’ knowledge.
The study of decision frictions and mistakes is a relatively new area in the 
analysis of the effects of taxation which makes it difficult to draw final con-
clusions. The field promises to help us understand what kind of behavioural 
patterns are really behind the estimated aggregate elasticities. This can help 
us give better forecasts about the effects of tax reforms (better understanding 
the difference between short-run and long-run effects), but also to learn more 
about the welfare effects of taxation.
What is behind the elasticity?
One of the most important questions in the study of the taxable-income elas-
ticity is what behavioural responses are behind the estimated elasticities: to 
what extent can the results be explained by real labour supply adjustment, and 
to what extent can they be explained by tax optimization or tax avoidance? 
Here we review the literature of other countries; we will revisit the question 
in the next section which discusses existing estimation results for Hungary.
Before the appearance of the literature on the taxable-income elasticity the 
focus of researchers was on whether tax changes affect the working hours of in-
dividuals. These studies found that men’s working hours do not react very sen-
sitively to tax changes, while women’s labour market participation and work-
ing hours react slightly more sensitively (Feldstein, 2002, Meghir and Phillips, 
2010). Moffitt and Wilhelm (1998) found that even though high-income men’s 
working hours are inelastic, their total earnings do react to tax reforms, suggest-
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ing that real labour supply changes may have occurred either in non-reported 
overtime, or in other aspects of work effort that are even harder to measure.
Another strand of the literature showed that dramatic changes in reported 
income were specifically due to tax optimization. Goolsbee (2000), for exam-
ple, showed that the behavioural effect of the 1993 US tax increase on high in-
comes was mainly due to the fact that executives exercised more of their stock 
options right before the tax rate increase. In this case, a significant part of the 
behavioural response did not have to do with the adjustment of labour supply.
Taking into consideration the results from other countries we may conclude 
that, although tax optimization does play an important role in some cases, the 
overall evidence does not support a view that labour supply adjustment does 
not play a part in the estimated elasticities. On the contrary, the more mod-
erate estimates of the taxable income elasticity are not much higher than es-
timates of the elasticity of working hours to tax changes. These in turn may 
underestimate labour supply adjustment as they do not take into account the 
changes in work effort.
Results from estimations for Hungary
This section presents re-estimated results of the study of Péter Bakos, Péter 
Benczúr and Dóra Benedek (Bakos et al. 2008; henceforth BBB) and the re-
sults of the study by Áron Kiss and Pálma Mosberger (Kiss and Mosberger, 
2011; henceforth KM). First, we briefly review the data and tax reforms used 
by both studies. We also investigate in detail how the studies identify the es-
timated effects. Then we survey the results in three respects. First, we discuss 
what control variables should be included in the regressions. Here we will focus 
on initial income (to treat the mean-reversion problem), the average tax rate 
(to control for the income effect) and demographic characteristics (to control 
for the different income trends of specific taxpayer groups). Second, we discuss 
how the elasticity of taxable income depends on the income level. Finally, we 
turn to the question of to what extent we may consider the estimated elastici-
ties as reflections of labour supply adjustment.
Data and tax reform episodes
Both studies use samples of individual tax return panel data compiled by the 
tax authority (APEH at the time of the research, NAV today). The data set 
was originally prepared for the Ministry of Finance, but was also used by the 
Office of the Fiscal Council. The database contains data from the tax return 
form xx53 for the respective years (as before inspection). The anonymous ran-
dom samples were selected by the tax authority as follows. For the BBB study 
a sample of 250,000 individuals was selected from 2004 data (approximately 
5 percent of all taxpayers), and then the 2005 data was added for the same in-
dividuals. For the KM study a 10 percent sample was selected from 2005 data 
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and tax files for the same individuals for three subsequent years were added. 
Sample attrition is a common phenomenon in similar analyses. In our case it 
is not significant because a significant part of the inactive population files a 
tax return either because they work for some months or because some of the 
social benefits they receive are taxable (e.g., some unemployment and mater-
nity benefits).
The 2004–2005 tax reform reduced the number of tax brackets from three 
to two, increased the employee tax credit, raised the pension contribution ceil-
ing, and introduced income dependent phase-out regions for some tax credits, 
raising marginal tax rates for those in the phase-out regions. These generated 
significant changes at all income levels both in the marginal and in the average 
tax rates; this allowed the authors of the BBB paper to obtain relatively precise 
estimates for a wide range of income.
The difference-in-differences estimation strategy identifies the effect of the 
marginal tax rate based on tax changes that affect the tax rates of similar tax-
payers differently; in the language of econometrics, this difference in the “treat-
ment” of different individuals is called exogenous variation. Changes in the 
income of individuals that are unexplained by observables also result in the 
change of tax rates, but this constitutes endogenous variation. Tax reform ep-
isodes, in turn, induce changes in the tax rates of individuals that are not due 
to their behaviour, thus providing exogenous variation.
In 2005, such exogenous variation at lower income levels (up to 2.5 times the 
annual minimum wage – thus including about 60 percent of income earners) 
was provided by the elimination of the middle tax bracket and the phenom-
enon of bracket creep.1 In the top 40 percent of the income distribution the 
main source of exogenous variation is the bracket creep; but the changes re-
garding the phase-out rules of tax credits also caused variation in the tax rates.2 
The phase-out of various tax credits introduce a variation in the tax rates across 
individuals which is independent of initial income, thus allowing a separate 
identification of the effect of the marginal and average tax rate as well as that of 
initial income. Additionally, both the employee tax credit and other tax cred-
its were phased out as a function of “total annual income”, an income defini-
tion that is broader than “taxable income” by also including (among others) 
capital income. This provides further variation in the change of tax rates that 
is not perfectly correlated with initial taxable income.
Focusing on the top 20 percent of the income distribution (annual taxable 
income of HUF 2 million and above), the only tax changes causing exogenous 
variation in the tax rates in 2005 were the increase of the pension contribu-
tion ceiling (from HUF 5.307 million to 6.6 million), the introduction of a 
phase-out range for the child tax credit starting at HUF 8 million, and the 
introduction of a phase-out range for a number of other tax credits at HUF 6 
million. The fact that tax credits were phased out as a function of total income 
1 Failing to index bracket thresh-
olds by inflation pushes taxpay-
ers into higher tax brackets.
2 Tax credits can be fully taken 
advantage of up to a given in-
come threshold, above which 
they are gradually withdrawn. 
The effective marginal tax rate 
increases typically by 10–20 per-
centage points for individuals in 
the phase-out range.
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(i.e., taxable income plus capital income) does not seem to have a big impact on 
tax rates. At the same time, if these phase-out ranges are not indexed to infla-
tion, they also affect marginal tax rates in a similar way as the bracket creep; 
and it is precisely this phenomenon that contributes the most to the identify-
ing variation in tax rates. It should be noted that a more precise accounting for 
these phase-out regions (mostly in the income range HUF 2–3 million) made 
a re-estimation of the BBB results necessary.
KM analyse the effects of tax changes between 2005 and 2008 (and, as a ro-
bustness check, between 2005 and 2007). The paper does not analyse the whole 
income distribution, but rather focuses on high income earners, estimating the 
effects of the so called “extraordinary tax” of individuals, introduced in 2007. 
The extraordinary tax increased marginal tax rates of the top five percent of 
earners by four percentage points. In this income range most income-depend-
ent phase-outs are not relevant; most of the identifying variation comes from 
the change of the extraordinary tax.
Results
In the following we review the main results of the BBB and KM studies, first 
focusing on how robust the results are to controlling for initial income and 
other control variables, then on the sign and magnitude of the parameter of 
the average net-of-tax rate (1 minus the average tax rate). The first issue is rel-
evant primarily from a theoretical point of view, while the second has direct 
tax policy relevance. A negative and statistically significant effect suggests the 
presence of the income effect: an increase of the average tax rate would lead to 
a higher activity of income generation as taxpayers seek to restore their previ-
ous (net) income position. This means that the total effect of a tax reform that 
simultaneously decreases the average and marginal tax rates does not neces-
sarily stimulate the generation of income. If however the sign of the parameter 
is positive, it may be a symptom of a labour market participation effect (some 
individuals may work more months in a year, or switch from part time to full 
time employment as a response to a cut in the average tax rate) or an improve-
ment in tax compliance.
We present the estimated parameters of three variables: the marginal tax rate, 
the average tax rate and log initial income. The regression diagnostics are in all 
cases “perfect”, therefore we will not present them in the tables (F-statistics of 
the first stage, under-identification and week identification tests, etc.).
Table 2.1 presents the original and the re-estimated BBB results for the whole 
sample of individuals earning more than the minimum wage. The tax price co-
efficient (i.e., the coefficient of the change in 1 minus the marginal tax rate) is in 
all specifications significant and, depending on the control variables included, 
between 0.0494–0.0744 (original results), and between 0.0301–0.0567 (re-
estimated). This estimation range is lower than most estimates in other coun-
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tries. The coefficient of initial income is very significant, and including it in the 
estimation decreases the tax-price elasticity by one third, while including the 
income effect and further control variables only affects the tax-price elastic-
ity to a small degree. The income effect is positive (and mostly significant) in 
columns (2) and (3), while it becomes negative (and insignificant in the origi-
nal results) in the specification treating income changes in the most flexible 
way – see in column (4).
table 2.1: results of bbb (2008) for the whole sample with income  
above the minimum wage (huF 636,000)
∆log(taxable  
income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
original re-estimate original re-estimate original re-estimate original re-estimate
∆log(1 – MTR)
0.0744** 0.0567** 0.0501** 0.0305** 0.0494** 0.0301** 0.0648** 0.0362**
(0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0162) (0.0159)
∆log(1 – ATR)
–0.0187 –0.0761 0.145** 0.0773 0.340** 0.266** –0.0673 –0.140**
(0.0570) (0.0551) (0.0637) (0.0612) (0.0670) (0.0642) (0.0646) (0.0613)
log(initial income)
–0.0252** –0.0245** –0.0311** –0.0300**
(0.00248) (0.00245) (0.00276) (0.00272)
N 146,676
Note: The regressions contain the following control variables: Column (1): only the 
marginal (MTR) and average (ATR) tax rates; in column (2) log initial income is 
added; in column (3) other individual characteristics are added; the specification 
reported in column (4) allows the constant and the coefficient of initial income to 
vary across income deciles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Bakos et al. (2008) and own calculations on the BBB data.
Table 2.2 presents the results of the same specifications on a sample restricted 
to higher-income taxpayers (HUF 2 million and above in the original BBB 
analysis, while the threshold is HUF 1.95 million in the re-estimated results 
because this is the income level where tax credits are fully phased out).
The originally high estimated coefficient of the marginal tax rate in the BBB 
analysis has been revised downward substantially by the re-estimation, with 
the level of significance also decreasing. As presented below, still for a sample 
earning HUF 3–5 million the estimated elasticity is about 0.1 and statistically 
significant, although it would be even higher in the original BBB estimation. 
This is not surprising in light of the discussion of the exogenous variation in 
the data above: there is minimal variation in the tax rates in the income range 
of HUF 2–3 million. At the same time, the mortgage tax cut is phased out in 
the income range of HUF 3–5 million, allowing for a more precise identifica-
tion (this income range was most affected by the recalculation of tax rates as 
compared to the original estimations).
Controlling for initial income proves to be crucial: it reduces the coefficient 
of the marginal tax rate substantially, while the coefficient of the average tax 
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rate changes its sign. The other control variables did not significantly affect the 
results. Based on the re-estimated results the uncompensated elasticity appears 
to be negative rather than positive, though the estimate of the income effect 
is relatively imprecise.
table 2.2: results of bbb (2008) for a higher income sample  
(huF 1.95 million and above)
∆log(taxable  
income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
original re-estimate original re-estimate original re-estimate original re-estimate
∆log(1 – MTR)
0.434** 0.104* 0.267** 0.0491 0.288** 0.0600 0.341** 0.0739
(0.0567) (0.0539) (0.0466) (0.0439) (0.0499) (0.0463) (0.0572) (0.0500)
∆log(1 – ATR)
0.377** 0.214** –0.649** –0.803** –0.392** –0.586** –0.285** –0.520**
(0.118) (0.103) (0.100) (0.0871) (0.113) (0.0958) (0.115) (0.0941)
log(initial income)
–0.0864** –0.0893** –0.0801** –0.0838**
(0.00620) (0.00603) (0.00656) (0.00634)
N 43,733
Note: The regressions contain the following control variables: Column (1): only the 
marginal (MTR) and average (ATR) tax rates; in column (2) log initial income is 
added; in column (3) other individual characteristics are added; the specification 
reported in column (4) allows the constant and the coefficient of initial income to 
vary across income deciles. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Bakos et al. (2008) and own calculations on the BBB data.
Initial income and other control variables play a less relevant role in the KM es-
timation (Table 2.3). The coefficient of the marginal tax rate is robustly around 
0.15–0.2; the statistical significance of the average tax rate however is not ro-
bust to the specification (for details see KM).
table 2.3: results of Km (2011) for individuals with initial income of huF 5–8 million
∆log(taxable  
income) (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆log(1 – MTR)
0.159** 0.155** 0.165** 0.198**
(0.066) (0.069) (0.063) (0.063)
∆log(1 – ATR)
–0.545* –0.557*
(0.313) (0.328)
log(initial income)
–0.027 –0.023 –0.009
(0.054) (0.050) (0.050)
N 6900
Note: The regressions contain the following control variables: Column (1): only the 
marginal (MTR) tax rate; in column (2) log initial income is added; in column (3) the 
average tax rate is added; the specification reported in column (4) includes further 
individual characteristics. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Kiss and Mosberger (2011).
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How does the elasticity of taxable income depend on income?
Table 2.4 reports the elasticities estimated on the whole sample above the min-
imum wage (Column 1–2), and separately for two subgroups comprising the 
bottom 80 percent of the sample (Column 3–6). On the full sample the coef-
ficient of the marginal tax rate is relatively low, but significant; while the coef-
ficient of the average tax rate is negative, and is weakly statistically significant 
in the re-estimated results. In the sample including individuals with income 
between the minimum wage and the start of the phase-out range of the em-
ployee tax credit (columns 3 and 4), the effect of the marginal tax rate is virtu-
ally zero, while the coefficient of the average tax rate is positive.
table 2.4: Estimated elasticities for various income groups, i
∆log(taxable 
income)
HUF 636,000 and above HUF 636,000–1.5 million HUF 1.5–1.95 million
original re-estimate original re-estimate original re-estimate
∆log(1 – MTR)
0.0648** 0.0362* 0.00715 0.00828 0.128** 0.124**
(0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0536) (0.0531)
∆log(1 – ATR)
–0.0673 –0.140* 0.236** 0.225** –0.231* –0.235**
(0.0646) (0.0613) (0.103) (0.102) (0.119) (0.118)
N 146,676 146,676 80,639 80,639 22,304 22,304
Note: Regressions include all individual control variables. Columns report estima-
tions for different samples based on initial annual income. Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Bakos et al. (2008) and own calculations on the BBB data.
A positive coefficient on the average tax rate could be a symptom of labour 
supply adjustment at the extensive margin (see Chapter 3 of this In Focus – I) 
or an improvement in tax compliance. In columns 5–6, where we report esti-
mates for taxpayers in an income range that corresponds to the phase out of the 
employee tax credit, we can see a significantly positive coefficient of the mar-
ginal tax rate of 0.12, and a significantly negative estimated coefficient of the 
average tax rate (income effect), larger in absolute value, although estimated 
with less precision. This result is important in the assessment of the employee 
tax credit: moving the phase-out region to a lower income range could have a 
smaller marginal disincentive effect and could even stimulate activity through 
the income effect. (A full-fledged welfare analysis would have to take into ac-
count the reduced leisure of those affected, which would make the welfare as-
sessment less clear-cut).
Results for higher income levels (approximately the top 20 percent of the in-
come distribution) are reported in Table 2.5. Compared to the original BBB 
results the re-estimation suggests a lower (and therefore usually statistically 
less significant) coefficient of the marginal tax rate, and a more negative (but 
not always statistically significant) coefficient of the average tax rate. The es-
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timation in the sample above HUF 1.95 million is imprecise, but we find a 
significant elasticity of around 0.1 for the sample including taxpayers with an 
initial income of HUF 3–5 million. There is not enough variation in the tax 
rate changes of the full sample above HUF 3 million to precisely estimate the 
coefficients of the marginal and the average tax rate simultaneously. Finally, the 
elasticity of taxable income is estimated to be about 0.2 for individuals with 
an income of HUF 5–8 million in the study by KM. They also find a negative, 
significant, but unstable income effect.
table 2.5: Estimated elasticities for various income groups, ii
∆log(taxable  
income)
HUF 1.95 and above HUF 3–5 million HUF 3 million and above HUF 5 million and above
KM (5–8)
original re-estimate original re-estimate original re-estimate original re-estimate
∆log(1 – MTR)
0.341** 0.0739 0.741** 0.0969* 0.447** 0.446 –0.108 –0.108 0.198**
(0.0572) (0.0500) (0.153) (0.0577) (0.0855) (0.321) (0.428) (0.428) (0.063)
∆log(1 – ATR)
–0.285* –0.520** 1.802* –0.0760 0.123 –1.268** –1.932** –1.932** –0.557*
(0.115) (0.0941) (0.813) (0.317) (0.391) (0.423) (0.408) (0.408) (0.328)
N 43,733 43,733 12,753 12,753 19,080 19,080 6,327 6,327 6,900
Note: Regressions include all individual control variables. Columns report estima-
tions for different samples based on initial annual income. Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Bakos et al. (2008) and own calculations on the BBB data (columns 1–8); Kiss 
and Mosberger (2011) for column 9.
Do estimated elasticities reflect adjustment in labour supply?
In the following we review the results of three exercises aiming to reveal more 
about the adjustment channels behind the estimated elasticities. Table 2.6 
presents the results of the first analysis, where we split the BBB database into 
groups based on whether the taxpayer claimed cost deductions or not.
table 2.6: Estimated elasticities for taxpayers with and without cost deductions
∆log(taxable 
income)
HUF 636,000–1.95 million HUF 1.95 million and above HUF 3–5 million
all no yes all no yes all no yes
∆log(1 – MTR)
0.047** 0.0495* 0.0320 0.0739 0.0256 0.151* 0.0969* –0.00639 0.208**
(0.018) (0.0196) (0.0497) (0.0500) (0.0679) (0.070) (0.0577) (0.0844) (0.0726)
∆log(1 – ATR)
0.064 0.0272 0.255 –0.520** –0.460** –0.630** –0.0760 0.261 –0.562
(0.079) (0.0821) (0.240) (0.0941) (0.112) (0.173) (0.317) (0.462) (0.398)
N 102,943 91,288 11,655 43,733 30,346 13,387 12,753 8,254 4,499
Note: Regressions include all individual control variables. Columns report estima-
tions for different samples based on initial annual income. Columns marked “no” 
include taxpayers with no cost deductions, columns marked “yes” in turn include 
taxpayers who did claim cost deductions. Columns marked “all” include both. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Own calculations on BBB data.
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Cost deductions are not very frequent or significant in the Hungarian tax 
system, though they can be claimed against some types of income, especially 
contract work (wage income also has components against which cost deduc-
tions can be claimed, e.g., wage income from foreign assignments). At lower 
income levels (columns 1–3) the effect of differentiation is negligible, while 
for higher incomes we find much higher elasticity for those taxpayers who do 
claim cost deductions than for others (for whom the results are not signifi-
cant, although the standard errors are large). This result is similar to the result 
found in the United States (see for example Gruber and Saez, 2002), but it is 
important to note that cost deductions are typically a fixed percent of income 
in the Hungarian tax system. So it is possible that the adjustment does not 
take place through cost deductions (i.e., through tax optimization), but rather 
through the magnitude (or the existence) of the given income type. Even then 
the question can be asked whether tax changes affect the generation or merely 
the reporting of these incomes. Based on these results it appears that we can-
not take an obvious stand as to what extent estimated elasticities reflect the 
adjustment of labour supply.
Table 2.7 reports results separately for men and women as estimated by BBB 
and KM: although the results are not clear-cut, in most cases the elasticity is 
higher for women. This certainly weakens the case for tax evasion as the expla-
nation: according to Meghir and Phillips (2010), tax evasion should be more 
widespread among men, a notion that finds support in Hungarian survey re-
sults (Semjén et al. 2009).
table 2.7: Estimated elasticities for genders separately
∆log(taxable 
income)
HUF 636,000–1.95 million HUF 3–5 million HUF 5–8 million
women men women men women men
∆log(1 – MTR)
0.0716** 0.0172 0.0892 0.117 0.232** 0.185**
(0.0245) (0.0276) (0.0878) (0.0757) (0.103) (0.084)
∆log(1 – ATR)
–0.0957 0.340* –0.176 0.0569 –1.194** –0.246
(0.0954) (0.136) (0.491) (0.424) (0.487) (0.431)
N 56,979 45,964 5,550 7,203 2,144 4,219
Note: Regressions include all individual control variables. Columns report estima-
tions for different samples based on initial annual income. Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Own calculations on BBB data (columns 1–4) and KM (columns 5–6).
Finally, Table 2.8 reports estimates on samples restricted to include individu-
als with wage income only. We suppose that individuals earning solely wage 
income have the least opportunity of tax optimization. The restriction does not 
appear to matter for the results, save for the coefficient of the average tax rate. 
In our interpretation this suggests that income shifting (tax optimization) is 
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not a dominant factor in the reaction to tax changes. This is also supported by 
a separate exercise reported by KM, showing no differential effect on the capi-
tal income reported by those affected by the extraordinary tax (thus finding no 
signs of income shifting). All in all it is likely that the elasticities estimated in 
both studies – which are not very large in international comparison – reflect 
labour supply adjustment.
table 2.8: Estimated elasticities for individuals earning wage income only
∆log(initial  
income)
HUF 636,000–1.95 million HUF 3–5 million HUHF 5–8 million
all wage only all wage only all wage only
∆log(1 – MTR)
0.0474** 0.072** 0.097* 0.091* 0.198** 0.212**
(0.183) (0.020) (0.058) (0.055) (0.063) (0.104)
∆log(1 – ATR)
0.064 0.219* –0.076 –0.631* –0.557* –0.743**
(0.079) (0.091) (0.317) (0.287) (0.328) (0.325)
N 102,943 73,477 12,753 6,373 6,900 4,240
Note: Regressions include all individual control variables. Columns report estima-
tions for different samples based on initial annual income. Standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Own calculations on BBB data (columns 1–4) and KM (columns 5–6).
We may conclude that Hungarian results are overall consistent with interna-
tional estimations: the elasticities are not very large, but in the case of specific 
groups they are notable. Re-estimation suggests lower elasticities than original-
ly reported by BBB (2008). Estimations for high-income taxpayers show larger 
tax price elasticities. While the international literature rarely finds a significant 
income effect, in the Hungarian estimations the coefficient of the average tax 
rate is often statistically significant; its sign is typically negative but sometimes 
positive. As Chapter 4 of this In Focus – I shows, this uncertainty has important 
consequences for economic policy. Although it cannot be ruled out that the 
results are partly due to tax optimization or tax avoidance, it is very likely that 
labour supply adjustment causes a significant part of the estimated elasticities.
The elasticity of taxable income and the “optimal income  
tax system”
How can we use estimates of the taxable income elasticity in the impact as-
sessment of tax changes? The simplest type of impact assessment estimates the 
direct fiscal impact of a tax change: while a “static” assessment is based on the 
assumption that the behaviour of economic agents remains unchanged, “dy-
namic” fiscal effects can be predicted with the help of the elasticity. Calcula-
tions of dynamic fiscal effects were performed by Benczúr (2007) in an ex-ante 
assessment of the 2007 extraordinary tax of individuals, but also in the studies 
of Bakos et al. (2008) and Kiss and Mosberger (2011).
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Second, the elasticity can be used as a parameter in more complex models. 
An example is given in Chapter 4 of this In Focus – I, presenting a microsimu-
lation model that uses this elasticity to take into account the behavioural ad-
justment of taxpayers.
Finally, the estimated elasticity is an important parameter of models that are 
used to characterize, and simulate, the “optimal income tax system”.
The theory of optimal taxation
The theory of optimal income taxation is an important field in public econom-
ics. The theory views the tax system from the point of view of an ideal “social 
planner”. Taxes change the incentives of economic agents, and distort their 
decisions; thus taxes are more costly for economic agents than the revenue 
that is collected by the government. At the same time, the government needs 
revenues to provide important public goods (national defence, rule of law, en-
vironmental protection) and support vulnerable groups in society. The opti-
mal tax system is one that can raise the revenue needed to finance the public 
activities desirable for society with the least social cost.
The theory of optimal taxation does not provide simple answers as to what 
the optimal tax system looks like. One reason for this is that the optimal tax 
system – as is clear from the introduction above – always depends on the pref-
erences of society. In other words, the theory can provide only conditional an-
swers: what kind of tax system corresponds to a certain set of social goals and 
values.3 Another reason is that, for the sake of transparency and tractability, 
theoretical analysis usually concentrates on one aspect of the tax system at a 
time. Thus the theory of optimal consumption taxation can be separated from 
the theory of optimal income or capital taxation. The aggregation of partial 
results and the assessment of their applicability are therefore separate impor-
tant tasks of the students and practitioners of the field. Finally, the results are 
generally sensitive to modelling assumptions and the value of some param-
eters that are hard to measure, raising a further barrier to policy applications.
The foundational work of the theory of optimal income taxation is by 
Mirrlees (1971). The work of Mirrlees is based on two main assumptions. The 
first assumption is that the incentive effect of taxation is mainly effective at the 
intensive margin, that is, individuals may respond to taxation by increasing or 
decreasing their working hours (but his formulation of the theory abstracts 
from entry to and exit from the labour market).4 The other main assumption 
is that an individual’s gross wage depends on their time-invariant productiv-
ity; the government is unable to tell the productivity of individuals, it can only 
levy taxes based on their income.
The type of results directly following from the logical structure of the theory 
describe how the optimal tax rates depend on the behaviour of taxpayers, the 
redistributive preferences of society and the shape of the income distribution. 
3 Exceptions are cases where a 
tax system can be changed in a 
way that no-one is made worse 
off. Such cases are however rare: 
even if winners gain more than 
the damage of the disadvan-
taged, it is not easy to find the 
way to compensate the latter.
4 The theory was later reformu-
lated by others (Piketty, 1996, 
Saez, 2002) to allow for adjust-
ment at the extensive margin, 
i.e., entry to and exit from the 
labour market.
Benczúr, kiss & mosBerger: tHe elasticity oF taxaBle income
91
At a given income level, the marginal tax rate should be high if taxpayer behav-
iour in that income range is not very sensitive to the tax rate, if redistribution is 
not very important for society, and if the number of taxpayers in that income 
range is small relative to the number of taxpayers with a higher income. This 
latter relationship connects the optimal income tax system to the distribution 
of income (or more precisely productivity). Regarding an increase of the mar-
ginal tax rate in a narrow income range, the more taxpayers there are above the 
affected income range, the more revenue is generated by the tax increase; the 
more taxpayers there are in the affected income range, the more their behav-
ioural reaction will impair the aggregate revenue effect.
The optimal top marginal tax rate: theoretical framework
In the following we describe a result of the theory of optimal income taxation 
and apply it to the case of Hungary: the formula of the optimal top marginal 
income tax. The result was first derived by Saez (2001), and later applied by 
Brewer et al. (2010) and Diamond and Saez (2011) for the UK and the US. Our 
treatment, and the application to Hungary, is based on their approach follow-
ing the paper by Kiss (2012).
The derivation, not reproduced here in full detail, is based on a theoretical 
framework in which individuals choose their labour supply (effort) optimally 
trading off consumption against leisure. The marginal tax rate affects this trade-
off, directly affecting optimal effort and the income thus produced.
The optimal taxation problem is viewed from the view point of an ideal “so-
cial planner”, ignoring the political process that converts society’s preferences 
into a tax system. The goal of the social planner is to maximize social welfare; 
that in turn is but an aggregate of all individuals’ welfare. The optimum is cal-
culated conditional on some level of government revenue needed to finance 
unmodeled government activity.
The marginal weight in the social welfare function of an individual with a 
gross income of z is g(z): this expresses how much government revenue soci-
ety is willing to forgo to leave that individual with one extra monetary unit of 
consumption. If society values redistribution, this social marginal weight will 
be g(z) > 1 for individuals with low income (society will value an additional 
dollar of a low-income individual’s consumption more than one dollar of gov-
ernment revenue); while it will be g(z) < 1 for individuals with high income 
(society will value an additional dollar of a high-income individual’s consump-
tion less than one dollar of government revenue).
A society desiring to support low-income individuals faces the problem that 
redistribution dampens the work incentives faced by both high-income and 
low-income individuals. If the tax system induces people to work less, govern-
ment revenue falls and less redistribution can be financed. This trade-off be-
tween equity and efficiency is at the core of optimal income tax theory.
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The optimal top marginal tax rate can be derived from the effects of a hypo-
thetical tax change, in which the tax rate increases on income above a thresh-
old z¯, leaving the tax system otherwise unchanged. Such a tax change affects 
social welfare in three ways. 1) Government revenue increases mechanically 
which is a social benefit (by allowing more to be spent on things valued by so-
ciety). 2) Raising the tax burden affects the welfare of those taxed which is a 
social cost. 3) Those affected may decrease their working hours, reducing gov-
ernment revenue which again is a social cost.
At the optimal top marginal tax rate τ* the sum of these three effects must 
be zero. If the sum of these three effects were positive, social welfare could be 
increased by a further tax increase (or by a tax cut if the sum were negative), 
meaning that the tax rate was not optimal in the first place. This condition 
implicitly determines the optimal top tax rate.
The result is a simple formula for the optimal top marginal tax rate, depending 
on only three parameters. The first parameter is the elasticity of taxable income 
of the highest earners: e. The second parameter a, characterizes the shape of the 
income distribution at high incomes. Its definition is a = zm/(zm – z¯), where 
zm is the average income of individuals with income higher than z¯. It has been 
observed in many countries that this ratio is fairly constant in the top range of 
the income distribution or, in other words, that it does not depend on the ex-
act value of threshold z¯. The third parameter, g is the average social marginal 
weight of taxpayers with an income above z¯. The formula of the optimal top 
marginal tax rate is then given as:
 
τ * = 1 – g
1 – g + e . a   .
 
(1)
The tax rate thus depends on just three parameters, two of which can be em-
pirically estimated: parameters e and a. Since the third parameter, parameter 
g, depends on the redistributive preferences of society, it is not straightforward 
to assign a value to it that is plausible for everyone. We get an upper bound 
for the optimal top marginal tax rate by assuming g = 0 above the threshold. 
In this case the value society assigns to an additional unit of consumption of 
the individuals with the highest income is negligible. The only force keeping 
down the tax rates of high-income taxpayers is the behavioural effect; and the 
optimal top marginal tax rate is equal to the tax rate maximizing government 
revenue. The formula of the optimal top marginal tax rate simplifies then to 
the formula of the revenue-maximizing top marginal tax rate:
 
τ * = 1
1 + e . a
  
. (2)
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The optimal top marginal tax rate – application for Hungary
We have thus presented the formula of the optimal top marginal tax rate in 
a simple theoretical framework. To apply this formula to Hungary, we first 
need to assign values to the parameters. The value of parameter a can be ob-
tained from tax return data: it is about 2.5 at high levels of income and is not 
sensitive to the exact choice of z¯ (Kiss, 2012). Based on the estimations of Kiss 
and Mosberger (2011) we choose a value of e = 0.2 for the elasticity of taxable 
income of high earners. Because of the statistical uncertainty about the pa-
rameter, it makes sense to also evaluate the formula at higher and lower levels 
of the parameters.5
Table 2.9 shows the value of the optimal top marginal tax rate as a func-
tion of the parameters. Of course, these values should not be compared to ac-
tual PIT rates. From a theoretical point of view social security contributions 
and consumption taxes are similar to the income tax, as they also reduce the 
amount of consumption goods that can be bought from one additional hour 
of work. (We describe below the actual tax rates that are comparable with the 
theoretical standards.)
table 2.9: the value of the optimal top marginal tax rate 
as a function of parameters g and e, with a = 2.5 (percent)
g
e
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 80 67 57 50
0.1 78 64 55 47
0.2 76 62 52 44
0.3 74 58 48 41
0.4 71 55 44 38
0.5 67 50 40 33
Source: Kiss (2012).
As can be seen in Table 2.9, the more sensitive the reaction of taxpayers to 
changes in the marginal tax rate (parameter e), and the more socially valuable 
the marginal consumption of high-income earners (parameter g), the lower 
the optimal top marginal tax rate. Our best estimate of the elasticity of tax-
able income (e = 0.2) is reflected in column 2. With this elasticity parameter, 
the revenue-maximizing top marginal tax rate is 67 per cent. The optimal top 
marginal tax rate changes very little if parameter g increases from zero to 0.1; 
but it decreases to 50 per cent if the value of parameter g is 0.5.
If we would like to compare the theoretically optimal tax rates to actual 
marginal tax rates of high earners, we must calculate effective tax rates that 
express how much net consumption an individual can buy by increasing their 
5 Kiss and Mosberger (2011) do 
not find robust evidence for the 
income effect. The presence of 
the income effect is equivalent 
to a case where parameter e has 
a lower value. Thus robustness 
checks with respect to parameter 
e allow one to get a sense of how 
the income effect would affect 
results.
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total wage cost by one unit. The formula of this effective marginal tax rate is 
calculated based on equation (3).
 
τtop  = 1 – (1 –  τcons )
1 – τpit – τee
1 + τer
  
. (3)
In this formula τpit represents the actual top PIT rate, τee and τer represent the 
contribution rates payed by the employee and the employer, while τcons repre-
sents the effective consumption tax rate.6
Figure 2.1 shows the actual effective top marginal tax rate in Hungary for the 
years 2005–2013. The calculation reflects the marginal tax burden of taxpay-
ers with income above the pension contribution ceiling. Employee-side pen-
sion contributions are not levied on income above the ceiling. The employee-
side pension contribution rate is 10 per cent in 2012, while the contribution 
ceiling is at just below HUF 8 million; about 2 per cent of tax payers have an 
income above this level.
Figure 2.1: the actual top marginal tax rate in hungary, 2005–2013
* Calculations for 2013 are based on information available in June 2012. The effective 
consumption tax rate for the years 2011–2013 was taken to be equal to its level in 
2010, the last year for which data were available.
Source: Kiss (2012) based on public data on the tax rates, government budgets, and 
National Accounts for the respective years.
Based on Figure 2.1 we can make the following statements about the actual top 
marginal tax rates of the last decade.7 The effective top marginal tax rate was 
close to the revenue maximizing rate until 2010; starting in 2011, the actual 
effective rate is significantly below the revenue maximizing rate. Figure 2.1 also 
suggests that if there had been no pension contribution ceiling in Hungary in 
these years, the actual effective rate would have been over the revenue maxi-
mizing rate until 2010 and below that rate starting from 2011.
The 2011 change in personal income taxation can be translated to the lan-
guage of the model with the help of two parameters. Effective top rates up un-
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6 The effective tax rate on con-
sumption is calculated as govern-
ment revenue from consump-
tion taxes divided by household 
consumption. The tax rate is 
calculated similarly by Brewer 
et al. (2010).
7 Here we keep the discussion to 
make positive statements; some 
normative issues are raised in 
the subsection on the discus-
sion of the results. For a more 
detailed normative analysis, 
see Kiss (2012), or Brewer et al. 
(2010), and Diamond and Saez 
(2011) from an international 
point of view.
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til 2010 were consistent with revenue maximisation for an elasticity of taxable 
income of e = 0.2, and an average social marginal weight of g = 0 assigned to 
high-income earners. The tax system effective from 2011 is consistent, given 
parameter e = 0.2, with a significant increase of the average social marginal 
weight of high-income earners (g = 0.5; see Table 2.9) or, with an unchanged 
g = 0 parameter, with the notion that high earners react much more sensitive-
ly to tax changes than shown by existing estimations (e = 0.4; see Table 2.9). 
Estimations for Hungary presented in this chapter contradict this notion, al-
though the long-term elasticity (in which longer-term decisions on one’s career 
path, like the decision to study, may factor significantly) may be higher than 
the short-term elasticity.
Discussion of the results
The discussion is divided into two parts. First we discuss considerations that 
may affect the results but were ignored so far; then we briefly reflect on the nor-
mative issue of redistributive preferences. We raise five considerations that may 
affect the optimal top marginal tax rate. Though there is considerable uncer-
tainty around their significance, the direction of their effect is clear in each case.
Income effect. If our estimate of the tax price elasticity is correct but we wrong-
ly ignore the income effect, then the optimal top marginal tax rate is higher 
than suggested by the above calculations. The reason is that the income effect 
dampens the behavioural effect of tax changes or, in other words, the correct 
optimal top rate corresponds to the case where the taxable-income-elastici-
ty parameter is lower. On Hungarian data the income effect is estimated by 
Bakos et al. (2008) to be statistically significant and relatively robust, while it 
is estimated by Kiss and Mosberger (2011) to be only marginally statistically 
significant and not very robust. The international literature rarely finds signifi-
cant income effects. Thus there is considerable uncertainty around this issue.
Income shifting, tax externalities. If the elasticity of taxable income is a result 
of taxpayers shifting income between different tax bases (profits or dividends 
as opposed to wage, for example) or between different time periods, then the 
real fiscal effects of the behavioural adjustment to a tax change are smaller 
than if the effect is fully the result of reduced economic activity. In this case 
we overestimate the behavioural response, and consequently the optimal top 
marginal tax rate is higher than in our calculations above. Although this is-
sue is not (and perhaps can never be) settled for good, indirect evidence found 
by Kiss and Mosberger (2011) suggests that the behavioural response in their 
policy episode is not a result of income shifting.
Tax avoidance. If there is considerable tax avoidance among some taxpayer 
groups, this means that taxable income is an inaccurate measure of productivity. 
If the extent of tax avoidance is affected by changes in tax rates, this means that 
real economic activity is less responsive to tax changes than our estimations 
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of the taxable income elasticity suggest. This, similarly to the case of tax exter-
nalities, raises the optimal top marginal tax rate (a tax increase induces a shift 
of income out of the personal income tax base into undeclared income sourc-
es that are taxed when they are converted into consumption, even though at a 
lower rate). Another effect of tax avoidance is that the tax system will burden 
taxpayers with a similar productivity (and similar total income) differently as 
a function of their ability to avoid taxes. This impairs the horizontal and ver-
tical equity of the tax system. As the effectiveness of achievable redistribution 
is lower, society’s desire for redistribution may suffer as a result.
Actuarial considerations. We assumed in our calculations that taxes and so-
cial security contributions have the same effect on taxpayer behaviour. This 
may be wrong if taxpayers expect that the benefits they receive from the social 
insurance system have a close link to their payments into the system. There is 
however great uncertainty both regarding the actual link between contribu-
tions and benefits and taxpayers’ perceptions about it.
International tax competition for talent. We assumed in our analysis that 
the behavioural adjustment of high-income individuals occurs solely at the 
intensive margin. In the short to medium run it is a plausible assumption that 
changes in the marginal tax rates do not induce high-income individuals to 
exit the labour force. At the same time, any long-run relationship (whether a 
positive or a negative one) is hard to establish based on the experience of de-
veloped countries. One particular aspect of the extensive-margin adjustment 
of high earners came into the focus of recent investigations: the behaviour of 
certain specialized professional groups whose services are highly sought after 
on international labour markets (see, e.g., the studies of Kleven et al. 2012a, 
2012b). Such groups include stars in spectator sports (like football players 
playing for major European clubs) or the most successful strata in other inter-
nationalized professions. A fierce international competition for high-income 
individuals is equivalent to a higher elasticity parameter, which implies a lower 
optimal top marginal tax rate.
On the redistributive preferences of society. One of the most important ques-
tions when thinking about the optimal tax system is how important redistribu-
tion is for society. Parameter g in the formula of the optimal top marginal tax 
rate expresses how much tax revenue society would be willing to forgo to allow 
a high-income individual to increase their consumption by one monetary unit. 
Since the parameter expresses value judgment, it has no scientifically correct or 
incorrect value. But as regarding any value-laden question affecting the whole 
of society, the question must be reflected on and debated. Peter A. Diamond 
and Emmanuel Saez – two researchers who made crucial contributions to the 
field – recently argued that the value of the parameter should be close to zero 
in the case of the top one per cent of the income distribution and, consequently, 
that the revenue maximizing top rate is an important benchmark for public 
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policy (Diamond and Saez, 2011).8 The most important argument in favour 
of this view is that it does not rely on a very egalitarian economic philosophy. 
Parameter g can be approximately zero not only if the welfare of low-income 
individuals is more important than that of high-income individuals (as in the 
Rawlsian theory of justice). Such a result can be obtained even if society values 
the welfare of each of its members equally (that is, even on a utilitarian basis) 
if consumption has decreasing marginal utility.
Concluding remarks
This chapter reviewed Hungarian estimations of the elasticity of taxable in-
come, placing these in the context of the international literature, and present-
ing an application of the estimated elasticity in the field of optimal taxation 
theory. In the first part of the chapter we surveyed the international literature 
in more detail than had previous Hungarian studies. Our survey concentrated 
on questions interesting for economic policy, rather than on technical details. 
We found that European studies generally found lower elasticities than the 
US literature, which is probably a reflection of the fact that in the US the per-
sonal income tax base can be influenced by a large number of deductions. We 
noted that the general view is that a good tax system leaves little opportunity 
to manipulate the tax base (in this case the tax base is “broad”). In such a tax 
system taxpayers have no strong incentives to pursue non-productive activities 
in order to reduce their tax base.
In the second part of this chapter we reviewed the two existing studies esti-
mating the elasticity of taxable income in Hungary. In the process we re-esti-
mated the results of Bakos et al. (2008). The results of both studies are in line 
with the findings of the international literature: the elasticities are not large but 
they are economically significant for some taxpayer groups. The re-estimation 
suggests lower elasticities than reported in the original BBB results. Higher-
income groups generally show a higher elasticity of taxable income; the pa-
rameter of the average tax rate is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, 
unlike in most international studies.
Finally we illustrated the economic significance of the taxable-income elas-
ticity by applying a result of the theory of optimal income taxation to Hungary. 
The theory suggests that the optimal top marginal tax rate is the function of 
solely three parameters: the elasticity of taxable income of high-income earn-
ers, a parameter describing the shape of the income distribution, and a param-
eter summarizing society’s redistributive preferences (expressing how much 
tax revenue society would be willing to forgo in order to allow a high-income 
individual to increase their net income by one monetary unit). We showed 
that the actual top marginal tax rates until 2010 were optimal if society has a 
strong taste for redistribution (g ≈ 0), while actual top marginal tax rates ef-
fective from 2011 are optimal if either social preferences for redistribution are 
8 For lower values of  z¯ – think-
ing about the top 5 or 10 per cent 
of taxpayers – the assumption of 
g = 0 is less evidently plausible; 
this is why we present a sensitiv-
ity analysis in Table 2.9.
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low (g ≈ 0.5), or if the elasticity of taxable income of high earners is about twice 
as high as in our estimations (e ≈ 0.4).
Such a high elasticity is not supported by empirical evidence in Hungary, 
and other considerations such as a potentially significant income effect point 
toward even higher optimal rates. A taxable income elasticity of high earners 
of about 0.1–0.2 is a robust result and appears to be mostly driven by the ad-
justment of labour supply. The long-term effect may be larger (e.g., through the 
adjustment of investments into human capital) but this notion is not proven 
empirically.
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3. LAbour suppLy At thE ExtEnsivE mArgin
Gábor Kátay & Ágota Scharle
The previous chapter of In Focus – I analyses how taxes affect the number of 
hours worked, among those employed. The labour supply decision can be con-
sidered at the extreme as well, when working hours are reduced to zero. In the 
literature this is referred to as adjustment at the extensive margin. Extensive 
adjustment occurs when a change in their wage or non-labour income induces 
the individual to enter (or start looking for) or exit employment. While the 
previous chapter discusses how individuals decide about their work intensity, 
this chapter examines the decision to enter into employment, or more precisely, 
the participation decision of individuals.1
The primary function of taxes and transfers is to generate funding for public 
expenditures and to redistribute earned incomes.2 Although their impact on 
labour supply is unintended, it deserves special attention, as it can jeopardise 
the sustainability of the economy. A detailed understanding of these supply 
side effects is a precondition to maintaining a sustainable welfare system. The 
next step is to reduce the disincentives by improving the targeting of provisions 
(entitlement), tightening the eligibility criteria, decreasing the cost of entering 
employment or cutting benefit amounts.3 In the following we do not consider 
welfare effects or measures to reduce supply disincentives.
The decision-making process
The decision on participation
According to the basic framework of mainstream economics, individuals com-
pare levels of utility when deciding on their labour market participation: they 
either choose to work and give up leisure for wages (and consumption) or not 
work but have more leisure at their disposal, while giving up the wages (and 
consumption). Accordingly, individuals only wish to enter employment if la-
bour (valued in itself) and their expected wages yield a higher level of utility 
than leisure would.
The decision clearly depends on preferences, which may vary across indi-
viduals: some may choose to work, while others may choose leisure (or unpaid 
domestic labour). Still, there are a number of factors affecting this simplified 
decision, other than individual preferences.
The first major factor is the expected net wage. It is quite evident that a per-
son who can earn higher net wages while giving up the same amount of leisure 
1 Participating workers either 
work or are looking for work 
(while being unemployed). In 
contrast, non-participating (in-
active) individuals do not work 
and are not looking for work.
2 The redistribution of incomes 
may be justified on the basis of 
values (solidarity, reducing 
poverty) or market failures 
(e.g. related to credit market 
constraints, asymmetric infor-
mation, or myopia) as well.
3 The measures l isted here 
(except for cutting the benefit 
amount) can improve labour 
supply incentives, while leav-
ing the original welfare purpose 
intact.
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is more likely to want to work. On the one hand, the expected net wage de-
pends on factors of labour demand, such as the individual’s level of education, 
or their previous professional work experience; on the other hand, it depends 
on taxation of labour. Our analysis mainly focuses on the latter: how does a 
change in the tax burden on labour affect individuals’ willingness to work? 
For instance, if there is a decrease in the average rate of personal income tax, 
the wage of the (potential) worker increases while employer costs remain un-
changed, and the higher potential net wage can encourage people to give up 
more of their leisure in order to work.
Another similarly important factor is the accessibility and size of welfare 
transfers, since modern welfare states provide many benefits in order to com-
pensate for the lost wages. The common primary aim of unemployment benefits 
and parental and family benefits is to compensate for the lost labour income.4 
We do not discuss this primary function of transfers here. We only analyse 
their financial (dis)incentive effect in the simplified framework of this chap-
ter. This effect comes from the fact that individuals receiving a disposable in-
come while staying out of work face a loss of these transfers as well as having to 
give up leisure for wages when entering employment. Therefore, when making 
their decision, individuals do not simply consider the net wage, but the gains 
to work, which equals the difference between the net wage and the transfers 
lost upon entering employment.5
Non-labour incomes may have a substantial role in the participation deci-
sion. These incomes discourage entering employment, because they increase 
disposable income and thus, the demand for leisure (as long as it is a normal 
good). For instance, if the capital income (e.g. dividends) of an individual was 
high enough, they would be less likely to enter employment. Certain welfare 
provisions (e.g. family benefits) are also income-independent, that is, their 
amounts do not decrease with the earned wages. Thus, these must be added 
to non-labour incomes. Also, the per capita incomes of other workers in the 
same household are to be regarded as non-labour incomes. For instance, as is 
often the case, one adult in the family works (the husband, typically) and the 
other remains inactive, but her disposable income is not zero.
The other non-financial factors that affect labour supply mostly depend on 
individual preferences mentioned above. There are a number of factors beyond 
disposable income that can influence the level of utility obtained by working 
or staying out of work. First, the decisions of people in the same household as 
the given individual may affect individual preferences: married couples often 
coordinate their decisions, e.g. because of the sharing of domestic labour and 
related preferences, or the fact that they wish to spend their leisure time togeth-
er. Second, the well-being of children is also important to their parents, which 
alters preferences yet again. Third, working does not necessarily decrease util-
ity; it can even yield pleasure in the form of self-realization and social contacts, 
4 Besides decreasing income 
inequality and reducing and 
preventing poverty, transfers 
can help achieve other social 
outcomes, e.g. equal opportu-
nity, the exploitation of certain 
positive externalities (through 
the means of subsidizing e.g. fur-
ther education or a healthy diet), 
or the prevention of population 
decline.
5 Although their quantif ica-
tion is problematic and there-
fore, empirical studies typically 
omit them, the cost of claiming 
the various transfers and that 
of further related obligations 
should also be considered.
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which alters the shape of the preference curves of the basic model. It is clear 
from the above that preferences can change over time: a young person still in 
education, a middle-aged family man, a woman with children to be raised, or 
an older person approaching retirement age may all have different degrees of 
willingness to work.
Figure 3.1 shows the dilemma of the decision.
Figure 3.1: Labour supply decision at the extensive margin
Source: Benczúr et al. (2012).
Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between the potential consumption of an in-
dividual (c) and their time spent working (l). If they do not work at all (l = 0), 
their disposable income is T, which is the sum of available transfers, non-la-
bour incomes, and the share of the incomes of others in the household. As 
the individual begins to work, they lose some of their welfare benefits (ΔT) 
immediately, while their disposable income increases by the earned net wage 
(wl). Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that workers do not have absolute 
control over how much they want to work: for instance, they may only want to 
work one day of the week, but such positions are available only to a very limited 
extent. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that workers may only accept 
full-time positions. Thus, we restrict their decision to two possibilities: accept 
a full time position (l = l*), or stay out of work (l = 0).
It follows from the above that the budget constraint is nonlinear even in the 
case of a simple flat tax system: in the case of nonzero hours worked, the equa-
tion describing the disposable income of an individual is c = wl + (T – ΔT); in 
the case of zero hours worked, the labour income of the person in question is 
wl = 0, and their welfare benefits and other non-labour incomes are T.
Ui denotes the indifference curve in the figure: this is the set of points which 
yield the same level of utility to the individual. Note the indifference curve 
which intercepts the budget constraint at l* working hours: this shows the lev-
el of utility of a potential worker who decides to work. Should the person in 
question decide to stay out of work, curve Ui0 which passes through point T 
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applies. It is clear that in this simplified, stylised framework that a potential 
worker decides about their participation by comparing which of the above two 
indifference curves yields them the higher level of utility. Figure 3.1 shows two 
scenarios: in the case of wl labour-related income, the worker remains inac-
tive because curve Ui0 is higher than Ui, while at wrezl, he is indifferent about 
entering employment, since the two indifference curves are identical in this 
case. A person’s net wage obtained by working in this case is called the reser-
vation wage wrez, in other words, it is the lowest expected wage which makes 
them enter employment.
It is clear that the person in the above example would clearly prefer inactiv-
ity in case of an increase in the tax burden on labour (or consumption). Since 
the slope of the budget constraint decreases in this case (from wrez to w), at l* 
labour the new budget constraint intercepts indifference curve Ui, which is 
lower, therefore, consuming the gains to work yields a smaller utility surplus 
than leisure, which the individual has to give up upon entering employment.
In reality, the tax and transfer system is more complex of course; the budget 
constraint can take up many forms due to the various tax rates, credits, and 
benefits. For instance, if a welfare transfer is available for the working poor as 
well but its amount depends on the level of income, the budget constraint is 
broken into two segments.6
Thus, similarly to preferences, budget constraints and accessible transfers (or 
in the case of entering employment, lost transfers) can also greatly vary across 
individuals. Consequently, there are those who are working or looking for work 
(active population) and those who choose to remain inactive. It is mostly seen 
in the case of low-skilled, low-income individuals that the average effective tax 
rate at point l* is quite high due to the transfers (gradually) lost upon entering 
employment, and their potential labour-related income is barely above the al-
lowance. Clearly, in such a situation, the recipient of the benefit continues to stay 
out of work until they can surpass the level of utility granted by the allowance.
Despite its simplicity, the above framework illustrates the decision mecha-
nism well, and allows us to draw a number of simple, universal conclusions at 
this point:
1) The higher the non-labour income of a person, ceteris paribus the less prob-
able it is that they are looking for work. In this case, point T in the figure is 
high enough to grant the individual the suitable level of consumption and thus 
utility, and the consumption surplus brought about by working yields them a 
relatively smaller utility surplus.
2) The bigger the lost transfer (ΔT), the less the individual wants to work. The 
straight segment of the budget constraint starts at a lower level if ΔT is high, 
therefore, it intercepts an indifference curve which is lower at point l* – that is, 
working yields a lower level of utility than that indicated by the indifference 
curve passing through point T.
6 The current social assistance 
scheme in Hungary works in a 
similar fashion for those living 
in the household of the claimant: 
the claimant themself cannot 
work, or else they lose the provi-
sion, and the family members 
can work, but if their income 
is too high, the family loses the 
provision.
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3) The higher the net hourly wage of an individual (e.g. due to a higher level 
of educational attainment), the steeper the slope of the budget constraint, and 
the higher the possibility that an individual chooses to work.
The duration of job search
We borrowed the above simple model from neoclassical theory. The model tells 
us if a person with given preferences wants to work or not. There is either no 
involuntary unemployment in this simplified framework, or it is explained by 
exogenous frictions in the labour market.7 In reality, those who want to work 
cannot get a job instantly: they are to become unemployed for a certain period 
of time. Labour market frictions which cause unemployment can be interpret-
ed in the so-called search and matching models (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1999, and Morvay, 2012). Search and matching models supplement the neo-
classical model of labour supply on the extensive margin by making explicit the 
labour market frictions which cause unemployment.8 The probability of find-
ing a job is determined by the intensity of job search, the number of positions 
offered by firms, and the efficiency of the search. Although the possibility of 
modelling the participation decision is not excluded in them, most search and 
matching models do not consider inactivity (but assume that all who are out 
of work want to work), and mostly focus on explaining frictional unemploy-
ment. That is, despite their shared theoretical roots, the two literatures aim to 
explain different labour market phenomena.
Labour market activity, taxes, and transfers in Hungary
Manipulating labour supply is not the primary function of taxes and transfers 
– but their side effects on it may turn out to be substantial. In Hungary, nearly 
one third of the working-age population receives some sort of a benefit, while 
barely two thirds participate in the labour market: this suggests that analysing 
the relationship between the participation decision and transfers is especially 
justified in the case of Hungary.
The consistently low level of employment can be traced to several causes: 
the economic structure inherited from the socialist era, the regime change, 
demographic processes, and the misguided policy choices of successive gov-
ernments all played a role in it.9 Due to the generous welfare policies aimed 
at relieving the social tension which followed the regime change, nearly 
one third of the working-age population make their living from some sort 
of a welfare benefit – unemployment, maternity, disability, or early retire-
ment benefits (see Table 3.1).10 Their proportion quickly increased in the 
first few years after the regime change, and has only begun to show a slow 
decline in recent years. This was partly due to the tightening of the condi-
tions for retirement, and partly to the increase in the average level of edu-
cational attainment.
7 This assumption can give an 
“employed versus unemployed” 
nature to the participation deci-
sion of the individual. Later, a 
number of attempts to explain 
involuntary unemployment ap-
pear in neoclassical theory, such 
as sticky wages, or the efficiency 
wage.
8 In a nutshell, the model analy-
ses the optimal search strategy 
from the jobseekers’ aspect, with 
job offers of varying quality 
coming up at random points in 
time, and assuming that post-
poning the participation deci-
sion is costly.
9 See a detailed analysis by Köllő 
(2009) on the social structure 
inherited from the socialist era 
(more specifically, the share and 
skill level of the unskilled popu-
lation) and the role of the policy 
measures taken in the first years 
following the regime change, 
and an assessment of the policy 
decisions by Váradi (2012). Faze-
kas and Scharle (2012) review the 
processes of the period following 
the regime change.
10 See Tables 11.1–11.5 in Sec-
tion 11 (Welfare benefits) in the 
present volume of The Hungar-
ian Labour Market (Statistical 
Data) – Review and Analysis 
on the per capita amount of the 
various provisions.
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table 3.1: share of various welfare recipients in the 15–64 year old population, 
1990–2010
Year
Unemploy-
ment benefit
Social 
assistance
Pension (under 
65 years)
Disability 
benefit
Maternity 
benefit Total
Receives ben-
efit and works*
1990 0.4 0.7 15.9 1.8 3.6 22.5 n. a.
1995 2.3 3.7 17.5 3.2 4.4 31.3 6.6
2000 1.8 2.4 19.7 3.5 4.4 31.8 8.3
2005 1.5 2.3 18.1 3.6 4.3 30.0 9.6
2010 2.8 2.5 15.9 2.8 4.0 28.0 10.2
* Per cent of the 15–64 year old population receiving benefits.
Note: The unemployment benefit covers the insurance-based provision, while the so-
cial assistance includes means tested provisions for the working aged. It includes the 
school leavers’ allowance and provisions for the long term unemployed (depending 
on the year: jövedelempótló támogatás, rendszeres szociális segély, rendelkezésre 
állási támogatás, bérpótló juttatás). Pension includes disability pension as well, disa-
bility benefit includes recipients of other such non-pension provisions, and maternity 
benefits include insurance based and flat rate benefits (GYED, GYES, and GYET).
Source: Calculation by Duman–Scharle (2011) based on data from Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (KSH), the Employment Office (FH), and the Central Administra-
tion of National Pension Insurance (ONYF). Last column: calculation by Árpád 
Földessy, based on the Labour Force Survey conducted by KSH.
The role of disability pensions and maternity benefits (GYES-GYED-GYET) 
in providing a livelihood for those who do not work is far greater than that of 
unemployment provisions (in every age group for women, and for those above 
the age of 35 for men, see Köllő, 2009). All things considered, the system is 
dominated by provisions that encourage exit from the labour market.
The majority of welfare recipients are inactive, and most of them exit from 
the labour market either for a prolonged period, or for good. Figure 3.2 shows 
that in Hungary, the low willingness to work is mainly explained by the inac-
tivity of “transfer dependent” groups: the difference between the average par-
ticipation rate in the EU and that in Hungary is mostly due to the low-skilled, 
the older workers, and women of childbearing age.
Figure 3.2: the contribution of certain social groups to hungary’s participation rate 
deficit relative to the Eu average (percentage points, in 2011)
Source: Kátay (2009), updated.
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Empirical research on adjustment at the extensive margin
Most countries have quite complex tax and transfer systems in place; average 
tax rates (e.g. applicable at the average wage or the minimum wage) cannot ad-
equately capture the variety of components of these systems. Therefore, it is 
not only the heterogeneity of individual preferences which justifies the use of 
individual (micro-level) data, but also the complexity of the tax system.
Thus, the empirical (international) literature on adjustment at the extensive 
margin is mainly based on micro-level analyses. Three main approaches are used. 
The first one includes the reduced-form approach and the program evaluation 
methodology. Instead of aiming for a general picture of the labour supply of 
individuals, studies of this approach analyse the effects of particular measures 
that have already run their course. Consequently, most of them only consider a 
small portion of the population (the affected group), so that the general effects 
of comprehensive changes in the tax and transfer system cannot be inferred 
from it. Such is the paper of Dickert et al. (1995) which analyses the effects of 
the expansion of tax credits in the United States, on data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Eissa and Liebman (1996) wrote 
a similar paper using the Current Population Survey.11
The estimation of structural equation(s) is another well-known approach 
used in Kimmel and Kniesner (1998), Aaberge et al. (1999), and Meyer and 
Rosenbaum (2001), among others. Generally, results show that it is secondary 
earners (married women, for the most part) and the low-skilled who respond 
to changes in the tax and transfer system at the extensive margin. However, 
the empirical literature of the structural approach is incomplete in a number 
of ways. First, methodological differences make the comparison between esti-
mations problematic. Thus, elasticities vary across quite a broad range. Second, 
also owing to the methodological simplifications, the net wage elasticities are 
also unquantifiable in a number of cases and therefore these estimations can-
not be used for policy simulations or even welfare analyses. Third, most esti-
mations mainly focus on the tax system and either exclude the social welfare 
system altogether, or include it only in a very simplified form.
The third strand of the empirical literature uses life cycle models (see e.g. the 
summary by Keane, 2011). In contrast with the above, life cycle models do not 
simply consider the static decisions of individuals, but their dynamic decisions 
– made with expected future income and situation in mind – on their activ-
ity paths, which cover their whole lifespan. The advantage of this approach is 
that it can treat decisions on education or retirement in their full dynamics. 
To its disadvantage, however, the identification of its estimation parameters 
is less clear. In addition, due to its complexity, the estimation procedure re-
quires considerable processing power. Because of these reasons, most papers 
only consider a small portion of the population (married women, for the most 
11 See Moffitt (2002) for a more 
detailed review.
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part), and similarly to the second approach, do not present an overall picture 
on the differences between the various groups.
Detailed analysis of the adjustment at the extensive margin in Hungary
The first Hungarian studies which examine the extensive adjustment of labour 
supply for the total working-age population are descriptive in nature, therefore 
do not quantify the effects of the various factors – such as taxes and transfers – 
and address them only indirectly (Galasi, 2003; Nagy, 2000). The first empiri-
cal findings which include transfers as well were published by Kátay and No-
bilis (2009): the authors used a simple decomposition method to analyse the 
effects of demographic composition and recipient ratios for various transfers 
on the aggregate participation rate. Their results suggest that the consistent 
increase of the participation rate beginning in 1997 was primarily due to the 
tightening of the access to transfers (more specifically, the gradual increase in 
the statutory pension age and, later, the tightening of conditions for disability 
pensions), and secondly due to a steady increase in the average level of educa-
tional attainment. Although smaller in magnitude, the temporary tightening 
of the child care system in 1996 and the change in the demographic composi-
tion (caused by the “Ratkó-grandchildren”, a wave of baby boomers entering 
the labour market) also had a significant effect.
Benczúr et al. (2012) is considered the first Hungarian attempt at the struc-
tural approach and the simultaneous handling of taxes and transfers. Similar-
ly to previous studies, the authors find that the response to changes in the tax 
and transfer system is significant only in a number of well-defined groups: the 
low-skilled, those approaching retirement age, and married women of child-
bearing age. As shown above, these are precisely the groups that can explain 
the difference between the participation rate in the EU and that in Hungary.
Table 3.2. shows the most important results of the estimations made by 
Benczúr et al. (2012).12 The figures denote marginal effects and their standard 
errors, pertaining to a given group (i.e. computed from the average values for the 
given group). They show how the probability to participate changes for an indi-
vidual of a given group in percentage points, if their net wage or available wel-
fare provisions were to increase by 1%. “Whole sample” in part A means those 
aged between 15 and 74, while the full sample for part B contains only those 
aged between 25 and 54 (prime-age population). The first row clearly shows 
that the average worker is sensitive to changes both in net the wage (0.395) 
and in transfers (–0.1367).13 However, the effect weakens considerably (to 
0.127 and –0.054, respectively) for the prime age (25–54 year old) population.
The three subsequent rows show that educational attainment has a signifi-
cant effect on individuals’ responses to changes in the tax and transfer system. 
The difference between the groups of various attainment levels is even strong-
er if we only consider the differences among the 25–54 year old population. 
12 The three-step procedure 
used in the paper yields a probit 
model, in which the left-hand 
side variable is a dummy for 
participation (employment or 
unemployment vs inactivity), 
and the right-hand side contains 
the net surplus income of the in-
dividual obtained through work 
(gains-to-work), the non-labour 
net income which includes wel-
fare transfers as well, and other 
control variables. The first two 
steps serve to correct for the bias 
introduced by the fact that the 
wages of the unemployed is un-
known. The estimations were 
run on a pooled cross section 
database constructed from the 
Household Budget Survey of 
KSH for the years 1998–2008. 
The table shows marginal ef-
fects computed on the sample 
averages of the respective groups.
13 This means that a 1 per cent 
increase in the net wage is asso-
ciated with a 0.395 percentage 
point increase in the probability 
of participation, while a 1 per 
cent increase in welfare transfers 
reduces this probability by 0.136 
percentage points.
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Marginal elasticity is the highest for low-skilled workers, while the prime-aged 
with higher education are practically insensitive to changes.
table 3.2: conditional marginal effects for various subgroups  
of the working age population
Working-age population (A) Prime-age population (25–54) (B)
Net wage Transfer Net wage Transfer
Whole sample
0.395 –0.136 0.127 –0.054
(0.038) (0.013) (0.014) (0.006)
Educational attainment:  
Primary school or less
0.294 –0.093 0.409 –0.194
(0.089) (0.028) (0.040) (0.019)
Educational attainment:  
Secondary school
0.310 –0.118 0.122 –0.054
(0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005)
Educational attainment:  
Higher education
0.139 –0.045 0.050 –0.019
(0.015) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Older workers  
(older than 50 years)
0.392 –0.103
(0.065) (0.017)
Women of childbearing age  
(25–49)
0.231 –0.108
(0.021) (0.010)
Prime-age, single men
0.096 –0.038
(0.012) (0.005)
Prime-age, single women
0.168 –0.076
(0.019) (0.008)
Prime-age, married men
0.039 –0.016
(0.005) (0.002)
Prime-age, married women
0.290 –0.133
(0.025) (0.012)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Benczúr et al. (2012).
The last rows present the responsiveness of selected subgroups. These show 
that one of the most sensitive groups is that of older workers, who most likely 
decide about the timing of their retirement depending on the available pro-
visions and expected wages. Moreover, the estimations confirm that married 
women of childbearing age are also sensitive to taxes and available transfers.
The effect of various transfers on adjustment at the extensive margin
The shortcoming of Benczúr et al. (2012) is that it treats the various transfer 
elements (such as unemployment provisions or child care benefits) as a whole, 
thus it does not differentiate between these elements in terms of labour supply 
incentives. In reality, changes in the various transfers can have varied effects. 
We address these issues in the present section.
Existing Hungarian studies which analyse the labour market effects of pen-
sions and maternity benefits have not measured labour supply adjustment by 
participation but by the employment or entry rates of various groups. Never-
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theless, in the long run, participation can be approximated by employment, if 
1. wages are perfectly elastic in the long run, and 2. the state of unemployment 
is solely explained by temporary frictions.
The first indirect findings on the child care system in Hungary are from the 
cross-section estimation of Galasi (2003), who attempts to decompose the dif-
ference between the employment of men and women into components.14 It is 
shown that 64 per cent of the observed employment gap is accountable to the 
parameter effects of the number of children, i.e. the fact that the negative effect 
of having children on the probability of entering employment was stronger for 
women. Köllő (2009) and Szabó-Morvai (2011) analyse the consequences of 
the 1996 abolition and eventual reintroduction of the insurance based mater-
nity benefit (GYED),15 using the Labour Force Survey of KSH and the Turning 
Points of Life-Course survey. Their results show an increase in the re-employ-
ment probability for skilled mothers (who were most likely entitled to GYED 
before the change in regulations), but this effect was not significant (except for 
the year of 1997). The reintroduction of GYED did not affect the probability of 
finding employment in the first two years after childbirth, but in the third and 
fourth years there was a substantial decrease (Szabó-Morvai, 2011).16
Studies examining the labour supply effects of old-age and disability pen-
sions show a consistently substantial and negative effect. Köllő and Nacsa (2005) 
reveal the interrelationship between expected wages, disability pensions, and 
labour supply. They estimate the effects of various factors on the likelihood of 
a man aged between 44 and 62 and that of a woman aged between 44 and 58 
to be retired at the end of 2000. The parameters suggest very strong regional 
differences. For example, the likelihood of a man 5 years short of the age for re-
tirement was 37 per cent across the whole sample, but the same value was only 
18 for the most developed micro-region and 56 for the most disadvantaged 
one. In the case of women, the differences were somewhat smaller. All else 
being equal, the low-skilled and those living in micro regions with low wages 
were more likely to be retired, and those in rural regions were less so. A coor-
dinated decision between husbands and wives seems more common within 
families than substitution: willingness to retire is lower, not higher for those 
with a working spouse.
Finally, Cseres-Gergely (2008) estimates how present wages and expected 
pensions affect retirement, using individual panel data from the Household 
Budget Survey of KSH for the 1993–2000 period. His results indicate that a 
1 per cent increase in the expected income of staying in employment is associ-
ated with a 0.11–0.13 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of retirement, 
while the same increase in expected pensions increases the same likelihood by 
0.16–0.18 percentage points.
An earlier paper by Cseres-Gergely (2005) suggests that this effect is to a large 
extent accounted for by the tax regulations for pensions. A pensioner living in 
14 Estimated in a logistic regres-
sion, on a dataset constructed 
from the first quarter waves of 
years 1993–2000 of the Labour 
Force Survey of KSH.
15 GYED is available to those 
who worked before the birth of 
their child, and its sum depends 
on their previous wages.
16 The fact that the insured ma-
ternity leave is relatively gener-
ous may be an explanation in 
that it provides savings for the 
period after its depletion (that is, 
it has a certain delayed income 
effect), but it is also possible that 
the decreased willingness to re-
enter employment in the third 
and fourth years among those 
entitled to GYED is because they 
want another child (Köllő, 2012).
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a typical family loses up to one quarter of their net income upon retirement, 
which is partly compensated for by the pension itself and partly by the fact that 
it is tax-free. The shift in individual incomes is almost exclusively determined by 
the previous two sources of income: other sources or casual work is rare. This 
shift does not influence the income of the spouse: the level and structure of 
their income is the same after the retirement of their spouses as it was before. 
Accordingly (and since other household incomes, e.g. from petty farming re-
main unchanged as well), per capita household income decreases by even less: 
13 per cent on average.
The effect of transfers on the timing of entering employment  
and the probability of finding a job
Individuals who choose to work do not become employed automatically. As 
we mentioned before regarding the duration of the job search, the timing of 
entering employment and job search cannot be analysed within the traditional 
model of labour supply; these decisions can be interpreted within the aforemen-
tioned search and matching models instead. These models consider a number 
of effects – the duration of job search and the quality of matching between 
jobs and workers – in a unified framework. Transfers have opposing effects on 
these two outcomes: they increase the unemployment period but at the same 
time increase the quality of the match. In this subchapter we only consider the 
former, negative effect, see box on the latter.
Empirical estimations based on search and matching models are not directly 
comparable to extensive supply estimations which analyse the participation de-
cision, because their subjects are different. However, effective policy responses 
can only be designed considering the results of both areas, since the current 
level of employment is affected by both the rate of participation (and supply) 
and the probability of finding a job. Therefore, we present a short review of 
the existing results of estimations on the probability of finding a job and the 
timing of accepting job offers.
Most existing Hungarian studies are based on reduced-form estimations 
which measure the probability of entering employment among the registered 
unemployed, and the timing of exits. They exploit the quasi-experimental situ-
ations created by the successive reforms starting in the 1990s, and the detailed 
and relatively easily accessible database of the Employment Office. In theory, 
estimations based on the search and matching model can capture demand con-
straints (such as the quantity of vacancies) and the effectiveness of the search 
as well as the factors which affect supply (the intensity of the job search). How-
ever, the estimations in Hungarian studies compare the behaviour of groups 
of the same productivity (which expect wage and job offers of the same distri-
bution) who only differ in terms of the amount or duration of the unemploy-
ment benefit they are entitled to.
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Unemployment benefits may keep the reservation 
wage higher than optimal, and thus can increase 
the period of unemployment, but at the same time 
they help job seekers find the position most suited 
to their abilities, thus making the worker–employer 
match more effective. Besides solidarity, this is the 
strongest argument for mandatory state unemploy-
ment insurance. This is because such an insurance 
would not work on a market basis, while it is the only 
way to ensure that workers who lack the savings to 
support a family and themselves can still search for 
a new job with the appropriate care. Benefit pay-
ments also make sense even if the problem could be 
tackled by taking out a loan, because many people 
cannot realistically assess their future opportuni-
ties or are unable to secure an adequate loan due to 
a dysfunction in the capital markets.
Chetty and Looney (2006) estimated that in both 
the United States and Indonesia, food consumption 
is reduced by 10 per cent if the main earner becomes 
unemployed. This shows that households can com-
pensate for the most part of the income loss result-
ing from unemployment: this finding suggests that 
17 This result somewhat refined 
the previous estimation by 
Micklewright and Nagy (1998) 
in which they did not control 
for the effect of recalled work-
ers. This is due to the fact that 
the effect of the tightening was 
measured by a comparison to 
the employment probabilities of 
two groups of benefit recipients: 
those who became unemployed 
just before and immediately af-
ter the reform. This introduced a 
bias because the share of work-
ers recalled to their previous job 
(for seasonal work) was higher 
among new entrants, and these 
recalled workers have a higher 
chance of entering employment. 
See a more detailed review of the 
analyses on the effect of this and 
similar reforms in Wolff (2001) 
and Cseres-Gergely and Scharle 
(2012).
18 Also controlling for the ef-
fect of the higher re-entry rate 
of recalled workers.
The positive effect of transfers on the labour market
the welfare gain resulting from the implementation 
of a formal unemployment insurance system should 
be low. However, in the case of Indonesia, it should 
also be taken into account that people use inefficient 
methods to avoid their consumption declining with 
their income (in technical terms: they smooth their 
consumption). Generally, if consumption does not 
closely follow the changes in income because people 
are highly risk averse, then public insurance would 
provide significant welfare gains by eliminating in-
efficient adaptation strategies, such as reducing hu-
man capital investments (Chetty and Looney 2005).
So far there is only one Hungarian study on the 
positive effect of unemployment insurance: Galasi 
(1996) analyses the effect of the amount of the un-
employment benefit on the intensity of job search, 
using data for 1992–1995 of the household panel 
of TÁRKI. His estimates reveal that a larger ben-
efit amount is associated with greater intensity in 
searching for a job, in the case of men. Thus, a larger 
benefit improves the chances of finding a job, since 
more intensive job search is likely to increase the 
frequency of job offers.
In the past twenty years, five papers have been published on the insurance-
based unemployment benefit and four on the allowance for the long-term un-
employed, and neither of them revealed a substantial negative effect on labour 
supply. For instance, in a study of those who exhausted their entitlement to the 
unemployment benefit, Micklewright and Nagy (1998) find a sudden increase 
in the re-employment rate of claimants immediately after they exhausted the 
benefit – suggesting that some of them found a job earlier, but delayed the en-
try –, but the affected group is only 2–3 per cent of the cohort under analysis. 
Wolff (2001), the most prudent of the three studies dealing with the reform of 
1993, finds no effect of a combined decrease in the replacement rate (the bene-
fit divided by the previous wage) and in the benefit duration in the case of men, 
and only a minor positive effect in the case of women.17 Köllő (2001) estimated 
the effects of the benefit amount using data from the Unemployment Register 
of the Employment Office and survey data gathered in the spring of 2001.18 Ac-
cording to his results, the replacement rate does not affect re-employment, but 
there is a slight increase in the probability of entry at the end of the entitlement 
period. However, the effect is only substantial for a minor fraction of the un-
employed (those with a high school degree or higher). Micklewright and Nagy 
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(1998), pertaining to the spring of 1994, estimated the largest disincentive effect 
out of the four papers which analyse the benefit for the long-term unemployed: 
they find that entitlement to the benefit is associated with a 0.144 decrease in 
the probability of entering employment in the case of men (0.157 in the case of 
women). Further estimations show smaller effects, but the differences are mi-
nor, and can be explained by changes in either the willingness to work (a shift 
in preferences) or in the entitlement conditions for the benefit, or by small dif-
ferences in the estimation procedures.
Conclusion
The primary function of taxes and transfers is to provide funding for public ex-
penditure, redistribute earned incomes on value-based terms, and compensate 
for labour income loss. Although their effect on labour supply is unintended, 
it deserves special attention, since it can jeopardise the sustainability of the 
economy. A detailed understanding of these supply side effects is a precondi-
tion to maintaining a sustainable welfare system.
This chapter explored how the tax and transfer system affects the participa-
tion decision of individuals, and how it enhances or reduces the intensity of 
job search and the entry into employment.
Hungarian empirical studies reveal that the labour supply effect of the tax 
and transfer system can be significant among certain groups: Benczúr et al. 
(2012) find that mainly the low-skilled, the older workers, and married wom-
en are sensitive to taxes as well as transfers, as opposed to prime-age workers 
with higher education who are practically insensitive to such changes. Due to 
the all-inclusive nature of the estimation method, this result cannot ascertain 
whether the entitlement (access) to the various transfers or the amount of the 
transfer (compared to expected wages) has the stronger effect on participation. 
Thus, it remains unclear whether a tightening of entitlement conditions or a 
reduction in the benefit amount is better suited for increasing participation.
Estimations on the various transfers seem to confirm the former: there was 
no substantial increase in the re-entry rate of mothers resulting from the abo-
lition of the insured maternity leave in 1996 (which meant a reduction in the 
amount, since everyone remained entitled to the flat rate leave), while studies 
on old-age retirement and the increase in retirement age (which tightened ac-
cess) found a significant labour supply effect.
Results on the timing of entering employment and the probability of find-
ing a job add further support: the papers which analyse the timing of entering 
employment following a cut in unemployment provisions find no significant 
positive effect on labour supply.
Finally, though it is not discussed in this volume, we must note that the 
primary function of transfers is not the creation of incentives for labour sup-
ply, but the redistribution of incomes. Therefore, reducing their disincentive 
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4. microsimuLAtion As A tooL For AssEssing thE impAct  
oF tAx chAngEs
Dóra Benedek, Gábor Kátay & Áron Kiss
Microsimulation makes it possible to take into account differences across 
households in the impact assessment of government measures. Heterogeneity 
may be important for two reasons. First, measures may affect different house-
holds differently (e.g., high and low-income households, families with and 
without children, etc.). Second, different households may respond differently 
to the same policy measure. Microsimulation modelling makes it possible to 
quantify the effect of heterogeneity. Using the results of the previous two chap-
ters on labour supply, this chapter analyses how changes in the tax and transfer 
system affect labour supply and macroeconomic performance.
Microsimulation as a tool
What is microsimulation?
Microsimulation is a modelling tool that can be applied in the analysis of the 
effects of economic policy measures at the level of economic units (individuals, 
firms, households).1 The modelling is based on a database providing detailed 
information on a sample of economic units such as the age, gender, and earn-
ings of an employee; or the number of employees and annual revenue of a firm, 
etc. The first step in the impact assessment of an actual or hypothetical govern-
ment measure is to calculate how the changes affect the individual economic 
units. For example, in the analysis of personal income taxation, microsimula-
tion modelling begins with calculating the tax liability for each taxpayer be-
fore and after the changes. The total tax revenue is then calculated by aggre-
gating the tax payable by individuals, weighted by population weights. Given 
that the unit of analysis is the individual, the simulation can take into account 
the interactions between various elements of the tax system, for example how 
a taxpayer’s child tax credit is affected by changes in the rules of another tax 
credit. Such exercises cannot be conducted – or only less accurately – without 
microsimulation. This is why microsimulation is important in the ex ante im-
pact assessment of government measures.
The use of microsimulation models has become increasingly widespread in 
policy making and policy analysis in the last two decades. They allow policy 
analysts to assess the redistributive impact of planned reforms, i.e., the analysis 
of which social groups win and which ones lose as a result of a policy change. 
1 This paper only discusses mod-
els used for the analysis of tax 
and transfer systems, although 
microsimulation modelling is 
also used in other areas.
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Microsimulation models allow one to study the effects of complex reforms (for 
example the overhaul of the whole family support system) as well as changes af-
fecting only one element of the system [such as a targeted increase in the child 
tax credit or the introduction of a 0% tax rate as a substitute to the employee 
tax credit (ETC)].
The two key elements of a microsimulation model are thus a database rep-
resenting the population and a set of rules decsribing the tax and benefit sys-
tem. These two determine the accuracy of the model. The database can be of 
two types: it may be a survey or an administrative database. The Household 
Budget and Living Conditions Survey (in Hungarian: Háztartási költségvetési 
és életkörülmény-adatfelvétel, HKÉF) of the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office (in Hungarian: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, KSH) is an example for 
the first, while the representative sample of individual tax returns from the 
National Tax and Customs Administration (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Adó- és 
Vámhivatal, NAV) is an example for the second. Both types of data have ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Surveys typically have a smaller sample size which 
makes estimation errors larger; also, sample selection and misreporting may 
cause systematic measurement errors. On the other hand, the advantage of 
surveys is that they provide information about the household, as opposed to 
just the individual. Administrative databases in turn are larger but they often 
provide information only about the individual and no information on other 
members of the household (at least this is the case in Hungary). Furthermore, 
administrative data sources only have information that is strictly related to 
the purpose of the public data collection at hand. It is possible, although far 
from sure due to the nature of the issue, that survey data include information 
on undeclared income and work. As a consequence, the decision which type of 
data to use should be made in the light of the research question. If the focus is 
on changes in taxation then the administrative database is usually the better 
choice. However, if the analysis focuses on taxation and transfers simultane-
ously, then information about the family is probably necessary, therefore the 
appropriate data source will be a survey such as the HKÉF.
Microsimulation models can be divided into static and dynamic models. The 
former are based on the simplifying assumption that economic actors do not 
change their behaviour in response to reforms, while the latter takes such be-
havioural reactions into account.2 Although in reality economic agents may 
change their behaviour in response to measures, static models can still be use-
ful. Firstly, they are sometimes the only tool we have in the absence of reliable 
empirical estimates for the behavioural response. Secondly, even if there are em-
pirical estimates of the parameters describing behavioural responses, it is not al-
ways easy to assess the estimation error and its impact on the simulation results. 
The assumptions underlying static simulation are simpler, and its weaknesses 
more transparent, which can be an advantage when interpreting the results.
2 This type of dynamic micro-
simulation is also often referred 
to as behavioural microsimula-
tion. Some of the literature uses 
the term dynamic microsimu-
lation in a more specific sense: 
it is used to describe long-term 
models, typically used for the 
long-term analysis of social se-
curity systems, that take into 
account the aging of generations.
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The development of microsimulation modelling
One of the first microsimulation models (TAXSIM) was developed by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in the USA at the end of the 
1970s (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). Currently, most developed countries use 
microsimulation models both in public administration and in research insti-
tutes3 particularly for the impact assessment of policy proposals. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, various microsimulation models are used: PenSim2 is 
used for the analysis of the pension system (Emmerson et al. 2004), the Policy 
Simulation Model is used for the analysis of proposed changes in the tax and 
benefit system, and a number of universities and research centres, such as the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), have their own models. The Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, CPB), which 
plays the role of a fiscal council, has a multi-purpose microsimulation model, 
MIMOSI (Romijn et al. 2008). Microsimulation has been used in the US to 
analyse the potential impact of different health care reform proposals on the 
proportion of the uninsured (Gruber, 2005, 2008, and Gruber and Levitt, 
2000), the employment incentives of family taxation in Germany (Steiner and 
Wrohlich, 2004), and different scenarios of pension reform in Belgium (Des-
met et al. 2007). Most of these models take into account behavioural effects. 
Finally, the EUROMOD model should be mentioned: a model that covers 
EU Member States and makes it possible to carry out static microsimulation 
and comparative analysis of countries. There is also an extension for a limited 
group of Member States for dynamic analysis.
Microsimulation modelling has developed in two important directions in 
recent years (see for example Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2005, and the over-
view by Williamson et al., 2009). On the one hand behavioural effects, particu-
larly labour market behaviour is increasingly incorporated into the simulation 
(see for example Aaberge et al., 2000, Blundell et al., 2000, Creedy and Duncan, 
2002, and Immervoll et al., 2007), in parallel with the increasing emphasis 
on economic incentives in economic policy. While these models have mostly 
concentrated on the adjustment of labour supply at the intensive margin, i.e., 
adjustment of working hours, more recent research tries to take into account 
the extensive margin as well, i.e., entry to and exit from the labour market.
Another important development in recent years has been the integration of 
micro- and macro approaches in economic policy modelling by the combina-
tion of microsimulation and “computable general equilibrium” (CGE) mod-
els. By linking microsimulation to macro models it is possible to take into ac-
count indirect macroeconomic feedback effects and thus quantify the overall 
economic effects of policy changes. The microsimulation module ensures that 
the analysis also takes into account household heterogeneity. Therefore, as op-
posed to traditional macro models, the analysis is not based on the assumption 
3 Some models, mainly used in 
Anglo-saxon countries are avail-
able at microsimulation.org.
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of one, or a few, representative households. Although commonly this approach 
was applied to developing economies, various studies used it in the analysis of 
taxation in developed countries, such as Aaberge et al. (2004) to explore the 
effect of ageing on the sustainability of public finances in Norway; Arntz et 
al. (2008) to analyse the hypothetical reform of the German welfare system; 
and Fuest et al. (2008) and Peichl (2009) to analyse the hypothetical intro-
duction of a flat income tax in Germany. Davies (2009) provides a survey of 
the linked microsimulation-CGE approach, while the topic is also picked up 
by the special issue of an international journal focusing on microsimulation 
(Bourguignon et al. 2010).
Microsimulation analyses in Hungary
The history of microsimulation in Hungary dates back to around 15 years 
ago; the method has however gained ground in recent years. The first tax 
and benefit microsimulation model was developed by the research institute 
Tárki for the Ministry of Finance in 1997 (Szivós et al. 1998). Later, Tár-
ki and the Ministry of Finance cooperated to develop the microsimulation 
model “TÁRSZIM” in the first half of the 2000s. This model is based on a 
database that links data from tax returns to the HKÉF. This model was used 
by Benedek and Lelkes (2005) to analyse the effect of the introduction of a 
hypothetical flat tax in Hungary. The Ministry of Finance also developed its 
own model, HKFSZIM (Benedek et al. 2009), based solely on the HKÉF. 
At the same time, Ecostat also created microsimulation models to analyse 
the Hungarian tax and benefit system (Ecostat, 2009, Cserháti et al., 2007, 
2009). The “HKFSZIM” model was developed further by the Office of the 
Fiscal Council by incorporating the adjustment of labour supply at the inten-
sive margin, and by an attempt to link microsimulation to the macro model 
of the Fiscal Council (the two models were linked by manual iteration). The 
extended HKFSZIM model was used by the Fiscal Council to analyse the ef-
fect of proposals regarding the tax system (Fiscal Council, 2010, Benedek and 
Kiss, 2011) and for own research projects. One of these projects, by Gáspár 
and Varga (2011), analysed the incidence of non-performing mortgage loans 
during the economic crises, assessing the relative importance of contributing 
factors such as job losses and the depreciation of the currency. The analysis 
conducted simulations to estimate the ratio of non-performing loans under 
different economic scenarios.
Four other Hungarian studies used microsimulation to analyse the effect of 
tax changes, however these did not develop a full-fledged model. One of these 
is the study by Bakos, Benczúr and Benedek (2008) that estimated the elastic-
ity of taxable income and simulated, using the elasticity, the effects of the in-
troduction of a flat income tax. Kiss and Mosberger (2011) used a simulation of 
a tax increase on high earners to illustrate the economic significance of their 
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estimated taxable-income elasticity. More complex microsimulation calcula-
tions were presented by Benedek and Kiss (2011) using partly static, partly dy-
namic microsimulation methods. Finally, Benedek and Lelkes (2011) used a 
microsimulation approach to estimate the impact of tax evasion on income 
redistribution (see Chapter 6 of In Focus – I).
A microsimulation tool
The rest of this chapter uses a microsimulation model created by Péter Benczúr, 
Gábor Kátay and Áron Kiss in Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB, the central bank 
of Hungary) to analyse hypothetical and actual economic policy measures (for 
a detailed description of the model see Benczúr et al. 2012a; the first results 
of the model were published in a non-technical paper in the MNB Bulletin, 
Benczúr et al. 2011).
The model has two important differences compared to microsimulation 
models used previously in Hungary. First, it takes into account labour supply 
adjustment both at the intensive and extensive margin; second, the microsim-
ulation module is embedded in a small macro model, which means that long-
term, general-equilibrium effects of government measures can be analysed. 
Two elements of the modelling strategy can be viewed as contributions to the 
international literature: 1) the way adjustment on the extensive margin is taken 
into account, 2) the full integration of the macro model and microsimulation 
that is made possible by the simplicity of the macro model.
Before moving on to the analysis, the main characteristics of the model are 
described. The model is based on the 2008 wave of the HKÉF. The use of the 
household survey is necessary because the model aims to analyse the effects of 
the whole tax and benefit system. Although it would be possible to use a more 
recent wave (the 2009 and 2010 waves are available at the time of the writing 
of this chapter), these are snapshots of an economy in recession. Considering 
that the dynamic effects calculated by the model are long-term, representing a 
hypothetical transition “from equilibrium to equilibrium”, data from the last 
year prior to the crisis appeared to be a better choice.
The income distribution observed in HKÉF data – particularly at high in-
come levels – does not correspond to that observed in administrative data; 
therefore an income correction step has been carried out before the simula-
tion. Income reported by taxpayers in the HKÉF was multiplied by a percen-
tile-specific correction factor at high income levels.
The model explicitly simulates labour supply adjustment at both the inten-
sive and extensive margin. Labour supply adjustment on the intensive margin 
is identified with the elasticity of taxable income, as estimated by Bakos et al. 
(2008) and Kiss and Mosberger (2011) (see Chapter 2 of In Focus – I). We cal-
culate the marginal and average tax rates for each tax payer before and after 
the tax changes; the adjustment at the intensive margin occurs by allowing 
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the taxpayers to increase or decrease their reported income to the extent cor-
responding to the estimated elasticities.
Identifying the labour supply adjustment at the intensive margin with the 
elasticity of taxable income is a natural choice from the perspective of a fiscal 
analysis, but may be questioned from a macroeconomic perspective. It is an er-
ror to equate these two concepts if the taxable income elasticity is not caused 
by any real economic adjustment (changes in the number of hours worked or 
work intensity) but rather simply by tax optimisation such as “relabeling” of 
income. There are two reasons why we assume that the elasticity parameters 
largely represent real labour supply adjustment. First, the estimated parame-
ters are considerably lower in Hungary than in other countries where the tax-
able income can be significantly reduced by applying deductions (such as the 
United States), and it does not differ significantly from estimates of the taxable-
income elasticity on broader definitions of income in the US that are harder 
to manipulate by the taxpayer. Our estimated parameters are also consistent 
with earlier international studies that estimated the elasticity of labour supply 
(number of hours worked) directly (see for example Meghir and Phillips, 2010). 
Second, as discussed in Chapter 2 of In Focus – I, the taxable income elasticity 
of individuals with wage income only is not lower than that of other groups 
in our estimations, whereas these individuals are probably the least likely to 
engage in tax optimisation practices.
The modelling of adjustment at the extensive margin is based on estimates 
by Benczúr et al. (2012b). The approach and the results are presented in detail 
in Chapter 3 of In Focus – I, therefore only a brief overview is provided here. 
Apart from individual characteristics, willingness to work is influenced by the 
amount of income an individual can expect to receive when working or out of a 
job. The difference between these two is the “gains-to-work”: this is lower than 
the wage income for those who lose eligibility for certain benefits when they 
take up work [an example is the child care benefit (“gyed”)]. For those who are 
in employment the simulation determines, based on the relevant rules, what 
transfers they would be eligible for if they were not working. For those who are 
out of work the wage they would be offered on the market is estimated. Then 
the model computes the gains-to-work for each individual and it calculates, 
based on the relationship estimated by Benczúr et al. (2012b), the probability 
of being active, given each individual’s age, gender and other characteristics. 
The microsimulation model thus calculates the labour supply shock resulting 
from a change of the tax and transfer system as a sum of two components: ad-
justment at the intensive and the extensive margin.
The labour supply shock thus calculated serves as an input into a small macro-
economic model that calculates how changes in labour supply affect real wages, 
the capital stock and output in the economy. The macro model is a long-run, 
neoclassical model of a small, open economy. In the long run capital is nearly 
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perfectly mobile internationally, or put differently, differences in the (risk-ad-
justed) returns between countries are nearly completely equalised. Therefore 
the supply of capital is highly elastic in the model. In addition to the capital 
supply equation, another element of the macroeconomic model – based partly 
on micro-based estimates and partly on calibration – is a production function 
of the economy. In equilibrium, wages are equal to the marginal product of la-
bour, as derived from the production function. The production function also 
influences the long-term substitutability of capital and labour.
Long-run equilibrium wages, as determined in the macro model, influence 
the long-term supply of labour: thus the behavioural microsimulation is repeat-
ed based on the output of the macro model; then, using the resulting labour 
supply shock, the macro model is re-run. This iterative process is continued 
until equilibrium is reached, that is, until the wage development on which the 
microsimulation is based corresponds to the macroeconomic consequences of 
the labour supply shock that is the result of the microsimulation.
The microsimulation model can, with relatively few components, assess the 
long-run labour supply and fiscal implications of changes in taxes and trans-
fers. The main components are the labour supply elasticities (themselves based 
on empirical estimates) and the small macroeconomic model assuming a very 
elastic adjustment of capital supply. However, there are a number of impor-
tant considerations that the model does not take into account. These should 
be kept in mind when interpreting the results. The most important limita-
tions are the following:
1) The macroeconomic model is suitable for comparative statics exercises; the 
dynamics of the transition path to the new equilibrium cannot be analysed.
2) Also following from the static character of the macro model, it does not 
explicitly model the consumption-savings decision of households (and the lev-
el of consumption does not feed back into other relationships of the model). 
Consumption (and VAT revenue) is thus calculated by the model based on a 
simplifying assumption that households spend their total disposable income. 
On the short run this means that we overestimate consumption and VAT rev-
enue; in the long run, however, it may be a more acceptable approximation.
3) The model is not closed from the side of the state; thus budget deficit (and 
debt) does not affect the sustainability of government finances via interest rates. 
This is less of a problem for a static macro model than it would be for a dynamic 
model; nevertheless, when interpreting the results it must be kept in mind that 
the model does not take into account the implications for fiscal sustainability 
of various sets of measures.
4) Calculations of the employment effects are based on the assumption that 
group-specific unemployment rates observed in 2008 represent equilibrium 
unemployment levels; the micro-mechanisms of search-and-matching in the 
job market are not, however, modelled in detail. This may be a relevant ommis-
in Focus – i. taxes, transFers and laBour market
122
sion if some labour market reforms affect the mechanisms of job search-and-
matching. For instance, if the duration of unemployment assistance is too short, 
job seekers might be less likely to find suitable job opportunities. A less effec-
tive labour-market matching has a negative effect on economic efficiency. The 
model does not take these considerations into account; it focuses exclusively on 
the incentive effect of transfers, that is, that transfer cuts induce individuals to 
search more intensively for a job. This means that the model may overestimate 
the positive long-term effect of transfer cuts on employment.
5) The model treats different types of labour (skilled and unskilled, for in-
stance) as “perfect substitutes”. This means that the model assumes that all job 
seekers will eventually find employment at the equilibrium wage rate (subject 
to a group-specific equilibrium unemployment level). It also follows that rela-
tive labour costs are assumed to correspond to relative productivity levels. The 
model ignores the possibility of a structural mismatch between labour supply 
and demand in terms of education, experience, or regional distribution. Al-
though this assumption makes sense in the very long run, it may result in over-
estimating the employment effect of transfer cuts because it is uncertain that 
individuals – even if they want to find a job – have the same likelihood of find-
ing employment as seemingly similar workers already employed.
6) Point 4 and 5 highlighted factors that might lead to the model overesti-
mating the long-run employment effects of transfer cuts. It should be added 
that the long-run approach of the model hides the fact that transfer cuts reduce 
aggregate demand and therefore slow down growth in the short run (particu-
larly in a weak cyclical position). We also note that transfer cuts increase the 
inequality of income distribution; this effect can be evaluated by the model 
(for detailed calculations see Benczúr et al. 2011, 2012a).
7) The model is based on the assumption that real wages are perfectly flexible 
over the long term. This assumption guarantees that all labour supply shocks 
increase employment. If wages cannot adjust for some reason, the excess labour 
supply leads to an increase in unemployment rather than the expansion of em-
ployment. The assumption of perfectly flexible wages means that the effects 
of a minimum wage policy cannot be evaluated in the model. The minimum 
wage puts a legal limit on downward wage adjustment, reducing the employ-
ability of low-productivity workers (its effect can however be eroded in the long 
run if it is increased at a slower pace than the rate of general wage inflation).
8) Our framework does not explicitly model the behaviour of the self-em-
ployed and the informal sector (for more on the informal sector see Chapter 6 
of In Focus – I). The labour supply elasticities that are used in the model (par-
ticularly in the case of adjustment at the intensive margin) are mainly related 
to employees (rather than entrepreneurs). This means that in the simulations 
we make the implicit assumption of unchanged behaviour on the part of the 
self-employed. With regard to the informal sector, the main issue is that it 
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is unclear whether undeclared work is at least partly observed in the survey 
data of the HKÉF. If only legal employment is observed in our data, than our 
simulation results are valid for declared employment, while the fiscal effects 
are estimated without distortions. If, however, respondents in the HKÉF 
also report undeclared work, then the results concerning employment will 
reflect both declared and undeclared work, while our estimated fiscal effects 
will be less accurate. The simulated employment effects may be accurate even 
in this case because the estimation of adjustment on the extensive margins 
is based on the HKÉF data (see Benczúr et al. 2012b); that is, the estimation 
and the simulation relate to the same indicator of employment, itself prob-
ably close to the official employment statistic calculated based onKSH’s La-
bour Force Survey.
Analysis of changes in the tax and transfer system
This section aims to answer three questions with the help of the microsimula-
tion model. 1) First, a flat-rate income tax system is compared to three alter-
native tax systems in which groups of low-income earners face lower tax rates. 
2) Second, revenue-neutral reform packages are compared to see which one is 
more friendly to economic growth and employment. 3) Finally, the long-term 
effects of actual measures introduced since 2010 are simulated.
There is some overlap between the analyses presented here and our previous 
analyses published in the MNB Bulletin (Benczúr et al. 2011); however, the 
analysis has been updated to reflect policy measures adopted or proposed since 
the publication of that article. While both this paper and the MNB Bulletin 
article focus on specific actual reform packages, Benczúr et al. (2012a) aims to 
provide a detailed, and more technical, description of the model rather than a 
detailed analysis of hypothetical or actual reform packages. Only the simula-
tions of revenue-neutral scenarios (i.e., point 2) above) and the results reported 
in Table 4.4 are taken from that paper, without substantial changes.
The employee tax credit and its alternatives
Table 4.1 displays the results of three scenarios. In all three the benchmark is 
a hypothetical, pure, flat income tax system (with a tax rate of 16%) without 
any employee tax credit or child tax credit, in which taxable social transfers 
and benefits are taxed as “independent” income (non-wage income). All oth-
er aspects of the tax system are based on rules that were in force in 2010. This 
benchmark is chosen for three reasons. First, apart from the child tax credit, it 
is close to the ideal tax system as envisaged by the current Hungarian govern-
ment. Second, the simplicity of the benchmark makes it very easy to analyse 
the partial effects of single policy measures without the interference of con-
founding elements. Finally, since the social transfers are taxed as independent 
income, as opposed to wage income, the employee tax credit does not decrease 
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the tax payable after them. Therefore, the employee tax credit only reduces the 
taxes payable after wages. As will be shown this is an important difference com-
pared to the tax credit system that had been in force until 2011.
The first pair of columns present the effects of a simple employee tax cred-
it as compared to the benchmark tax system. The employee tax credit makes 
wage income tax exempt up to the minimum wage – a monthly income of 
HUF 73,500 (approximately EUR 270) in 2010. With a tax rate of 16% the 
maximum amount of the employee tax credit becomes HUF 11,760. The em-
ployee tax credit is phased out at a rate of 10% starting right at the minimum 
wage. The static fiscal effect of the employee tax credit thus specified – con-
siderably less generous than the actual tax credit between 2003 and 2011 – is 
approximately HUF 180 billion, roughly equivalent to the cost of job protec-
tion measures being introduced in 2013 (see below). While its employment 
effect is considerable – two per cent – it increases effective labour and GDP to 
a lesser extent suggesting that those newly entering employment are mainly 
low-skilled, low-productivity workers. The large employment effect is mainly 
due to the fact that the tax credit can only be used on wages, thus the financial 
gains to employment increases substantially for low earners, which creates in-
centives to take up employment.
The scenario in the second pair of columns achieves the tax exemption of in-
comes up to the minimum wage through the introduction of a zero-per-cent 
lower tax rate. The difference between the zero-rate version and the tax credit 
is that all tax-payers (even the high earners) benefit from the zero rate since it 
is not phased out. This also means that this scenario is considerably more ex-
pensive for the government budget than the employee tax credit. To correct 
this, the upper tax rate must be set in a way that the cost of this reform pack-
age is roughly equal to the first scenario: in this case, the marginal tax rate on 
income above the minimum wage is 24 per cent instead of 16 per cent.
Table 4.1 shows that the zero-rate version performs worse in every aspect 
than the tax credit: in addition to a significantly lower employment effect, it 
has a negative impact on effective labour, capital and GDP. The reason for this 
is that the higher, 24% marginal tax rate has a negative impact on higher earn-
ers’ labour supply at the intensive margin.
The third pair of columns show the estimated impact of the targeted employer-
contribution relief included in the government’s “Job Protection Program” as 
effective in 2013. As part of these measures, workers aged under 25 or over 55 or 
those in manual occupations (“category 9” of the Hungarian occupation clas-
sification system FEOR, based on the international system ISCO) are eligible 
for a 14.5 percentage point employer-contribution relief after wages up to HUF 
100,000 for two years; women returning to work after receiving child care ben-
efits are entitled to a 27 percentage point employer-contribution relief on wages 
up to HUF 100,000 forints for two years (and a relief of 14.5 percentage points 
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for an additional year). As argued in Chapter 3 of In Focus – I, the contribution 
relief actually targets groups with a low employment rate whose labour supply 
probably responds sensitively to incentives at the extensive margin. The previous 
two scenarios have been calibrated to have a similar static fiscal impact to the 
“Job Protection” measures. The results indicate that although employer contri-
bution relief has a considerable impact on employment, it is still lower than the 
effect of the employee tax credit presented in the first two columns. At the same 
time, its dynamic effect on the government budget balance is more favourable.
table 4.1: tax credit and its alternatives
Employee tax credita,b Zero lower rate with a higher regular ratea
“Job Protection” 
measuresa,c
static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic
Macroeconomic effects (difference from the benchmark in per-cent, levels)
Effective labour 0.9 –0.6 0.6
Employment 2.0 1.3 1.0
Capital stock 0.7 –0.5 0.5
GDP 0.8 –0.6 0.6
Gross average wage –0.1 0.1 1.6
Disposable income 2.4 1.5 1.4
Fiscal effects (HUF billion, 2010 prices)
Personal income tax –185 –185 –177 –199 0 30
Employee contributions 0 9 0 –8 0 35
Employer contributions 0 19 0 –16 –185 –142
Taxes on consumption 35 44 32 27 0 26
Taxes on corporations 0 5 0 –4 0 4
Taxes on sales 0 4 0 –3 0 3
Transfers 1 25 1 8 0 9
Change of budget balance –150 –79 –144 –194 –185 –37
a Compared to a flat tax of 16% without any type of tax credits.
b Social transfers are not eligible for the employee tax credit.
c The following groups are eligible for an employer-contribution relief. Workers aged 
under 25 or over 55 and those in occupations of “category 9” in the Hungarian oc-
cupation classification system (FEOR, based on the international system ISCO): 14.5 
percentage points after a gross monthly wage of up to HUF 100,000 for two years; 
women returning to work after receiving child care benefits: 27 percentage points 
after a gross monthly wage of up to HUF 100,000.
Note: Positive changes of budget balance indicate an improvement and negative fig-
ures a deterioration of the balance. The estimate of the VAT revenue is based on a 
simplified assumption.
This should not be taken to mean that any type of employee tax credit must 
do better than any set of targeted incentives. One of the most important argu-
ments in favour of targeted incentives is that they may help to filter out workers 
whose earnings are underreported (officially earning the minimum wage but 
receiving payments in cash), and thus may help reduce tax avoidance. Anoth-
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er argument for targeted incentives may be that they are not phased out, thus 
they do not increase marginal tax rates in the phase-out region – even though 
the hypothetical employee tax credit in our simulations is phased out at lower-
to-middle income levels and (as argued in Chapter 2 of In Focus – I) marginal 
tax rates have minimal or no effect on the labour supply at those income levels. 
An argument in favour of tax credits, in turn, may be that low market wages 
define sufficiently well which groups need incentives: it is likely that many peo-
ple who are out of employment would earn relatively low wages: not enough to 
compensate for lost transfers and other non-labour income. Increasing their 
gains-to-work may target the incentives just right.
In this comparison the difference between the employee tax credit and the 
“Job Protection” measures is due to two main reasons: On the one hand, the tax 
credit affects a larger number of low-paid workers and exactly those to whom it 
matters most in terms of relative income. On the other hand the “Job Protec-
tion” measures provide contribution relief to other workers for whom the in-
centive effect is not relevant (such as higher-paid women returning after mater-
nity leave or the highly skilled and highly paid employees under 25 or over 55).
Revenue-neutral reform packages
The three scenarios presented in Table 4.2 describe policy packages that have 
a nearly neutral fiscal effect. The simulations were taken from the working pa-
per by Benczúr et al. (2012a). The benchmark in this case is the tax system of 
2008. The first pair of columns present an across-the-board Personal Income 
Tax (PIT) cut financed by an increase of the Corporate Income Tax (CIT). The 
second scenario assumes that the PIT cut is financed by transfer cuts, more 
specifically the elimination of the possibility of early retirement. In the third 
pair of columns a similar transfer cut is combined with a cut in the CIT.
The first pair of columns indicate that a revenue-neutral package consisting 
of an across-the-board PIT cut and a CIT increase has a negative impact on the 
GDP. The reason is that capital supply is almost perfectly elastic in our model, 
whereas the reaction of labour supply to changes in taxation is a lot less elastic. 
Therefore, increases in labour supply that result from lower personal income 
taxation cannot counterbalance the decline in capital supply brought about by 
the increase of capital taxation, and therefore total production declines. How-
ever, the manner in which the PIT cut is implemented is important. Increased 
revenues from a higher CIT tax might make it possible to cut the PIT in a tar-
geted way so as to achieve a positive overall GDP-effect.4
In the scenarios presented in the second and third pair of columns income and 
capital tax cuts are financed by cuts to social transfers. For the model, transfer 
cuts mean savings for the government budget and increasing labour incentives 
at the same time. Other, potentially counterveiling effects of transfer cuts are 
not taken into account in the model (see our discussion of the model’s limita-
4 If the PIT cut is concentrated 
at high incomes, there might be 
cases when the GDP impact of 
the increased labour supply re-
sulting from adjustment at the 
intensive margin is greater than 
the decline in output caused by 
the increase in the CIT.
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tions above for more detail). Therefore in this simple framework transfer cuts 
have a clear and positive effect on both the labour market and the budget. The 
results suggest that employment increases more if the budget savings from 
transfer cuts are spent on PIT relief, while the capital stock and GDP increase 
more if they are spent on CIT relief.
table 4.2: revenue-neutral policy packages
CIT increasea  
and PIT cutb
Elimination of early 
retirementc and PIT cutb
Elimination of early 
retirementc and CIT cuta
static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic
Macroeconomic effects (difference from the benchmark in per-cent, levels)
Effective labour 0.7 4.4 3.7
Employment 0.1 4.1 3.9
Capital stock –6.7 3.6 10.1
GDP –1.9 4.1 5.9
Gross average wage –3.2 –0.3 2.8
Disposable income 1.3 2.8 1.4
Fiscal effects (HUF billion, 2010 prices)
Personal income tax –253 –318 –260 –195 –7 146
Employee contributions 0 –30 1 53 1 84
Employer contributions 0 –70 0 103 0 173
Taxes on consumption 46 21 3 46 –42 22
Taxes on corporations 234 204 0 26 –234 –178
Taxes on sales 0 –9 0 19 0 28
Transfers 0 1 241 255 238 249
Change of budget balance 27 –201 –14 307 –44 523
a The CIT increase was calibrated as an increase of the effective tax rate on capital 
from 0.073 to 0.098; a CIT cut is calibrated as the effective tax rate decreasing to 
0.048.
b The lower PIT rate (up to HUF 1.7 million) is reduced from 18% to 14.5%, while the 
upper PIT rate is reduced from 36% to 32.5%; the “extraordinary” top PIT rate (from 
HUF 7.137 million) decreases from 40% to 36.5%. The ETC makes the minimum 
wage PIT-exempt: its rate remains equal to the lower PIT rate thus its maximum 
monthly amount is reduced to HUF 10,005.
c In the scenario where the possibility of early retirement is eliminated, retired people 
under the pension age in our sample lose their entitlement to old age pension in our 
simulations. In this case static numbers should be interpreted as long-term effects 
without behavioural reactions.
Note: Positive changes of budget balance indicate an improvement and negative fig-
ures a deterioration of the balance. The estimate of the VAT revenue is based on a 
simplified assumption.
The long-term macro-economic impact of measures introduced since 2010
The next set of simulations assesses the long-term impact of policy measures 
introduced in the past two years (2013 measures are taken into account as of 
August 2012, the closing of the Hungarian version of In Focus – I). Some of 
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these measures affect indirect taxes (on consumption, transactions or corpo-
rate income) that do not have a direct effect on labour market incentives; the 
intentional simplicity of the macro module should be taken into account when 
interpreting the simulated effects of these measures.
table 4.3: the impact of measures introduced between 2010 and 2013
Changes in PIT  
and contributionsa Changes in transfers
b Other tax changesc
static dynamic static dynamic static dynamic
Macroeconomic effects (difference from the benchmark in per-cent, levels)
Effective labour 5.0 1.5 0.0
Employment 0.6 2.6 0.3
Capital stock 4.1 1.2 –0.1
GDP 4.7 1.4 0.0
Gross average wage 1.2 –0.1 1.3
Disposable income 7.3 –0.1 –4.2
Fiscal effects (HUF billion, 2010 prices)
Personal income tax –420 –340 0 8 0 30
Employee contributions 131 226 –22 –5 0 17
Employer contributions –184 –48 0 31 –139 –124
Taxes on consumption 57 132 –18 –2 361 377
Taxes on corporations 0 30 0 9 –104 –105
Taxes on sales 0 21 0 6 171 171
Transfers 0 7 115 132 0 4
Change of budget balance –416 28 75 180 289 370
a Elimination of “super-grossing” and the employer tax credit tax credit, abolition of 
non-taxable transfers, introduction of a flat income tax at a 16 per cent rate, expand-
ed child tax credit, introduction in 2013 of the “Job Protection Program”, increase of 
employee contributions.
b Cuts to the amount and maximum duration of the unemployment benefit, extended 
duration of the less generous type of child care benefit (“GYES”) to up to the third 
birthday of the child.
c The simulation was calibrated based on information available in August 2012. Con-
sistently with the government’s publicly communicated intentions it was assumed 
that only one-third of the 2011–2012 bank tax would be made permanent. As of Jan-
uary 2013, this no longer reflects the government’s official policy. Other tax changes 
in the period of 2010–2013 include cuts in the CIT, increases in the VAT and excise 
duties, the introduction of a tax on phone calls and text messages, the introduction 
of a tax on financial transactions, increases in the tax on company cars and the tax 
on insurance policies, the estimated extra revenue from the planned introduction in 
mid-2013 of an electronic road toll system, and the introduction of an optional new 
tax regime for small businesses.
Note: Positive changes of budget balance indicate an improvement and negative fig-
ures a deterioration of the balance. The estimate of the VAT revenue is based on a 
simplified assumption.
The first pair of columns in Table 4.3 present the impact of changes to wage 
taxes and social security contributions (both on the employee and the employ-
Benedek, kátay & kiss: microsimulation as a tool...
129
er side). Overall, the measures appear to have the biggest effect by improving 
incentives for high earners, and to a lesser extent by promoting employment 
through the general PIT rate cuts, the extention of the child tax credit and the 
“Job Protection” measures.
The flat, 16 per-cent rate PIT significantly reduced the effective marginal tax 
rate for high income earners leading to considerable adjustment at the inten-
sive margin in the simulation. Additional labour supply is gradually absorbed 
by labour demand through the adjustment of the wage rate, resulting in an in-
creased level of effective labour (only a small part of which is new employment, 
while most is the reflection of adjustment at the intensive margin), capital and 
output. The elimination of the employee tax credit would, on its own, lead to 
a 2 per cent decline in employment, but other measures like the general PIT 
cut, the “Job Protection” program and the expanded child tax credit turn the 
overall effect into modestly positive territory. The balance of the elimination 
of the employee tax credit and the “Job Protection” program in terms of em-
ployment is simulated to be around minus one per cent, consistent with the 
results presented in the first sub-chapter, although it should be kept in mind 
that savings from the abolition of the ETC considerably surpass the cost of the 
“Job Protection” program. One reason why the ETC was relatively less efficient 
is that it could be credited against some government transfers (transfers taxed 
as wage income are typically insurance-type transfers like the unemployment 
benefit and some maternity benefits), thus its elimination was a tax increase 
and a transfer cut at the same time. In contrast, the targeted employer contri-
bution relief affects only income from actual work.
Moving to the second pair of columns, the cuts in the amount and duration 
of the unemployment benefit significantly increase employment in our simu-
lation; as we noted above, this result should be considered as an upper estimate 
and treated with great caution. The model takes into account only the finan-
cial incentive effect of transfers and ignores all other, potentially relevant ef-
fects. These might be particularly relevant in the case of the unemployment 
benefit: while reducing the duration of the assistance creates a stronger incen-
tive for job search, and thus might reduce the reservation wage of job seekers, 
the matching of employees and employers might be affected negatively if the 
duration of the assistance is too short.5
The last pair of columns indicate the cumulative effect of other changes that 
are not directly related to labour taxation and transfers. The reduction of la-
bour taxation (first pair of columns) and the CIT of businesses with revenue 
lower than HUF 500 million (approximately EUR 1.85 million) were offset 
mainly by increases in taxes on consumption (including the VAT, excise du-
ties, the part of the new taxes on financial transactions and telecommunication 
services that falls on household consumption) and to a lesser extent by taxes 
paid by businesses on their inputs which we interpreted as taxes on sales (the 
5 Most of the structural unem-
ployment is the result of such 
labour market frictions and 
inefficiencies.
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part of the new taxes on financial transactions and telecommunication ser-
vices paid by businesses as well as additional charges related to the introduc-
tion of the electronic road toll system).6 Despite the positive budget balance, 
the overall impact on the real economy is almost neutral because value-added 
type consumption taxes have a more limited impact on the real economy than 
labour and capital taxes. The moderate positive employment effect is due to 
the new options introduced in the taxation of small businesses. However, due 
to technical limitations, this was modelled in a very simplified way, as the re-
duction of the effective employer contribution rate from 27% to 16% to a spe-
cific group of businesses.
The cumulative effect of all measures assessed is displayed in the first pair 
of columns of Table 4.4. Individual measures may strengthen or weaken each 
other’s effect, therefore the cumulative effect may be different from the sum of 
effects in Table 4.3 (for example, the elimination of the ETC after the transfer 
cus has a lower impact on the transfer side and will thus have a greater nega-
tive effect on employment). The balance of effective labour, capital and GDP 
is clearly positive, the employment effect largely caused by the simulated effect 
of the unemployment benefit cuts: in a simulation without these measures em-
ployment would decline by 0.13 per cent.
table 4.4: the full 2010–2013 package and hypothetical risk-premium shocks
Measures between 2010–2013 Risk premium of +50 basis points
Risk premium of 
+100 basis points
static dynamic dynamic dynamic
Macroeconomic effects (difference from the benchmark in per-cent, levels)
Effective labour 4.6 4.3 3.0
Employment 2.6 1.5 0.9
Capital stock 3.7 –5.5 –15.4
GDP 4.3 0.9 –3.5
Gross average wage 2.3 –1.6 –5.4
Disposable income 1.7 –1.1 –4.5
Fiscal effects (HUF billion, 2010 prices)
Personal income tax –405 –319 –374 –440
Employee contributions 105 205 141 67
Employer contributions –293 –164 –257 –368
Taxes on consumption 404 504 441 366
Taxes on corporations –103 –76 –120 –170
Taxes on sales 169 195 174 147
Transfers 103 119 113 109
Change of budget balance –20 463 117 –290
Note: Positive changes of budget balance indicate an improvement and negative fig-
ures a deterioration of the balance. The estimate of the VAT revenue is based on a 
simplified assumption.
6 In the calibration of the model 
we calculated an effective tax 
rate on consumption, including 
both value-added and transac-
tion-type taxes. While the first 
influences only real labour in-
comes, the latter influences both 
real labour and capital incomes.
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The third and fourth columns of Table 4.4 present scenarios where, in addition 
to the effects of the complete set of economic policy measures, the required 
return on capital invested in Hungary goes up by 50 or 100 basis points. The 
required  return can increase as a result of a riskier economic environment or 
if investors consider sectoral surtaxes, the effective nationalisation of private 
pension funds or retroactive taxation as signs of a permanent increase in uncer-
tainty. It is not surprising that in a small open economy capital is very respon-
sive to increases in the required  return on capital, and a downward adjustment 
of the capital stock results in the decline of output and wages. The increase of 
the required returns has a more moderate impact on the labour market: an in-
crease of 100 basis points reduces effective labour supply by just over 1.5 per-
centage points, while changes in the capital stock and GDP are much greater. 
According to these admittedly simplified calculations, an increase of 80 basis 
points in the required return wipes out the potential growth-enhancing effect 
of all other measures within the last two years.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has provided an overview of the international and Hungarian ap-
plications of microsimulation methods and briefly presented the microsimula-
tion model created by Péter Benczúr, Gábor Kátay and Áron Kiss at MNB. This 
model has been used to analyse the employment and macroeconomic effects of 
hypothetical and actual changes to the Hungarian taxes and transfer system.
Summarising the findings of the different impact assessments, the first part 
compared three alternative ways of promoting the employment of low-income 
groups that are characterised by a low employment rate. It has been shown that 
the introduction of a zero per cent tax rate up to the minimum wage performs 
less well than if the minimnum wage is made tax exempt by an employee tax 
credit. Using a simple parametric example it has been shown that a limited 
employee tax credit that can be credited only against wage income (and not 
against government transfers) and is phased out rapidly above the minimum 
wage (two aspects in which this particular variant is more restrictive than 
the actual ETC in Hungary between 2003 and 2011) would probably have a 
higher employment impact with a similar static fiscal cost than the “Job Pro-
tection Program” entering into force in 2013. In terms of employment level, 
the balance of the elimination of the ETC and the introduction of the “Job 
Protection Program” is approximately minus one per cent, although the fiscal 
balance of both measures is positive. The relatively small employment effect of 
the ETC compared to its cost is mainly due to the fact that until 2011 it could 
be credited against some government transfers, thus its elimination meant a 
PIT increase and a transfer cut at the same time.
The second set of simulations analysed the impact of revenue-neutral poli-
cy packages. The simulations have shown that the increase of capital taxes in 
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a small open economy (where capital supply is nearly perfectly elastic in the 
long run) has a significant negative impact on both the capital stock and out-
put. Therefore, while financing labour tax cuts by capital tax hikes increases 
effective labour, it has a negative impact on GDP. Transfer cuts always have a 
positive impact in our model because they mean savings for the government 
budget and improved work incentives for the groups affected at the same time. 
As we have discussed in detail, this is due to the fact that the model only takes 
into account the role of transfers as financial incentives and ignores potential 
negative countervailing effects.
Finally, we have attempted to assess the potential long-term macroeconomic 
effects of the most important tax and transfer measures introduced in the pe-
riod of 2010–2013. In the simulations the strongest effect of the policy pack-
age is to improve incentives for high earners and thereby increase the effective 
labour supply at the intensive margin. The employment impact of the whole 
policy package is moderate: the effect of tax changes is somewhat negative; the 
only substantial positive effect in the simulations appears to come from the 
cuts of the unemployment benefit. A permanent increase of the expected re-
turn on capital investments could easily turn negative the growth-enhancing 
effects of all other measures combined.
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5. LAbour dEmAnd EFFEcts oF tAxEs And trAnsFErs
5.1 A theoretical framework for measuring labour demand effects
Árpád Földessy & Ágota Scharle
In the standard model of economics, the wage elasticity of labour demand de-
pends on the elasticity of substitution between the factors of production (cap-
ital and labour), the price elasticity of the final product, the share of labour 
output within the total production cost, and the price elasticity of the other 
factors of production.1 Thus, the labour demand of a firm mainly depends on 
the price of its product, the wage level, and the productivity of the workers. It 
will hire additional labour until the return on their product (marginal pro-
ductivity) is higher than the wage cost. The wage elasticity of labour demand 
in the long run (when capital adjusts as well) equals the elasticity of substitu-
tion between labour and capital.2
In reality, the labour market is more complex than the above model, for sev-
eral reasons. Human labour, which is the product on this market, is insepara-
ble from the people who do the work; therefore, supply and demand does not 
only depend on wages. People are not all alike, and employers cannot always 
measure their exact productivity. Firms often operate on non-competitive mar-
kets, which make them monopolies to some extent, and as such, they can in-
fluence the prices of their products and/or the level of wages as well. The state 
regulates the labour market much more thoroughly than others: it determines 
the terms of layoffs and the maximum of working hours, it levies various taxes 
and contributions on wages, and sets the minimum wage. These peculiarities 
increase the cost of hiring and firing – for both parties.
This chapter explores the labour demand effects of social security contribu-
tions, which are one of the main tools of state regulation of the labour market. 
The ensuing subchapters briefly summarise earlier empirical evidence and pro-
vide a more detailed account of recent results.
In order to place these results into a common conceptual framework, let us 
return to the simple model presented in Figure 1.2 of Chapter 1 (Introduc-
tion), which shows employment on the horizontal axis, and wage on the ver-
tical axis.3 The demand curve is downward sloping: the higher the total wage 
cost, the lower the number of workers employed by the firm. The supply curve, 
however, is upward sloping: the higher the net wage, the higher the number of 
people who want to work. The two panels of the figure differ in the wage elas-
ticity of labour demand: a given change in wages induces a smaller increase in 
1 For the derivation of the labour 
demand curve see e.g. Bosworth 
et al. (1996).
2 To be precise: this statement 
assumes a two factor CES pro-
duction function with constant 
returns to scale.
3 The next couple of paragraphs 
are based on Scharle et al. (2010).
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labour demand in the right panel (i.e. the elasticity is lower). Market equilib-
rium occurs where demand equals supply at a given wage (point A in the figure, 
L0). At this point, the total cost of labour equals the net wage (w0).
Figure 5.1.1: Equilibrium of labour demand and supply with a unit tax on labour
Let us now introduce a unit tax of T. In this case the new equilibrium occurs at 
the employment level (L1) where the difference between the gross and the net 
wage equals the tax (T = B1 – B2).4 Without supply and demand adjustment, 
public revenue would equal T × L0, but the introduction of the tax decreases 
employment, therefore, the actual revenue is going to be T × L1 < T × L0.
How is the newly introduced tax burden shared between workers and em-
ployers? The figure shows that the gross wage increases by (w1gross – w0), while 
the net wage decreases by (w0 – w1net), and their relative magnitude depends on 
the relative slope of the demand and supply curves.
The existing empirical evidence suggests that the wage elasticity of labour 
demand in Hungary is in the middle range by international comparison. Al-
though Köllő (1998) finds a relatively low parameter value (–0.17) for the pe-
riod following the regime change, later studies based on micro-level data re-
veal an elasticity of around –0.5 and –0.8, in line with comparable estimates 
for mature market economies (Kőrösi, 2002a). Jakab and Kaponya (2010) use 
macro-level data for VAR-estimations and find a long-term partial effect of a 
similar magnitude (–0.67). The elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour can also be identified using the investment equation, since – maintain-
ing the assumption of a neoclassical environment – the price elasticity of cap-
ital demand equals the elasticity of substitution between inputs. According 
to an estimation based on the investment equation in Kátay and Wolf (2004), 
this long-term elasticity is –0.8, which is close to the estimates based on a la-
bour demand equation.
The elasticity of demand for labour is highest at low wages – i.e., among the 
low-skilled. Kertesi and Köllő (2003) analyse firms’ labour demand for 2000–
4 This result is independent of 
the legal incidence of the tax (i.e. 
who should be paying it) – see 
also Subchapter 5.5.
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2001 with models distinguishing between three types of labour (unskilled, 
young–skilled, and older–skilled). The demand for unskilled labour (workers 
with lower secondary education or less) is much more elastic to wages: in the 
short run, a 1 per cent increase in wages is associated with a 0.4 per cent decrease 
in the demand for labour by firms, while this decrease stays below 0.2 per cent 
for skilled labour. These values are relatively low, but fall within the normal 
range for developed market economies (Hamermesh, 1993). The time series 
analyses of the demand for blue- and white-collar labour by Tarjáni (2004) 
for the years between 1992 and 2002 yield similar results.5 Thus, a decreasing 
of tax burdens is likely to affect the employment of the low skilled, which is 
where the gap between Hungary and the EU 15 is most apparent.
The four subchapters of this chapter extend these findings in three separate 
directions. Subchapter 5.2 reviews the results of earlier studies on wage subsi-
dies. Subchapter 5.3 – by presenting the results of a new paper – analyses how 
targeted wage subsidies for specific groups of workers affect the labour demand 
for the given group. Subchapter 5.4 reviews the options for differentiating the 
minimum wage – which functions as a lump-sum tax on unskilled labour – in 
order to reduce its negative effect on demand. Finally, Subchapter 5.5 gives a 
brief review of the international literature on the effect of social security con-
tributions depending on whether they are paid by workers or employers.
5.2 The impact of previous wage subsidy programmes  
on employment
Péter Galasi & Gyula Nagy
Few studies examined the impact of wage subsidy programmes on employment 
in Hungary in the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. The 
main characteristics of these studies are reviewed by Cseres-Gergely and Scharle 
(2012) (particularly: Table 7.A2, p. 171). This chapter provides a brief overview 
of the main findings of these studies.
Wage subsidy programmes were characterised by the following in the given 
period: employers were eligible for a subsidy of up to half of the wage cost for 
a maximum period of one year if they hired workers who had been registered 
as unemployed for at least six months (in the case of new entrants for at least 
three months) and retained them in work for at least twice the duration of 
the subsidy. Each year approximately 10–30 thousand people participated in 
wage subsidy programmes (October closing headcount) in the given period, 
and three months after leaving the programme 60–70% of participants were 
in non-subsidised employment (MTA KTI, 2012).
The first programme impact evaluation using control groups took place in the 
mid-1990s (1995–1997) as part of a project funded by the World Bank. In ad-
dition to research, the World Bank project also concentrated on development 
5 See also Galasi (2002) on la-
bour supply in Hungary and 
Kőrösi (2002b, 2005) on labour 
demand.
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and created the monitoring system for active labour market measures in the 
employment office. The findings of this research are presented here based on 
O’Leary (1998).
In addition to wage subsidies, the research also included other programmes. 
The sample was selected from the unemployed register and the sample consisted 
of 1,000–1,500 participants per programme. The number of participants in 
the control group was approximately 4,500 people. All programme and control 
group samples were representative. The first observation took place in the sec-
ond quarter of 1996 and the second observation in the first half of 1997. This 
design allowed registering the labour market status of all participants in pro-
gramme and control groups at two distinct time points, as well as any changes 
over a minimum of six months.
Four outcome indicators (that measured the impact of programmes) were 
defined: 1) the individual was employed in a non-subsidised job or was self-em-
ployed at any point during the observation period (Job1); 2) the individual was 
employed or self-employed with or without support at any point during the ob-
servation period (Job2); 3) the individual was employed in a non-subsidised job 
or self-employed at the second observation (Job3); 4) the individual was em-
ployed or self-employed with or without support at the second observation (Job4).
The impact of programmes was measured using three methods. All esti-
mation methods were based on the assumption of conditional independence, 
thus the methods did not deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween groups.
First, the means of the outcome variables for programme participants (treat-
ment) and control groups were compared (unadjusted programme effect). In 
reality this method does not measure the effectiveness of programmes because 
the results include the effects of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity 
between groups; however they are useful as a comparison with the results of 
other methods to see how well they dealt with the effect of differences in the 
composition of groups.
Second, the impact of programmes was estimated using regressions: with 
the outcome variable on the left, other observed variables on the right and a 
dummy variable of programme participation. In this case the programme im-
pact is indicated by the coefficient of the programme participation variable 
estimated with different regression procedures. The procedure was repeated 
with an added interaction variable on the right side that indicated whether the 
participant received any other assistance from the job centre in addition to the 
programme. The estimation was carried out using the method of least squares; 
when estimating successful job finding as a dependent variable this is known 
as “linear probability model” in the literature.
Third, the impact of the programme was estimated using the method of 
matched pairs. The essence of this method is that each participant in the treat-
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ment group is matched with at least one participant from the control group 
who is identical or very similar in terms of observable indicators. If the match-
ing is successful, the impact of the programme is the mean difference between 
the values of the outcome variable of the matched pairs. The similarity or the 
difference of individuals is computed using a method estimating multi-di-
mensional distance. In this case Mahalanobis distance was used to calculate 
the distance between individuals.
Around 35 descriptive variables indicating the participants’ socio-demo-
graphic characteristics, educational attainment, previous labour market history, 
previous and current occupations, and desired occupations, the characteris-
tics of household (demographics, number of children, household income) and 
dummy variables for counties were used as independent or matching variables.
Table 5.2.1 gives a summary of the estimated values of main programme ef-
fects and their significance. Negative values and non-significant estimates in-
dicate that the programme has no positive impact on a specific outcome vari-
able as measured by a certain method.
table 5.2.1: wage subsidies – net programme effects
Wage subsidy
effect t value
Unadjusted effect
JoB1 0.17 9.96
JoB2 0.24 14.42
JoB3 0.20 11.90
JoB4 0.21 12.60
Adjusted effect using regression
JoB1 –0.09 4.68
JoB2 0.00 0.06
JoB3 –0.02 1.12
JoB4 0.00 0.11
Effect calculated using matched-pairs method
JoB1 –0.10 5.57
JoB2 –0.02 1.32
JoB3 –0.02 1.23
JoB4 –0.01 0.31
Job1: the individual was employed in a non-subsidised job or was self-employed at 
any point during the observation period. Job2: the individual was employed or self-
employed with or without support at any point during the observation period.  
Job3: the individual was employed in a non-subsidised job or self-employed at the 
second observation. Job4: the individual was employed or self-employed with or 
without support at the second observation.
Source: O’Leary (1998).
Only positive and significant effects suggest that the programme had a measur-
able and quantifiable impact on a specific outcome indicator as measured by a 
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given method. The programme outcome indicating the success of job finding 
can be interpreted as the estimated mean difference between the employment 
probabilities of the two groups.
The unadjusted effects are significant and positive; or to put it differently, 
programme participants are more likely to obtain employment than the con-
trol group. However, if we control for the effect of observed variables– using 
regression or matched pairs methods –, then these effects partly disappear or 
change direction (significant and negative). Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the observed job finding advantage among participants of wage subsidy 
programmes compared to the control group is due to the more favourable ob-
servable characteristics of the participant group. Thus the programme has no 
positive impact on the employment probabilities of participants.
The impact of wage subsidy on job finding was also addressed by other studies 
(Galasi, Lázár and Nagy, 1999, Galasi and Nagy, 2005); however these cannot 
be considered programme impact evaluations because they did not use control 
groups and their estimation methods (limited dependent variable models and 
duration models) are not suitable for calculating programme effects.
The study by Galasi, Lázár and Nagy (1999) was based on the empirical da-
tabase used by O’Leary (1998) and set out to measure the relative success of 
three active programmes (wage subsidy, business start-up and public works) 
concentrating on the observable characteristics of participants. The outcome 
variable was the probability of job-finding among participants. Job-finding 
was defined as an unemployed person taking up non-subsidised employment 
or working as self-employed in their own business.
The authors estimated a logistic probability (logit) model where the probabil-
ity of job-finding was on the left and on the right were age groups, educational 
attainment (binary variable), binary programme variables (reference: public 
works) and the methods used for job search. In addition they added a binary 
variable to the explanatory variables, the value of which was one if after leav-
ing the programme the individual claimed unemployment benefit, and zero 
in all other cases. The model also included some household characteristics of 
the participants (such as household income, number of dependants and family 
members in employment) as well as the employment rate of the “small region” 
to indicate the local labour market situation.
The model is suitable to assess the impact of each programme on the prob-
ability of job-finding independently from the observed characteristics of par-
ticipants and the local labour market situation. The parameter estimation for 
the binary programme variables suggested that both business start-up and 
wage subsidy programmes are more effective than public works (as measured 
by the probability of job-finding), and business start-up subsidy is more effec-
tive than wage subsidy.
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Galasi and Nagy (2005) examined trends in the employment probability 
of the long-term unemployed taking part in wage subsidy and training pro-
grammes over a four-year period between 2002 and 2005, using the monitor-
ing database of active measures. Here only findings related to wage subsidy 
programmes are presented. In the monitoring of active measures information 
about the employment situation of the individual was collected using survey 
methods at the end of the third month after exit from the programme. There-
fore in a way it measured the short-term impact of programmes. This survey 
did not have a control group, however information was available about partic-
ipants in each programme. For participants of wage subsidy programmes the 
follow-up questionnaire was answered by employers. The questionnaire only 
asked whether the individual was still employed by the same employer at follow 
up. (There was no information as to whether the individual worked elsewhere.) 
Therefore the remainder discussed the probability of being retained in work.
Around 62–64% of participants leaving the programme were retained in 
work. It is possible that some of those who were not retained by their employ-
er in the programme found employment elsewhere; therefore the results pro-
vided information about the lower limit of employment probability. Even if 
there had been information on the job-finding of all programme participants, 
given the short time scale of the evaluation between exit and follow-up, this 
would have only measured the short-term impact of the programme. Another 
issue was the high rate of non-response: 23–28%. Therefore there might be a 
selection bias in the final sample, and for this reason the authors estimated the 
probability of being retained in work using a binomial probit model. Techni-
cally this estimates two equations – returning the questionnaire and employ-
ment – the error terms of which are correlated with each other if there is a self-
selection bias. Statistical tests indicated that the assumption of self-selection 
was indeed correct in most cases. On the right side of the “retention in work” 
equation were gender, educational attainment, age, occupation, counties, lo-
cal unemployment rate and the duration of the subsidy (less than 180 days, 
180–270 days, 271–360 days, 361–540 days, more than 540 days). Estimations 
were carried out for each year and also pairs of years (2002–2003, 2004–2005).
Findings indicated that there was a weak but significant correlation between 
gender and the probability of being retained in work. Women were slightly 
more likely to be retained by their employers than men. The relationship was 
stable over time and women’s advantage in terms of job retention was around 
three per cent. The effect of age was significant and positive in each year, the 
youngest age group (under 25) was less likely to be retained in their job than 
other age groups; there were no systematic (permanent over time) differences 
between the retention probabilities of other age groups.
The authors found significant differences also by educational attainment, 
using primary school education as a reference for comparison with other edu-
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cation levels. Programme participants without completed primary education 
were the least likely to be retained in work and higher than primary education 
was an advantage in most cases. Most equations indicated that those with a vo-
cational secondary education had the highest relative chances, and those with 
a tertiary education had no, or diminishing, advantage over time compared to 
participants with a primary education.
As far as the duration of the wage subsidy was concerned, wage subsidies that 
lasted 180–270 days were associated with higher probability of retention than 
wage subsidies for less than 180 days. This was the only stable result over time: 
all parameters are positive and significant. Apart from this, there were many 
non-significant parameter estimates that suggested that the duration of the 
wage subsidy had no impact on the probability of retention. There were only 
two occupations that were significantly associated with retention in work af-
ter exit from the programme. The estimation of parameters in all equations 
was negative and significant for semi-skilled occupations (such as jobs in ma-
terial handling, janitor, clerical assistants), and similar results were found for 
manual labour jobs in the construction industry.
Finally, in less favourable labour market conditions (indicated by a higher 
local unemployment rate) the probability of retention declined. This relation-
ship was very strong each year, however it was getting somewhat weaker over 
time, and (the absolute value of) the parameter decreased: while in 2002 it was 
nearly –0.72, in 2005 only –0.30.
Summarising briefly the main findings of studies looking at the impact of 
wage subsidy programmes, two main conclusions can be put forward: first, 
according to the only programme impact evaluation study in Hungary these 
programmes did not improve employment chances in the mid-1990s; second, 
there were differences in the probability of being retained in work among 
participants of wage subsidy programmes according to gender, age group and 
educational attainment: women, those over 25, and with higher than prima-
ry school education were more likely to be retained by the employer who re-
ceived the wage subsidy, than men, those aged 25 years or younger and with a 
primary education or lower.
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5.3 The impact of a wage subsidy for older workers
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely, Ágota Scharle  
& Árpád Földessy
The importance of targeted wage subsidies
Voucher-type targeted wage subsidies reduce wage costs for specific groups of 
workers for a limited period and can be accessed at no or very low cost for the 
employer. Due to their targeted nature, they are cheaper to implement than 
across the board cuts in taxes or social security contributions. The low admin-
istrative cost makes them more appealing to employers compared to traditional 
wage subsidies, which typically involve a lengthy application process and also 
depend on the discretion of a public official who allocates the limited resources 
available for such grants.
Providing a targeted and temporary wage subsidy can be effective in two 
cases: 1) for workers lacking sufficient experience and 2) for workers subject 
to discrimination.6 In the first case the subsidy compensates the employer for 
the low productivity of an inexperienced worker and also allows the worker 
to acquire some experience during the subsidised period so that they can re-
tain the job after the subsidy has expired. In the second case, the subsidy com-
pensates for the risk of hiring someone with (perceived) low productivity. If, 
for example, employers think that long term unemployment is a sign of lower 
productivity (at least on average), a temporary subsidy can make them more 
open to hiring long term jobseekers and testing their productivity in practice. 
Some of the newly hired workers will prove to be equally productive and will 
retain their jobs,7 while others may prove less productive and lose their jobs. 
But even in the latter case, the subsidy removed them from the discriminated 
group and allowed them to acquire some work experience.
The recent global financial crisis has increased the policy relevance of wage 
subsidies as a means of preventing the rise of long-term unemployment and 
speeding up recovery. Such subsidies are especially relevant for new Member 
States struggling to meet EU employment targets.
In this subchapter we summarise new evidence on the Start extra scheme, a 
voucher-type targeted wage subsidy for older workers introduced in Hungary 
in 2007, based on the recent results of Cseres-Gergely et al. (2012). Start extra 
is very similar to the targeted payroll tax subsidies in Belgium and Finland 
and a targeted tax credit in the US, which earlier studies have shown to have 
some positive impact.8
Potential limitations in programme efficiency
According to Kluve (2010), wage subsidies and services/sanctions are the most 
effective in increasing re-employment rates. The effectiveness of wage subsi-
dies however has been questioned on several accounts. First, not all empirical 
6 See Lovász (2012) for an expla-
nation and a summary of empiri-
cal evidence from Hungary.
7 This follows from the nature 
of statistical discrimination: 
while long term jobseekers may 
on average be less productive, 
long term unemployment is 
not a deterministic feature, i.e. 
there is considerable variation 
in workers’ productivity within 
the group.
8 For a review of the internation-
al evidence, see Cseres-Gergely 
et al. (2012).
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studies found positive and significant effects. In fact, the few existing papers 
on transition countries have all shown a neutral or negative impact (Kluve, 
2010, Betcherman et al. 2004). Second, wage subsidies are relatively expensive, 
which implies that the magnitude of their effect is as important as its sign, i.e. 
only a relatively large impact can make such programmes cost effective. Third, 
the narrow targeting of subsidies may stigmatise recipients and reduce both 
take-up and effects (Katz 1996). Fourth, deadweight and substitution costs 
are likely to be high (Betcherman et al. 2004). Deadweight loss occurs when 
individuals who would have been able to find a job anyway absorb the subsidy. 
Substitution occurs when employers dismiss non-subsidised workers in order 
to replace them with subsidised ones. Both reduce the efficiency of subsidies, 
and, unless accounted for, will also distort the estimates of their net impact.
The design of the Start extra scheme
The Start extra scheme was introduced in 2007 as an extension to an existing 
scheme for school leavers, and was phased out in 2012. It was a quasi-voucher 
scheme that offered a temporary reduction on payroll tax (social security con-
tributions) to employers hiring the holder of the “voucher”. The amount of the 
subsidy varied across eligible groups, as summarised in Table 5.3.1 All long-
term unemployed were eligible for Start plusz, and Start extra doubled the 
subsidy for a selected subgroup with multiple disadvantages, i.e. for jobseekers 
above 50 and those who had only completed primary education.
table 5.3.1: rules of the various start schemes at the time of introduction
Name
Eligibility
Amount of subsidy  
(% of total wage cost)* Ceiling on subsidy
1st year 2nd year
Start School leavers: below 25 (30 for gradu-ates), no prior paid job
14 7
1.5 × minimum wage 
(2 × for graduates)
Start plusz
On parental leave or care allowance, or 
registered unemployed for 12 months 
within preceding 16 months, not eligible 
for old age pension
2 × minimum wage
Start extra
Over 50 or primary education only, and 
registered unemployed for 12 months 
within preceding 16 months, not eligible 
for old age pension
25 14 2 × minimum wage
* In 2007, the employer’s contribution was 32% of the gross wage, and this was waived 
in full during the first year of employing a person with a Start extra voucher. The flat 
rate health contribution was waived in both years in all schemes, which was 1,950 
HUF a month (about 8 EUR), or around 3% of the minimum wage. The subsidy was 
further extended in 2009 and replaced by a new scheme in 2012.
The scheme (all three variants) had been administered by the tax authority who 
issued a plastic card to eligible persons which indicated the type and eligibil-
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ity period of the subsidy. Cards were issued only if claimed, but the evaluation 
of claims was automatic, and local job centres had been actively encouraging 
job seekers to claim the card.
The validity of the card and thus the period of eligibility started on the day of 
issue. Jobseekers were therefore advised to claim the card immediately before 
starting their job, so that their employer would be eligible for the maximum 
length of the subsidy. The subsidy lasted for a maximum of two years.
Between July 2007 and December 2008, the Start extra card was claimed 
by 8,859 persons and issued to 8,392 persons. Less than 2% of the claims were 
declined by the tax authority, and some 5% was not issued for other, unknown 
reasons. During the same period, the number of persons employed with the 
subsidy started to grew steadily, peaking at 4,998 in November 2008. This sug-
gests that most cards had been claimed once the job seekers had a job offer, as 
recommended by job centres. Until the end of 2008, 6,115 persons had been 
hired with the Start extra card, and of that, 3,127 were long-term jobseekers 
aged over 50 with at least secondary education.
The Start extra subsidy is well targeted considering that re-employment prob-
abilities are significantly lower for uneducated and older job seekers. Demand 
for older workers declined significantly in the 1990s, partly due to the sharp 
drop in their relative productivity and also due to discrimination (see Lovász, 
2012 for a review of empirical evidence). There is also some evidence that wage 
subsidies are more effective if targeted at the long-term unemployed (as in the 
Start extra scheme) rather than at low-ability workers (Brown at al., 2011).
The employment and wage impact of the Start extra scheme  
for older workers
There are very few empirical studies on Hungarian active labour market pro-
grammes and the two earlier papers that evaluate the impact of traditional 
wage subsidies have somewhat conflicting results.9 As far as we know, Cseres-
Gergely et al. (2012) was the first attempt to evaluate the re-employment effect 
of the Start schemes.
Cseres-Gergely et al. (2012) estimate the effect of the Start extra subsidy for 
older workers with at least a secondary education, exploiting the particular 
design of the scheme, i.e. that it is available for jobseekers aged 50 or above, 
but excludes otherwise similar jobseekers aged just below 50. They find a sig-
nificant positive effect on both re-employment probabilities and wages in the 
case of men aged over 50, but no significant effect for women. Their estimates 
are interpreted as the additional effect of the extra subsidy (on top of the base 
subsidy of Start plusz) for multiply disadvantaged groups.
The dataset they use was drawn from administrative records, constructed 
for the Institute of Economics, Research Centre for Economic and Regional 
9 O’Leary (1998) found negative 
or zero employment effects and 
a significant increase in earn-
ings on the first job, except for 
job seekers aged over 45, where 
effects on employment were also 
positive and significant. Using 
data for 2010, Csoba and Nagy 
(2012) estimated a 24-fold in-
crease in log-odds of employ-
ment, which is a dubiously large 
effect.
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Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (IE-CERS HAS), containing 
a 50% random sample of the total working age population. It is a panel of the 
employment and job search history of working age individuals covering the 
period between January 2002 and December 2008. Thus, jobseekers are ob-
served for 18 months following the introduction of the programme. There is 
information on age, sex, dates of entering and exiting employment, earnings 
(pension insurance records), unemployment history and type and period of 
receiving various transfers (including disability benefits) and sick leave. There 
is no data on the actual claiming the Start cards or on the employer.
In the case of older workers, the programme design generates a discontinu-
ity in eligibility, which can be used to identify the programme effect. In this 
case, the treatment group is formed by those eligible for participation and are 
slightly above the age 50, while the control group is formed by those who are 
similar to them in all aspects, but stay slightly below age 50 during the obser-
vation period. Those with at most primary education must be excluded, as they 
are eligible for the same support regardless of age.
The discontinuity design strategy assumes that heterogeneity in the variable 
with the discontinuity is irrelevant in determining outcomes. This is not com-
pletely so in this case, as age tends to reduce the chance of re-employment, but 
we can account for this in the estimation strategy by using a precise age meas-
ure.10 Although age is changing over time, it has an almost fixed distribution 
in adjacent time-points. Because of this and because the discontinuity design 
provides us with randomly allocated treatment and control groups, this strategy 
yields consistent estimates of the programme effects. If the differential effect of 
extraneous factors on outcomes over time (such as seasonality or the business 
cycle) is to be taken into account separately from unemployment duration, it 
has to be controlled for using some statistical method, such as a difference in 
differences strategy, where we look at the difference between the control and 
the treatment outcomes before and after the programme.
Treatment is defined as eligibility for the Start card. This is not only a prag-
matic decision taken due to the lack of better data, but is also justified on the 
basis of the official information on claims, take-up and subsequent employ-
ment, which suggest that claiming the voucher is most likely to happen after 
the outcome, that is, after the employer decided to hire the job seeker. “True” 
take-up therefore is not actual participation, but the ability to participate: be-
ing informed of the scheme and of the age condition by either the employer 
or the job seeker.
Based on the above considerations, Cseres-Gergely et al. (2012) define the 
treatment group as those aged between 50 and 52.5 and the control group 
includes those aged between 45.5 and 48.5 in June 2007. The 18-month gap 
between them ensures that no member of the control group becomes eligible 
for participation during the observed period. In other respects the two groups 
10 We also check the presence of 
the effect by repeating the esti-
mation for age groups below and 
above the eligibility threshold, 
before and after the programme 
was made available.
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both fulfill the eligibility criteria at the time the scheme was introduced, i.e. 
they have accumulated 12 months of registered unemployment.
Re-employment effects are estimated in various specifications: probits for 
the probability of being employed 15 or 18 months after the introduction of 
the scheme and duration models (a modified Jenkins type probit) for the prob-
ability of exit to a job at any time after the introduction of the scheme (Jenkins, 
1995). Wage effects are estimated in standard Mincer-type wage equations, 
where they use the interaction of the treatment dummy and a dummy indicat-
ing spells after the introduction of the programme. This is interpreted as the 
programme effect, i.e. as a shift in the wage advantage (or more likely, disad-
vantage) of older jobseekers re-entering employment.
The average marginal effects on employment estimated in various model 
specifications tend to be small but positive and significant for men, and insig-
nificant for women. The first two columns of Table 5.3.2 show the increase in 
participants’ employment probability compared to non-participants 15 and 
18 months after the introduction of the program, respectively, controlling for 
individual and regional characteristics and for seasonality. The former is in-
cluded as a test of whether the global crisis starting in late 2008 may have af-
fected the programme. The third column shows the increase in participants’ 
probability of entering a job, controlling for changing overall job-entry chances 
over time, besides controls listed above. The fourth column shows the same 
probability for persons with lower11 secondary vocational education. Results 
are robust to the definition of employment and unemployment in the data. The 
preferred specification (presented below) includes controls for age, education, 
and past work history.
table 5.3.2: Employment effects for job seekers aged around 50
15 months 18 months Total Job finding probability  
for lower secondary vocationalafter the introduction of the program
Men 0.1040** 0.0782 0.0144*** 0.0164**
Women 0.0638 0.1040 0.0016 –0.0034
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Note: See full regression results in Cseres-Gergely et al. (2012).
For men, the positive effect is driven by job seekers with lower secondary voca-
tional education, who constitute 74% of the sample. For the higher educated, 
there is no significant effect, which may be due to the ceiling on the subsidy 
(which reduces the value of the subsidy at high wages) or possibly to stigma ef-
fects, which may be stronger in white collar occupations.
As shown by the coefficient of the interaction of the treatment and the pro-
gramme period in Table 5.3.3, the subsidy for job seekers aged over 50 has a 
significant positive effect (the effect on the subsequent wages of men).
11 Completed a vocational 
secondary school that does not 
offer a school leaving (A level) 
certificate required for entering 
university level education.
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For women, the subsidy has no significant effect either on employment, or 
on wages. A possible explanation is that older women are less likely to actively 
look for a job, which lowers the potential impact of any wage subsidy that is 
by design dependent on job search and at the same time, it also makes its esti-
mate less precise. An earlier result by Micklewright and Nagy (2010) points to 
a similar direction: they found that a mild tightening of job search criteria for 
unemployment benefit recipients had a significant positive effect on the prob-
ability of re-employment only in the case of women aged over 30.
table 5.3.3: wage effects job seekers aged around 50
Men Women
Eligibility (aged over 50)
–0.200* –0.0302
(0.114) (0.151)
After June 2007
0.147** 0.340***
(0.0614) (0.0933)
Eligibility after June 2007
0.157* 0.0978
(0.0893) (0.132)
Note: See full regression results in Tables B3 in the Appendix of Cseres-Gergely et al. 
(2012).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The above results give gross estimates of the program effect which is valid only 
if the control group was not affected by the program, for example through a 
replacement of employees by long-term unemployed similar to them and eli-
gible to the subsidy. As a crude check for substitution effects, Cseres-Gergely et 
al. (2012) examine the probability of becoming unemployed for the employed 
population around the time of introducing the subsidy and find no significant 
trend in the job loss probabilities of workers aged below 50 with secondary or 
higher education. This suggests that substitution is unlikely to lessen the im-
pact of the programme.
The total cost of the scheme is relatively modest, compared e.g. to re-training 
or public works programmes in Hungary. Between July 2007 and December 
2008, the Start extra scheme cost a total of 1 billion HUF per annum. This 
amounts to 593 EUR per person (not controlling for right censoring in em-
ployment spells). Neglecting the costs of administration, which are likely to be 
very low, the cost of the programme is the additional subsidy (on top of Start 
Plusz available to all long term unemployed). The short term benefits of the 
programme include savings on social assistance expenditure and employee’s 
social security contributions (17% of the gross wage). Long term benefits may 
include social security contributions following the expiration of the subsidy, 
longer employment spells in the subsequent work history, postponed retire-
ment and savings on health care costs. For lack of empirical evidence on the 
magnitude on these long term effects (in Hungary), Cseres-Gergely et al. (2012) 
concentrate on the short term balance.
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Cseres-Gergely et al. (2012) conclude that short run benefits exceed the cost 
if deadweight loss – that is the share of those who would have found a job with-
out the subsidy – is below 20% of subsidised jobs. As a crude measure of the 
latter, the number of subsidised job entries as recorded by the Tax Authority 
is compared to the number of entries by potentially eligible job seekers as ob-
served in the dataset. Results suggest that there may be some deadweight in 
the programme but that it is not very large.
Conclusions and policy implications
Wage subsidies are often promoted as an efficient means of increasing demand 
for low skilled workers, however, existing evidence on their employment effects 
is somewhat mixed, especially in the case of transition economies. A recent 
evaluation of the Hungarian Start extra scheme for older workers suggests that 
well designed targeted wage subsidies can be effective in a transitional context 
as well. The Hungarian Start extra subsidy for jobseekers with at least second-
ary education and aged over 50 appears to be cost effective for men, even con-
sidering its short term benefits only.
The overall efficiency of this programme could be improved by narrowing the 
target group to jobseekers with less than upper secondary education and pos-
sibly by supplementing it with incentives for job search, especially for women. 
The fact that Cseres-Gergely et al. (2012) found no significant effect for educated 
jobseekers also implies that the recent government plans to cut social security 
contributions for all workers aged over 50 (regardless of education) is likely to 
carry considerable deadweight loss. Restricting the measure to those with at 
most secondary education would improve its cost efficiency.
5.4 The pros and cons of differentiating the minimum wage  
in Hungary
Ágota Scharle & Balázs Váradi
This subchapter does not present new findings, but aims to summarise what 
we could expect of a targeted reduction of the minimum wage as a tool for in-
creasing employment, based on existing Hungarian and international litera-
ture. The suggested introduction of a lower minimum wage for school leavers, 
proposed by the Hungarian minister for national economy in June 2012, gives 
immediate relevance to the subject. We begin with an overview of the func-
tions and effects of the minimum wage as well as the main characteristics of 
its domestic regulation, with a special focus on the idea of differentiation. We 
then aim to reconstruct and analyse the reasoning that may buttress the gov-
ernmental and expert proposals  “regarding the differential” modification of 
the gross minimum wage.12 Finally, we briefly outline the proposal of Scharle 
and Váradi (2009), arguing for a regional differentiation of the minimum wage.
12 Gábor (2012) and Köllő (2012) 
provide a more comprehensive 
summary. For a general over-
view, see Neumark and Wascher 
(2008), for a Hungarian lan-
guage outline see Gábor (2012).
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The minimum wage and its effects
The minimum wage is a policy instrument that is widely (though not univer-
sally) applied in the developed world. The relevant international literature gen-
erally distinguishes between three social functions of minimum wage regula-
tions: 1) achieving social equity, 2) fostering employment and 3) minimising 
income inequalities. Hungarian national policy often cites a fourth point jus-
tifying minimum wage increases: that of reducing tax avoidance.
The first point encapsulates the social expectation that the state should sup-
port the most vulnerable employees and that there is a certain amount of re-
muneration for human labour that employers must not fall short of. Accord-
ing to the International Labour and Employment Relations Association, the 
basic purpose of the minimum wage is to satisfy this demand (ILO, 2009). 
This function, however, is difficult to describe with the models and empirical 
analyses of economics. Consequently, the labour economics literature primar-
ily focuses on the effects that changes to the minimum wage have on employ-
ment and distributive justice.
The theory regrettably does not provide a definitive answer concerning em-
ployment. The simplest among the models of labour economics is the textbook 
equilibrium model that supposes perfect competition, a positive wage elasticity 
of labour supply and a negative elasticity of labour demand, applying the Mar-
shallian cross to the labour market. Within this framework there is a definitive 
impact on employment: the minimum wage is either not binding (if it stays 
below the equilibrium wage level that is socially optimal), or it causes unem-
ployment and deadweight loss. This is because those employer-employee pairs 
for whom it would only be worthwhile to sign a contract if they could agree on 
a wage that is lower than the minimum wage would be deprived of the possi-
bility of such a mutually beneficial transaction. In this model, then, the mini-
mum wage is ineffective or downright harmful in terms of employment growth.
However, as soon as we allow for market failures in our models, the intro-
duction or increase of the minimum wage has the ability to improve social wel-
fare and employment levels to a certain point. This holds true even if the em-
ployer is monopsonistic (or multiple employers form a cartel), as well as in the 
more plausible case where an employer hiring several employees ceteris paribus 
has to pay a higher wage than its competitor that works with fewer employ-
ees. There are models with multiple equilibria, one characterised by low wages 
and low performance, and another by high wages and high performance. In 
these scenarios, the introduction or increase of the minimum wage may push 
the economy over the tipping point from the former into the latter, creating a 
more advantageous social welfare climate. Yet other models that consider the 
effects of company training, friction and job search produce results that en-
able an increase of the minimum wage to raise employment rates within a cer-
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tain interval. The models that examine factors with ripple effects prove even 
less conclusive than the predictions based on partial equilibrium models (for 
a more detailed overview see Köllő, 2012, Gábor, 2012).
Concerning the third social function, under certain circumstances in their 
perfect competition model Lee and Saez (2012) find that by way of improv-
ing the income status of some of the poor, the positive distributive impact out-
weighs the social harm caused by the reduction in employment that the mini-
mum wage necessarily entails, if distributive justice has enough weight on the 
social agenda. The income inequality reducing impact of the minimum wage 
strongly depends on more than one factor: the way minimum wage rise af-
fects income distribution through some employees losing their jobs and others 
starting to earn more, as well as to what extent may the concepts of “minimum 
wage earner”, “low wage earner” and “low productivity worker” be equated.
If the actors of the economy can also adapt to the minimum wage rise by tax 
avoidance, the impact is going to look different. The relative cost of formal 
(registered) employment will increase and there is a greater motivation toward 
partially (grey) or fully informal employment (black market jobs). This may al-
leviate the potential negative employment tendencies but it simultaneously de-
creases the extra income that a surge in formal employment would reasonably 
entail. (Even if the tax avoidance tendencies of grey market workers decrease, 
the ratio of grey or black market workers will grow.) The subject is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 6 of this In Focus – I.
If the main message of the theory proves to be: “it depends”, we have to turn 
to empirical research. Do econometric analyses provide unequivocal replies 
to the question of whether the minimum wage rise grows or shrinks employ-
ment rates and income inequalities?
Lamentably, gauging the impact minimum wage has on employment is 
charged with statistical and methodological issues. Until the beginning of 
the 90s there was a collectively accepted view based on econometric analyses, 
stating that minimum wage rise affects employment figures negatively, the only 
question being its extent. However, when Card and Kruger (1994) published 
their groundbreaking study, the acceptance of the theory was replaced by ani-
mated disputes. Nonetheless, according to the overview of Gábor (2012), 60 
to 80 per cent of current studies continue to find significant negative employ-
ment tendencies, with only 20 to 40 per cent of articles rating the impact on 
employment as not significant or positive.
The minimum wage rises of 2001 and 2002 provided a good opportunity for 
domestic empirical analyses in Hungary. The increase was substantial on an in-
ternational scale: within two years, the minimum wage rate jumped from 29 per 
cent of the average wage to 41 per cent, surpassing even Canadian and British 
levels. Though the aggregated figures do not show a decline in this period of the 
increased labour demand, econometric studies found employment effects to be 
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negative, in unison with most of the international findings. Kertesi and Köllő 
(2004) demonstrated that among companies with 5–20 employees 12 thousand 
workers were made redundant after the first rise. Elek et al. (2012) analysed the 
impact that the increase of average wage (entailed by the minimum wage rise) 
had on employment up to 2003. According to their study, in the companies that 
were strongly affected by the rises the average wage rate grew significantly faster, 
while employment levels rose significantly slower (or shrunk faster).
According to Köllő’s 2012 findings, minimum wage rise on a grand scale 
alleviated income inequalities, even if only short term. The Gini coefficient of 
gross income went back from the 0.39 pre-increase levels to 0.36 (though by 
2005 it reached 0.38 again). This temporary decrease in inequality is not in-
significant: it roughly corresponds to the 2005 differences between “old” and 
“new” EU member states.13 The impact on household income inequalities was 
weaker, however, explained by the fact that minimum wage earners are typi-
cally not the first earners in the household. At the time of the great rises less 
than 20 per cent of them belonged to the lowest income quartile (Benedek et 
al. 2006, Szabó, 2007).
Regulating the minimum wage in Hungary
In Hungarian regulation the rate of the minimum wage is established annu-
ally, without a straightforward formula or clear criteria. It is determined by 
the government, with representatives of employment organisations involved 
to a varying degree: sometimes to a large extent, at other times merely in a 
consulting role (Gábor, 2012, Neumann and Váradi, 2012). Before the latest 
public work regulations came into effect, the minimum wage was almost uni-
versally extended to a large group of employees. Differentiating between job-
seeker qualities (such as age, education, experience, ability to work etc.) has 
not been part of Hungarian minimum wage regulation for long. With the 
2006 introduction and 2007 enforcement of guaranteed minimum income 
the Hungarian minimum wage regulation also introduced an (upwards) dif-
ferentiation; but it was the 2012 labour code that allowed for differentiation 
of guaranteed minimum income levels between “certain groups of employees” 
(article 153 clause 2). As emphasised by Gábor (2012), none of the instances 
of the above-mentioned practice are exceptional. For all of them, we can find 
a varying number of European countries practicing a similar differentiation.
Arguments for the selective downward modification of the minimum wage
As demonstrated above, both Hungarian and international empirical evidence 
suggests that if we can identify labour market segments where the gross wage 
cost of the guaranteed minimum income is “too high” (compared to the aver-
age or median income, for instance), in other words, where the supposed em-
ployment reducing impact of the minimum wage is significant, the general 
13 EU-15: 29.9; the 12 new 
member states: 33.2. (Source: 
Eurostat.)
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employment situation can be improved by reducing the minimum wage levels 
pertaining to these groups. If the positive impact is large enough, and the so-
cial costs (of a political, budget-related, or administrative nature or originating 
from boosting the black economy or creating arbitrage opportunities) and side 
effects of downward reduction are not too significant, a modification of this 
kind may serve to improve social welfare even if the other two functions of the 
guaranteed minimum income (fairness and equity) are somewhat hurt by it.
Modifications of this kind are not a rarity in the developed world: a number 
of European countries apply downwardly modified minimum wage policies 
(see Benedek et al. 2006, Table 1), according to age (youth: the Netherlands, 
Slovakia, France, Ireland, Belgium, Great Britain), time in service (entry level 
jobs: Czech Republic, Poland, Cyprus), altered work capacity (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia) or casual worker status (Spain). These modifications typically target 
groups with a low average wage level, among whom the value of the (universal) 
minimum wage would be comparatively high. This is, in fact, the environment 
where the minimum wage reduction can be expected to yield significant posi-
tive employment effects.
Whether this is beneficial for the society on the whole can only be determined 
after carefully weighing the sum of its effects. To illustrate the considerations 
associated with selective differentiation, let us summarise the reasoning of a 
related policy proposal.
Regional minimum wage in Hungary
Scharle and Váradi (2009) point out that even though Rutkowski (2003) and 
Smith (2007) suggest its application if there is significant territorial dispersion 
between wages and price levels, the regional modification of the minimum wage 
is not common practice in Europe. However, the 2005 OECD country review 
of Hungary explicitly suggests its implementation (OECD, 2005). The recom-
mendation is based on the idea that uniform minimum wage levels impact un-
derdeveloped areas more strongly, for two reasons. Firstly, the price and wage 
levels are typically lower, therefore the countrywide minimum wage is higher 
both in real value and compared to the local average wage. Secondly, the propor-
tion of unskilled workers is characteristically higher in these territories. Hence, 
supposing that the net employment impact of the minimum wage is greater on 
the unskilled than on the skilled, the underdeveloped regions are going to be 
affected much harder. Regional differentiation (a minimum wage rate that is 
lower than the national level) is suggested in the hope of counterbalancing this 
effect. This proposal is nuanced, but, on the whole, strengthened by the find-
ings in Chapter 6 of this In Focus – I. Benedek et al. describe the distribution of 
disguised minimum wage earners (arguing that there is a higher volume of this 
kind of tax avoidance practice in the capital, as well as among those with a higher 
effective income, under-represented in the regions in question). But the region-
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by-region separation of actual minimum wage earners from the disguised ones 
would require further study, utilising the findings in the above mentioned article.
We know relatively little of the territorial differences between price levels in 
Hungary, though the time series of Dusek and Szalka (2008) largely reinforce 
the positive correlation between income levels and price levels; a connection 
that is in line with the theoretical prediction. This implies that the differences 
between nominal sub-region average wages overstate the difference between 
real wages (the problems entailed by regional price level differences and taxing 
nominal income were also touched upon in the introductory 1st chapter eaar-
lier). At the same time, considering that the territory of a median sub-region 
is no more than 480 square kilometers, geographic mobility and product arbi-
trage prevent the emergence of substantial differences in price levels between 
small and densely populated sub-regions.
The data in Figure 5.4.1 suggests that a minimum wage policy that is efficient 
on a national level may affect underdeveloped regions more strongly. This coin-
cides with calculations by Kertesi and Köllő (2004) stating that the wage shock 
implied by the minimum wage rises of 2001 and 2002 was largest for young 
persons, unskilled workers and those living in high unemployment regions.
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Figure 5.4.1: minimum wage rates in proportion to sub-region average wage rates, 2008
Note: The 33 sub-regions with the worst conditions are marked black; the dashed line 
denotes the national average. The weighted wage tariff data underestimate the aver-
age wage, therefore the above ratio is somewhat rounded up; however, this has little 
bearing on the relative situation of sub-regions.
Source: Scharle and Váradi (2009), Figure 2.
If we consider territorial differentiation, the first point to address is what ter-
ritorial unit it should apply to. Scharle and Váradi (2009) suggest sub-regional 
differentiation since a significant part of inequalities is not reflected on a coun-
ty level. Taking commuting into account, a sub-region largely corresponds to 
the area delineated as the local labour market. On a sub-regional level, if there 
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are enough competitors present, wages will level out in the short term, without 
movement of workforce or capital. In this milieu the political and administra-
tive framework necessary for differentiation can also be set up.
The proposal identifies four plausible groups of criteria to establish the ex-
tent of moderation:
– indicators demonstrating the high presence of a low productivity work force 
especially affected by the minimum wage level (the rate of registered unem-
ployed people and the proportion of the permanently unemployed and the 
young jobless; the ratio of people with altered labour capacity and the pro-
portion of unskilled workers in the active population),
– as an indicator of the demand for unskilled labour, the proportion of the em-
ployed in the unskilled population,
– the proportion of minimum wage/average wage ratio, measuring the effi-
ciency of the minimum wage; the so-called Kaitz index14 that includes the 
proportion of those employed on minimum wage and the shock measured 
at the 2001 rise,
– and tax payments per capita, measuring the income status.
The various indicators highlight various sub-regions as severely disadvan-
taged. Structured in a table, Scharle and Váradi (2009) identify the few sub-
regions that seem to be the most likely candidates for differentiation.
They then move on to confront the political difficulties of regional differen-
tiation and, taking the aims and interests of the stake-holders into considera-
tion, attempt to develop a politically viable arrangement. They thus compare 
three different potential solutions, presenting the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each, as well as the foreseeable reaction of stake-holders:
– allowing for the reduction of the minimum wage by modifying the labour 
code, with sub-regional development councils retaining the right to estab-
lish the exact extent thereof,
– reducing the gross cost of the minimum wage by utilising EU development 
funds, inspired by the example of the Start card for entry level employees,
– reducing the gross cost of the minimum wage by relief from social security 
contributions, employing budget resources.
Finally, through an international comparison they conduct calculations 
on the desirable extent of differentiation. They also suggest rules aimed at de-
creasing the risk of arbitrage and, inasmuch as possible, present the budget and 
employment related impact of a few imaginable scenarios. According to their 
calculations based on earlier empirical estimations, in these sub-regions a 30 
per cent decrease of the minimum wage could boost unskilled employment 
levels by 6–12 per cent within 2 or 3 years. The developments of the past two 
years, especially the strengthening of the administrative role of the district, and 
the proposed amendment to the labour code make even the first version of the 
proposal (which seemed somewhat far-fetched in 2009) feasible.
14 The Katz index is the ratio 
of the minimum wage and the 
average wage, multiplied by the 
number of people employed on 
minimum wage.
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5.5 A review of the international literature on the differing 
effects of employer versus employee contributions
Árpád Földessy
In the classic model of economics, the labour market effects of taxing employers 
and employees are equivalent (this is the so called tax liability side equivalence, 
or LSE): the economic burden does not depend on whom the tax was levied on 
in the legal sense (Musgrave, 1959; Stiglitz, 1988; Fullerton and Metcalf, 2003). 
This is corroborated by empirical analyses as well, such as Tyrväinen (1994) 
or Robertson and Symons (1990), who show that such differences in the types 
of taxes have no effect on the fluctuation of wage costs or unemployment in 
OECD countries. This stems from the classic model, in which labour supply 
is determined by the net wage and labour demand by the total wage cost, and 
their equilibrium depends on the difference of these two (and the sum of tax-
es). Therefore, the share of employee and employer contributions within total 
taxes is of no consequence.
However, in most countries, the allocation of social security contributions 
between employees and employers is the subject of lively debates among poli-
ticians and the general public as well (Borck et al. 2002; Ruffle, 2001). To ac-
count for this interest, the economic literature has turned to examining the 
assumptions behind the equivalence theorem. The first of these is the perfectly 
competitive labour market, in which gross wages freely adjust to changes in the 
tax system. This assumption may not hold if the minimum wage is close to the 
equilibrium wage, unions are strong (Riedl and Tyran, 2003), taxation is pro-
gressive (Lockwood and Manning, 1993, Holm et al. 1995, Rasmussen, 1997, 
1998, Andersen and Rasmussen, 1999), or if the unemployment benefit is tied 
to gross wages (Picard and Toulemonde, 2001). The latter situation arises when 
the unemployment benefit is indexed to the market wage but is non-taxable, 
which is quite common in OECD countries.
In the absence of such external constraints, wage adjustment may still be 
imperfect if for example workers resist nominal cuts in the net wage, which 
leads to wage rigidity. In this case, real wages can only adjust to the new equi-
librium level with an increase in the level of prices, which definitely disproves 
the equivalence principle in the short run. While Bewley (1999) names effi-
ciency wages as the primary cause of endogenous wage rigidity, Pisauro (1991) 
shows that the equivalence is also valid in these labour markets, as long as 
agents base their decisions on the net wage. However, as Riedl and Tyran 
(2003) point out, in an efficiency wage world it is unlikely that decisions are 
solely based on the net wage. This hypothesis relies on the results of Kersch-
bamer and Kirchsteiger (1999), who conduct a laboratory experiment and 
find that the tax burden tends to be larger for the party which is legally obli-
gated to pay it. As the first step toward disproving the equivalence principle 
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the authors test the rationality condition, and after finding that it holds for a 
convincing share of participants, they relax the assumption that individuals 
only want to maximize their after-tax earnings. They conclude that labour 
market decisions are in fact influenced by certain social norms of work and 
material well-being as well as net wages, which suggests that the validity of 
the equivalency principle is limited.
Riedl and Tyran (2003) focus on the social norm of gift-exchange, the es-
sential mechanism behind efficiency wages (Campbell and Kamlani, 1997). 
In theory, employers offer their workers higher wages than the market equi-
librium level as a quasi-gift, hoping for a level of effort higher than that which 
can be enforced by supervision. This partly goes beyond the assumption of a 
perfectly rational and utility-maximizing worker, but is considered quite real-
istic in view of the existing social norms. However, Akerlof (1982) shows that 
the equivalence is valid in the case of gift-exchange as well: according to his 
hypothesis, labour markets of this type enable workers to regard taxes inde-
pendently from the relationship to their employers, and thus base their deci-
sions on the level of gross wages.
The wage paid by the employer is of particular importance in exchange-based 
labour markets: as long as it is observable by the employer, it indicates the gen-
erosity of the employer’s gift and through this determines the level of effort to 
be made in return. However, according to the hypothesis, the wage paid by the 
employer will depend on the legal incidence of the tax: they pay the gross wage 
if the tax is levied on employees and the net wage if it is levied on employers.
In accordance with this theory, if the burden of contributions and taxes is 
levied on workers, the wage which they can observe and use as an indicator for 
employer recognition will be the gross wage, and will choose their effort level 
accordingly. If, however, taxes and contributions are levied on the employer, 
the observable wage will be the net wage. Therefore, such a tax system – since 
workers observe the net wage, rather than the gross wage – causes a decrease in 
the perceived generosity of employers and thus in worker effort as well.
In such a case, employers, who are concerned with employee satisfaction 
(and effort), will be interested in raising the net wage. By contrast, if the tax 
burden is shifted from employers onto workers, the gross wage will become 
the observed wage which is high enough for the employer to attempt a cut (re-
ducing the net wage as well). Thus, in an efficiency wage world, the incidence 
of taxes has an opposing effect on net wages, which disproves the tax liability 
side equivalence principle.
Riedl and Tyran (2003) test the above hypothesis on Dutch college students 
using behavioural experiments. Their results indicate that the presence of equiv-
alence can be proved in the short run as well. Their results hold for markets 
which are independent from each other and have different tax systems, and 
also for a change in the tax systems implemented on the same market. The in-
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cidence of taxes has no significant effect either on worker effort or on the in-
come distribution between employers and workers.
The external validity of the experiment is restricted by a number of factors, 
such as the fact that in the experiment by Renner and Tyran (2003) the labour 
market has fairly large excess supply (40 per cent). Furthermore, disregard-
ing long-term contracts between workers and employers could have affected 
the results: these are proven to increase wage rigidity on markets where the 
employer is not perfectly aware of worker productivity. The experiment also 
disregards the fact that the lack of information and awareness on the tax sys-
tem by workers can strongly influence their perception of wages. While well-
informed workers may tolerate a cut in net wages following a tax burden shift 
to the employers’ side, that may be harder to accept for those who have no ex-
act information regarding it. Finally, being well informed or not about taxes 
may vary across the different types of tax. For instance, successful communi-
cation by the government can raise tolerance and awareness toward new taxes, 
while other types of taxes excluded from this may escape workers’ attention 
(Sausgruber and Tyran, 2005).
Gourke (2000) points out the importance of social security contributions, 
which are – in contrast to the income tax – independent of the taxpayer’s 
source of earnings. While according to the equivalence principle, a change in 
gross wages compensates workers in the event of a shift in the legal obligation 
for paying income taxes from employers to workers, this cannot be achieved in 
full in the case of a similar shift in social security contributions. This is because 
the income tax is borne exclusively by those employed, but social security con-
tributions also apply to jobseekers and the inactive population. The latter two 
groups have no employer to compensate them for the shift, which will there-
fore affect their net income – for jobseekers this equals the unemployment 
benefit minus social security contributions. Thus, regarded in a broader sense, 
the shift changes the relative level of labour income as opposed to non-labour 
incomes, which has an unavoidable effect on labour supply.
All in all, it is fair to say that the equivalence principle regarding worker and 
employer taxes has been empirically verified by the literature. However, the 
validity of some of the assumptions behind the principle may be questioned 
under certain conditions, such as a binding minimum wage, strong union activ-
ity, a progressive tax system (Lockwood and Manning, 1993; Holm et al. 1995; 
Rasmussen, 1997, 1998; Andersen and Rasmussen, 1999), taxable unemploy-
ment benefits (Goerke, 2000) or unemployment benefits tied to the gross wage 
(Picard and Toulemonde, 2001). One or another of these conditions applies in 
almost every OECD-country, and thus in Hungary as well.
Finally, let us return to the role of social norms which are potentially impor-
tant determinants of worker behaviour beside net wages. Even though ana-
lysing these with the tools of economic analysis is dubious, Kerschbamer and 
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Kirchsteiger (1999) present convincing evidence of their effects. By contrast 
Riedl and Tyran (2003) show that there are norms (namely gift-exchange and 
efficiency wages) that do not alter the equivalence of the effects of worker and 
employer taxes.
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6. tAx AvoidAncE, tAx EvAsion, bLAcK And grEy EmpLoymEnt
Dóra Benedek, Péter Elek & János Köllő
Introduction
There are various forms of tax avoidance and tax evasion related to the labour 
market. While some of the workers are employed lawfully and pay taxes and 
contributions on their wages (declared work); others, although registered re-
ceive part of their pay as envelope wages without paying taxes, or may reduce 
their tax liability using other – unlawful – means (for example sham contracts). 
A third group of workers might not even be registered (black work/undeclared 
work). Black and grey work are against the law and thus fall into the category 
of tax evasion, while within “white” (lawful) employment it is possible to iden-
tify groups (e.g. of entrepreneurs) that use tax avoidance methods that are legal 
in order to reduce their tax liability.
It is not accidental that black and grey work and legal tax avoidance are at the 
centre of economic policy debates in Hungary. Their prevalence has major im-
plications for the aggregate economic effects of minimum wage increases, tax 
cuts to low skilled workers or other economic policy measures. This chapter 
provides an overview of empirical results – mainly using existing studies – con-
cerning tax evasion and the labour market to help attain a clearer understand-
ing. Following a brief theoretical introduction, it presents empirical findings 
from international studies on the prevalence of the shadow economy and un-
declared work and then moves on to explore black and grey work, as well as 
tax evasion among entrepreneurs in Hungary, using detailed, micro level data. 
Finally, the last sub-chapter considers the income redistribution effects of tax 
evasion, still using micro-level data. The economic policy implications of the 
findings are also discussed at various points.
Factors that determine tax evasion
According to the traditional economic approach (see for example Slemrod and 
Yitzhaki, 2002) economic actors make decisions about tax evasion by compar-
ing the potential costs and benefits – or differently the payable fine and the 
amount of tax that can be evaded.1 Therefore, higher fines and increased (or 
better targeted) inspection will definitely reduce tax evasion whereas the effect 
of tax rates in the theoretical models is unclear as they influence both poten-
tial benefits and costs. However, it is difficult to explain the willingness to pay 
taxes using the standard model – considering the limited risk of being caught 
and the rates of potential fines –, therefore the more recent literature on be-
1 The expected value of the loss is 
equal to the sum of the fine and 
the tax liability multiplied by 
the probability of being caught.
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havioural economics incorporates the effect of the social environment, such 
as respect for rules and the need for belonging to groups.2
Another strand of the theoretical literature considers the distorting effects 
of tax evasion. In this approach, tax evasion reduces effective tax rates in a pre-
dictable way, therefore the main negative consequence of tax evasion is not the 
loss of tax revenue but the fact that it has a differential impact on different sec-
tors. Therefore it distorts economic activity and also leads to an unintended 
re-distribution of income between economic actors.
Coming to empirical findings, the international literature identifies various 
factors associated with tax evasion, including black and grey work. Various 
studies, using macro-level data (see for example Christie and Holzner, 2006), 
showed a positive association between the tax burden and the extent of tax 
evasion. Using micro-level data from Quebec Lemieux et al. (1994) showed 
that the tax burden influenced the decision between white and black work. 
In his analysis of the flat-rate tax reform in Russia, Slonimczyk (2012) found 
that informal employment declined among employees who experienced a de-
cline in their tax rates. Various empirical studies looked at the impact of the 
tax burden on declared income, although there were mixed findings on what 
might have caused changes in reported income: tax evasion (i.e. grey work), 
tax optimisation (for example turning labour income into capital income) or 
changes in labour supply. This debate is presented in detail in Chapter 2 of In 
Focus –I; however generally it can be assumed that both channels have a role 
in adjustment (see for example the review by Saez et al. (2012) or the article 
by Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) on tax reform in Russia). In addition to taxes, 
factors considered to influence black and grey work include over-regulation 
of labour and product markets, the administrative burden of businesses, loss 
of eligibility for welfare provisions when taking up declared work, and laxity 
of tax inspection (see for example Koettl and Weber, 2012).
Estimating the prevalence of the shadow economy  
using aggregate data
The shadow economy can be measured using direct and indirect methods. Di-
rect methods use secondary analysis of population and business surveys and 
(micro-level) administrative data, for example calculating the extent of the 
shadow economy based on the amount of tax arrears uncovered by the tax 
authority’s investigations. Indirect methods estimate total economic activity 
and income using a range of related proxy variables, and compare them with 
reported economic performance and income. The comparison can be made at 
the micro level – for example using household survey data on consumption 
and food consumption as proxies for actual income, such as in Pissarides and 
Weber (1989); or at the macro level – for example estimating total economic ac-
2 For a summary of the theoreti-
cal literature on tax avoidance 
and tax evasion in Hungarian see 
for example Scharle et al. (2010).
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tivity based on cash flow or energy consumption, see for example Lackó (1998). 
The advantage of macro-level approaches is that they need less data, while the 
advantage of micro level ones is that they provide information about the dis-
tribution of hidden activities. Schneider (2004) provides a detailed descrip-
tion of these methods.
The majority of international comparative studies suggest that the share of 
the shadow economy is higher in Hungary than in Western Europe, howev-
er lower than in some Eastern European countries. According to Schneider’s 
(2004; 2012) indirect estimates using macro-level data, the shadow economy 
made up 24–26% of the GDP in Hungary between 1999 and 2007. This was 
similar to Poland, however significantly higher than in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia (17–19%), or Austria and Germany (10–16%), but lower than the 
estimated 30–34% for Romania. Elek et al. (2009b, Table 1) reported various 
figures concerning the shadow economy in Hungary.
Some international comparative studies assess the loss of tax revenue due to 
the shadow economy comparing “theoretical” tax revenue, estimated using in-
come and consumption data from national accounts and tax regulations, with 
actual revenue from taxes. Christie and Holzner’s (2006) rough estimates sug-
gested that 46% of consumption was hidden from VAT payment, and 30% of 
the personal income tax base as well as 36% of social insurance contributions 
were hidden in Hungary. However, this calculation did not take into account 
the overall complexity of the tax system and the presence of tax allowances, 
therefore the figures should be considered upper estimates – nevertheless they 
might still be suitable for international comparison. This comparison also sug-
gested that tax evasion was higher in Hungary than in Western Europe and 
its magnitude was similar to that in other Visegrád countries. A more exact 
estimate of the evasion of main taxes in Hungary was provided by Krekó and 
P. Kiss (2008) who argued that the evaded part of the VAT base was 12–14% 
of GDP in 2005, equivalent to 23–27% of household consumption (the VAT 
base) and thus considerably lower than Christie and Holzner’s (2006) estimates. 
According to Krekó and P. Kiss the hidden VAT was around 2% of GDP; while 
the total quantified tax evasion – including tax evasion by employees and the 
self-employed – came to around 7–8% of GDP.
International estimates of shadow employment
With regards to labour-market related forms of tax evasion, cross-country com-
parisons in the international comparative literature cannot always fully consid-
er all dimensions of shadow employment (grey and black work); therefore they 
use more easily measurable proxies. Hence entrepreneurs without employees, 
unpaid family workers, employees without a written employment contract or 
(as a broader category) workers employed by micro businesses (less than five 
employees) are often considered informally employed workers. The different 
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proxy categories provide different estimates for informal employment. Con-
sidering the three most frequently analysed categories, six per cent of the non-
agricultural workforce were entrepreneurs with no employees and 2.6% were 
employed without a written employment contract in Hungary in 2006–2007 
(the latter nearly halved since 2002), while approximately 2% of the workforce 
had more than one job. These figures, with some exceptions, are broadly simi-
lar to those of other Visegrád countries – however the share of those without 
an employment contract and of entrepreneurs are considerably lower than in 
the less developed OECD countries, such as Mexico and Turkey.3
According to the Eurobarometer Survey of the European Commission in 
2007, seven per cent of the Hungarian sample responded that they had done 
undeclared work in the previous 12 months and eight per cent of those in em-
ployment said that they regularly received all or part of their pay as an envelope 
wage. Thus, data suggest that both black and grey work is more widespread in 
Hungary than the EU average (five per cent for both). Interpretation is made 
more difficult by the fact that the highest rate of undeclared work was record-
ed in Denmark (18%) while Southern European countries reported very low 
rates (one to four per cent in Cyprus, Malta, Italy, Spain and Greece), which 
seems to contradict information from other sources. This suggests that cross-
country differences in black and grey work are very difficult to measure reli-
ably with survey methods due to differences in the willingness to respond and 
in the interpretation of questions.
The remainder of this chapter explores wage-related tax evasion in Hungary 
using a secondary analysis of micro-level (administrative and population sur-
vey) data that were mainly collected for other purposes. This approach mini-
mises the underreporting bias of surveys specifically designed to measure tax 
evasion, however it still has the advantage of micro-level analysis which per-
mits the disaggregated analysis of tax evasion. These studies typically use data 
until 2007 or even earlier, therefore Box 6.1 at the end of this chapter analyses 
changes in the prevalence of envelope wages in the past four years using popu-
lation surveys from 2008 and 2012.
Measuring undeclared work using administrative data
Within undeclared work, the share of those workers can be estimated who 
have not been declared to the authorities by their employers but in different 
surveys respond that they are working. For the comparison, the number of 
declared workers (i.e. whose employers pay the employment-related contri-
butions) can be calculated using individual-level administrative data from 
the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance (in Hungarian: 
Országos Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság, ONYF) and the National Tax and 
Customs Administration (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal, NAV, 
previously APEH); total employment is taken from the KSH’s Labour Force 
3 Source of data: OECD (2008). 
The computations are based on 
European Social Survey, Euro-
pean Labour Force Survey and 
OECD Labour Force Statistics 
databases.
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Survey (LFS).4 The validity of the comparative (discrepancy) method depends 
on whether the majority of undeclared workers report their work in the LFS. 
Indirectly this is suggested by the fact that the LFS recorded the highest level 
of employment compared to other surveys (Population Census, KSH Time 
Use Survey, Tárki Monitor) in 2001 (Elek et al. 2009b).
Recently various studies estimated the level of undeclared employment in 
LFS data using the comparative method (Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1: Estimates of undeclared employment in the LFs, 2001–2007 
(percentage)
Source: From referenced studies.
Results are slightly different depending on the methods and the sub-samples 
used, but they always fall into the range of between 10–17 per cent and do not 
seem to indicate major changes in 2001–2007. (This is the case despite the 
fact that the minimum wage increased considerably in 2002 which, accord-
ing to the theoretical models, would have implied an increase in undeclared 
work.) Ádám and Kutas (2004) compared LFS data with tax return data from 
NAV. Elek et al. (2009a) modelled the LFS definition of employment on a 
database of 200,000 contribution payers from the ONYF and used the start 
and end date of insurance periods to adjust for any gaps in contribution pay-
ment (i.e. for fragmented employment).5 With a slightly different approach, 
Augusztinovics and Köllő (2007) used the insurance qualifying time from the 
ONYF database to correct fragmented employment, focusing on the non-
retired population. Finally, the Social Renewal Operational Programme (in 
Hungarian: TÁMOP) 2.3.2-09 coordinated by the Institute of Economics 
of the Hungaran Academy of Sciences (MTA KTI, the predecessor of the 
Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, in Hungarian: Közgaz-
daság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont, KRTK) used a much larger 
sample of panel data – administrative data from half of the population – how-
ever its estimates refer only to the 25–49 year old population and indicate 
relatively low undeclared work levels (See Annex on pre-publication data.)
8
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4 The Labour Force Survey de-
fines people in employment as 
those who did at least one hour’s 
paid work in the reference week 
or did not do any paid work but 
had a job and were temporar-
ily away.
5 For the exact matching of 
the Labour Force Survey’s and 
ONYF’s definition of employ-
ment see the Appendix of Elek 
et al. (2009a).
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These results are consistent with estimates from surveys: the prevalence of 
undeclared work was estimated at 15% by Semjén et al. (2009b), while Czibik 
and Medgyesi (2007) estimated approximately 10%. Köllő (2010) used a joint 
KSH–ONYF survey (see Bálint et al. 2010) to estimate black employment 
among those who worked in the same job according to the LFS from a given 
year until 2008. Completely undeclared work (no qualifying service for pen-
sion during the year) even in this relatively stable group of workers reached on 
average 8.4% each year between 1999 and 2006.6
Using micro-level databases it is possible to analyse undeclared work based 
on gender, age, place of residence and occupation. First, it can be concluded that 
undeclared work is substantially less common among employees than entre-
preneurs. For example the number of entrepreneurs was estimated at 527,000 
based on the LFS as opposed to 302,000 according to ONYF in 2004 (Elek 
et al. 2009a). Undeclared employment is significantly more common among 
men than women, and in terms of age, it is most prevalent in the 25–39 age 
group. Overall, nearly half of the undeclared workers are in the 25–39 age 
group (see Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2: the number and percentage of undeclared workers in the total workforce 
by age group and gender in the LFs and onyF samples, 2004
Note: Considering that pensioners in employment were not required to pay pension 
contribution in 2004 and employment in the 15–24 age group was very low, data is 
only presented for the 25–54 age group. According to calculations based on the MTA 
KTI–TÁMOP database (see Annex of this chapter) in 2007, when pension contribu-
tion had to be paid, undeclared employment was about five per cent – well below 
average – among the 50–74 year olds.
Source: Elek et al. (2009a).
The prevalence of undeclared work is highest in the central parts of the coun-
try and it is above average on the Great Plain. However, the regional estimates 
might be biased because ONYF records the permanent address while LFS 
uses the place of actual residence; therefore some of the workforce moving 
into regions with more job opportunities might not appear there as a regis-
6 The results might be biased by 
the fact that those people who 
were the most motivated to par-
ticipate in the joint KSH–ONYF 
survey were those who suspected 
that they were not declared by 
their employers to the relevant 
authorities. This bias could be 
partly adjusted by applying 
weighting based on observable 
characteristics.
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tered employee. However, other data suggest that migration is low so this bias 
is probably not substantial. The findings of these studies are consistent with 
the results of a survey reported by Sik and Tóth (1998) in that undeclared work 
was least prevalent in Transdanubia, particularly the Central-Transdanubia 
region. The estimates according to occupational groups are very sensitive to 
the accuracy of categorisation, therefore only some unequivocal results are 
highlighted here: undeclared work is prevalent and common among workers 
in building construction, drivers, machine operators, technicians and people 
in personal services. Above average prevalence is found among security guards, 
architects, secondary school and university graduate IT workers, university 
graduate cultural occupations and in repair and maintenance. There is no, or 
very limited, undeclared employment among secondary school and universi-
ty graduate employees in health and human services (working mostly in the 
public sector), university graduates in general (except architects and cultural 
occupations), in catering and in elementary occupations (except agricultural 
workers).7 Undeclared employment is below average in the retail sector and in 
light industry as well.
The database used by Köllő (2010) is the only database that combines LFS 
and ONYF data for the same individuals, therefore the probability of report-
ing can also be analysed using multivariate estimation. The study included 
individuals who said that they had been working in the same job without in-
terruption and looked at the actual ratio of these that appeared in the ONYF 
register as opposed to the expected 100 per cent. The coefficients of variables 
explaining the percentage of reporting indicated below-average ratios where 
higher levels of undeclared employment would have been expected based on 
the findings of other studies and everyday experience (small enterprises, self-
employed, casual workers, new entrants and those near pension age, people 
in atypical employment, male, Budapest, areas affected by high unemploy-
ment). The controlled (multivariate) estimation showed that reporting was 
lowest among people with a non-vocational secondary education. The ratio 
of reported qualifying time was somewhat, although not significantly, higher 
among those with a primary education or below, while among those with a sec-
ondary vocational qualification the data show that the ratio was around 3–4% 
higher (compared to those with a non-vocational secondary education). Col-
lege graduates reported more working days by four percentage points, while 
university graduates by eight percentage points than comparable people with 
a non-vocational secondary education.
Measuring grey work
Underreporting of wages is prevalent in some sectors even in Scandinavian 
countries, often cited as examples of a high level of tax compliance.8 It is par-
ticularly common that entrepreneurs pay the compulsory minimum wage. 
7 These findings do not exclude 
the possibility that the preva-
lence of undeclared employment 
is high among the self-employed 
in these occupations.
8 Based on inspections carried 
out in 678 pizza restaurants, the 
Danish tax authority found that 
wages were under-reported for 
40% of the workers. The majority 
of the others were completely 
undeclared. One third had their 
“first day at work” at the given 
workplace (Kolm and Nielsen, 
2008).
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This “disguised minimum wage” is especially common in countries on the Eu-
ropean periphery, and it was also widespread in Hungary until recently. Softer 
and harder facts on this were reported by the World Bank (2005) for multiple 
countries, Erdogdu (2009) for Turkey, and Kriz et al. (2007), Masso and Krillo 
(2009) and Meriküll and Staehr (2010) for the Baltic States. In various coun-
tries, such as Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania, the number of people 
who are paid the minimum wage is (or was a few years ago) suspiciously high, 
despite the minimum wage – average wage ratio being near the international 
average (World Bank, 2005). Although there might be various reasons for the 
high number of people earning around the minimum wage, tax evasion is cer-
tainly one of them (for alternative arguments see for example Shelkova, 2008 
or DiNardo et al. 2005). In an international comparison, Tonin (2011) found 
a strong relationship between the rate of people who are paid the minimum 
wage and the estimated size of the black economy.
Hungarian studies so far – except for Elek et al. (2009b) – were based on the 
assumption that fraudulent employers register their workers at the minimum 
wage to minimise their tax liabilities, however workers are also paid envelope 
wages. This assumption is strong far from obvious. Even if it is true that entre-
preneurs maximise their profit in the short run if they pay the national mini-
mum wage, in the long run this strategy has costs as well: on the one hand it 
might trigger the protest and exit of workers, and on the other hand it might 
increase the probability of being caught if the tax authorities are suspicious of 
companies paying the minimum wage. “Registering workers at the minimum 
wage” becomes the dominant form of underreporting wages if workers have 
limited bargaining power and/or see no strong relationship between contri-
bution payment and future eligibility for transfers (pension, unemployment 
and health care), moreover the tax authorities do not consider minimum wage 
as a signal of tax fraud.
Incentives and permissive conditions for “registration at minimum wage” 
were undeniably present in Hungary before 2007. Due to high contributions 
the potential gain from underreporting wages was high and has remained 
high. As is highlighted by Tóth and Semjén (2009) the majority of those who 
are paid the disguised minimum wage accept underreporting out of necessity. 
The relationship between contributions and benefits is loose and the probabil-
ity of being caught only increased in 2007 when – following the examples of 
Bulgaria (2003) and Croatia (2003) – a contribution base equal to twice the 
minimum wage was introduced. This made it clear that policy makers consid-
ered the payment of minimum wage as a “signal of tax fraud”. This measure 
reduced the number of people paid the minimum wage by 60% in a single year; 
however this does not mean that underreporting of wages became less preva-
lent, but the optimum method of hiding the tax base changed.
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Research in Hungary started relatively late in 2007 and estimates of the 
prevalence of underreporting of wages are rather uncertain and spread across 
a wide range depending on the methods and assumptions applied.
The existence of underreporting of wages was studied using indirect methods 
by Tonin (2011), and Benedek et al. (2006). Tonin found that food consump-
tion declined more in poor households where one or more family members 
earned the minimum wage than in similarly poor, but non-minimum wage 
earning households after the increases of the minimum wage in 2001–2002. 
Thus, he concluded that the typical worker earning the minimum wage receives 
some of his pay as an envelope wage (for more details see Box 6.2). On the con-
trary, Benedek et al. found that the average person earning the minimum wage 
does not consume more compared to their income than a similar worker who 
earns more than the minimum wage.
The number of workers earning the minimum wage
Attempts to estimate the magnitude of underreporting face difficulties from 
the outset because it is difficult to establish how many people are earning the 
minimum wage. Payroll statistics are only available for companies of five or 
more workers, while the general assumption is that the majority of workers 
earning the minimum wage are employed by companies with 0–4 employees. 
One of the first attempts to establish the number of people earning the mini-
mum wage was by Krekó and P. Kiss (2007, 2008); in a period when some of 
the data necessary for reliable estimates was not available. They started out 
from the observation that 30% of tax payers reported an annual income of less 
than twelve times the monthly minimum wage in 2005. After adjusting these 
figures using data on daily working time and assumptions on annual working 
time, they concluded that 700–750 thousand people were paid no more than 
the minimum wage in 2005, approximately equivalent to 25–27% of the work-
force at that time. Later, more accurate estimates could be made using ONYF’s 
data on contribution payments (the KELEN database) because these provide 
more accurate information on the length of contribution payments within 
the year9 and also allow a distinction between wages and income-dependent 
transfers that appear in personal income tax returns as labour income such as 
unemployment allowance, child care allowance and sick pay.
Estimates based on ONYF data suggest that a smaller rate of workers were 
paid the minimum wage. Using data from 2004 Elek et al. (2009b) estimated 
the number of workers earning the minimum wage at or below 472,000 peo-
ple (17%). They also concluded that only 40% of those with an annual “labour 
income” less than twelve times the monthly minimum wage were actually paid 
less than the minimum wage per month. The majority did not reach this level 
because they were not working throughout the whole year.
9 The duration of employment in 
one year can only be estimated 
from personal income tax re-
turns – based on information 
on tax credits.
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Even more accurate calculations can be done using the very large 50% sam-
ple of the MTA KTI–TÁMOP database (for details on the database see the 
Annex of the Chapter). According to this data set, 21.3% earned no more 
than twelve times the monthly minimum wage annually in 2005. However, 
if only the income of employees and public sector workers is considered (and 
the income of entrepreneurs and transfers are disregarded) then the annual 
rate drops to 15% while the rate of those whose average daily earning falls be-
low the daily minimum wage amounts to only 10.2%. This rate is only slightly 
higher than the 9.6% reported in the Wage Survey (in Hungarian: Bértarifa-
felvétel) based on the monthly pay of workers in companies with five or more 
employees and public sector workers.10
Finally, the April – June wave of the KSH’s Labour Force Survey in 2001 
provided useful information, since it also covered earnings as a special feature. 
The survey identified 486,000 employees whose monthly pay was not higher 
than the minimum wage; this corresponded to 17.7%.11
Based on the above calculations it might be concluded that the total num-
ber of people who were paid the minimum wage or less was between 300 and 
500 thousand during the peak of the mid-2000s; well below the 1–1.5 mil-
lion figure suggested by the media.12 The question is, how many of these were 
committing tax fraud?
The number of disguised minimum wage earners
Krekó and P. Kiss (2007) estimated the number of disguised minimum wage 
earners based on the assumption that wages and the rate of part-time workers 
were the same in companies with 0–4 workers and in larger companies. They 
found that companies employed more than 450,000 people fraudulently at the 
minimum wage in 2005, somewhat more than 15% of the total workforce. The 
rate of fraudsters was estimated at 70% in small companies. Furthermore, it was 
estimated that for more than 300,000 part-time workers employers reported 
shorter working time than the actual number of hours worked.
Elek et al. (2009b, 2012) used the double hurdle econometric model to es-
timate the probability of fraud in 2003 and 2006 data.13 The model starts 
from the assumption that the (latent) true wage can only be observed if two 
conditions are met simultaneously: the individual’s productivity is above the 
minimum wage level and is not underreporting. In all other cases the mini-
mum wage is observed instead of the true wage. If model variables can capture 
the variance in productivity and fraud, then the probability of fraud and the 
true earnings of individuals can be estimated. Both estimations were based on 
data from the Wage Survey for companies with five or more employees, where 
payments under the minimum wage were practically non-existent. Thus the 
aim was to identify envelope wages for those who were paid in a narrow range 
around the minimum wage.
10 Using the original weightings 
of the Wage Survey provided by 
the National Labour Office, this 
rate is 7.6%. The above figure is 
obtained using the correction 
weights computed by the IE HAS 
Databank that also take into 
account that the response rate 
among small businesses is below 
average. It should be noted that 
six per cent of the 2005 Wage 
Tariff Survey’s sample worked in 
companies with 0–4 employees.
11 For this computation we con-
verted the net monthly wage into 
the gross monthly wage using 
the tax table and then calculated 
full-time monthly equivalent 
earnings based on the number of 
working hours paid. This value 
was then compared to the mini-
mum wage which was, at that 
time, 40,000 forints.
12 Google returns 1,502 search 
results for the term “one mil-
lion minimum wage earners” 
(in Hungarian: “egymillió min-
imálbéres”).
13 The model was f irst used 
by Cragg (1971) to model the 
consumption of durable goods. 
Since then the model and its ex-
tensions have been used by nu-
merous studies, however we are 
not aware of many applications 
in the field of wage distributions 
(but see Shelkova, 2008 and Di 
Porto, 2011).
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Elek et al. (2009b, 2012) estimated the rate of disguised minimum wage earn-
ers in the private sector using the above method at 7–11% in 2003 and 5.5–6% 
in 2006. They found that approximately 40–50 of those earning the minimum 
wage received envelope wages as well in the two years (however, the estimate is 
rather sensitive to the assumptions on the wage distribution).14 The estimated 
true wage of fraudsters was significantly above the minimum wage (by about 
2–2.4 times in the two years), which follows from the fact that the probability 
of fraud is highest among high-skilled minimum wage earners.
Estimates also show that disguised minimum wages are more common 
than the average in free-lance or retail type occupations that are character-
ised by frequent cash transactions.15 This is not surprising since the presence 
of costumers using cash provides more opportunities for tax fraud. While 
underreporting was estimated to be 15% among cleaners, in the construc-
tion industry it was 50–60%, and nearly 100% among managers and uni-
versity graduates. The share of disguised minimum wage earners in the total 
workforce is highest in the construction and retail sectors.16 The probability 
of underreporting is negatively associated with the size of the company; fur-
thermore it is low in foreign-owned companies (Tóth and Semjén (1996) and 
Semjén and Tóth (2004) reported similar findings). The probability of under-
reporting is higher in Budapest and in villages compared to towns; which is 
consistent with the findings reported by Semjén et al. (2009b) for example. 
The presence of tourism increases, while the density of enterprises decreases 
the probability of tax fraud.
Not only is the probability of fraud higher among more educated minimum 
wage earners with better earnings potential – this is expected –, but also they 
are responsible for a disproportionately large part of the contribution and tax 
base hidden as a result of underreporting wages. This is not addressed explic-
itly in the above studies; therefore it is discussed here using 2006 data from 
the paper by Elek et al. (2012), see Table 6.1.
table 6.1: “disguised” minimum wage earners in the quintiles  
of the estimated true wage, 2006
Quintiles of the estimated true wage
Total
bottom 2nd 3rd 4th top
Minimum wage earners (percentage) 41.6 8.0 8.0 7.9 6.4 14.8
Probability of fraud among minimum  
wage earners (percentage)
33.4 54.2 61.5 70.6 84.9 47.5
Fraudulent minimum wage earners in the group 
(percentage)
13.9 4.3 4.9 5.6 5.4 7.0
Excess of the simulated real wage above the 
minimum wage (thousand forints)
3.6 22.3 54.1 106.1 285.7 95.1
The distribution of hidden wages (percentage) 2.0 3.8 10.4 23.1 60.7 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on results reported by Elek et al. (2012).
14 Elek et al. (2009b) estimated 
the proportion of disguised min-
imum wage earners at 40–65% 
of all minimum wage earners in 
2003; the lower end indicates a 
scenario when tax evasion only 
happens among minimum wage 
earners. (Allowing tax evasion 
above the minimum wage chang-
es both the true wage distribu-
tion and the number of disguised 
minimum wage earners.) Elek et 
al. (2012) estimated the propor-
tion of disguised minimum wage 
earners at around 50% for 2006.
15 For the definition of catego-
ries see Köllő (2008), Appendix 4.
16 It should be noted that these 
results include only employees 
and not the self-employed.
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For Table 6.1 business sector employees observed in the Wage Survey were 
ranked into quintiles (one-fifths of equal number) based on their estimated 
true wage; for non-fraudsters this was equivalent to the actual wage and for 
fraudsters to the predicted true wage. The table shows that the probability of 
fraud among minimum wage earners in the bottom quintile was 33%, while 
it was 85% among the potentially highest earners. Although the number of 
disguised minimum wage earners declines, the excess of the true wage above 
the minimum wage increases sharply towards the high end of the (true) in-
come distribution. Based on this information it is possible to calculate how 
the amount hidden from taxation is distributed between quintiles of work-
ers: over half of it goes to the quintile with the highest (true) pay.17 The policy 
implications of this will be discussed later.
It should be noted that the above calculation ignores the underreporting of 
working time as a form of evading the minimum wage (Krekó and P. Kiss, 2007; 
Elek et al, 2009b; Semjén et al. 2009b), which frequently occurs in the lower 
segments of the market and somewhat mitigates the inequalities reported in 
the table. Box 6.3 examines whether the introduction of the stamp book for 
casual workers (in Hungarian: alkalmi munkavállalói könyv) reduced the ex-
tent of the black economy – through the registration of previously undeclared 
workers, or boosted it – by switching regular employment into casual work.
Policy implications
What is the effect of the fight against the underreporting of wages on the la-
bour market? Kolm and Nielsen (2008) examined this question using a partial 
equilibrium framework, thus ignoring the impact on investment and budget. 
According to their model stricter inspection increases unemployment through 
an increase of production costs (that is equivalent to the increase of effective 
tax rates). Higher labour taxation, somewhat surprisingly, reduces unemploy-
ment: the return on underreporting is higher if tax rates are higher, therefore 
increased labour supply puts a downward pressure on wages and makes it pos-
sible to expand demand as well as employment.
Obviously, the underreporting of wages also influences the labour market via 
reducing budget revenues, particularly in countries characterised by high state 
intervention and where the tax burden on legal employment is high. What is the 
impact of underreporting on the budget? Köllő (2008) deliberately attempted 
to give an exaggerated upper bound estimate for hidden wages and foregone tax 
revenues. He attempted to estimate the increase in the tax base and revenues 
based on the following assumptions: a) all minimum wage earners are fraud-
sters, b) all workers currently receiving the minimum wage would be paid the 
same as what workers with a similar education and experience are getting who 
are not paid at the minimum wage level, c) labour demand is insensitive to wages, 
and d) underreporting can be eliminated at zero cost. Under these admittedly 
17 Given that the groups are of 
equal size, the total amount of 
hidden income is the sum of the 
product of the numbers in the 
third and fourth rows.
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unrealistic conditions, social security contributions would go up by 8.5% and 
income tax revenues by 9.7%. This would mean an additional revenue equiva-
lent to 1.3% of the GDP (approximately 250 billion forints in 2003). How-
ever, if it is considered that not all people who are paid the minimum wage are 
fraudsters and their true pay is lower than that of similar workers paid above 
the minimum wage, labour demand is price elastic and combating tax evasion 
is expensive, then this figure most likely remains well under 1% of the GDP.
In a similar analysis, Elek et al. (2009b) sought to answer a similar question: 
by how much would budget revenues have increased if all workers paid the 
minimum wage had been receiving the simulated wage using the double hur-
dle model? The estimated impact on the budget was 0.6–0.7% of the GDP – in 
the case of companies with five or more employees. Krekó and P. Kiss (2008) 
estimated the loss from the tax base as a result of workers paid the minimum 
wage or less at 2% of the GDP (out of this the loss of tax revenue could be around 
1% of the GDP), however this is biased by the overestimation of the number of 
minimum wage earners. Whichever findings are considered, the hidden tax 
base of disguised minimum wage earners is considerable smaller than the loss 
of the tax base due to tax evasion by entrepreneurs and VAT fraud. Krekó and 
P. Kiss (2008) estimated these at around 7% and – as previously highlighted – 
12–14% of the GDP respectively in 2005–2006.
The easiest way to combat underreporting seems to be an increase of the mini-
mum wage. This was one of the arguments in favour of the minimum wage in-
creases of 2001–2002, and it was one of the stated aims of the introduction of 
the double contribution liability in 2007. However, in addition to its benefits 
– no additional cost – this solution has major disadvantages. Various studies 
(Kertesi and Köllő, 2004; Halpern et al. 2004; Köllő, 2008) pointed out that 
the increase of the minimum wage reduced labour demand and made low-pro-
ductivity and low-paid labour more expensive. On the other hand, as is clearly 
shown by Table 6.1, raising the minimum wage will only have a small impact 
on the total amount of foregone labour taxes and contributions. A drastic in-
crease, for example by 20,000 forints, would reduce the tax base hidden by the 
top quintile only by 10%: instead of 285,000 forints on average to 265,000 for-
ints (or in the second quintile from 106,000 forints to 86,000 forints). Con-
sidering that the top two quintiles hide four fifths of the total wages, the over-
all “whitening” effect would not be significant; nevertheless it would make it 
considerably more expensive to employ low-productivity workers.
Underreporting at the minimum wage level among employees became negli-
gible in 2007,18 and peaks appeared in the wage distribution around the “skilled 
minimum wage” and the double of the minimum wage. Changes in the com-
position of people underreporting their wages are illustrated by characteristics 
of the 80,000 employees who were paid twice the minimum wage in 2007. The 
average wage of this group was only 91,500 forints in 2005; therefore they saw 
18 See for example Elek et al. 
(2009b, Figure 4) on the trends 
in the number of minimum wage 
earners between 2000 and 2007.
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an increase of over 40% in two years. This was considerably higher than the 20% 
which people earning less than twice the minimum wage in 2007 achieved in 
two years. This suggests that the prevalence of tax evasion was higher than the 
average in the second group in previous years (and it is likely that they are still 
receiving some of their pay as envelope wages on top of their increased wage). 
There were significantly more people from Budapest and in managerial posi-
tions among those earning twice the minimum wage than among those earn-
ing slightly less. The suspicion of underreporting is further increased by the 
fact – as shown by Elek et al. (2012) – that companies labelled as fraudulent 
in 2006 were more likely to increase the pay of their minimum wage earners 
to the double of the minimum wage in 2007 than other companies.
It should be noted that the differentiation of the minimum wage and the 
introduction of a contribution base that is larger than the minimum wage – if 
implemented out of budgetary considerations – essentially mean a simple form 
of presumptive taxation. This simple form implies excessively high tax burden 
for some businesses while others can easily comply with the regulations. Dif-
ferentiating the minimum wage according to certain employee characteristics 
cannot be considered a sophisticated solution either, because presumptive taxa-
tion would require the definition of contribution minimums adjusted to the 
characteristics of businesses.19 However differentiating according to educa-
tional attainment seems adequately targeted from a budgetary perspective in 
Hungary, considering that around nine tenths of graduates who are paid the 
minimum wage are fraudsters according to the findings of the above studies.
Unfortunately there is limited information about tax evasion above the min-
imum wage, an area becoming increasingly important, and its analysis poses 
serious methodological difficulties. The main drivers for tax evasion probably 
remained the same and only the peak at the minimum wage became “blurred”; 
thus underreporting of wages remains an important area for research.
Tax behaviour of the self-employed
Due to its special nature, the tax behaviour of the self-employed is discussed 
separately. Compared to employees, they have more – legal and illegal – op-
portunities to minimise their tax liabilities, for example by declaring their la-
bour income as capital income. Based on a comparative analysis in the Euro-
pean Union, Krekó and P. Kiss (2007, 2008) estimated the loss of tax base for 
the self-employed at around 6,7–7,5% of the GDP and the loss of tax revenue 
approximately half of this between 2005 and 2007.
Similarly to the tax-price elasticity literature discussed in Chapter 2 of In Fo-
cus – I, Benedek (2011) estimated the elasticity of taxable income among the 
self-employed, and disaggregated it into labour supply and other (mainly tax 
avoidance) responses.20 The tax reform used for the analysis was the introduc-
tion of the simplified business tax (in Hungarian: egyszerűsített vállalkozói 
19 About the notion and its appli-
cation see for example Musgrave 
(1981), Tanzi and Casanegra di 
Jantscher (1987) and Arachi and 
Santoro (2007), regarding ap-
plicability in Eastern Europe see 
the papers by Pashev (2007) and 
Wallace (2002).
20 For a similar international 
study see Kopczuk (2010).
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adó, EVA) in 2003. For those who opted in, the simplified business tax offered 
a general low marginal tax rate as opposed to the complex and higher marginal 
tax rates of the regular business tax. The EVA replaced not only the personal 
income tax for entrepreneurs but also dividend tax as well as VAT; however 
the tax base was the gross revenue that could not be reduced by offsetting the 
expenditures of the company. Therefore switching to EVA was worthwhile pri-
marily for medium and high income companies with small expenditure ratios.
The database used by Benedek (2011) was a 10% sample of entrepreneurs sub-
mitting a tax return in 2006 that included each line of the tax return as well 
as information about gender, age, labour market status and region for 2000–
2006. The analysis was based on data from 2001 and 2004.
The results of the estimation showed that the marginal tax rate had a signifi-
cant impact on the income reported by entrepreneurs. The estimated tax-price 
elasticity was 0.07–0.12 depending on the specification. This value includes 
all possible channels of response – i.e. labour supply, tax evasion and the re-
classification of income (for example between salary and non-salary payments). 
When the regression also controlled for tax evasion using proxy variables, the 
estimated elasticity dropped to 0.043–0.055. Considering that the role of non-
salary payments is limited for entrepreneurs, the two main forms of adaptation 
were labour supply and tax evasion. Thus the latter could be considered labour 
supply elasticity of entrepreneurs, and the difference between the two values 
was explained primarily by the elasticity of tax evasion.
This estimated total elasticity is low compared to other countries, particularly 
the elasticity found in the United States; however it is somewhat higher than 
the elasticity of employees estimated using data from Hungary (for more on 
the results of estimations in the international literature and research in Hun-
gary, see Chapter 2 of In Focus – I.) As will be shown in the next sub-chapter, tax 
evasion among entrepreneurs is very high. This suggests that they aim to mini-
mise their tax liabilities under any conditions either using legal tax optimisa-
tion methods or tax evasion; this explains the relatively low tax-price elasticity. 
Contrary to total elasticity, the elasticity of labour supply can be considered 
substantial – although low by international comparison – which shows that 
the real productivity of entrepreneurs responds to changes in taxation.
Tax evasion and income redistribution
Finally, the extent of tax evasion is examined using indirect methods. Indirect 
methods using micro data estimate tax evasion by comparing income and con-
sumption information (e.g. Pissarides and Weber, 1989, Lyssiotou et al., 2004) 
or different income categories (e.g. Fiorio and D’Amuri, 2005, Matsaganis and 
Flevotomou, 2008). These calculations do not distinguish black and grey em-
ployment, and other forms of tax evasion, therefore they can be considered an 
overall measure of tax evasion.
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Benedek and Lelkes (2011) compared data from the HCSO’s household budg-
et survey (HKÉF)21 with individual-level data from the tax authority to esti-
mate the impact of tax evasion on redistribution and revenues. To estimate tax 
evasion at the individual level, information on both real and reported income 
is necessary. The problem is that no single database in Hungary has both type 
of data, so the database for the analysis must be merged from two different 
sources.22 The joint database of the household budget survey and tax data is 
suitable for estimating the underreporting of income.23
It is estimated that income is underreported on average by 9–13% (Table 
6.2); however it varies greatly according to the level of income.
table 6.2: underreporting of income by taxpayers’ income deciles, 2005
Taxpayer’s income decile  
based on real incomea
Real taxable income  
(thousand forints)
Extent of underreportingb  
(percentage)
1st (bottom) 301 26–30
2nd 692 25–29
3rd 892 14–18
4th 1,070 10–14
5th 1,248 9–13
6th 1,432 8–12
7th 1,690 9–13
8th 2,014 8–12
9th 2,560 10–13
10th (top) 4,534 13–16
Mean 1,682 9–13
a Real income: gross taxable income in 2005.
b Underreporting of income = (Real income – Reported income)/Real income. The 
estimations were run using two specifications, the bottom and top values indicate 
the results of the two estimations.
Source: Benedek and Lelkes (2011).
The underreporting of income is U-shaped: it is highest at the bottom and 
top end of the income distribution. It is approximately 14–30 per cent among 
the bottom third of tax payers and 13–16 per cent in the top decile, while it is 
lower among middle-earners. As a percentage, the prevalence of underreport-
ing is highest among the low paid; however in absolute terms its value is much 
greater in the top decile.
Apart from the income, there are substantial differences in terms of oth-
er variables as well. Entrepreneurs underreport their income by around two 
thirds (67%), while the same figure among employees is only four per cent. 
Nevertheless, high underreporting among entrepreneurs is not characteristi-
cally Hungarian. For example a study found that even in Sweden – which has a 
high level of tax compliance, entrepreneurs underreport their income by about 
30% (Engström and Holmlund, 2009). Underreporting is higher among men 
than among women, which might be explained by men’s smaller risk aversion 
21 In Focus – I already uses 
the new name of the Hungar-
ian Central Statistical Office’s 
Household Budget and Liv-
ing Conditions Survey (KSH 
HKÉF). However, that paper 
still refers to it by its previous 
name: Household Budget Sur-
vey (HKF).
22 The estimation uses the 
following two samples: First, 
the budget survey from 2005 
(representative of the Hungar-
ian population) with 9,270 ac-
tive age participants who, by 
their own admission, pay taxes. 
Second, an approximately 5% 
sample of personal income tax 
returns for the tax year 2005, 
that consisted of 217,530 tax 
payers after data cleaning. Both 
datasets had information about 
individual characteristics that 
were the basis for the statisti-
cal matching to integrate the 
two datasets. The source of real 
taxable income was the budget 
survey; meanwhile information 
on the reported income came 
from the tax dataset.
23 The utilisation of this method 
is based on the assumption that 
the budget survey provides in-
formation about real earnings 
with no under-reporting. How-
ever, if earnings are under-re-
ported by households – although 
they are higher than in the tax 
dataset – then the computed 
under-reporting underestimates 
the real level of under-reporting.
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(Eckel and Grossman, 2008). In terms of regional distribution, the findings 
suggest that underreporting is highest in Central Hungary, followed by West 
Transdanubia. Finally, tax evasion is somewhat higher in older age groups and 
that might be explained by the higher prevalence of entrepreneurs in this cat-
egory (Table 6.3).24
table 6.3: underreporting of income by main source  
of income, region, gender and age group, 2005
Share of population  
(percentage)
Estimated reported incomea  
(thousand forints)
Underreporting of incomeb 
(percentage)
Main source of income
Wage 90 1550 4
Business income 10 770 67
Region
Central Hungary 31 1796 17
Central Transdanubia 11 1380 8
West Transdanubia 12 1350 13
South Transdanubia 7 1284 9
Northern Hungary 12 1363 5
North Great Plain 13 1287 9
South Great Plain 14 1295 12
Gender
Male 50 1581 17
Female 50 1362 7
Age group
16–29 18 1147 9
30–44 39 1497 14
45–59 41 1593 12
60–65 2 1462 20
a Real and reported income: Gross taxable income in 2005.
b Underreporting of income = (Real income – Reported income)/Real income
Source: Benedek and Lelkes (2011).
The impact of tax evasion on the income distribution can be examined using a 
microsimulation model. As a result of tax evasion, families pay approximately 
20% less personal income tax than they should be paying based on their true 
income. If tax evasion is taken into account, income inequalities are much 
greater than suggested by reported income. In this case, the Gini Coefficient 
and the P90/P10 indicators are around 5–7% higher, mainly as a result of 
higher underreporting of income among high earners. This also explains that 
taking tax evasion into account the 2005 tax system was less progressive than 
it seemed on the basis of reported income.
24 The latter two findings seem-
ingly contradict the findings re-
garding black employment: this 
suggested that the prevalence 
of undeclared employment was 
lowest in the Transdanubian re-
gions and highest in the youngest 
age group. However, this sub-
chapter looks at tax evasion in 
general and not only undeclared 
employment.
in Focus – i. taxes, transFers and laBour market
178
Concluding remarks
This chapter has provided an overview of empirical findings related to black 
and grey employment as well as tax evasion in Hungary, based on micro-level 
data. According to estimates based on the comparison of KSH’s Labour Force 
Survey and administrative data, the prevalence of undeclared (black) work was 
around 10–17% – depending on the methods used and the selection of the 
sub-sample – in Hungary between 2001 and 2007. The findings do not high-
light any noteworthy trends over time. The prevalence of black work is above 
average among men, the self-employed and in Central Hungary, as well as in 
certain occupations such as building construction and services.
To examine the phenomenon of grey employment, the number and distri-
bution of disguised minimum wage earners in 2006 – before the introduction 
of the double minimum wage rule – was analysed using the double hurdle 
econometric model. It was estimated that disguised minimum wage earners 
are concentrated in certain groups: their number and share was higher for ex-
ample in the construction and retail sectors and in micro enterprises. In other 
occupations that are also characterised by a high number of minimum wage 
earners – for example cleaners and unskilled workers –, the prevalence of un-
derreporting of income was much lower. It was also shown that over half of the 
loss of the tax and contribution base could be attributed to the top quintile of 
the true earnings distribution. Therefore a uniform increase of the minimum 
wage – apart from reducing the employment of unskilled workers who were 
really paid the minimum wage – has only a limited impact on the amount of 
wages hidden from taxation, and thus, it does not have a substantial aggregate 
impact on reducing the shadow economy. Differentiating the minimum wage 
based on carefully selected characteristics (such as the introduction of a uni-
versity graduate minimum wage), however seems to be an effective measure.
Finally, the total amount of unreported income – from black and grey em-
ployment as well as other sources – was estimated comparing data from the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s Household Budget Survey and tax re-
turns submitted to the tax authority. The average rate of underreporting was 
found to be 9–13%, higher in the lowest and highest income groups. Estimates 
concerning the distribution of underreporting were by-and-large similar to the 
findings related to black and grey employment: tax evasion was higher among 
men, entrepreneurs and in Central Hungary.
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6.1. The prevalence of envelope wages and the fear of unemployment
István János Tóth & Mihály Fazekas
There are different types of undeclared work. A 
worker can be (a) employed by an unregistered 
business, (b) employed illegally by a registered busi-
ness, (c) employed legally by a registered business 
and receive one part of their wage declared to the 
tax authorities and the other part as an undeclared 
envelope wage. If a worker is not employed by the 
company although effectively works there and re-
ceives his/her payment against a VAT invoice issued 
by another company (typically his/her own) then 
this is considered a variant of case (b) or (c).
This chapter explores whether the crisis has had 
an impact on the prevalence of envelope wages and 
it also looks at the relationship between previous 
unemployment experience and workers’ willing-
ness to accept envelope wage payments. First, the 
potential effects of the crisis will be discussed, then 
the data for the analysis, and finally the main find-
ings will be presented.
In terms of undeclared work, registered busi-
nesses could have responded to demand and sup-
ply shocks associated with the crisis or unrelated 
government shocks (such as the increase of the min-
imum wage, statutory pay increases etc.) in a num-
ber of ways: 1) they laid off some of their workforce 
and “re-employed” them illegally, 2) increased the 
share of envelope wage payments within the work-
ers’ pay package, or 3) they increased the proportion 
of undeclared workers against declared workers, in 
extreme cases they froze hiring legally and only took 
on undeclared workers who were then paid envelope 
wages. All three adjustment strategies lead to the in-
crease of envelope wage payment both in terms of 
prevalence and amount.
On the contrary, it might also be argued that the 
crisis and government measures had a negative im-
pact not only on companies that register their em-
ployees but on the undeclared labour market as well. 
Demand for the products of businesses employing 
undeclared workers also declined despite their rela-
tive advantage in terms of labour cost compared to 
their competitors that employ registered workers 
(to a greater extent). Furthermore the decline in the 
share of undeclared work might also be associated 
with sectoral factors: due to the decline in consump-
tion (particularly consumer services characterised 
by high under-reporting) and its stagnating at a low-
er level than before the crisis, or the collapse of the 
construction industry in Hungary, companies that 
relied more heavily on undeclared work might have 
been more likely to leave the market or reduce the 
number of their (undeclared) workers.
However, another possibility is that the flat in-
come tax introduced in 2011 might have created 
incentives for declared as opposed to undeclared 
work for both employers and – particularly higher-
paid – employees through the reduction of the tax 
wedge and no changes in the probability of inspec-
tion. These potential effects could have reduced the 
prevalence and extent of envelope wage payments.
The sum of the various effects can only be estab-
lished with empirical analysis using multiple data 
sources. This chapter presents the relevant findings 
of two surveys that can provide useful information 
for further economic analysis. The first survey took 
place in 2008 and the second in the spring of 2012, 
both using a sample of 1,000 adults from the general 
population aged between 18 and 60 years.* Data was 
representative and homogeneous in terms of gender, 
age groups and type of settlement in both surveys.
Results suggest that at least 14.6% of 18–60 year 
olds received envelope wage payments at least once 
in the previous two years in 2008, while the same 
figure was 14.4% in 2012 – therefore the situation 
has not changed over the past four years. The survey 
also asked those who received part or all of their pay 
as an envelope wage to estimate the share of their 
last such pay within their total net earnings. Again, 
there were no considerable changes compared to 
the situation before the crisis: 29 per cent said that 
they received less than a quarter of their net earn-
* For the questionnaires and main characteristics of the 
surveys see link in the on-line version.
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ings as an envelope wage payment, 17 per cent said 
less than half, eight per cent said no more than three 
quarters, three per cent said more than that but not 
their total pay, and 44 per cent stated that they re-
ceived their total pay as an envelope wage.
There were various changes in the relationship be-
tween the prevalence of envelope wage and the char-
acteristics of workers over the past four years; how-
ever the direction and strength of correlations often 
remained the same. For example, receiving enve-
lope wage payments was more common among men 
(18–19%) than women (11%) both in 2008 and 2012.
Similarly, the willingness to accept envelope wage 
payments was consistently associated with previous 
unemployment experience. While 9 per cent of re-
spondents who had never been unemployed received 
envelope wage payment in 2008 and 2012, 22 per 
cent of those who had experienced unemployment 
before said that they had received envelope wage 
payments within the previous two years.
With regards to other factors, there were some 
changes. In 2008 envelope wages were significantly 
more prevalent among workers in Budapest (19%) 
than those in the countryside (14%); by 2012 the situ-
ation changed and they became less prevalent in Bu-
dapest (12%) and increased somewhat among those 
living in the countryside (15%). There were similar 
changes in the age groups of workers: while in 2008 
envelope wages were more common in the age group 
under 30 (21%) and 30–44 (16%) (their prevalence 
being 9% above 45), in 2012 the prevalence of enve-
lope wages was high only among young people (20%) 
and in the other two age groups it was 13%.
Looking at the characteristics of people who take 
up undeclared work in the 2008 survey, it emerges 
that envelope wage payment was particularly com-
mon in a clearly defined group of workers (those 
avoiding poverty) – see Fazekas et al. (2012). This 
group is characterised by not having any assets apart 
from the property where they live, have a low lev-
el of education, work in semi-skilled or vocational 
jobs and often they or one of their family members 
has already experienced unemployment. People in 
this group move between a) legal employment with 
fully declared pay, (b) undeclared work and (c) un-
employment. This highlights the link between un-
employment and the prevalence of envelope wages. 
It can be assumed that the acceptance of undeclared 
or mixed pay is heavily influenced by the risk of un-
employment. If there is such risk or it is higher, then 
the worker is more likely to accept envelope wage 
payments as well. The risk of unemployment was 
measured by asking the question “have you ever 
been unemployed since you first started working?” 
and the number of months in work during the pre-
vious year. The analysis of this relationship on the 
pooled database of 2008–2012 shows a correlation 
in the expected direction between past unemploy-
ment and receiving envelope wage payments (the 
probability of this is 2.7–3.2 times higher). The same 
result is obtained if gender, education, type of set-
tlement and age are included in the analysis as con-
trol variables.**
** For detailed results see link in the on-line version.
6.2. Minimum wage or minimum tax?
Mirco Tonin
What is the interaction between minimum wage leg-
islation and the underreporting of earnings? Tonin 
(2011) looks at this issue by investigating the mas-
sive minimum wage increase that took place in Hun-
gary in 2001, when the statutory monthly minimum 
wage was increased from 25,500 HUF (98 EUR or 
90 USD using the average exchange rate for 2000) 
to 40,000 HUF (156 EUR or 140 USD using the av-
erage exchange rate for 2001).
The basic idea is that the minimum wage can have 
an impact on compliance, as it usually represents 
the smallest possible amount that has to be declared 
to be in the official economy. The impact is similar 
when declaring a sub-minimum amount is permis-
sible, but attracts higher scrutiny by the tax author-
ity (Tonin, 2013a).
In an environment in which firms and workers 
can collude to report to the fiscal authorities an 
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earnings amount that is different from the true 
one, the minimum wage poses a constraint on this 
decision and induces an increase in compliance by 
some, while pushing others out of the formal labour 
market into the black economy or into inactivity. As 
a result, there is bunching of declared earnings at 
the minimum wage level. Other things being equal, 
the higher the importance of underreporting in the 
economy or in a given sector or profession, the high-
er the spike in the distribution of declared earnings 
at the minimum wage level.
With underreporting of earnings, a minimum 
wage hike implies that some workers who on paper 
experience an increase in their earnings are actually 
just swapping some of the cash, “tax-free”, payments 
for declared, and therefore taxable, income. As a re-
sult, they experience an actual drop in disposable in-
come, as they are forced to declare a higher share of 
their true compensation (their effective tax rate goes 
up). Workers who were already declaring more that 
the new minimum wage before the hike, albeit pos-
sibly also underreporting, are instead unaffected.
Given that undeclared payments are not directly 
observable, it is necessary to employ some indirect 
measures to see whether this is indeed what hap-
pened in Hungary in 2001. Tonin (2011) looks at the 
change in food consumption or in the consumption-
income gap, i.e. the difference between consump-
tion and income in a given period, using the Hun-
garian Household Budget Survey Rotation Panel.
In particular, the study compares the change in 
food consumption (or the change in the consump-
tion-income gap) in the period 2000–2001 between 
households affected by the minimum wage hike 
(the treatment group) and similar but unaffected 
households (the control group). Households in the 
treatment group are those with at least one mem-
ber employed before the hike in the private sector 
for a (declared) wage above the minimum wage in 
force (25,500 HUF), but below the much higher to-
be minimum (40,000 HUF). Households in the con-
trol group are those in which there is an employee 
with a similar wage employed in the public sector or 
an employee earning somehow above the to-be min-
imum before the hike. These two groups are compa-
rable in the sense that there is a lot of overlapping in 
terms of total household income and, more impor-
tantly, the dynamics of food consumption did not 
differ between these two groups in the period just 
prior to the minimum wage hike, i.e. in 1999–2000.
What the analysis shows is that the dynamics of 
food consumption (or of the consumption-income 
gap) instead differs after the minimum wage hike, 
with households that apparently gained from the 
higher minimum wage, the ones in the treatment 
group, experiencing a drop compared to households 
in the control group. Interestingly, when consider-
ing skilled and unskilled/semi-skilled employees 
separately, the drop is present only for the former 
group, while there is no drop whatsoever for the lat-
ter. This suggests that underreporting of earnings 
is concentrated among relatively high productivity 
(skilled) employees declaring low wages rather than 
among low productivity (unskilled/semi-skilled) 
employees, who are more likely to be genuinely 
earning wages close to the minimum. There is also 
some evidence that, when considering skilled em-
ployees, the effect is particularly strong for house-
holds whose total income is relatively high, i.e. above 
100,000 HUF.
One alternative explanation for the drop could 
be an increase in labour market risk after the mini-
mum wage hike for the treatment group. If labour 
market risk were indeed the driver, then one would 
expect the low skilled to have a stronger treatment 
effect compared to skilled employees, while the op-
posite appears in the data. In any case, to avoid this 
confounding factor, only employees who remained 
employed for at least 12 months after the hike, i.e. 
for the whole of 2001, are considered in the analysis. 
This makes it more likely to have workers with an 
under-declared wage in the sample used in the anal-
ysis than in the population as a whole. One indeed 
could expect workers receiving cash side-payments 
to be more likely to keep their job after a minimum 
wage hike compared to workers complying with fis-
cal regulation, as unreported income may act as a 
buffer to absorb the minimum wage shock.
The study suggests that the minimum wage can 
affect compliance with fiscal regulation. However, 
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it is rather blunt as an instrument to fight under-
reporting. A too low minimum wage would fail to 
make a dent on underreporting, while a too high one 
may push firms and workers underground or simply 
price-out low skilled workers. It is possible to devise 
similar but more targeted instruments to fight un-
derreporting. Bulgaria, for instance, has introduced 
sector- and occupation-specific “minimum social 
insurance thresholds” on which social security con-
tributions have to be paid (Tonin, 2013a).
Tonin (2011) has thus shown evidence of under-
reporting of earnings and its interaction with min-
imum wage legislation in the Hungarian context. 
These issues, however, are not specific to Hungary. 
Within European labour markets, there is evidence 
of a positive correlation, after controlling for the 
minimum wage level, between the extent of under-
reporting of earnings in the economy, as measured 
through a Eurostat survey (EC, 2007) on cash-in-
hand payments by employers, and the proportion of 
full-time employees with earnings at the minimum 
wage level (Tonin, 2013b).
This correlation is consistent with the role of the 
minimum wage in an economy with underreport-
ing highlighted above, while it is possible to exclude 
alternative explanations related to the prevalence of 
small firms in the economy or to the tax rate. The 
practice of officially declaring the minimum wage 
and paying additional remuneration as cash in an 
envelope seems not to be peculiar to Hungary, but 
is relevant in many countries in Central and East-
ern Europe.
6.3. Tax evasion in the Hungarian mini-job scheme
Árpád Földessy & Ágota Scharle
The advantages of mini-job type employment 
contracts
Simplified employment contracts, such as the Ger-
man mini-job scheme can boost employment by 
reducing the administrative burden of hiring and 
employment, provided that the reduction is effec-
tive in practice. In most cases, the simplification is 
implemented in the compliance rules of taxes and 
contributions, e.g. in the case of Hungary, buying 
a single welfare contribution stamp replaces the 
reporting and payment of various social security 
contributions and personal income tax. The sim-
plification decreases both the fixed and the trans-
action costs of hiring and employment, which on 
the one hand increases demand for labour (espe-
cially at low wage levels, where this fixed cost is 
relatively high, compared to wages), while on the 
other hand it may promote registered employment 
(“whitening”).
In Hungary, the so called stamp book for casual 
workers (stamp book or SB hereinafter) introduced 
in 1997 and abolished in 2010 included further in-
centives: in most years, the price of welfare contri-
bution stamps was lower than the sum of taxes and 
contributions on the minimum wage payable in a 
regular employment contract. The most favourable 
year was 2005, when the tax and contribution bur-
den was 18–24 per cent of the total wage cost with 
a SB, as opposed to 40 per cent in a regular contract 
at the minimum wage (Budapest Institute, 2012).
Previous studies on the whitening effect of the 
stamp book for casual workers
The stamp book reduced wage costs as well as ad-
ministrative costs for seasonal and casual labour. 
This may have increased demand for labour and 
may have reduced unregistered employment. In the 
following, we only consider the latter effect. The ac-
tual whitening effect of the stamp book – in con-
trast with the unambiguously positive demand ef-
fect – cannot be predicted on a theoretical basis. 
In accordance with policy aims, it might have pro-
vided an incentive for reporting previously unde-
clared labour (whitening), but unintentionally, it 
also promoted the legal or semi-legal underreport-
ing (greying) of the wage cost for registered employ-
ment. Determining the relative magnitude of these 
two effects is an empirical question.
Previous studies on the stamp book, along with 
non-representative surveys and reports prepared 
by the government administration mainly focus 
on the types of abuse, e.g. the case of buying fewer 
Földessy & scHarle: tax evasion in tHe Hungarian...
183
welfare stamps than implied by the actual number 
of hours worked (ÁFSZ, 2008; Semjén et al. 2008a, 
2009a). However, the recurrence of such forms of 
abuse does not necessarily prove that the stamp 
book was ineffective. Consider the case of when 
the worker in question had been engaged in fully 
unregistered (black) work or was not employed at 
all: his or her employment with a stamp book would 
in this case generate revenue for the budget and 
increase registered employment even if the contri-
bution stamps were not paid for the full length of 
their contract.
Semjén et al. (2008b) survey the employment re-
cord of workers using the stamp book in the spring 
of 2008.* Their results indicate that in most cases the 
booklet was used either to legalize previous black 
employment to some extent, or during a period of 
probation. The survey also revealed that most re-
spondents never met a labour inspector during their 
employment, or if they did, the inspector did not al-
ways fine the non-compliant employer. Finally, Elek 
et al. (2009b) analysed the whitening effect of the 
stamp book using the administrative data of the 
Central Administration of National Pension Insur-
ance (in Hungarian: Országos Nyugdíjbiztosítási 
Főigazgatóság, ONYF). According to their calcu-
lations, the bigger half of those employed with a 
stamp book in 2006 had no other, registered job 
during the year, In fact, a vast majority of them had 
not worked in a registered job in the preceding two 
years. However, the revenues gained from the stamp 
book were modest (around 3 billion HUF in 2006), 
which implies a net fiscal loss even if as little as 5 per 
cent of that smaller half of potential cheaters did in 
fact abuse the booklet.
Examining the stamp book using administra-
tive data
The linked administrative database of the Institute 
of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences al-
lows us to examine the performance of the stamp 
book over a longer time span (see the Appendix by 
Mónika Bálint in Chapter 1 of In Focus – I).** The raw 
aggregate data reveal a rapid increase in the number 
of stamp book contracts, mainly among those who 
had been previously unemployed. There was also a 
rapid rise in the number of workers without any pri-
or registered status which would have made them 
eligible for social security benefits. The majority of 
those previously unemployed had been registered 
as such for several months prior to entering employ-
ment with the stamp book. The share of those who 
had been unemployed for one month only, was just 
below 15 per cent – and did not increase substan-
tially in the months when the formerly unemployed 
could be employed at a reduced contribution rate. 
However, around 20–25 per cent of those with a 
stamp book had previously worked in regular, de-
clared employment. Those switching from a fully 
registered job to grey employment would be found 
in the latter group, but not all of this group may be 
cheaters. Considering the above, we estimate that 
roughly one quarter of those employed with a stamp 
book contributed to the “greying” of employment. 
At the beginning of the period under analysis, the 
degree of abuse at the individual level was still mi-
nor: between 2002 and 2006, the median of the pre-
vious wages for those entering a SB job from a regu-
lar job was 0–3 per cent larger than the minimum 
wage in the given year. The same value is 12–18 per 
cent for 2007 and 2008.
The composition of those employed with a stamp 
book confirms our assumption based on prior la-
bour market status (i.e. that those who had worked 
before are shifting to grey employment). Those en-
tering a SB job from unemployment are on average 
less educated, they had been unemployed for several 
months prior to entry, and there was no significant 
increase in the number of such entrants between 
August 2002 and December 2005, when previously 
unemployed jobseekers paid a discounted contri-
bution rate in a SB job. By contrast, those who had 
a registered employment spell before their SB job 
were more likely to enter during the discount period, 
* The survey was conducted in April 2008, in Szabolcs 
and Győr-Sopron counties and Budapest, in a sample 
of 159 individuals.
** We used the version of the database which contains 
the originally daily-level labour market information 
in monthly aggregates.
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more likely to have a short period of unemployment 
before their SB job, and less likely to live in the dis-
advantaged northern regions.
In summary, the share of workers entering a SB 
job from regular employment (i.e. those poten-
tially shifting to grey employment) is considerable, 
but in our calculations, remains below one quar-
ter of SB workers. Based on previous studies, ac-
cording to which grey employment is more com-
mon e.g. among men and in the central part of the 
country, the improved targeting for labour inspec-
tion may be an efficient tool for curbing the abuse 
of the stamp book.
Determining the net fiscal impact of shifts be-
tween black, grey and fully registered employment 
would require further and more detailed calcula-
tions, on a database which documents the nature of 
employment relationships on a daily basis. Finally, 
in order to determine the net benefit of the stamp 
book, one would also need to estimate labour de-
mand effects. This is because the reduction in the 
wage cost could potentially increase employment 
(white, grey, or black), either through an increase in 
hiring (if some of those labelled above as “becom-
ing whiter” had in fact not been employed before) or 
through a decrease in the risk of job loss (if some of 
those labelled as “becoming greyer” would have lost 
their jobs in the absence of the SB scheme).
AppEndix
The MTA KTI–TÁMOP database
The database contains data on half of the population aged 15–74 in Hungary, 
using the social insurance number to link administrative datasets from the Cen-
tral Administration of National Pension Insurance (in Hungarian: Országos 
Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság, ONYF), National Health Insurance Direc-
torate (in Hungarian: Országos Egészségpénztár, OEP), the Hungarian State 
Treasury (in Hungarian: Magyar Államkincstár, MÁK), and the National 
Labour Office (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal, NMH). The 
database originally contained records of variable length. It was subsequently 
homogenized, so it currently records whether an individual was employed on 
the 15th day of each month between January 2001 and 2009. For computa-
tions reported here, to ensure comparability of the datasets, assisting family 
members and employees claiming old age pension have been excluded from the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Furthermore, we only considered those birth co-
horts that might have been included in the administrative dataset. Employees 
in the LFS may include a subset of farmers exempt from tax and contribution 
payment (licensed traditional small-scale producers, in Hungarian: őstermelő) 
and therefore excluded from the ONYF dataset. Currently the database is un-
dergoing preliminarly tests to assess the reliability of the data. Once these are 
over, the database will become accessible for the broader research community. 
A more detailed description of the database and its availability is provided in 
the Appendix of Chapter 1 of In Focus – I.
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Editor’s ForEword
Álmos Telegdy
The Effects of Firm Attributes on Worker Outcomes
The wage or employment effects of individual characteristics such as gender, 
level of education, experience in the labor market or family background have 
been central questions in labor economics since its beginnings. During the 
1980s, however, as databases became more and more sophisticated and firm-
level data were made available, a number of economists turned their attention 
to the linkages between workers’ wages and the characteristics of firms they 
work for. This literature has increased rapidly ever since, and typically focuses 
on union status, industry and size of firm, ownership (usually foreign, state 
and employee ownership), and the firm’s involvement in international trade.1
The first question which may occur to those who try to assess the impact of 
this large and growing literature is whether it is all that important. Do work-
ers who are identical in their observed and unobserved productive character-
istics receive different wages just because they work for different employers? At 
the first sight, there is no reason to believe this: after all, there is only one labor 
market on which workers compete for employment opportunities and firms 
try to choose the best employees they can afford. The labor market, however, 
is more complex than this rather simplistic view suggests.
The reasons for wage differentials of workers with similar productive capac-
ity are multiple.
First, workers do not consider only the rate of pay when they decide which 
job offer to accept, but take into account a range of job attributes, of which 
the pay rate is only one. Such job characteristics are many, some giving extra 
utility to the worker (such as a pleasant working environment or interesting 
tasks) while some rather make jobs unattractive (long working hours, night 
shifts, high risk of injury or death, monotonous work and so on). As firms face 
different costs to provide amenities and decrease disamenities (for example, by 
creating a safer environment), and workers have different preferences across 
these attributes, some will choose firms that provide less of the amenities if they 
are compensated for them in the form of higher wages (Rosen, 1986).2 Since 
the level of amenities and disamenities can vary at the industry, occupation or 
firm level, they create wage differentials which correlate with these firm char-
acteristics (or the firms themselves).
1 Pencavel (1991) discusses the 
theoretical and empirical aspects 
of the effects of unionization on 
labor markets while DiNardo 
and Lee (2004) adapt a novel ap-
proach to the union wage dif-
ferential measurement. An early 
example of inter-industrial wage 
differentials study is Groshen 
(1991); Kertesi and Köllő (2003a, 
2003b, in Hungarian) discuss 
this in the Hungarian context. 
The effect of firm size and wages 
is summarized by Oi and Idson 
(1999). Brown et al. (2010) study 
the employment and wage ef-
fects of privatization, Bonin et 
al. (1993) and Hansmann (1996) 
discuss the behavior of employ-
ee-owned firms and Huttunen 
(2007) analyzes the effects of 
foreign ownership on wages and 
employment composition. John-
son and Stafford (1999) provide 
a synthesis of the labor market 
effects of international trade.
2 For example, risk averse work-
ers prefer firms (or jobs) which 
are safer, but they are likely to 
pay for this in the form of lower 
wages. Their less risk averse col-
leagues rather accept jobs which 
are riskier but provide a higher 
salary. Note that this is a compet-
itive model of wage determina-
tion: it simply replaces the salary 
of the worker with total com-
pensation, which includes any 
job attribute that is important 
to the worker and (potentially) 
costly to the employer.
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The second reason is that it may be beneficial for employers to compensate 
workers above the market wage: if the productivity of workers is tied to their 
compensation (so higher wages promote higher effort), then it is rational for 
a profit-maximizing firm to pay “efficiency wages” – wages above the market 
clearing level (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). A similar reasoning can be applied 
when not worker effort, but quits alter the profits of the firm. If employers in-
cur fixed costs of labor (which are the hiring and firing costs), it is in their in-
terest to induce workers to stay with the firm as long as possible so the fixed 
costs are spread across many time units.3 In this case higher-than-market wages 
may reduce the workers’ incentives to quit and thus can indirectly increase the 
firms’ profits (Stiglitz, 1985). If monitoring costs (which are directly related to 
workers’ effort level) and the fixed costs of labor vary by firm type (for example, 
by industry, or firm size) then the efficiency wage mechanism will bring about 
wage differentials which are related to such firm characteristics.4
Third, the productivity of workers does not depend only on their abilities, 
but also on whether they and their employers are a good match or not. If labor 
markets were frictionless, each worker and firm would find the best match and 
so their joint productivity (and therefore the wage of the worker) would be the 
best possible achievable. Search and hiring costs, however, hamper the creation 
of the best employer-employee matches. Getting a suitable employer (or an em-
ployee, from the point of view of the firm) is a probabilistic mechanism: some 
workers find employers they can work well with, while others are less lucky and 
get into employment relationships which are less successful. This probabilistic 
process will have an effect on wages, and two very similar workers may end up 
having very different wages just because one was lucky enough to find a good 
firm while the other was less successful in her search.5 Again, if some firms put 
more effort in their search for potential employees, they will on average find 
better matches, which will be reflected by their salaries.
Finally, some types of employers may have different objectives than the con-
ventionally assumed profit maximization of investor-owned enterprises. One 
obvious candidate for such behavior is the employee-owned firm, where the 
employee-owners may pay themselves all realized surplus in the form of wages, 
or may be willing to trade off high wages for safe jobs (Earle and Estrin, 1996). 
A second candidate for non-profit maximizing behavior is state ownership. 
Firms under state ownership may pursue social goals rather than profit maxi-
mization, or politicians controlling firms may maximize votes with the help 
of the firm’s resources; either of these objectives may result in higher employ-
ment and wages (Shleifer, 1998).
Data and Measurement
Studies analyzing the linkage between firms and wages rely heavily on data. 
Broadly speaking, the quality of the data can be classified by coverage, wheth-
3 Examples of fixed costs of labor 
are search costs, training costs 
of workers (including the lost 
production due to time loss of 
experienced co-workers), and 
severance pay.
4 See, for example, the study 
written by Krueger and Sum-
mers (1988), who analyze this 
question in the context of inter-
industrial wage differentials.
5 See Pissarides (2000) for a gen-
eral treatment of this subject.
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er firms and workers can be followed in time and how long the panel is, and 
whether they have information on both firms and workers (thus forming a 
linked employer-employee dataset).
The coverage can be assessed in two different ways: whether it has informa-
tion from all sectors (usually industries) of the economy, or whether it is a sam-
ple or it covers the whole population of firms.6
The longitudinal length of the data is also of crucial importance. A com-
mon problem in such studies is that firms and workers are not randomly allo-
cated with respect to the variable of interest. For example, firms under foreign 
ownership may be fundamentally different from domestic ones in many di-
mensions; those which engage themselves in international trade may also be 
different from those which buy their inputs and sell the produced output ex-
clusively on the domestic market. Such selection may create channels through 
which wages are different across types of firms, but this is not caused by the 
variable of interest but some other firm attribute which is correlated with it. 
For example, foreign-owned firms may be established in industries which pay 
higher wages or in regions where wages are high. Exporting firms may have 
been more productive and paid higher wages already before they engaged in 
international trade. In these two examples, the wage differential between for-
eign and domestic firms and exporting and non-exporting firms is not caused 
by the variables of interest, namely foreign ownership and international trade. 
Not taking into account such selection may contaminate the measured rela-
tionship between firm attributes and worker outcomes. If the characteristics 
along which the selection takes place are measurable, the researcher may con-
trol for them explicitly. Many of these factors, however, are hidden to the re-
searcher (but not to the managers or owners of the company who make the 
decisions regarding workers’ wages). In this case panel data techniques, such 
as the inclusion of firm fixed effects of firm level trends can attenuate the se-
lection bias. The difference in the estimated effects with and without controls 
for selection bias is often very large, thus demonstrating that the treatment of 
the selection problem is of the utmost importance.
Finally, information on workers’ individual characteristics and wages also 
raises the quality of data in several important ways. The inclusion of worker 
characteristics may remove important biases and thus allow more precise meas-
urement of the effects.7 Second, some variables – wages, for example – can be 
measured more precisely at the individual level (if only firm level informa-
tion is available, the wage measure is usually the average wage at the company). 
Third, some questions simply cannot be studied without worker information. 
An example is wage differentials within one firm, across genders, occupations, 
or age cohorts.8
6 This is a self-evident quality 
measure: one cannot analyze 
sectors which are not in the 
data, and the larger the sam-
ple is, the better the statistical 
properties the results will have.
7 Two firms, for example, may 
have different composition of 
the workforce. Not control-
ling for this composition may 
introduce a bias in the measure-
ment of the firm characteristic 
on wages.
8 Hungary can boast perhaps 
the best datasets in the Central 
and East European region. Its 
firm-level data (gathered by 
the National Tax and Customs 
Authority) covers each double-
entry book keeping firm, hav-
ing information on the balance 
sheet and income statement (as 
well as some additional infor-
mation, such as the employment 
level of the firm and its main 
activity). These data can be 
linked to the Wage Survey data 
(gathered by the National Em-
ployment Foundation) which 
have information for a sample 
of workers in a large number of 
firms, providing data on their 
individual characteristics, 
wages, and on their job (such as 
the exact job code and tenure). 
The data, unfortunately, is not a 
panel in workers (only in firms). 
Both datasets start in 1986 and 
new waves are continuously ap-
pended.
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Short Summary of In Focus – II
In Focus – II is composed of four studies, each analyzing the effect of a firm 
characteristic on workers’ wages and sometimes also on the employment level 
of the firms.
Chapter 1 (written by Mariann Rigó) analyzes how collective contracts (in-
cluding, but not being restricted to wage contracts) result in a wage differential 
between covered and uncovered firms’ workforce. Using data from the period 
1992–2008, the unconditional wage differential between covered and uncov-
ered firms’ employees is quite large on average (around 20 percent), falling little 
when individual characteristics are controlled for. However, observable firm 
characteristics explain a large portion of the unconditional wage differential, 
which falls to 3.5–5 percent if these are included among the control variables. 
The wage gap further drops to 2–2.5 percent if unobserved firm characteris-
tics are also controlled for. Analyzing the periods 1992–2000 and 2001–2008 
separately suggests somewhat a larger wage differential for the first period (4.6 
percent in 1992–2000 and 2.1 percent in 2001–2008) which is in line with the 
growing importance of the statutory minimum wages, which were increased 
substantially after 2000.
Chapter 2 (written by John Sutherland Earle and Álmos Telegdy) analyzes 
how wages change when a domestic firm is acquired by foreigners. The au-
thors use two datasets, one at the firm level and one when individual worker 
characteristics and wages are linked to the firm level information, forming a 
linked employer-employee dataset. They find that foreign firms pay workers 
a very large premium of 46–60 percent. As practically always in such studies, 
the selection of target firms by the future foreign owners is likely to be non-
random and taking this selection into account changes the results. Control-
ling for firm attributes (both observable and unobservable, but fixed in time) 
more than halves the estimated wage effect of foreign ownership. This reduc-
tion is sizable, but the estimated effect is still very large, in the order of 16–27 
percent. A number of firms undergo two ownership changes during the pe-
riod studied: from domestic to foreign and back to domestic ownership again. 
The authors use this subsample to test whether the foreign wage increase lasts 
even after the firm is sold back to domestic owners, and find that firms indeed 
pay higher wages after divestment. This wage premium (relative to the never 
acquired domestic firms), however, is much smaller than the one measured 
while the firm was in foreign ownership. The foreign wage effect, therefore, is 
linked to foreign ownership and mostly disappears when foreigners divest the 
firm back to domestic owners.
The analysis in Chapter 3 (written by John Sutherland Earle and Álmos Tel-
egdy) aims to understand the effects of another form of ownership: how are 
the employment size of the firm and the wages of workers altered in the case 
Álmos Telegdy: ediTor’s Foreword
195
of state ownership? This question is very important, especially in the light of 
the fear shared by both policy makers and the general public that privatiza-
tion, will lead not only to productivity improvement, but to layoffs and lower 
wages as well (Szentpéteri and Telegdy, 2010). In the first part of the chapter 
the authors study the employment outcomes of privatization in a comparative 
perspective, using data from five Central and East European countries (Hun-
gary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia and Ukraine). They control for selection with 
two econometric methods: firm fixed effects, which removes any observed and 
unobserved firm attribute fixed in time, and also firm-level trends, which, in 
addition to fixed effects, also removes any attribute linear in time. Contrary 
to the expectations of policy makers and the public at large, privatization does 
not lead to a large drop in firms’ employment size, at least not when it is com-
pared to state-owned enterprises. When fixed effects and firm-specific trends 
are controlled for, the estimated effects of domestic privatization are indeed 
negative (except in Russia) but their magnitude is smaller than 5 percent. For-
eign privatizations, on the contrary, lead to firm growth in all countries except 
Romania, and the magnitude of the effect is larger than 10 percent in three 
countries. When the regressions are weighted by the employment size of the 
firm (and thus the estimated effects refer to the proportion of net employment 
change as a result of privatization in all initially state-owned firms), the esti-
mated employment effects of domestic privatization are essentially zero (ex-
cept in Russia, where the effect is still positive) and the beneficial employment 
effects of foreign privatization are also removed in the three EU countries but 
remain large and positive in Russia and Ukraine.
In the second part of this chapter the authors use only Hungarian data, and 
analyze wage changes when the firm is transformed from state into private own-
ership. Using linked employer-employee data, they find that domestic privati-
zation does reduce the wages of workers, but the magnitude of the reduction 
varies by worker type. By demographic characteristics, females and young em-
ployees experience the smallest drop. Contrary to domestic privatization, the 
employees of state-owned firms transferred to foreign ownership experience 
a wage increase, which is especially large in the case of highly skilled workers.
Chapter 4 (written by Miklós Koren and Péter Tóth) analyzes the labor-mar-
ket impacts of international trade. Using Hungarian firm- and worker-level 
data, the authors compare wages paid by exporting and importing firms to 
those paid by non-traders. More specifically, they ask how the wages of work-
ers change when a firm starts exporting or importing. While trade is generally 
thought to be useful in facilitating the efficient distribution of resources, it is 
less well understood what effect it has on individual workers. A worker losing 
her job because of cheap imports will find little consolation in the fact that the 
country as a whole has become more efficient. The authors look at firm- and 
worker-level data to uncover the heterogeneity in worker experience.
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Firm-level analysis is useful because it can control for broader trends and 
fluctuations in the economy and in the industry. For example, a sector might 
experience a surge in exports and a rise in wages because of cyclical demand. 
But if demand is as cyclical at home as it is abroad, trade has no direct effect on 
wages. The analysis can control for industry cycles by comparing firms within 
the same narrow industry. This is also a potential drawback, however. Several 
theories of trade predict a reallocation of resources across industries: as the 
country liberalizes, import-competing sectors shrink (resulting in lower labor 
demand, and, likely, lower wages), while exporting sectors expand.
The main finding of the chapter is that both exporters and importers pay 
higher wages, but the effect is stronger and more robust for importers. The 
wage premium paid by exporters seems to reflect firm selection: firms already 
pay higher wages several years prior to becoming exporters, probably because 
they have a better workforce. In contrast, the wage premium paid by importers 
gradually increases after the initial import has taken place. The finding con-
tradicts the conventional wisdom that “exports are good, imports are bad.” To 
understand why this is the case, the authors also present evidence on the effect 
of imports on firm performance: importing intermediate inputs and capital 
goods both contribute to higher firm productivity, which may result in greater 
market share. It seems that the bigger pie can then be shared with the workers 
of the firm. Hence, allowing firms to access import markets freely can boost 
demand for local labor.
Not all workers gain from increasing trade, however. Citing a recent study 
on the Hungarian food and textile sectors, the authors show that workers in 
certain occupations most affected by outsourced production (i.e., those whose 
output is now imported) suffer some wage decrease relative to workers at non-
importing firms. Moreover, even among positively affected workers, the gains 
are not distributed equally: managers and highly skilled workers gain more, 
which suggests that trade might have contributed to the rise in wage inequal-
ity in the past two decades.
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1. Estimating thE union – non-union wagE diFFErEntial  
in hungary*
Mariann Rigó
introduction
Social dialogue is a traditionally strong institution in continental Western 
European countries. While social partners exercise their bargaining activity 
both at firm, sectoral and national level in these countries, and reach a bargain-
ing coverage of close to 100 percent, social dialogue in transitional countries 
is a fragile institution showing a fragmented structure, and covers only a frac-
tion of the workforce (Neumann, 2006b). The large discrepancy between the 
Western and the transitional countries is not surprising bearing in mind the 
different historical roots of the social partners. While trade unions in West-
ern Europe inherited their attitudes from the Taylorist and Fordist, and later 
from the Japanese style organization paradigm,1 trade unions in the transi-
tional countries had to reorganize themselves, find their new roles in the fun-
damentally changed economic environment and cope with their social inher-
itance. The outcome in most transitional countries was an industrial relations 
system where the firm level is the most (and only) important channel of col-
lective negotiations.
The difference between the two groups of countries (Western vs. transitional) 
is also mirrored by the number of studies analyzing the union wage differential. 
Though unionization is one of the most heavily studied topics in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and in continental Western Europe,2 much less is known about the 
nature of industrial relations in transitional countries, and the available evi-
dence is mostly presented by descriptive and case studies.3 Based on these stud-
ies, researchers share the opinion that collective bargaining is weak in transi-
tional countries, and unionism has little or small labour market impact. One 
aim of this paper is to revisit the assumed weak role of trade unions in these 
* This study is based on Rigó 
(2012).
1 In the 50s and 60s, collective 
agreements in the Taylorist and 
Fordist work organizations lim-
ited employers’ f lexibility re-
garding wages and employment 
conditions to the smallest pos-
sible (e.g. rigid wage scale system, 
exact regulation of fringe ben-
efits, system of job description 
specifying exactly the content of 
each job). Starting from the 80s, 
the Japanese style organization 
paradigm replaced the former 
rigid institution leaving some 
flexibility for the employer e.g. to 
reward employees by individual 
performance. The power of col-
lective agreements was reduced 
later to “maintain a minimum 
solidarity” between employees 
and to “limit the flexibility of 
local bargaining” (Tóth, 2006b 
p. 150). The study by András 
Tóth in the Hungarian Labour 
Market, 2006 (Tóth, 2006b) 
yields a detailed analysis about 
the attitudes of the Western and 
transitional trade unions.
2 Concerning unionization in 
the US, see for example Lewis 
(1986)’s comprehensive sum-
mary or Blanchflower and Bry-
son (2004) and Hirsch (2003). 
DiNardo and Lee (2004), Free-
man and Kleiner (1990) and 
Lalonde, Marschke and Troske 
(1996) use US enterprise-level 
data and focus on the labour market impacts of recent unioniza-
tion. Regarding the experiences of continental Western European 
countries, see for example Hartog et al (2002), Card and de la Rica 
(2006) or Gürtzgen (2006).
3 The In Focus chapter of The Hungarian Labour Market, Review 
and Analysis 2006 (edited by Károly Fazekas and Jenő Koltay) 
gives a comprehensive overview of Hungarian industrial relations. 
For example, the studies by Tóth (2006a) and Neumann (2006a), 
(2006b) provide a detailed picture of the the employers’ organiza-
tions and trade unions, describe the process of reorganization of 
these institutions after the regime change, and emphasize their 
current strengths and weaknesses. Tóth (2006b) analyzes the 
characteristics and attitudes of post-guild (Western European) 
and post-socialist trade unions. The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labour, being responsible for the collection and management 
of collective agreement records, publishes on its home page case 
studies of special industries. A country-level comprehensive study 
based on the industrial case studies is Fodor, Nacsa and Neumann 
(2008). Pollert (1999) provides a short overview of industrial rela-
tions during the transition in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic. The East German and the Hungarian experiences 
are compared in Frege and Tóth (1999).
There are only few studies quantifying the labour market impact of 
unionism in transitional countries. For an exception, see Neumann 
(2001) and Kertesi and Köllő (2003) analyzing Hungarian data, or 
Iga et al (2009) using Hungarian, Czech and Polish data.
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countries by quantifying the wage impact of collective agreements based on 
the Hungarian, large, representative, linked, employer-employee panel data, 
which covers the period of 1992–2008 and includes detailed information on 
17,783 firms.
Institutional Setting
The Hungarian institutional setting can be characterized as a heavily decen-
tralized system where bargaining at the firm level – individual and collective 
bargaining – are the most important channels of the wage negotiations. Secto-
ral collective agreements are almost absent, and even if present, they are weak 
regarding their regulatory power.4 Most of the employers’ organizations are 
not entitled to sign sectoral agreements, and even if signed, they specify “opt-
out” clauses concerning the most important restrictions. This situation results 
in sectoral agreements being nothing other than a “collection of good wishes” 
(Neumann, 2006b p. 129). Firm-level trade unions should pay 40 to 60 per-
cent of their fees to higher level unions. However, the actual transfers are much 
smaller. Besides, trade unions at this level also need to cope with the lack of 
specialized staffs and experts. They have hardly employed any fresh graduates 
since they were first established, and tend to operate with only a few staff mem-
bers these not being enough to fulfil the interest representation role.5
Union confederations at the national level are also able to influence the bar-
gaining outcomes through their participation on the tripartite forum, which 
represents trade union confederations, employers’ associations and the govern-
ment, and issue recommendations for the minimum wage and for the annual 
wage increase. These recommendations serve as a guideline for the firm-level 
collective negotiations.
Workers at the company level are represented by two institutions: works 
councils and trade unions.6 Works councils were set up by the Labour Code 
in 1992 to introduce a new form of employee representation, which is inde-
pendent of union membership. The aim was to create an institution, which 
is close to the German model where works councils operate as a platform for 
joint decisions by the workers and managers on the most important questions. 
However, the co-determination rights in the Hungarian version were limited 
to the use of the social fund; otherwise, the workers were only given informa-
tion and consultation rights. Moreover, the two institutions often overlap in 
Hungary having the same people in the works council’s and trade union’s seats. 
As the bargaining right of a union depends on the number of votes it gets in the 
works council, union members have strong incentives to ensure seats for their 
nominees in the works council. Thus, works councils are mostly regarded as 
useless and unnecessary institutions without any functional role.
The functionality of trade unions, which form the other channel of employ-
ee representation, also lags behind the functionality of their Western Euro-
4 Neumann (2006a, 2006b) ana-
lyzes the strategies of higher 
level (sectoral) trade unions and 
how they work. In the current 
study we highlight some impor-
tant conclusions of the above 
papers.
5 The first wave of sectoral ne-
gotiations took place in 1992. 
The next wave occurred in 2005 
when industry level agreements 
were signed in the construction 
and in the private security in-
dustries. In 2001, the share of 
employees covered by a secto-
ral agreement was 5.9 percent, 
which is quite low compared 
to the coverage rate of the sin-
gle employer contracts, which 
was 37.2 percent (see Statistical 
Data, 2006 p. 295, Table 11.8.).
6 Benyó, Neumann and Kelemen 
(2006) yields a detailed analysis 
on how works councils func-
tion. In the current study we 
highlight the most important 
features emphasized in the 
study.
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pean counterparts. While trade unions in Western countries aim to regulate 
employment relations “in the name of solidarity and equality” (Tóth, 2006b 
p. 151), trade unions in post-socialist countries try to avoid conflicts. Instead 
of representing the “automatic solidarity between employees” (Tóth, 2006b p. 
155), collective agreements provide considerable flexibility for the employers 
to influence work conditions and wages.
Firm-level trade unions have the privilege by law to engage in collective bar-
gaining and to conclude agreements. Once concluded, the agreement is auto-
matically extended to all employees of the firm. While collective agreements in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries and in continental Western Europe include precise 
and strict regulations concerning wages, the Hungarian collective agreements 
have mostly vague or, in some cases, no regulations on wage elements. Collec-
tive agreements including regulations on wages are termed separately as wage 
agreements. Wage agreements have the same legal status as collective agree-
ments, however, wage agreements are negotiated on a yearly basis, while collec-
tive agreements are often contracts of indefinite duration (Neumann, 2006b).
Fodor, Nacsa and Neumann (2008) provides a comprehensive summary of 
the concluded collective agreements. The authors, analyzing the text of 304 
collective agreements in 20 industries, found that Hungarian collective con-
tracts share the following main features. Most of the agreements include pre-
cise regulations on extra working hours, overtime work, non-wage and social 
benefits.7 On the other hand, regulations on wage elements are vague specify-
ing mostly only guaranteed wages8 and formulating target wage recommenda-
tions. The elements of modern HR techniques (e.g. the specifications of perfor-
mance pay, group bonuses etc.) are almost totally absent from the agreements.9
The coverage of agreements varies substantially by the size of firm, by industry, 
and also changes over time. Collective agreements are more likely to be con-
cluded in large companies. For example, in 2004, only 9.4 percent of compa-
nies employing less than 50 employees concluded a wage agreement, while the 
coverage was around 50 percent in companies with more than 300 employees 
(Statistical Data, 2006, Table 11.16.). By industry, the mining, transport, and 
the electricity industry were the most covered sectors with a coverage rate of 
around 80 percent, while in construction, trade and financial intermediation 
the share of employees covered was around 25 percent (Statistical Data, 2006, 
Table 11.15.). Over time, the number of registered collective agreements does 
not show substantial variation ranging between 1200 and 1300 reported agree-
ments in the period of 1998–2004 (Statistical Data, 2006, Table 11.3.). On the 
other hand, the number of registered wage agreements decreased from around 
800 in 1998 to 515 reported cases in 2004. The drop in the number of wage 
agreements in recent years is due to the growing influence of the national level 
regulations in the wage determination. In 2001, the statutory minimum wage 
increased by 60 percent compared to its level in 2000, reaching higher values 
7 These areas were traditionally 
well-regulated in pre-transition-
al collective contracts as well (Fo-
dor, Nacsa and Neumann, 2008).
8 Guaranteed minimum wages 
are specified in those firms where 
wages explicitly depend on the 
performance of the employee. 
The guaranteed wage is usually 
the base salary or a certain frac-
tion, usually 70–80 percent of 
the base salary.
9 There are a few exceptions 
in the chemical industry with 
collective agreements defining 
both the bonus-tasks and the 
allocation of bonuses.
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than the firm-level trade unions hoped for. As a consequence, the number of 
agreements specifying higher wage increases than the national one dropped 
substantially.10
Comparing the institutional setting to other countries, industrial relations 
in Hungary can be characterized as being a mixture of the two main regime 
types, the Anglo-Saxon and the continental European ones. Similarly to the 
US and UK, the institutional setting is decentralized, the main level of bar-
gaining is the firm, and since industrial agreements are rare and lack an effec-
tive extension mechanism, the two most important sectors of the economy are 
those covered by a firm-level agreement and the non-covered ones.11 On the 
other hand, the dominant dimension of industrial relations in the Western 
European continental countries (e.g. in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal) includes a network of sectoral agreements, which are practically extended 
to all firms in the economy. Firm-level agreements may coexist with industrial 
agreements or be an alternative to them, but these firm-level contracts cover a 
much smaller fraction of the workforce.12 Despite the relatively high degree of 
centralization of industrial relations compared to the US and the transitional 
countries, there are substantial differences between the continental Western 
European regimes. Since Calmfors and Driffill (1988) much attention has been 
paid to the centralization and the coordination dimensions of the regimes. Ac-
cording to the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis, bargained wages are the highest 
and macroeconomic outcomes are the worst under intermediate degrees of 
centralization, which in most cases refer to sectoral bargaining. On the other 
hand, both decentralized and centralized bargaining produce lower wages and 
better macroeconomic outcomes.13 However, in many countries (e.g. Portugal 
and the Netherlands) there is multiple-level bargaining with coexisting bar-
gaining arrangements, and there is no theory to give guidance in such cases.
According to the ranking of Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Austria, Norway 
and Sweden are the most centralized countries, and the UK, US and Canada 
are at the other extreme of the scale, while Germany and the Netherlands lie 
in-between. According to the OECD’s ranking (OECD, 2004, p.151, Table 
3.5) covering the period of 1995–2000, Norway is the most centralized coun-
try with the highest level of coordination, followed by Portugal with similarly 
high centralization and coordination scores. Austria, Germany and the Neth-
erlands are considered to be medium centralized countries with predominantly 
industry-level bargaining and a high level of coordination. Spain and Sweden 
are medium centralized with a medium degree of coordination, while Italy 
is considered to be decentralized with a high degree of coordination. Transi-
tional countries lie at the low end of both the centralization and the coordi-
nation scale:14 fragmented firm-level contracts constitute the most important 
channel of collective negotiations, and the thin layer of sectoral agreements 
cover only a fraction of the employees. Due to the small coverage of industrial 
10 Despite the minimum wage 
increases, there would be scope 
for wage agreements to regu-
late other aspects of the salary 
system. However, as highlight-
ed by case studies (e.g. Fodor, 
Nacsa and Neumann, 2008), 
wage agreements in most cases 
specify only minimum and guar-
anteed wages and average wage 
increases.
11 Note, however, that there 
are important differences be-
tween the institutions of the 
Anglo-Saxon and transitional 
countries. For example, trade 
unions have different historical 
backgrounds, and the process 
of negotiation, the relevance of 
individual membership (whether 
individual-level or firm-level 
coverage is relevant) is also 
different (in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries firm-level collective 
contracts cover only member 
employees). DiNardo and Lee 
(2004) gives a detailed overview 
of the process of collective nego-
tiation in the US.
12 For example, in Spain, 15 per-
cent of workers was covered by 
firm-specific contracts in 1991 
(Card and de la Rica, 2006), and 
in Portugal, the coverage of firm-
specific contracts was less than 
10 percent in 2000 (Cardoso and 
Portugal, 2005).
13 When the bargaining is de-
centralized, which usually cor-
responds to enterprise level bar-
gaining, unions’ wage demands 
are suppressed by market forces 
(unable to increase firm’s cost 
level above that of competitors), 
while under centralized bargain-
ing the wage demands are miti-
gated by internalizing the vari-
ous negative externalities (e.g. 
higher consumer or input prices, 
unemployment externalities). 
(Calmfors and Driffill, 1988)
14 An exception is Slovakia, 
which is classified as having a 
modestly centralized and coor-
dinated institutional structure 
due to the more important role 
of sectoral agreements.
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agreements and their weak regulatory power, we only investigate the wage im-
pact of firm-level (single- or multi-employer) collective contracts in Hungary.15
The empirical findings of the few quantitative studies from Hungary docu-
ment modest or statistically insignificant wage impacts. Neumann (2001) us-
ing Hungarian data from 1998 finds a statistically significant wage impact of 
5.6 percent in the case of firm-level collective agreements. Kertesi and Köllő 
(2003) analyzing the interaction of market concentration and unionization on 
the same dataset from 1998 concludes that industrial rents in highly concen-
trated industries are grabbed by unions, which leads to higher wages in those 
sectors. Iga et al. (2009) uses three transitional datasets, Hungarian and Czech 
data from 2002 and Polish data from 2004 to estimate the impact of firm-level 
and industry-level collective agreements. On average, using the cross-sectional 
data, they do not find a significant wage impact in any of the countries. In Hun-
gary, firm-level collective agreements are found to be associated with 5–7 per-
cent higher wages in those firms which were set up prior to or a few years after 
the transition. Compared to the above discussed papers, the current study is 
the first analysis which uses panel data. Therefore, it is the first study, which is 
able to take into account in the regression analysis both observable and time-
invariant unobservable factors, which may influence wages.
Data
Data for the analysis come from two sources. We use the Hungarian Wage 
and Employment Survey (WES) linked to various workplace characteristics, 
while data on collective and wage agreements are recorded by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labour. Our analysis covers the period of 1992–2008. The 
linked WES database is representative, and provides various information on 
the workers (wage, gender, age, highest level of education defined by five educa-
tional categories, 4 digit occupational code) and also workplace characteristics 
(balance sheet information, 2-digit industry classification, location, ownership 
structure, number of employees). The database covers all tax-paying legal entities 
with double-sided balance sheets that employ at least 20 employees.16 Within 
firms, employees are sampled: on average, 6.5 percent of production workers 
and 10 percent of non-production workers entered into the sample. The data-
base follows firms over time, thus, we have the opportunity to take into account 
time invariant unobserved firm-level heterogeneities in the regression analysis.
Data on collective and wage agreements are registered and maintained by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour.17 The registration of wage agreements 
commenced in 1992. Since 1998, the Ministry extended the data collection 
to all collective contracts. The problem with both the wage and the collective 
agreement records is that though registration is compulsory, there is no sanc-
tioning in the case of unreported records. Therefore, the number of reported 
agreements may be biased. On the one hand, existing, but non-reported agree-
15 Multi-employer collective 
contracts are usually contracts 
of enterprises having common 
ownership. Thus, they can be 
considered as being closer to the 
company-level contracts (Neu-
mann, 2006b). In the current 
study we define both single- and 
multi-employer contracts as 
firm-level collective contracts.
16 Starting from 1995, the data 
collection was extended to (the 
sample of) firms with at least 
10 workers, and from 1999 on 
to micro-firms as well.
17 The database on collective 
agreements are available on the 
Ministry’s webpage.
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ments bias the institutional statistics downward. On the other hand, expired 
agreements may bias the institutional statistics upward if the expiration of the 
contract was not reported to the Ministry. As wage agreements are negotiated 
yearly, wage agreement records may be biased mostly downward. However, in 
the case of the collective agreement records, bias in both directions may be pos-
sible, as in many cases the duration of the collective contract is indefinite with 
no expiration date.18 The database includes information on the start and the 
end date of the agreements. In the case of the wage agreements, only the start 
date is important as their expiration is one year. However, the duration of collec-
tive contracts is mostly indefinite unless the expiration date is exactly specified.
The database was restricted to firms employing at least 20 employees. First, 
union coverage is very low in small firms. Besides, dropping smaller firms also 
eliminates the changes in the sampling of the database over time. As a next step, 
we examined the coverage of firms in the different industry categories: coverage 
ranges from zero coverage to 77 percent through the different 2-digit NACE 
categories. To get rid of categories with very low coverage, we dropped those 
industry categories where less than 5 percent of the employees are covered by a 
collective agreement. The final database includes information on 17,783 firms 
with 1,493,331 employee-year observations.
table 1.1: yearly number of collective and wage agreements, coverage of firms  
and employees in the database used for the analysis  
(after the cleaning and the sample selection procedures)
Year
Collective agreement Wage agreement
# agreements firms covered (%)
employees 
covered (%) # agreements
firms covered 
(%)
employees 
covered (%)
1992 17 0.4 0.6 6 0.1 0.2
1993 108 2.2 4.2 63 1.3 1.8
1994 292 5.6 16.5 129 2.5 5.9
1995 378 6.6 18.9 102 1.8 3.6
1996 491 8.8 20.1 141 2.5 4.9
1997 669 11.8 25.6 204 3.6 6.6
1998 959 17.0 35.3 473 8.4 19.3
1999 969 16.2 35.5 458 7.6 23.8
2000 995 14.6 34.0 513 7.5 19.7
2001 945 13.7 28.9 438 6.3 13.6
2002 885 18.4 39.0 461 9.6 19.4
2003 859 18.6 41.8 451 9.7 23.3
2004 874 16.9 36.3 485 9.4 25.3
2005 846 16.3 33.4 344 6.6 14.7
2006 763 15.7 32.4 199 4.1 10.6
2007 709 15.1 30.7 72 1.5 3.0
2008 696 14.8 27.1 62 1.3 2.5
1992–2008 11,455 12.5 27.1 4,601 4.9 11.7
18 The problem of upward bias 
(expired contracts when the 
expiration is not reported to 
the Ministry) is mitigated by 
the careful monitoring activ-
ity of the Ministry. Besides, 
the linked employer-employee 
database includes only existing 
firms, therefore, agreements of 
non-existing companies do not 
bias the institutional statistics.
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Table 1.1 presents the yearly number of firms with collective contract and cover-
age in the union and non-union categories. Regarding the collective agreement 
variable, on average, through 1992–2008, the coverage of firms was 12.5 per-
cent, while the coverage of employees was 27 percent. Firms’ coverage peaked 
in 2003 reaching 18.6 percent. From 2003 onwards, the coverage of collec-
tive agreements decreased, and in 2008 the coverage of firms was 14.8, while 
the coverage of employees was 27 percent. In the case of the wage agreement 
records the statistics are as follows. On average, the coverage of firms through 
1992–2008 was 4.9 percent, and the coverage of employees 11.7 percent. Firms’ 
coverage reached its highest value of 9.7 percent in 2003, which dropped to a 
low level of 1–2 percent by 2007–2008.
Estimation method
The union – non-union wage gap is estimated using individual earning func-
tions. First, we compute the difference in average wages between the two groups 
of firms (union and non-union firms), termed as the raw union wage gap ( first 
specification). However, the raw wage gap may be biased by several factors (e.g. 
the educational level, the occupation of the employee or the industry classifica-
tion, ownership structure of the company), which can be controlled for using 
the linked database. It may happen, for example, that firms having a collective 
agreement have a more advantageous employee composition, e.g. employ more 
employees with a higher education level than firms without a collective agree-
ment. In this case, the raw union wage gap also incorporates the higher return 
to education. The descriptive statistics outlined in the previous Institutional 
setting section also highlight the fact that firms are not randomly assigned to 
the union and non-union group: firms with a collective agreement are system-
atically larger, and are concentrated in certain industries.
After computing the raw wage gap, we estimate the union wage premium19 
taking into account several factors, which may influence the wages. The equa-
tions are estimated including controls step by step. In the second specification 
we control for employee characteristics (gender, educational level, age, occu-
pation), while in the third specification observable firm variables (size, industry, 
region, ownership structure of the firm) are also included.
Additionally, the Hungarian linked database provides the opportunity to 
follow firms over time. Therefore, we can take into account unobservable firm 
fixed effects ( fourth specification). Firm fixed effects are time invariant vari-
ables, which cannot be observed by the researcher, e.g. managerial efficiency, 
quality of capital, profit opportunities, organizational structure of the firm, 
work conditions, location of the firm (e.g. being close to highway, airport), etc. 
Omitting firm fixed effects among the control variables may bias upward or 
downward the estimated union wage gap. In the event that firms with a col-
lective agreement are systematically “better” along these unobservable factors, 
19 The terms wage gap, wage 
advantage, wage premium are 
used as synonyms in the study.
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the union wage gap taking into account only observable controls also incorpo-
rates the positive impact of firm fixed effects, thus, it will be biased upward.20
In the fourth specification we take into account observable employee and firm 
characteristics, as well as time invariant firm fixed effects.21
The Hungarian data offers the opportunity to use the collective and/or the 
wage agreement dummy variables to assess the power of unions.22 There are sev-
eral arguments in favor of applying any of the contract dummies. For example, 
the wage agreement dummy variable is probably downward biased, while the 
collective agreement variable is less likely to be downward biased, but might be 
upward biased as well. In principle, wage premium could be attributed only to 
firms having wage agreement. On the other hand, it is possible that the mere 
presence of a trade union and its ability to represent the employees and to sign 
a collective agreement is enough to secure a positive wage premium. In this 
case union power is better captured by using the collective agreement dummy.
Furthermore, another interesting question is to analyze if signing a wage 
agreement in firms having an existing collective contract ensures a positive 
wage premium on top of the collective agreement premium. To assess the above 
questions, we estimate the wage equation in all four specifications (raw wage 
gap, including observable employee characteristics, including observable em-
ployee and firm characteristics, including firm fixed effects) using first only the 
collective agreement dummy. In this case the wage gap measures the wage dif-
ferential between firms with and without a collective agreement. Next, we use 
only the wage agreement dummy variable, and measure the wage gap between 
firms having wage agreement and not having any kind of collective agreement.23 
Finally, both agreement variables are jointly included in the analysis to assess 
the question if signing only a collective contract (without a wage agreement) 
leads to higher wages, and if additionally a wage agreement (on the top of the 
collective contract) could secure even higher wages.
Estimation results
Table 1.2 summarizes the estimated average union wage gap for the period 
of 1992–2008 in all four specifications using the various agreement dummy 
variables.
The raw wage gap is remarkably large: firms with collective agreement pay, 
on average, 23 percent higher wages than firms without collective agreement, 
and the estimated value for firms with wage agreement is 26 percent.24 The 
raw wage gap decreases slightly when controlling for employee characteris-
tics (gender, education, occupation, age): the wage gap after taking into ac-
count individual controls is 19–22 percent. Observable firm characteristics 
are responsible for a substantial drop of the wage premium, which decreases 
by 70 percent to a value of 5–7 percent in the third specification. Thus, after 
filtering out the impact of observable variables, the wage advantage of a col-
20 The size and the direction of 
the bias depends on the corre-
lation of the firm fixed effects 
with the union dummy and with 
the dependent variable. In the 
case when both correlations are 
positive (firms with collective 
agreement are systematically 
“better” e.g. due to the more 
efficient managerial activity, 
and “better” firms pay higher 
wages to the employees), then the 
specification taking into account 
only observable controls will be 
upward biased.
21 The econometric specifica-
tion of the estimated individual 
earning equation can be found 
in the Appendix.
22 The collective agreement 
(wa ge a greement) du m my 
variable takes the value of 1 in 
year t if the firm had a collective 
(wage) agreement in that year. 
The value of the collective (wage) 
agreement dummy is 0 if the firm 
did not have a collective (wage) 
contract in that year.
23 In this case (if the union pres-
ence is captured by the wage 
agreement dummy), firms hav-
ing only a collective agreement 
(without a wage agreement) are 
left out of the analysis. Includ-
ing these firms would result in 
a mixed comparison group of 
having no collective agreement 
and only collective agreement. 
Thus, the wage gap would be 
composed of the wage agreement 
– no wage agreement gap and 
the wage agreement – collective 
agreement gap. In this way, we 
omit 5,615 firm-years out of the 
81,497 firm-year observations.
24 We estimate the union wage 
gap using individual earning 
equation having the natural 
logarithm of individual wages 
as the dependent variable. There-
fore, the estimated union wage 
gap is the difference in log wages, 
which is an approximation of the 
percentage wage differential (if 
the gap is sufficiently low).
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lective agreement is much smaller than the raw wage gap. The considerably 
high wages (23–26 percent higher wages in firms with a collective agreement) 
can be, in large part, explained by various firm-level factors, which may in-
fluence wages, e.g. the size or the industrial classification of the firm. Includ-
ing firm fixed effects further decreases the gap: in the final specification the 
wage premium of a collective agreement drops to 2.6, while the gap of wage 
agreements falls to 3.5 percent.
table 1.2: average union wage gap estimates using individual wage equations, 
1992–2008
Raw wage gap + observable indi-vidual controls
+ observable firm 
controls + firm-FE
Including only one type of contract variable
Collective  
agreement
0.227*** 0.185*** 0.0534*** 0.0259***
(0.0264) (0.0192) (0.0133) (0.00944)
Observations 1,517,744 1,517,744 1,493,331 1,493,331
Wage agreement
0.262*** 0.220*** 0.0626*** 0.0347***
(0.0253) (0.0212) (0.0143) (0.00913)
Observations 1,250,041 1,250,041 1,226,778 1,226,778
Including both contract variables
Collective  
agreement
0.202*** 0.161*** 0.0353** 0.0208*
(0.0318) (0.0216) (0.0179) (0.0111)
Wage agreement
0.0574** 0.0572*** 0.0440** 0.0101
(0.0273) (0.0205) (0.0198) (0.00631)
Observations 1,517,744 1,517,744 1,493,331 1,493,331
Dependent variable: log of individual’s monthly gross wage specified as base salary, 
overtime pay, regular payments and 1/12th of the previous year’s bonuses.
Notes: The above table shows the estimated parameters of the collective agreement 
(wage agreement) variable. All specifications include year dummies. Individual ob-
servable controls are as follows: gender, education (three categories), age (three cat-
egories), occupation (seven categories). Firm-level observable controls are as follows: 
ownership, size, industrial classification (19 categories), location (seven categories). 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Comparing the results over the various specifications (starting from the raw 
wage gap to the last specification including firm fixed effects) highlights the 
point that firms with a collective agreement are “better” than the average along 
both observable and unobservable characteristics. For example, contract firms 
are mostly large, they tend to have an advantageous location, therefore they 
can pay higher wages than smaller firms or those being located in a less advan-
tageous region.25 Or, as an illustration of the firm fixed effects, it is possible 
that employees in contract firms are more productive, more motivated workers. 
Therefore, firms with such employees can pay higher wages than firms employ-
ing less productive, less motivated workers.
25 The descriptive statistics 
also confirm that the coverage 
is larger among larger firms. For 
example, the database used in 
the study shows that more than 
60 percent of firms employing 
more than 300 employees was 
covered by a collective contract, 
while the coverage was 5 percent 
in firms with 20–50 employees 
in 2000. In the same year, the 
coverage in the Budapest region 
exceeded 60 percent, while in the 
other counties it reached only 
21–54 percent.
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The union premium using the wage agreement dummy is somewhat higher 
than employing the collective agreement variable, though the difference be-
tween them is tiny. Comparing the results (using either the collective or the 
wage agreement dummy) suggests that both dummy variables are appropriate 
to describe the power of unions. Furthermore, the estimates are in line with 
the results obtained in the specifications, which jointly include the agreement 
variables. Including both the collective and the wage agreement variables into 
the earning equation can reveal if the wage advantage associated with the wage 
agreements exceeds the wage premium of collective agreements. The bottom 
panel of Table 1.2 depicts the results of the joint specifications. Taking into 
account both observable and time invariant unobservable controls, the wage 
advantage associated with collective agreements is around 2 percent, and is not 
significantly different from the wage premium of wage agreements. Though in 
principle wage advantages are associated only with wage agreements, these re-
sults suggest that the mere presence of a trade union, which is able to conclude 
a collective agreement, is enough to secure higher wages even without signing 
a formal wage agreement.
Given the differences in the estimation method and the underlying institu-
tional setting, the comparison of the Hungarian results to previously reported 
results from other countries is not straightforward. The modest wage premi-
um found in the current study is comparable both to the estimates from con-
tinental Western Europe and to some US studies using company-level data. 
In one respect, the magnitude of the wage premium (2 percent) found in the 
final specification of the current study, and the pattern of the results across 
the specifications are similar to Gürtzgen (2006). The author using German 
linked employer-employee panel data documents that the 18–20 percent raw 
wage gap of firm-level contracts decreases by roughly 70 percent after includ-
ing observable firm-level variables. In her final specification taking into ac-
count time invariant unobservable fixed effects, the wage premium reaches 
a maximum of 2 percent. The comparison of the current study to Gürtzgen 
(2006) is straightforward as the results are quantitatively close to each other, 
moreover, the estimation method and the institutional system also share some 
common elements.26 However, there are different reasons behind the modest 
wage premium in the Hungarian and German case. Gürtzgen (2006) proposes 
as a possible explanation of her results it being the consequence of the highly 
corporatist system, which prevents unions to behave as “aggressive local rent 
seekers” (Hartog et al, 2002 p. 322). A similar argument applies to the Dutch 
case as well. Hartog et al (2002) using cross-sectional firm-level data finds in-
significant wage advantage associated with firm-level agreements relative to 
the extended sectoral-level contracts.27 The authors explain their results as 
probably being due to the characteristics of the Dutch labour market where 
different bargaining regimes coexist and are “embedded in a corporatist web” 
26 Gürtzgen (2006) also uses 
linked employer-employee data, 
and estimates individual earning 
equation. However, the German 
database follows not only firms, 
but also individuals over time. 
Therefore, the author can take 
into account time invariant in-
dividual unobserved effects as 
well. Similarly to the Hungarian 
case, the collective agreement 
dummy is defined at the level of 
the firm, but her study also ex-
amines the impact of industrial 
contracts. In Germany, there are 
three regimes: the uncovered 
sector, and the sectors covered 
by industrial- or firm-level agree-
ments.
27 Comparing the Dutch and 
the Hungarian case, there are 
institutional differences be-
tween the two countries, and 
the applied methodologies are 
also different in the papers. The 
Dutch study uses cross-sectional 
data, therefore, cannot control 
for unobservable firm fixed ef-
fects.
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(p 320). In this environment, unions do not act as “aggressive local rent seek-
ers” (p. 322). Card and de la Rica (2006) using Spanish cross-sectional data 
finds that firm-level collective agreements are associated with a 5–10 percent 
wage premium.28 A possible interpretation of their results refers to the charac-
teristics of firm-level and sectoral-level agreements. While sectoral-level agree-
ments tend to flatten wages across skill groups, firm-level agreements provide 
a more flexible wage structure.29
Estimates from the Anglo-Saxon countries are usually higher than docu-
mented in continental Western Europe. The most cited number is that the 
mean union wage gap is 15 percent based on Lewis (1986)’s work. Blanchflow-
er and Bryson (2004) and Hirsch (2003) document a somewhat higher wage 
premium of 18–20 percent. However, these studies are based on household 
surveys and use mostly individual controls as these databases provide only 
limited information on the firm of the employee. On the other hand, studies 
based on enterprise-level data (Freeman and Kleiner, 1990, Lalonde, Marschke 
and Troske, 1996, DiNardo and Lee, 2004) obtain minor or insignificant wage 
advantages associated with unionism. These authors interpret the contrast of 
their findings to previous literature as being the consequence of the methodo-
logical differences (individual vs. enterprise-level estimation, household survey 
vs. enterprise-level data, collective agreement statistics based on questionnaire 
vs. institutional statistics, scarce firm-level controls vs. rich firm-level informa-
tion). Or, another likely reason behind the differing results is that the above 
mentioned enterprise-level studies analyze the labour market impact of recent 
unionization. Unionism in the US started to decline in the 80’s due to the in-
creased opposition of managers to unionization and due to the more frequent 
use of labour-saving technologies (DiNardo and Lee, 2004).
The Hungarian results of modest wage advantages associated with firm-level 
contracting are also comparable to the above US enterprise-level estimates. Not 
only are the magnitude of the estimates very similar, but one feature of the in-
stitutional setting is analogous: both of these studies assess the wage impact of 
firm-level coverage vs. no coverage. However, the underlying reasons behind the 
small wage impacts are again different. Though the institutional structure in 
both countries is decentralized, the US and Hungarian trade unions have his-
torically different roots. While unionism in the US was traditionally a strong 
institution, Hungarian trade unions had to reorganize themselves following 
the regime change, and find their new roles in the new environment. In most 
cases, the attitude of these unions became dominated by the social inheritance 
(wide scope of flexibility for the employer, regulation of non-wage elements of 
the salary, holiday/recreation possibilities for members, etc.).
The present results based on the 1992–2008 linked employer-employee pan-
el data are also in line with the previous cross-sectional Hungarian estimates. 
Neumann (2001) using the Wage and Employment Survey from 1998 and 
28 The Spanish study, due to the 
universal extension of sectoral 
agreements, also examines the 
wage premium of firm-level col-
lective agreements relative to the 
sectoral-level contracts.
29 The authors find that the wage 
premium of firm-level collective 
contracts is higher for skilled 
employees.
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the Ministry’s records of collective and wage agreements found a 5–6 per-
cent wage premium as a result of firm-level wage agreements. His estimate is 
similar in magnitude to our result (6.26 percent) taking into account observ-
able individual and firm-level characteristics. The study by Iga et al. (2009) us-
ing another database leads to a similar conclusion.30 The authors found a 5–7 
percent wage premium in those firms which were set up prior transition or in 
the early transitional years. Our study additionally suggests that taking into 
account unobservable firm-level characteristics further diminishes the wage 
gap. The panel estimates of the final specification imply that wages in contract 
firms are only slightly higher than in non-contract firms: the wage gap due to 
the existence of collective or wage agreements is a maximum of 2–3.5 percent.
Another interesting question deals with the impact of the minimum wage 
regulation. The statutory minimum wage was increased by 60 percent in 2001 
compared to its level in 2000. As a consequence, firm-level wage agreements 
somewhat lost their importance, which is reflected in the diminishing num-
ber of recorded agreements.31 To analyze the question, we define two periods: 
the first one covering the years 1992–2000 and the second one including the 
years 2001–2008, and interact the wage agreement dummy with the period 
dummies. In this way, we obtain separate estimates for the first and the second 
periods. Results are shown by Table 1.3.
table 1.3: union wage gap estimates by period using individual wage equations
Observable individual and firm controls + firm-FE
1992–2000
0.0745*** 0.0466***
(0.0185) (0.00793)
2001–2008
0.0522*** 0.0210*
(0.0160) (0.0121)
Observations 1,226,778 1,226,778
Dependent variable: log of individual’s monthly gross wage specified as base salary, 
overtime pay, regular payments and 1/12th of the previous year’s bonuses.
Notes: The above table shows the estimated parameters of the interacted wage agree-
ment variables. All specifications include year dummies. Individual observable con-
trols are as follows: gender, education (three categories), age (three categories), oc-
cupation (seven categories). Firm-level observable controls are as follows: ownership, 
size, industrial classification (19 categories), location (seven categories). Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
As expected, the results imply that the wage gap is somewhat larger in the first 
period. The specification taking into account only observable characteristics 
suggests that the wage advantage due to firm-level wage agreements is 7.5 per-
cent in the first period, and the estimated parameter is somewhat smaller, 5.2 
percent after 2000. The gap further diminishes when including unobserv-
able firm fixed effects: the wage premium is 4.7 percent in the first period and 
30 Iga et al. (2009) uses the Euro-
pean Structure of Earnings Sur-
vey from 2002, which includes 
agreement records from other 
sources.
31 The statutory minimum wage 
was increased substantially for 
the first time in 2001. Starting 
from 2006, the government 
introduced a three-tier mini-
mum wage system, in which the 
guaranteed minimum wages 
differ by education. Due to 
these regulations, the number 
of wage agreements dropped 
significantly in recent years, 
especially after 2005. Accord-
ing to the Ministry’s records, 
the number of reported wage 
agreements dropped to 267 in 
2007 and further to 185 in 2009.
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drops to 2.1 percent in the second period. Thus, the specifications, which esti-
mate separate parameters for the periods before and after 2000 imply that the 
importance of firm-level trade unions decreases over time. The change in the 
national minimum wage regulation probably played a large role behind the 
diminishing power of firm-level trade unions. Note, however, that it is also 
possible that the less important role of trade unions is partly due to a general 
trend (mostly experienced in the US), which emphasizes individual bargain-
ing, individually set wages and flexible job arrangements.
As a summary, we can conclude that the wage premium of firm-level collec-
tive contracting is modest in Hungary. This is in line with expectations based 
on the decentralized, fragmented institutional structure. In our analysis esti-
mating individual wage equation and using the institutional records of collec-
tive agreements, we found on average 2–3.5 percent wage gap for the period of 
1992–2008 due to firm-level collective agreements. The raw wage gap is mostly 
explained by observable firm characteristics, but including unobservable firm 
fixed effects further reduces the gap. This last specification suggests that firms 
with a collective agreement are “better” (along unobservable characteristics) 
than the average.
The estimated parameters are similar to the ones obtained in previous stud-
ies using data from continental Western Europe, and to US enterprise-level 
estimates. Nevertheless, the underlying reasons behind the modest wage im-
pacts are different. In continental Western Europe the explanations mostly re-
fer to the corporatist, centralized and coordinated social dialogue. In the US 
the general declining importance of trade unions is the main reason. On the 
other hand, in Hungary trade unions could not overcome the social heritage 
and did not function as “classical” trade unions aiming to ensure the “auto-
matic solidarity” between the employees. The attitudes of employees, employ-
ers and trade unions are largely affected by the characteristics of the previous 
regime: ensuring flexibility for the firm’s management, and regulating mostly 
the non-wage elements. Analyzing the role of trade unions in the regulation 
of non-wage elements could be the topic of future research.
appEndix
The estimated individual wage equation
We estimate the following wage equation:
lnWijt = αUjt + γΓ + εijt, where Γ = (Xijt, Zjt), εijt = vj + ηijt and ηijt ~ N(0, ση).
Wijt shows the gross wage of the individual: the gross monthly wage of indi-
vidual i employed by the firm j at time t. On the right hand side, Ujt is the col-
lective agreement (wage agreement) dummy variable, which takes the value of 
1 if firm j had a collective contract (wage agreement) at time t. In our study we 
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aim to estimate the α parameter of the U contract dummy. The estimated α pa-
rameter quantifies the union power. The matrix Γ = (Xijt, Zjt) includes further 
control variables. Xijt summarizes the individual regressors (gender, education 
level, age, occupation of the employee), and Zjt includes the firm-level controls 
(size of the company, industrial classification, location, ownership). The error 
term εijt = vj + ηijt is composed of a firm fixed effect νj and a random noise com-
ponent ηijt ~ N(0, ση). All specifications include year dummies.
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2. thE EFFEct oF ForEign acquisitions on workEr wagEs*
John S. Earle & Álmos Telegdy
Introduction
This chapter analyzes a question that has been the subject of controversy in the 
context of both policy and research: the benefits and costs of foreign versus 
domestic ownership. Indeed, the posture of economic policy towards foreign 
direct investment (FDI), particularly cases of foreign acquisitions, seems to 
display a certain degree of ambivalence in many countries. On the one hand, 
FDI is valued as a source of finance, jobs, and technologies, and governments 
frequently compete for the favor of investors by offering special preferences 
and tax abatements. On the other hand, most countries completely prohibit 
majority foreign ownership in so-called “strategic” sectors – for instance, air-
lines and (until recently) banking in the US – and they often impose additional 
regulatory burdens and uncertainties that add to the inherently higher costs of 
sending capital and monitoring managers across national boundaries. These 
policies are frequently abetted by public fears of globalization, and a major is-
sue in the debates is the effects of foreign ownership on workers and their wages.
Research on wages and FDI has examined a number of countries and used 
several types of data, and it has consistently documented a raw wage differ-
ential in favor of foreign ownership. A major issue in this research, however, 
is that FDI may be selective, “cream-skimming” or “cherry-picking” the best 
domestic firms for acquisition and the best areas and industries for greenfield 
start-ups. Studies using firm-level data and corrections for this selection bias 
found that the foreign wage premium survives, but it diminishes in magnitude 
(e.g., Conyon et al. 2002; Girma and Görg, 2007). The firm-level data, of course, 
typically contain little or no information on individual worker wages and char-
acteristics, which makes it difficult or impossible to control for, and analyze, 
employee composition and relative wages by characteristics of workers within 
firms. Studies of worker-level data with information on employer ownership can 
address these issues, but they generally contain no controls for firm selection 
into ownership type or much employer information, which could be useful for 
disentangling the possible mechanisms underlying an FDI-wage correlation.
The advantages of both firm- and worker-level data can be exploited only 
with linked employer-employee data (LEED), and recently there have been 
several such studies (e.g., Heyman et al. 2007; Huttunen, 2007). These stud-
ies typically conclude that the causal effect of foreign ownership is small or it 
totally disappears.
* This study is based on Earle, 
Telegdy and Antal (2012). We 
thank László Tőkés for excellent 
research assistance.
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In this chapter we estimate the impact of foreign acquisitions on the level 
and structure of wages in Hungary, an economy that rapidly reformed and 
liberalized inward investment during the 1990s. The data we analyze begin 
in 1986 when the centrally planned regime completely prohibited foreign in-
volvement, they continue through the adoption of a very liberal regulation 
of FDI in which – despite significant opposition – the government awarded 
special treatment to many foreign investors, and they end in 2008, several 
years after accession to the European Union. The result of liberalization was 
ownership transfer from domestic to foreign owners that took place not only 
quickly but also broadly across nearly all sectors. At the same time, the tightly 
controlled wages of the centrally planned systems were abruptly liberalized, 
permitting organizations to set their own wages and to increase skill differ-
entials, which had tended to be compressed under socialism (e.g., Kornai, 
1990). We focus on acquisitions both because of their particular interest in 
the political economy of FDI (greenfield investments tend to be less contro-
versial) and because of the better possibilities of controlling for selection of 
firms into foreign ownership, a common problem that biases the estimated 
effects of foreign ownership.
Data Sources and Sample Selection
We analyze data from two sources. The first is the National Tax Authority in 
Hungary, which provides balance sheet data for all legal entities engaged in dou-
ble-entry bookkeeping. These data are available annually from 1992 to 2008 for 
all firms and from 1986 to 1991 for a sample of disproportionately large enter-
prises. The firm-level data files include the balance sheet and income statement, 
the proportion of share capital held by different types of owners, and some ba-
sic variables, such as employment, location and industrial branch of the firm.
The second source is the Hungarian Wage Survey, which has information on 
workers’ earnings and characteristics every three years between 1986 and 1992, 
and on an annual basis ever since. The Wage Survey data provide extensive in-
formation on employees’ earnings, their highest level of education, gender, age, 
occupation, whether the worker is a new hire and also working hours in some 
years. In 1986 and 1989 the survey covered all firms. At the start of the tran-
sition the sample design was changed to having only firms with more than 20 
employees, which was gradually reduced to 5. In 1986 and 1989, workers were 
selected from narrowly defined occupational and earnings groups within firms 
randomly (managers were all included in the survey). From 1992 onwards the 
sample design changed; production workers were selected if born on the 5th or 
15th of any month, while non-production workers were chosen if born on the 
5th, 15th, or 25th of any month. Therefore, even though the target group of the 
survey was the population of firms above 20 employees, if a firm did not have 
any employees born on the given days in a particular year, the firm-year is miss-
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ing from the data. This design was maintained for the firms with at least 20 
employees by 2001, and for firms with employment above 50 thereafter, but 
for the smaller firms all employees’ information was required. The data pro-
vide the number of production and non-production workers which we use to 
weight up the sample to the firm level employment. With the help of the firm 
level data we also construct a firm weight which adjusts the sample to the to-
tal number of employees in the relevant sectors of the Hungarian economy.
These data are linked to the firm-level data to form a linked employer-employ-
ee dataset (LEED), which is a panel in firms but not in individuals. Nonetheless, 
relying on individual information we linked 44 percent of observed employ-
ees that do not change their workplace from one year to the next. Although 
we cannot identify the effect of ownership change from workers who move 
between domestic and foreign firms, we can control for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity in the case of employees that stay with the same firm during a 
foreign acquisition or divestment.
We restrict our attention to full-time employees only, and we focus our at-
tention to individuals between the age of 15 and 74. The final dataset is com-
posed of 1.9 million firm-year observations on 377 thousand unique firms, to 
33 thousand of which we link employee information resulting in a LEED of 
2.5 million worker-years.
Ownership Evolution and Summary Statistics
Hungary got off to an early start in corporate control changes with gradual 
decentralization and increased autonomy provided to state-owned enterprises 
during the late 1980s (Szakadát, 1993). The first foreign acquisitions had al-
ready taken place in 1989, the most well-known being the privatization of the 
lighting company Tungsram, bought up by General Electric. In the early 1990s 
not only were constraints on foreign investment drastically eased, but tax and 
other preferences for foreign investors were also provided (OECD, 2000). By 
the mid-1990s, Hungary had the highest value of foreign direct investment 
per capita among the post-socialist countries.
The share distribution of foreign ownership after acquisitions in 2000 is 
shown in Figure 2.1.1 Almost one-third of the firms with positive foreign own-
ership are fully foreign-owned and 20 percent possess exactly 50 percent of the 
company’s shares. The other firms are distributed roughly equally around all 
possible ownership stakes. The evolution of the foreign acquisitions (defined 
as an increase in foreign ownership above 50 percent), as well as the total em-
ployment of these firms is presented in Figure 2.2, which clearly reflects the 
early start and the importance of foreign acquisitions in shaping Hungarian 
corporate ownership. The proportion of foreign acquisitions had already start-
ed to increase at the beginning of the 90s and quickly reached 3 percent, their 
aggregate employment raising to about 15 percent of all employment in the 
1 Except for several years at the 
beginning of the time period 
observed in the data, the share 
distribution of foreign owner-
ship is very similar to the one 
presented here.
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firm-level data by 1999. After this year their share in employment fell but nev-
ertheless remained as high as 12 percent.
Figure 2.1: distribution of foreign ownership share in 2000
Notes: N = 4,418 firms. Only firms with positive foreign ownership  
share included.
Figure 2.2: Evolution of foreign acquisitions
Notes: N = 1,881,279 firm-years in the firm data, 2,475,478 worker-years in the 
LEED.
According to the definition we use in our analysis, the only condition a firm 
has to satisfy to be a foreign acquisition or divestment is passing the 50 per-
cent ownership threshold, but firms may differ in the starting and ending 
proportions of foreign ownership. We look at the foreign share distribution 
in such firms to understand the typical patterns of ownership change: does 
the foreign ownership stake change only several percentage points around 
the 50 percent threshold or do foreigners rather buy and sell large propor-
tions of capital in such firms? We analyze the foreign ownership stakes be-
fore and after acquisitions and divestments in Figure 2.3. The bars show the 
distribution of firms by the pre-acquisition (divestment) foreign ownership 
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share, and the diamonds show the mean share of foreign ownership after the 
change had taken place. The pre-acquisition share information reveals that 
70 percent of the target firms had no foreign ownership. One-fifth of all firms 
had 50 percent foreign ownership before the acquisition while the remaining 
10 percent of firms are distributed roughly equally across other proportions 
of pre-acquisition foreign ownership. After the foreign takeover, the foreign 
ownership share is very high, reaching 80 percent on average. Pre-divestment 
foreign ownership is also concentrated at 100 percent, but less than half of 
the firms are exclusively owned by foreigners, the others being quite equally 
distributed around across the whole distribution between 50 and 100 per-
cent. The average foreign ownership stake after the divestment is only about 
10 percent, documenting that after divestment foreigners did not retain much 
of a stake in the firm. Therefore, both foreign acquisitions and divestments 
result in extreme changes in foreign ownership.
Figure 2.3: distribution of foreign ownership before and after  
foreign acquisitions and divestments
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Notes: N = 4,928 acquisitions, 983 divestments. Bars depict the distribution of ac-
quired (left panel) and of subsequently divested (right panel) firms according to size 
of foreign ownership share in the last domestic year (for acquisitions), or in the last 
foreign year (for divestments) before the change in majority ownership. Diamonds 
depict the average foreign share in the first foreign year (for acquisitions), or in the 
first domestic year (for divestments) after the change in majority ownership.
As most of the previous studies, in the firm data we use the firm-level average 
wage, defined as the total payments to workers over the average number of em-
ployees. Wages are deflated by yearly CPI and are measured in 2008 Hungar-
ian forints. The first row of Table 2.1 shows that unconditional mean wages 
are twice as large in foreign-owned firms as in domestic enterprises.
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table 2.1: Firm characteristics of the sample
ALDO FOAQ
Average Annual Wage Bill per Worker
1,083.6 2,052.9
(1,829.4) (2,634.0)
Tangible Assets
142.1 2,094.6
(4,803.9) (30,214.6)
Employment
22.4 119.3
(366.3) (651.0)
Labor Productivity
23.0 62.5
(171.4) (928.5)
N 1,835,371 47,972
Industry in 2000
Agriculture, Hunting, Fishing, Forestry 5.0 2.8
Mining, Electricity, Gas, Water Supply 0.6 1.2
Manufacturing 17.3 26.2
Construction 10.2 3.4
Wholesale, Retail Trade, Repair 31.2 36.1
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 5.2 7.0
Business Services 19.4 12.0
Other Services 11.2 11.3
N (firm-years) 90,171 3,055
Notes: Average earnings measured in thousands, tangible assets and labor productiv-
ity in millions of 2008 HUF. Standard deviations in parentheses.
table 2.2: individual characteristics by ownership type – lEEd
Domestic Foreign
Monthly Earnings
137.3 237.2
(120.9) (247.6)
Female 38.1 42.4
Education
Elementary 27.1 16.9
Vocational 33.9 28.7
High school 30.2 36.0
University 8.8 18.4
Experience
22.7 21.6
(11.0) (10.8)
New Hire 11.2 10.2
Occupation
Elementary Occupations 10.1 5.0
Skilled Manual Workers 46.8 46.0
Service Workers 10.3 6.9
Clerks 7.5 6.2
Associate Professionals 12.7 18.2
Professionals 4.1 8.7
Managers 8.6 9.0
N (worker-years) 2,344,622 142,433
Notes: Earnings measured in thousands of 2008 HUF. Standard deviations in paren-
theses.
earle & Telegdy: The eFFecT oF Foreign acquisiTions...
219
The LEED have information on individual wages paid in May. They include 
the monthly base wage, overtime pay, regular payments other than the base 
wage (e.g., language and managerial allowances), and 1/12th of the previous 
year’s irregular payments (such as end-of-year bonuses). If the worker was hired 
during the previous year, we divide the last wage component by the number 
of months the worker spent with the company in that year. Table 2.2 shows 
that by this measure the wage premium in firms acquired is similar to the fig-
ure in the firm level data.
In addition to wages, Table 2.2 also presents the characteristics of firms while 
Table 2.3 provides the descriptive statistics for worker characteristics. Meas-
ured by the value of tangible assets or employment, foreign firms are much 
larger and they are also much more productive (as measured by labor produc-
tivity, the value of sales over the average number of employees). The industrial 
composition of foreign and domestic firms also differs substantially. Relative 
to domestic firms, foreign-owned firms predominate in manufacturing, and 
they are less prevalent in agriculture, construction and business services.
The average characteristics of workers also vary by ownership type. For-
eign owners employ a higher proportion of female workers and university 
graduates; vocational and high school graduates are in similar proportions 
employed in domestic and foreign companies and those with only elemen-
tary education are more likely to be employed by domestic firms. Little dif-
ference exists in the length of work experience and the likeliness to be newly 
hired (defined as hired during the previous calendar year). The occupational 
distribution differs between foreign and domestic firms: the workforce in 
foreign-owned companies has a higher proportion of associate profession-
als and professionals, smaller proportions of workers in elementary occu-
pations, service workers and clerks while the proportion of managers is the 
same across the two ownership types. Relative to domestic firms, therefore, 
workers in foreign companies tend to be more educated, somewhat less ex-
perienced, and more likely to be female and in professional and associate 
professional occupations. The firm and worker characteristics, of course, are 
simple unconditional means that take no account of any other characteristics 
of foreign and domestic companies, but they are suggestive of the underly-
ing heterogeneity in the population.
Estimation Procedures
Our first firm-level estimating equation is the following:
 lnWjt = a + δf FOREIGNj,t-1 + Σγj REGIONj + ΣλtYEARt + ujt , (1)
where j indexes firms and t indexes time. lnWjt is the natural logarithm of the 
wage bill per employee, and we control for year and regional effects. The regres-
sion is weighted by the number of employees in the firm-year. In some specifi-
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cations we disaggregate FOREIGN into two types of foreign acquisitions: sin-
gle acquisitions and acquisitions followed later by divestment (i.e. a domestic 
acquisition) after at least one year of foreign ownership.
To account for possible differences in workforce composition we use the 
LEED and control for gender and human capital:
 lnwijt = a + βitXit + δf FOREIGNj,t-1+ Σγj REGIONj + ΣλtYEARt + zijt . (2)
Xi is a vector of individual characteristics including three educational dummies 
(VOCATIONAL, HIGH SCHOOL, and UNIVERSITY, the omitted category being at 
most 8 years of schooling), (potential) EXPERIENCE in level and squared, and a 
dummy variable for gender = 1 for female employees (FEMALE). As education 
and experience may be correlated, and gender may influence both, we include 
a full set of interactions among these variables.
There are good reasons to believe that the OLS estimates of the foreign own-
ership effects are biased: the owners of the acquiring firms are likely to select 
targets that have better growth prospects or a more skilled workforce, for ex-
ample. If the firm characteristic upon which the selection is performed is not 
observed for the researcher, the estimated effect of ownership on wages will 
be biased. To attenuate this selection bias, we add firm fixed effects to the re-
gression to control for all unobserved time invariant effects at the firm level. In 
addition, with the help of employee-level variables we link most workers who 
did not change their workplace from one year to any other (those who changed 
cannot be linked). This procedure resulted linking almost half of the workers 
across years. Having obtained the links, we can control for worker effects which 
takes out all the time-invariant variation from the data for those workers who 
do not change jobs. Note that these estimates identify the foreign effect from 
the sample of incumbent workers – those who had already been with the firm 
before the foreign acquisition took place.
The Effect of FDI on average wages and on the wage structure
Using Equations (1) and (2), we estimate the foreign effect with OLS, firm 
fixed effects and joint firm-worker effects. Simple OLS regressions (shown in 
Table 2.3) function as benchmarks for our attempts to distinguish selection 
bias from causal effects, and they provide measures of average wage differen-
tials for firms by all ownership types. The estimated effect on the firm level data 
implies a 64 percent wage differential controlling only for region and year ef-
fects. The simple average FDI effect estimated with the LEED data is smaller, 
but still large at 46 percent.2
The LEED of course permits us to include worker characteristics and con-
trol for gender, education, potential experience and interactions between 
these variables. It is quite striking that the inclusion of these individual con-
trols changes the estimated foreign effect only by 4 log points. The inclusion 
2 The two datasets and the de-
pendent variables are different, 
so it is not surprising that the 
estimates differ, but they both 
suggest that the foreign wage 
effect is positive and large in 
magnitude.
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of firm fixed effects, on the other hand, reduces the coefficients in both sam-
ples by a large extent. The firm-level estimate falls to 0.27 and the individual 
estimate to 0.16.
table 2.3: the effect of foreign acquisition on wages
OLS no controls OLS with controls FFE FWFE
Firm Data
0.636** N.A. 0.270** N.A.
(0.041) (0.024)
LEED
0.463** 0.420** 0.158** 0.051**
(0.038) (0.025) (0.016) (0.012)
Notes: N = 1,881,267 firm-years in the firm data, 2,475,478 worker-years in the LEED.
N.A. = Not applicable.
As the difference between the OLS and the fixed effects estimates are a meas-
ure of selection of target firms of acquisitions, the difference between the esti-
mated coefficients suggests that this is quite large: the future foreign owners 
carefully select their targets from the high-wage domestic firms. As wages may 
reflect worker quality, it is likely that foreign acquired firms had a better than 
average workforce already before the acquisition took place. The further in-
clusion of worker-firm joint fixed effects further reduces the estimated foreign 
wage effect to 5 percent. This shows that even those workers, who were already 
employed with the target firm before the foreign acquisition, received a wage 
increase of 5 percent on average, relative to the non-acquired counterfactual.
The analysis so far treated all foreign firms equally and did not distinguish 
single acquisitions from those which were subsequently divested. In the regres-
sions with a single foreign dummy variable we made the implicit assumption 
that the foreign wage effect is symmetric in both directions, but an interesting 
question is whether this assumption is correct. These specifications allow us to 
examine differences between firms that were kept in foreign ownership and 
those which were further divested to domestic entrepreneurs. In addition, by 
looking at those firms which experienced both acquisitions and divestments 
during the period observed, we can estimate the symmetry of the foreign wage 
effect for both acquisitions and divestments within firms, eliminating any fixed 
differences between acquisitions and divestments.
Table 2.4 presents these results. Single acquisitions are estimated to increase 
wages by 28 percent in the firm sample and by 17 percent in the individual sam-
ple. When the acquisition is followed by a divestment to Hungarian owners, 
the effect does not change much. When worker effects are controlled for (and 
thus the estimation is identified from incumbent workers), the effect is still of 
5–8 percent. Thus, both types of acquisition lead to positive wage effects but 
do they persist if the firm is sold to a domestic owner? The estimations reveal 
that the reversal of the foreign effect is not complete, but nor is it small. The 
coefficient for divestments (relative to the initial domestic period) is always 
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smaller than the acquisition effect and the difference is quite large. For exam-
ple, in the case of the firm sample, the coefficient on divestment is almost half 
as large as that of acquisitions. This analysis provides evidence, therefore, that 
a large part of the foreign wage effect indeed is associated with foreign owner-
ship as it disappears when the foreign owners leave the company.
table 2.4: the effect of foreign ownership by type of investment
Firm level LEED
FFE FFE FWFE
Single Acquisitions
Acquisition Effect
0.283** 0.169** 0.052**
(0.031) (0.020) (0.016)
Domestic-Foreign-Domestic
Acquisition Effect
0.298** 0.212** 0.083**
(0.046) (0.037) (0.021)
Divestment Effect
0.164** 0.142** 0.051*
(0.063) (0.048) (0.026)
Notes: See Table 2.3.
Our analysis has established a robust and positive average treatment effect of 
foreign ownership on wages, but we have not yet studied the effect on vari-
ous worker groups. Are there some worker types which win, and some others 
which lose wages as a result of foreign ownership, or everybody benefits and 
receives a positive foreign wage premium? Foreign ownership is usually asso-
ciated with high quality products and services, better technology and better 
corporate culture so one could hypothesize that workers with high levels of 
human capital get higher wages relative to their less endowed colleagues. To 
test this, we interact foreign ownership with worker characteristics and run 
the same regressions as before. In the first set of regressions we test how the 
foreign wage effect varies with gender, education and experience. Table 2.5 
shows that the wage effect of the reference group (male workers with elemen-
tary education and 10 to 20 years of experience) is 13 percent. The estimated 
effects of the interaction terms show that relative wages indeed change after 
a foreign acquisition: some of the estimated effects are negative while others 
larger than zero and their magnitude also varies. Nevertheless, the negative 
effects are never larger in magnitude than the main effect, showing that for-
eign ownership increases the wages of both genders, all types of education 
and experience groups, as well as new hires and workers with longer tenure. 
As expected, better education is associated with higher foreign wage effects 
and the wage premium declines with experience. The estimated wage dif-
ferential across the two genders is small and statistically insignificant, while 
workers in their first year with the firm get smaller wages by 3 percent than 
before the acquisition.
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table 2.5: Effects of foreign acquisition on the wage structure  
by gender, education and experience groups
FE Standard error
Acquisition Effect of Reference Group 0.127** 0.021
Female –0.011 0.011
Vocational 0.021* 0.010
High school 0.046** 0.013
University 0.238** 0.032
Experience: 0–10 –0.032** 0.009
Experience: 21–30 –0.015* 0.007
Experience: 30+ –0.009 0.010
New Hire –0.033* 0.015
Notes: N = 2,474,692 worker-years. Reference group: Males with elementary educa-
tion and 11–20 years of potential labor market experience, who are not new hires. 
Coefficients and standard errors from a regression where the acquisition dummy is 
interacted with individual characteristics.
The universal increase of wages is true for the occupational structure as well, 
as demonstrated by the estimated effects in Table 2.6, where we interact the 
foreign acquisition dummy with 1-digit occupational dummies: the estimated 
effects are all positive and almost always significant. The big winners of foreign 
ownership are managers and professionals, but occupations requiring lower 
skill levels are also associated with a 12–16 percent wage premium. The sole 
exception is the category comprising of service workers, who receive wages 9 
percent higher than before the acquisition which is quite sizable economically, 
but this effect is statistically not significant.
table 2.6: Effects of foreign acquisition on the wage structure by occupation
FE Standard error
Manager 0.474** 0.043
Professional 0.356** 0.043
Associate Professional 0.162** 0.022
Clerks 0.127** 0.021
Service 0.090 0.058
Skilled manual 0.121** 0.019
Unskilled 0.126** 0.022
Notes: N = 2,474,692 worker-years. Coefficients and standard errors from a regression 
where the acquisition dummy is interacted with occupational group dummies.
One possible objection to the analysis above concerns measurement error in 
the wage variable correlated with ownership. First, working hours may be dif-
ferent under domestic and private ownership. As the wage variable used in this 
analysis is the yearly average in the firm data and monthly in the LEED, we do 
not capture any variation in working hours. The post-1999 LEED, however, 
provide information on hours worked, and we use this to test for possible bi-
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ases. We run similar regressions as before but with working hours as the de-
pendent variable.3 The estimated coefficients (not shown), are small and im-
precisely estimated, showing that hours are probably not very different across 
ownership types.4
Second, wages can be biased due to under-reporting to decrease tax payments. 
The tax burden on employment is high in Hungary and tax avoidance is widely 
considered rife. If under-reporting is more prevalent in domestic firms, the es-
timated foreign effect may be upward biased. To check whether domestic firms 
are indeed more likely to avoid taxes than foreign-owned enterprises, we carry 
out two tests. First, we interact the foreign dummy with a cheating index which 
is defined at the industry level and shows the likeliness of cheating (Elek et al. 
2009). Our results show that in industries where under-reporting is less likely, 
the foreign wage difference is larger than in cheating industries. This result 
rejects the hypothesis of domestic firms being less honest in terms of report-
ing true earnings, although it is also consistent with other differences across 
size and industry categories in how foreign firms operate. As a second test, we 
replace wages with a dependent variable indicating whether the worker was 
paid very close to the minimum wage that year (defined as being paid less than 
3 percent more than the minimum wage). We find that a lower proportion of 
workers were paid the minimum wage in foreign-owned companies, and the 
estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero. This result may sug-
gest more misreporting in domestic firms, but the magnitude of the coefficient 
is rather small (0.038–0.066). As only about 10 percent of workers receive the 
minimum wage in our sample, this wage differential cannot explain the large 
estimated foreign wage premium.5
To summarize, all of the analyses imply a positive, statistically significant 
wage effect of foreign acquisitions. The reversal of the FDI effect in cases where 
acquired firms are subsequently divested to domestic owners also suggests that 
the wage effect is genuine and not entirely the result of selection. The estimat-
ed FDI effect tends to be smaller in the LEED than in the firm-level data, but 
still higher than those estimated in other countries. But what is the economic 
mechanism which generates this premium?
We argue that a genuine wage effect of FDI implies a productivity differential 
across domestic and foreign firms. As we discussed in the introduction, high 
firm productivity is not sufficient to having higher wages if labor markets are 
competitive, but combined with different types of rent sharing can lead to it. 
Also, it is hard to imagine that an unproductive firm would pay higher wages, 
unless it has some rents to extract (for example, monopoly position). As the 
foreign firms from out data operate in various kinds of industries, it is unlikely 
that they all have some rents which they can share with workers. To examine 
the wage-productivity relationship, we estimate two specifications with the de-
pendent variables being labor productivity (total sales divided by employment) 
3 A more natural test would be 
the replacement of monthly wage 
with hourly wage in our regres-
sions, but the wage variable in-
cludes several types of payments 
which do not vary directly with 
hours worked.
4 The measurement of working 
hours is probably noisy in the 
case of white collar workers. As 
a robustness test, we rerun the 
regressions with only blue collar 
workers, and obtained similar 
results.
5 This result can also be in-
terpreted as another piece of 
evidence for the foreign wage 
premium.
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and average compensation. By comparing the magnitudes of the two estimated 
coefficients, we can draw conclusions about the similarity of the productivity 
and wage effects. Table 2.7 contains the results, which show a wage effect of 
24 percent, similar to that which we obtained before. The labor productivity 
effect of foreign ownership is almost 38 percent, much larger than the wage 
effect. The difference in the two effects can be the result of the productivity 
effects of capital and the rents going to the owners of capital – the foreign in-
vestors. Indeed, when we control for capital and material costs per worker in 
Column 2 of the table, we find very similar wage and productivity effects: the 
foreign coefficient of the wage equation drops to 17 percent, while the labor 
productivity effect falls much more to 18 percent.
table 2.7: the effect of acquisitions on labor productivity and average wages
(1) (2)
Average Compensation
0.241** 0.172**
(0.002) (0.002)
Labor Productivity
0.378** 0.179**
(0.003) (0.002)
Controls for Capital Intensity and Material Cost/Worker No Yes
Notes: N = 1 658 584 firms. Regressions are weighted by employment.
Why then are the productivity and wage effects of FDI in Hungary so high? 
One possibility is that Hungarian firms started the transition in a backward 
condition, technologically and organizationally far from the frontier, and thus 
it was relatively easy for foreign investors to raise productivity and wages. To 
examine this, we carry out further analysis. First, we collected data on the ori-
gin of the foreign owner by source country.6 Our assumption is that owners 
from more developed countries are likely to bring more up-to-date technol-
ogy and organizational capital and so increase labor productivity and subse-
quently wages.7 We test this assumption by interacting the foreign ownership 
dummy with the proportional difference between the GDP per capita of the 
source country of FDI and the Hungarian figure.
We also test whether the wage effect varies with the timing of the foreign ac-
quisition. Domestic firms were further away from their production possibili-
ties frontier at the beginning of transition and wages were also smaller than in 
latter periods. Therefore, in early transition foreign owners had more space for 
improvement than later. As an additional test, we disaggregate the target firms 
by their ownership type into state and privately owned firms and test whether 
the foreign acquisition effect is different across the two types. Here the hypoth-
esis is that state-owned firms are further from their production possibilities 
frontier so foreign ownership may have a larger effect on them.
In the top panel of Table 2.8 we first show how the foreign wage effect var-
ies by the grade of development of the sending country of FDI. The interac-
6 Foreign raiders are predomi-
nantly from continental Euro-
pean countries.
7 An alternative assumption is 
that those owners who are used 
to paying high wages are more 
likely to raise wages of Hungar-
ian workers for equity reasons 
or for motivating them to exert 
more effort or not leave the firm.
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tion term between the relative GDP per capita and the foreign acquisition 
dummy variable is positive and significant in both samples, showing that the 
foreign wage effect is higher for wealthier sending countries. Early and late ac-
quisitions have similar estimated wage effects in the firm sample, but they do 
differ in the LEED. While those acquisitions which took place before 1998 
raise wages by 30 percent, those which happened after this year have an effect 
of only 23.5 percent. The next test permits the FDI acquisition effect to vary 
between state-owned targets (i.e., privatizations) and those that are domestic 
private. Again, the estimated FDI effect is larger for the former firms, which 
were inherited from the central planning system, and therefore are likely to be 
farther from the productivity (and wage) frontiers. The heterogeneity of the 
wage effect by the ownership of the target firms is quite large in the firm level 
sample, where foreign ownership raises the average wage of domestic firms by 
14, and for state owned firms by 35 percent.
table 2.8: Fdi impact estimates by source of country gdp,  
acquisition period, and target type
Firm-Level LEED
GDP per capita
0.055** 0.036**
(0.005) (0.004)
R2 0.234 0.333
Early Acquisition
0.301** 0.208**
(0.028) (0.022)
Late Acquisition
0.235** 0.104**
(0.090) (0.017)
R2 0.251 0.340
State-Owned
0.351** 0.202**
(0.030) (0.024)
Domestic Private
0.137** 0.120**
(0.057) (0.022)
R2 0.254 0.340
Notes: In the first panel, N = 1,786,859 firm-years for firm-level sample and 2,430,840 
worker-years for LEED; in the next two panels, N = 1,804,481 firm-years for firm-
level sample and 2,474,692 worker-years for LEED. All specifications include year 
and region dummies, and firm fixed effects; in addition, we control for gender, edu-
cation, experience and their full interactions in the LEED. GDP per capita measures 
the difference between the source countries’ and the Hungarian GDP per capita, 
relative to Hungarian GDP per capita. All GDP values measured in 2000 US dollars. 
GDP data is from World Bank.
Conclusions
This paper investigated the effect of inward foreign direct investment on earn-
ings in Hungary. We found that foreign ownership is correlated with higher 
earnings in a pooled OLS specification, and the wage premium is very large 
at 40–60 percent, even after controlling for various worker and job character-
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istics. However, foreign owners “cherry-pick” high-wage domestic firms, as 
shown by the reduction of the foreign wage premium when we apply econo-
metric methods that attenuate the selection bias. Nonetheless, even in these 
specifications, we still find a positive and strongly significant foreign wage effect 
of 16–27 percent, which is larger than that which most studies find for devel-
oped countries. We also find that the wage increase is universal across worker 
types: some benefit more than others such as high skilled, young workers, but 
all skill groups, occupations, and both genders experience a foreign wage pre-
mium. Those workers who were with the firm already before the acquisition 
are also estimated to enjoy increasing wages.
Regarding the underlying economic mechanism, we find that the wage pre-
mium is associated with the difference in the productivity across domestic and 
foreign-owned firms. This is underlined by the heterogeneity of the foreign 
wage effect, which shows that the wage effect is larger in the case of early acquisi-
tions, when the target firm was owned by the state, and when the sending coun-
try’s grade of development is high. These factors are all likely to be associated 
with the possibility of high productivity change after the foreign acquisition.
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3. privatization, EmploymEnt and wagEs:  
EvidEncE From hungary in comparativE pErspEctivE*
John S. Earle & Álmos Telegdy
Introduction
One the most controversial, yet least studied, issues in the economic transition 
of Hungary and indeed in any reforming economy concerns the impact on em-
ployees when their employers are privatized. While many commentators have 
simply assumed that employment would fall and perhaps wages would as well 
when new private owners strive for increased efficiency, there have been few 
careful estimates of these impacts, and essentially none outside of the manu-
facturing sector. This paper reports research estimating employment effects 
using firm-level data for Hungary and four other nearby economies (Lithu-
ania, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine) and wage effects using linked worker-
firm-level data for Hungary.
The Employment Effects of Privatization
The greatest opposition to privatizing a firm usually comes from the firm’s 
own employees, fearful of job losses and wage cuts. Workers’ apprehensions 
about privatization are consistent with standard economic analyses, whereby 
new private owners raise productivity and reduce costs in response to hard-
er budget constraints and stronger profit-related incentives (e.g., Boycko et al. 
1996; Aghion and Blanchard, 1998). However intuitive, the empirical basis for 
these results is remarkably slender, as there have been very few studies that have 
focused on the employment and wage effects of privatization, still fewer that 
have used appropriate micro-level databases, and essentially none that provide 
estimates outside manufacturing.1
Previous research on the consequences of privatization for workers has been 
hampered by small sample sizes, short time series, and difficulties in defining 
a comparison group of firms. The data limitations have not only reduced the 
generality of the results but also constrained the use of methods that could 
account for selection bias in the privatization process. In the first systematic 
study of the effects of privatization on employment and wages, for example, 
Haskel and Szymanski (1993) analyze 14 British publicly owned companies, 
of which four were privatized and the others were deregulated. Bhaskar and 
Khan (1995) use data for 1983 and 1988 to estimate employment effects in 
62 Bangladeshi jute mills, half of which were privatized. La Porta and Lopez-
de-Silanes (1999) analyze 170 privatized firms in Mexico, although the post-
* We thank Eszter Nagy and 
László Tőkés for excellent re-
search assistance.
1 The relatively little research on 
employment and wage effects 
contrasts with the large litera-
ture on privatization and firm 
performance; see the surveys 
by Megginson and Netter (2001) 
and Djankov and Murrell (2002).
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privatization information is limited to a single year. Other studies have some-
times included employment as one of several indicators of firm performance, 
but not the focus of analysis. Overall, the results from this small body of previ-
ous research are inconclusive, containing both negative and positive estimates 
of the effects on workers.
One partial exception to this characterization of previous research is Brown 
et al.’s (2010) study of manufacturing firm data through 2005 for Hungary, 
Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. In this paper, we build on and extend research 
on the employment effects of privatization, adding Lithuania, non-manufac-
turing firms, and additional years of information (to the extent available), as 
well as providing a focus on Hungary in comparison to the other economies. 
We also present employment-weighted estimates that allow us to draw infer-
ences on the overall impact of privatization on numbers of employees, not just 
on firm-level behavior, and to assess variation in the effect of privatization 
with firm size. We follow earlier work on privatization (including Brown et al. 
2006) in distinguishing domestic from foreign owners, post-privatization, and 
devoting attention to the important problem of selection bias, whereby firms 
of differential quality are selected to be privatized or to remain in state hands.
An analysis of Hungary in comparative perspective is of particular inter-
est because it is frequently considered one of the most successful transition 
economies, and the other economies in our data cover the range for degree 
of success, at least as viewed by the conventional arbiters in the Internation-
al Financial Institutions.2 We study these economies using quite compre-
hensive data that include nearly the universe of firms inherited from central 
planning, both those eventually privatized and those remaining under state 
ownership. The total data set contains more than 70,000 firms (by compari-
son with the 30,000 in Brown et al. 2010), and the time series information 
runs from the Communist and immediate post-Communist period, when 
all were state-owned, through as late as 2009, well after most had been privat-
ized. For each firm in each country, we have comparable annual information 
on average employment and ownership, the latter distinguishing foreign and 
domestic ownership types and allowing us to infer the precise year in which 
ownership change occurred.
Our aim is to provide consistent estimates of the employment effects of pri-
vatization for Hungary and the comparator economies using much larger sam-
ples and longer panels than were available to earlier researchers. The data pro-
vide comparison groups of state-owned firms operating in the same industries 
as those privatized, and the long time series permit us to apply econometric 
methods developed for dealing with selection bias in labor market program 
evaluations. We estimate regression models including not only firm fixed ef-
fects but also firm-specific time trends, which control not only for fixed dif-
ferences among firms but also differing trend growth rates that may affect the 
2 The World Bank’s (1996) 
four-group classif ication of 
26 transition economies, for 
example, puts Hungary in the 
first group of leading reformers, 
Romania in the second, Russia 
in the third, and Ukraine in 
the last. Similarly, the EBRD’s 
annual indicators of “progress 
in transition” invariably place 
Hungary at or close to the top 
of all transition economies; ac-
cording to overall “institutional 
performance” in EBRD (2000), 
Hungary is ranked first, with 
a score of 3.5, while Romania 
is awarded 2.3, Russia 1.9, and 
Ukraine 2.1.
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probability of privatization and whether the new owners are domestic or for-
eign investors.
The substantial variation we find in the estimated employment effect of pri-
vatization in our data shows the importance of careful choice of econometric 
method. The most persuasive specifications, those that include firm fixed ef-
fects and particularly those that take into account firm-specific trends, however, 
show no evidence of large negative impacts of privatization on employment in 
Hungary or any of the other countries. Privatization to foreign owners is gener-
ally estimated to raise employment at a privatized firm, although these effects 
are strongest in Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine, and weakest in Lithuania and 
Romania. Weighted results show more variation, but again in the most con-
vincing models including firm-specific trends there are no large, statistically 
significant, negative effects. The results thus contradict the simple expecta-
tion of many workers as well as many economists that privatized firms would 
reduce employment, but they are consistent with Brown et al.’s (2010) finding 
of a substantial “scale effect” whereby privatized firms expand output, to some 
extent offsetting employment losses from increased efficiency.
The next section describes our data for Hungary and the other four coun-
tries, and Section 3 discusses their privatization programs. Section 4 explains 
the estimation procedures, and Section 5 presents the results. Conclusions are 
summarized in Section 6.
Data
Our analysis draws upon annual unbalanced panel data for most of the firms 
inherited from the socialist period in each of the five countries we study. The 
sources and variables are quite similar across countries, although the Hungar-
ian and Romanian data tend to be more similar to each other than to those 
in the Soviet successor states. The basic data sources are the National Tax Au-
thority in Hungary and the Ministry of Finance in Romania, which provide 
data for all legal entities engaged in double-sided bookkeeping. In addition, 
the Romanian data are supplemented by the National Institute for Statistics’ 
enterprise registry and two datasets of the State Ownership Fund, describing 
its portfolio and the privatization transactions. The Hungarian data are avail-
able for 1986–2005 and the Romanian data for 1992–2006.
The State Committees for Statistics in Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine (Statis-
tikos Departamentas in Lithuania, Goskomstat in Russia and Derzhkomstat in 
Ukraine) are the successors to the branches of the corresponding Soviet State 
Committee. They compile the basic databases for our analysis in these coun-
tries, the annual enterprise registries. These are supplemented by joint venture 
registries that are available in Russia and a database from the State Property 
Committee in Ukraine, which we have linked across years. The Lithuanian 
data cover the period of 1995–2006, the Russian 1985–2005 and the Ukrain-
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ian 1989 and 1992–2006. The whole Russian and the early Ukrainian data 
(until 1996) are based on industrial registries which are supposed to include 
all industrial firms (manufacturing as well non-manufacturing) with more 
than 100 employees or more than 25 percent owned by the state and/or by le-
gal entities themselves included in the registry. In fact, the practice seems to be 
that once firms enter the registries, it remains there even if the original condi-
tions for inclusion are no longer satisfied. The data may therefore be taken as 
quite comprehensive with respect to the “old” industrial sector of firms that 
were inherited from the Soviet system. The whole Lithuanian dataset and the 
Ukrainian data starting with 1996 contain all firms regardless of size and in-
dustrial affiliation.3
Table 3.1 contains the numbers of firms and firm-year observations for state 
ownership as well as domestic and foreign privatizations. We base our regres-
sion estimates of the effects of domestic privatization on thousands of observa-
tions (the smallest number is in the case of the Lithuanian privatization time 
series, but even this is almost 6,500, while in the case of Russia we have almost 
200,000 firm-year observations). The total number of foreign privatizations 
is much smaller but enough to estimate its effects.
table 3.1: number of observations in regressions by ownership type
Always State Privatized Domestic Privatized Foreign
Firm–years Firms Firm–years Firms Firm–years Firms
Hungary 27,505 6,064 74,763 6,579 9,008 712
Lithuania 9,010 1,353 6,454 705 448 42
Romania 29,686 4,783 69,458 5,739 2,442 184
Russia 79,436 9,933 194,053 13,801 2,959 188
Ukraine 78,437 12,397 86,063 7,540 3,805 283
Total 224,074 34,530 430,791 34,364 18,662 1,409
Privatization Policies
The methods and tempos of large enterprise privatization differed quite sig-
nificantly across the five countries we study in this paper. Hungary got off to 
an early start in ownership transformation and maintained a consistent case-
by-case sales approach throughout the transition. At the very beginning, the 
transactions tended to be “spontaneous”, initiated by managers, who were also 
usually the beneficiaries, sometimes in combination with foreign or other in-
vestors (Voszka, 1993). From 1991, the sales process became more regularized, 
generally relying upon competitive tenders open to foreign participation, al-
though management usually still had control over the process. Unlike many 
other countries, there were no significant preferences given to workers to ac-
quire shares in their companies, nor was there a mass distribution of shares 
aided by vouchers. Hungarian privatization thus resulted in very little worker 
3 The data are further described 
by Brown et al. (2006), (2010) 
who use a subset of the obser-
vations we study in this paper.
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ownership (involving only about 250 firms), very little dispersed ownership, 
and instead significant managerial ownership and highly concentrated block-
holdings, many of them foreign (Frydman et al. 1993a). Although the process 
appeared at times to be slow and gradual, in fact it was quicker than in many 
other East European countries.
In Romania, by contrast, the early attempts to mimic voucher programs and 
to sell individual firms produced few results, and, after a few “pilots”, privatiza-
tion really began in earnest only in late 1993, first with the program of Man-
agement and Employee Buyouts, and secondly with the mass privatization of 
1995–96 (Earle and Telegdy, 2002). The consequences of these programs were 
large-scale employee ownership and dispersed shareholding by the general pop-
ulation, with little foreign involvement. Beginning in 1997, foreign investors 
became more involved, and blocks of shares were sold to both foreigners and 
domestic entities. Similarly, Lithuania went through a mass privatization in 
the early 1990s and subsequent sales; because our Lithuanian data start only in 
1995, our results reflect these later privatizations. In both countries, the result 
was a mixture of several types of ownership and a slower speed than in Hungary.
Ukraine and Russia’s earliest privatization experiences have some similarities 
to the “spontaneous” period in Hungary, as the central planning system dis-
solved in the late 1980s and decision-making power devolved to managers and 
work collectives (Frydman et al. 1993b). The provisions for leasing enterprise 
assets (with eventual buyout) represented the first organized transactions in 
1990–1992, but the big impetus for most industrial enterprise privatization in 
Russia was the mass privatization from October 1992 to June 1994, when most 
shares were transferred primarily to the concerned firms’ managers and work-
ers, who had received large discounts in the implicit prices they faced (Boycko 
et al. 1995). Some shares (generally 29 percent) were reserved for voucher auc-
tions open to any participant, and these resulted in a variety of ownership struc-
tures, from dispersed outsiders holding their shares through voucher invest-
ment funds to domestic investors who acquired significant blocks; sometimes 
managers and workers acquired more shares through this means, but there were 
few cases of foreign investment. Blockholding and foreign ownership became 
more significant through later sales of blocks of shares and through second-
ary trading that resulted in concentration. Ukraine used somewhat different 
mechanisms, but in general followed Russia’s pattern at a slower pace. In both 
countries, the initial consequence was large-scale ownership by insiders and 
some blockholding by domestic entities. Concentration and foreign owner-
ship increased subsequently.
These general patterns are reflected in Table 3.2, which contains the percent-
age of firms privatized to domestic and foreign owners. We define a firm as pri-
vate if more than 50 percent of its shares are privately held; it is domestic if it 
is private and the number of shares held by domestic investors is higher than 
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those held by foreign owners; it is foreign if it is private but not domestic (near-
ly all foreign privatized firms by this definition are majority foreign-owned).4
table 3.2: private ownership shares
1992 2004
Hungary
Domestic 0.37 0.60
Foreign 0.03 0.09
Lithuania
Domestic N.A. 0.37
Foreign N.A. 0.02
Romania
Domestic 0.00 0.80
Foreign 0.00 0.03
Russia
Domestic 0.00 0.58
Foreign 0.00 0.02
Ukraine
Domestic 0.00 0.48
Foreign 0.00 0.01
N.A.= Not available.
As of late 1992, 37 percent of the Hungarian firms had already been privat-
ized, while the process had not yet started in Romania, Russia, and Ukraine 
(for Lithuania we do not have data for this year). By the end of the period, a 
large proportion of firms had been privatized to domestic or foreign investors 
in all countries: 83 percent in Romania, 69 percent in Hungary, 60 percent in 
Russia, 49 percent in Ukraine and 39 in Lithuania.5 The percentage of firms 
majority privatized to foreigners is by far the highest in Hungary, reaching 9 
percent by 2004, while in the other countries this proportion is 1–3 percent. 
Given our sample sizes, it is still enough to estimate a foreign effect.6
Empirical Strategy
We follow the broader literature on the employment effects of privatization 
in estimating reduced form equations, while trying to account for potential 
problems of heterogeneity and simultaneity bias (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; 
Megginson and Netter, 2001). Estimating these effects faces some potential 
problems. The first is the possibility that aggregate shocks may affect employ-
ment and ownership.7 Moreover, the shocks may be industry-specific, and the 
available deflators may not perfectly capture price changes. Most studies have 
too few observations at their disposal to be able to account for industry-spe-
cific fluctuations; yet if these are correlated with privatization, the estimates 
may be biased. Taking advantage of the large samples in our data, we include a 
full set of (2-digit) industry controls in levels and each interacted with a time 
trend. Unlike most previous studies, our data also contain a comparison group 
of firms that remain in state ownership throughout the period of observation.
A more difficult problem is the possibility of selection bias in the privatiza-
tion process. Politicians, investors, and employees of the firms may all influ-
4 Ownership is measured at year-
end. The Russian data do not 
contain an ownership variable 
before 1993, nor do they provide 
percentage shareholding. Virtu-
ally all the privatizations in our 
data are mass privatizations so 
the earliest date they could take 
place was October 1992. Nearly 
all these privatizations led to ma-
jority private ownership (e.g., 
Boycko et al. 1995).
5 These proportions seem very 
small compared to what was 
found in other studies using 
these data (Brown et al. 2010). 
The main difference in the pro-
portion of firms privatized is that 
we use firms from all sectors of 
the economy while they had only 
manufacturing. We restricted 
our sample to manufacturing 
and obtained very high propor-
tions of privatized firms. The 
energy sector and some services, 
however, have been privatized 
to a smaller extent. Industries 
with low levels of privatization 
include mining, energy, water 
distribution, and such service 
sectors as transportation, post 
and telecommunication, real 
estate, garbage collection, and 
cultural and sporting activities. 
The proportion of firms privat-
ized by industries is available 
upon request.
6 See Table 3.1 for sample sizes. 
The Russian registries contain 
codes for state, domestic, joint 
ventures, and 100 percent for-
eign firms, but foreign shares 
are available only for a subset of 
firms in four years. We classify all 
joint ventures as foreign.
7 Studies that estimate a privati-
zation effect as the difference 
between pre- and post-privatiza-
tion levels for a sample of privat-
ized firms (e.g., Megginson et al. 
1994) are unable to distinguish 
the effect of privatization from 
such aggregate fluctuations.
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ence whether a firm is privatized and whether the new owners are domestic or 
foreign. Politicians concerned with unemployment may prefer to retain firms 
with the worst prospects in state ownership in order to protect workers from 
layoffs, and the employees themselves may work to prevent privatization in such 
cases. Potential investors are also likely to be most interested in purchasing firms 
with better prospects. To remove such time-invariant differences across firms, 
we therefore include firm fixed effects (FE) in some specifications. Since firms 
could also differ in their trend growth rates in ways that are correlated with 
ownership change, for instance because potential investors see growth oppor-
tunities, we add firm-specific trends to some specifications (labeled FE&FT). 
Taken together with the full set of industry-year interactions, the fixed effect 
and firm-specific trends also control for changes in the environment, including 
both competition from other firms and subsidies (implicit or explicit) from the 
government, that may also influence employment behavior at the firm level.8
The basic specification for the panel data model takes the following form for 
each country separately:
 logempijt = α0 + α1DOit + α2FOit + Indj + Indj × Trendt + Yeart + uit, (1)
where i indexes firms, j indexes industries, and t indexes time periods (years). 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the firm’s employment, Ind 
and Year represent a set of 2-digit industry and year dummies, Trend is a time 
trend, and uit is an idiosyncratic error.9 The equation is estimated unweighted 
and weighted by employment, the latter in order to permit an assessment of the 
overall employment effect and the degree to which impacts vary with firm size.
Results
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 contain results for the unweighted and employment-weight-
ed regressions estimating relation (1) with the natural log of average number of 
employees as the dependent variable. Equations are fitted by OLS, fixed firm 
effects (FE), and firm-specific trends (FE&FT). On an unweighted basis, the 
OLS specifications produce small negative domestic coefficients in Hungary 
and the other two non-fSU economies, but large coefficients in Russia and 
Ukraine, particularly the former. By contrast the foreign coefficients are all 
positive and large. As the OLS specification provides only a cross-sectional 
comparison of average employment in privatized years relative to years in state 
ownership (both for firms never privatized and the pre-privatization years for 
firms subsequently privatized), containing no control for previous size levels, 
these estimates cannot be interpreted as causal. Rather, they reflect a mixture 
of the causal effect and the selection effect of privatization on size, and they 
provide a useful baseline for the FE and FE&FT estimates.
The FE estimates, and even more so the FE&FT estimates, in Table 3.3 show 
a narrower range of domestic coefficients, and some attenuation of the foreign 
8 Firm fixed effects and trends 
also control for regional differ-
ences in the economic environ-
ment, for instance in labor mar-
ket conditions that may affect 
employment and wage behavior.
9 Our estimates permit general 
within-firm correlation of re-
siduals using Arellano’s (1987) 
clustering method. The standard 
errors of all our test statistics are 
robust to both serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity.
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coefficients. Sizable negative impacts are estimated only under FE for domes-
tic privatization in Lithuania and Ukraine, each of them about –20 percent. 
In the other countries, as well as for these two in the FE&FT specification, all 
the estimates lie close to zero. In Hungary, the FE estimate for domestic pri-
vatization is actually a positive 0.048, while with FE&FT it is a small –0.029. 
The foreign coefficients are positive everywhere and they are statistically sig-
nificantly different from zero. In Hungary, the estimated effect is 0.45 in the 
FE specification and 0.11 in the FE&FT. Thus, while the estimates do vary 
substantially across countries and across estimation methods, in no case is 
there evidence of large negative causal effects of privatization on employment, 
whether the new owners are domestic or foreign investors. Comparison of the 
FE and FE&FT results to each other, and to the OLS estimates, also shows 
that the direction of selection bias, the extent to which unobserved factors cor-
related with ownership influence the level and growth of employment, varies 
considerably across countries.
table 3.3: Estimated effects of privatization on firm employment (unweighted)
Hungary Lithuania Romania Russia Ukraine
OLS
Domestic
–0.106*** –0.178** –0.126*** 0.967*** 0.077***
(0.033) (0.070) (0.029) (0.018) (0.024)
Foreign
0.698*** 1.271*** 0.705*** 1.674*** 1.369***
(0.074) (0.233) (0.114) (0.098) (0.096)
FE
Domestic
0.048*** –0.222*** 0.014 0.009 –0.186***
(0.018) (0.029) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012)
Foreign
0.450*** –0.091 0.155** 0.243*** 0.208***
(0.041) (0.114) (0.076) (0.047) (0.055)
FE&FT
Domestic
–0.029** –0.051** –0.036*** 0.058*** –0.033***
(0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009)
Foreign
0.112*** 0.014 –0.052 0.152*** 0.127***
(0.029) (0.069) (0.050) (0.035) (0.036)
N (firm–years) 111,276 15,912 101,586 276,448 168,305
Notes: Dependent variable: log(employment). The equations include industry, year, 
and industry-time trend interaction controls.
Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
The FE estimates, and even more so the FE&FT estimates, in Table 3.3 show 
a narrower range of domestic coefficients, and some attenuation of the foreign 
coefficients. Sizable negative impacts are estimated only under FE for domes-
tic privatization in Lithuania and Ukraine, each of them about –20 percent. 
In the other countries, as well as for these two in the FE&FT specification, all 
the estimates lie close to zero. In Hungary, the FE estimate for domestic pri-
vatization is actually a positive 0.048, while with FE&FT it is a small –0.029. 
The foreign coefficients are positive everywhere and they are statistically sig-
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nificantly different from zero. In Hungary, the estimated effect is 0.45 in the 
FE specification and 0.11 in the FE&FT. Thus, while the estimates do vary 
substantially across countries and across estimation methods, in no case is 
there evidence of large negative causal effects of privatization on employment, 
whether the new owners are domestic or foreign investors. Comparison of the 
FE and FE&FT results to each other, and to the OLS estimates, also shows 
that the direction of selection bias, the extent to which unobserved factors cor-
related with ownership influence the level and growth of employment, varies 
considerably across countries.
table 3.4: Estimated effects of privatization on employment  
(weighted by firm employment)
Hungary Lithuania Romania Russia Ukraine
OLS
Domestic
–0.937*** –0.213 –0.717*** 0.350*** –0.494***
(0.092) (0.129) (0.121) (0.064) (0.098)
Foreign
–0.083 0.145 0.151 0.712*** 0.102
(0.146) (0.250) (0.184) (0.167) (0.210)
FE
Domestic
–0.209*** –0.121** –0.097*** 0.061*** 0.002
(0.024) (0.061) (0.023) (0.013) (0.030)
Foreign
–0.072 –0.295*** –0.052 0.235*** 0.144***
(0.045) (0.098) (0.043) (0.044) (0.035)
FE&FT
Domestic
0.037 0.008 –0.002 0.056*** –0.034
(0.039) (0.051) (0.028) (0.014) (0.030)
Foreign
–0.003 –0.085 0.009 0.179*** 0.106**
(0.055) (0.052) (0.105) (0.051) (0.045)
N (firm–years) 111,276 15,912 101,586 276,448 168,305
Notes: Dependent variable: log(employment). The equations include industry, year, 
and industry-time trend interaction controls.
Standard errors (corrected for firm clustering) are shown in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
The unweighted estimates in Table 3.3 provide answers to questions about the 
effects of privatization on firm-level employment behavior by country and esti-
mation method, but without regard to firm size. Table 3.4 weights the regres-
sions by firm employment and therefore addresses questions on the overall im-
pact of privatization on employment and on how the impact varies with firm 
size.10 Again, the OLS estimates are shown only as a baseline, and only the FE 
and FE&FT estimates provide evidence on causal effects. These FE specifica-
tions show some more substantial negative effects for domestic privatization 
in Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania, and for foreign privatization in Lithu-
ania (but recall the small sample size for the foreign estimates in Lithuania). 
However, all these coefficients become small and statistically insignificant in 
the FE&FT specification. Robust positive results emerge only in Russia and 
Ukraine for foreign privatization and for domestic privatization only in Russia. 
10 The “overall impact” does not 
take into account any indirect ef-
fects, as privatized firm behavior 
may affect other firms through 
interactions in product and fac-
tor markets.
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In summary, the FE results for Central Europe imply that the employment ef-
fect of privatization was more negative in larger firms, but the FE&FT results 
suggest little difference once firm-specific trend growth is taken into account.
The Effect of Privatization on Wages
Another interesting aspect of privatization policies is the effect on workers’ 
wages. The effect of privatization on wages may be negative if new private 
owners are more profit oriented than the state, and in their attempt to reduce 
costs, expropriate worker rents.11 But the cost-reduction effect may be offset if 
privatized firms pay more to attract new workers, elicit more effort, or reward 
higher productivity. Depending on the relative strength of these mechanisms, 
wages may either rise or fall as a result of privatization.
The effect of privatization on wage differentials is also ambiguous theoreti-
cally. The new private owners strive for cost reduction, which affects the wages 
of all workers. This would lead to a drop in wages for all worker types. If the 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) was overstaffed with non-production workers 
as argued for instance by Kornai (1992), it is possible that across-the-board 
cost cutting will have a larger effect on university graduates and non produc-
tion workers and so their wages would fall more, at least relative to production 
workers. On the other hand, if the firm adapts new technology and therefore 
replaces production workers with more skilled employees (Katz and Murphy, 
1992), the wages of those with vocational education or in blue collar occupa-
tions may fall more. If the skill-biased technological change leads to replace-
ment of workers carrying out routine tasks with robots and computers, it is 
also possible that low-skilled workers who do non-routine tasks (such as driv-
ing or cleaning) would gain relative to skilled production workers and clerks 
(Katz et al. 2006).
Although the effect of privatization on wages has direct policy relevance and 
its understanding would also shed light on the behavior of state-owned enter-
prises, surprisingly few papers have studied it. An example of an early attempt 
to analyze the average wage effects of privatization is Haskel and Szymanski 
(1993), who study a small sample of British privatized firms. Brown et al. (2010) 
use firm level data from four transition countries’ manufacturing sectors and 
find that average wages fall little (less than 5 percent) after domestic privatiza-
tion, and transfers to foreign owners actually increase workers’ wages. Only 
one study analyzes the effects of privatization on wage differentials: Melly and 
Puhani (forthcoming) look at the personnel records of one large firm which 
underwent privatization and conclude that women, low skilled workers, old-
er, and high-tenure workers experienced relative wage cuts after privatization.
In this chapter we build on this research but also expand it in several dimen-
sions. We use a linked employer-employee data covering all large Hungarian 
firms from all industries, and a random sample of their workforce. The panel 
11 A related literature discusses 
such expropriation in hostile 
takeovers (Shleifer and Sum-
mers, 1988; Gokhale et al. 1995).
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is long, covering more than 20 years, and most privatized firms are observed 
for several years both pre- and post privatization, which enables us to use pan-
el techniques to control for possible selection of firms into privatization. We 
therefore study not only one firm or a limited set of industries, but the entire 
enterprise privatization in Hungary. The data allow analyzing not only of av-
erage wages but also the wages of various demographic and skill groups and 
occupations. We produce results for both domestic and foreign privatizations 
which present very different wage behavior after privatization.
In the following we present the data and the empirical setting, and the results.
Data, Descriptive Statistics, and Empirical Methodology
The dataset used in this paper is the Hungarian linked employer-employee data, 
which is a large panel in firms which cover all the sectors of the economy. The 
data are a 23 year long panel in firms (from 1986 to 2008) but not in workers. 
They cover essentially all large firms of the economy and a sample of smaller 
enterprises. We include in this study only those firms which were state-owned 
at one point so they were at risk of privatization. Since we have information on 
both firms and workers, we can control for selection into privatization at the 
firm level while the worker level data allow the use of individual wages, controls 
for individual characteristics and the analysis of wage differentials. Workers 
are sampled randomly at the firm level, which covers approximately 8 percent 
of its employment.12 The number of observations per firm varies, but in some 
cases, particularly in small firms there are only a few (sometimes only one) 
employees observed. To study wage differentials, we need firms which have a 
large enough sample of employees to get consistent and robust estimates on 
their relative wages. To satisfy this condition, we use only those firms which 
have observations on more than 10 workers. The resulting sample is quite large, 
composed of more than 1,200 domestic and 240 foreign privatizations, as well 
as a control group of 311 never privatized SOEs.13 Figure 3.1 presents the evo-
lution of ownership and shows the early start of Hungarian privatizations and 
the heavy presence of foreign investors. By the turn of the century, the share of 
state-owned firms declined to 35 percent while domestic and foreign privatized 
enterprises increased their weight from zero to 40 and 25 percent, respectively.14
Firms under the three ownership types differ in many respects, suggesting 
that selection was indeed non-random and its treatment is important. As Ta-
ble 3.5 demonstrates, monthly earnings are quite similar in never privatized 
and domestically privatized firms, but they are much higher in foreign-owned 
companies.
The share of workers along various individual characteristics also varies across 
types of owners: female workers are least prevalent in always state-owned com-
panies, more likely to work in domestically privatized firms and their share 
is the highest in foreign-owned enterprises. Measured by the highest degree 
12 For a description of the data, 
see Chapter 2 of Infocus – II.
13 We define a firm as privatized 
if it was ever state owned and 
the state is a minority owner; 
if the shares owned by domes-
tic private owners exceed those 
owned by foreigners, the firm is 
domestically privatized; oth-
erwise it underwent a foreign 
privatization.
14 The increase of the share of 
SOEs thereafter is due to sample 
changes, not nationalizations of 
already privatized companies.
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completed, the skill level of employees is highest in foreign-controlled firms 
and lowest in SOEs. Average work experience is the lowest in foreign compa-
nies, and highest in the domestic ones.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of ownership
N = 35,483 firm-years.
table 3.5: worker characteristics by ownership
State-owned Domestic Foreign
Monthly Earnings
149.2 135.5 236.6
(109.7) (142.9) (244.1)
Female (%) 38.3 41.8 43.5
Education (%)
Elementary 35.3 26.5 16.6
Vocational 27.7 36.7 27.9
High school 29.9 27.8 37.6
University 6.9 9.0 17.9
Experience (years)
22.8 24.0 21.3
(11.0) (10.7) (10.7)
Occupation (%)
Managers 6.2 10.5 9.1
Professionals 4.5 3.3 8.0
Associate Professionals 14.2 10.9 20.2
Clerks 8.3 7.5 6.4
Service Workers 9.4 8.3 6.4
Skilled Manual Workers 46.8 50.2 45.2
Elementary Occupations 10.5 9.3 4.8
Worker–years 1,265,138 287,584 165,539
Firms 311 1,217 240
Notes: Weighted unconditional means (standard deviations). Earnings measured 
in thousands of 2008 HUF, deflated by CPI. The definition of occupations fol-
lows ISCO-88 where Elementary Occupations, Service Workers, Clerks, Associate 
Professionals, Professionals and Managers coincide with the corresponding major 
groups; Skilled Manual Workers cover Skilled agricultural and fishery workers, 
Craft and related trades workers and Plant and machine operators and assemblers.
0
20
40
60
80
100
DomesticStateForeign
200820072006200520042003200220012000199919981997199619951994199319921991
%
inFocus – ii. The eFFecT oF employer characTerisTics...
240
There are some notable differences in the occupational structure of firms as 
well. The share of workers engaged in elementary occupations is small in foreign 
owned firms, while the share of associate professionals and professionals is very 
high. State owned enterprises have fewer managers than privatized companies.
We estimate the following equation to study the wage effect of privatization:
 lnwijt = a1 + βit Xit +ad DOMESTICj,t–1 +af FOREIGNj,t–1 +
 + Σβj REGIONj + ΣλtYEARt + zijt . (2)
Xi is a vector of individual characteristics including a dummy variable for fe-
male, three educational dummies (vocational, high school, and university, the 
omitted category being at most 8 years of schooling), and three dummies for 
potential experience (11–20, 21–30, and more than 30 years of experience, the 
omitted category being 0–10 years of experience). The coefficients of interest, 
ad and af provide the conditional effect of domestic and foreign privatization. 
As selection into privatization is likely to be non-random, we add firm fixed 
effects ai to the regression.
When we analyze wage differentials, we use the same equation except that 
the domestic and foreign privatization dummies are interacted with the ele-
ments of Xit:
 lnwijt = ai + β’it Xit +a’d DOMESTICj,t–1 +a’f FOREIGNj,t–1 +
 + γ’d Xit DOMESTICj,t–1 +γ’f Xit FOREIGNj,t–1 
 + Σβ’j REGIONj + Σλ’tYEARt + zijt . 
(3)
In this specification the parameters of interest are γ’d and γ’f , and they show 
how wages are affected by domestic and foreign privatization relative to the 
base category of worker. In another specification, we substitute the individual 
characteristics with occupational categories to see how the wage effect of pri-
vatization varies by occupation.
Results
The estimated effects of domestic and foreign privatization on average wages 
are presented in Table 3.6. The OLS estimates represent the difference in wages 
between SOEs and domestic and foreign privatizations, after controlling for 
gender, education, experience, region and year. They show that average wages 
at domestically privatized enterprises are more than 12 percent lower than the 
average wage in SOEs. Foreign owned companies, on the contrary, pay a wage 
premium of 24 percent. These results, however, may reflect biased selection of 
firms into privatization. The fixed effect estimations control for any such selec-
tion that is time-invariant. They indeed show that the wage effects of domestics 
and foreign are smaller than the OLS regressions suggested, but nonetheless 
they are still large. Domestic private owners are estimated to decrease wages by 
9 percent after acquisition while foreign owners increase them by 12 percent.
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table 3.6: Estimated effect of privatization on wages
OLS Standard error FFE Standard error
Domestic –0.124*** 0.020 –0.093*** 0.016
Foreign 0.238*** 0.029  0.117*** 0.021
Notes: N = 1,718,261 worker–years. Dependent variable = ln(real gross earnings). The 
equations include year, region, gender, education, experience, and occupation con-
trols.
Standard errors corrected for firm clustering.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Do these changes in wages affect all workers proportionally, or do they vary 
by type? To start with wage differentials by gender, education, and experience 
in Table 3.7, the domestic privatization effect for the reference group (male 
workers with only elementary education and 0 to 10 years of experience) is –8.4 
percent. Relative to this group, female workers have a wage gain of 5 percent 
(so the overall female wage effect of domestic privatization is –3.4 percent). 
By the level of education there is a slight upward trend in the privatization ef-
fect: high school and university graduates have a wage premium of 3.3 and 4.3 
percent relative to the reference group. Domestic privatization clearly favors 
young employees as all workers who have more than 10 years of experience have 
a wage decline of about 6 percent more than their younger fellows. Therefore, 
the category which has the smallest drop in wages (they actually have a tiny in-
crease) is young, high-skilled female workers, who are estimated to earn about 
1 percent higher wages than before privatization.
table 3.7: the effects of privatization on the wage structure:  
gender, education, experience
Domestic Standard error Foreign Standard error
Privatization Effect for Reference Group –0.084*** 0.014 0.036 0.024
Ownership interactions
Female 0.049*** 0.011 0.050*** 0.016
Vocational –0.004 0.008 0.021 0.012
High school 0.033*** 0.013 0.034** 0.017
University 0.043** 0.020 0.168*** 0.029
Experience: 11–20 years –0.058*** 0.006 –0.023** 0.011
Experience: 21–30 years –0.060*** 0.008 –0.025 0.013
Experience: 30+ years –0.053*** 0.011 –0.015 0.017
R2-within 0.365
Notes: N = 1,718,261 worker-years. Dependent variable: ln(real gross earnings). The 
estimated coefficients on domestic and foreign wage differentials come from the 
same regression. Reference group: male with elementary education and 0–10 years 
of labor market experience. The equations include year, region, gender, education, 
experience controls and firm fixed effects, and are weighted by employment.
Standard errors corrected for firm clustering.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
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The variation of the foreign wage effect is presented in the second column of 
the table. The reference group has a wage premium of 3.6 percent but this is 
not significant at any conventional level. There are some similarities in the 
effects of wage differentials with domestic privatization: females earn 5 per-
cent more than the reference group, and the wage differential measured for 
vocational and high school graduates is practically the same across the two 
ownership types. Foreign investors also favor young workers, but the effect 
is smaller (and statistically less precise than for domestic ownership). The 
main difference between the foreign and domestic wage effects material-
izes in university graduates. While the wage premium of this skill category 
is only 4 percent after domestic privatization, such workers in foreign-pri-
vatized companies are estimated to gain 17 percent higher wages relative to 
the reference group.
The estimated wage effects of privatization by occupations are presented in 
Table 3.8. Domestic privatization is estimated to have no effect on the wages 
of professionals. Associate professionals, skilled non-manual workers and 
those in unskilled occupations experience a wage loss of 4–6 percent and 
managers of 7 percent. The largest wage losers are service workers and skilled 
manual workers, who earn less by 10 and 14 percent, respectively. Foreign 
owners raise managers’ wages the most (by 34.5 percent) and professionals 
(by 25 percent). Associate professionals and skilled non-manual workers get a 
wage increase of 7–10 percent, which is similar to that which unskilled work-
ers obtain. Service and skilled manual workers receive essentially no wage in-
crease after privatization.
table 3.8: the wage effects of privatization by worker occupation
Ownership interactions Domestic Standard error Foreign Standard error
Manager –0.073 0.038 0.345*** 0.056
Professional –0.034 0.023 0.247*** 0.032
Associate Professional –0.055** 0.025 0.095*** 0.034
Clerks –0.044** 0.017 0.070*** 0.025
Service –0.102*** 0.028 0.004 0.066
Skilled manual –0.128*** 0.015 0.031** 0.015
Unskilled –0.060*** 0.012 0.100*** 0.025
R2-within 0.343
Notes: N = 1,718,261 worker-years. Dependent variable: ln(real gross earnings). The 
estimated coefficients on domestic and foreign wage differentials come from the 
same regression. Reference group: male with elementary education and 0–10 years 
of potential labor market experience. The equations include year, region and occupa-
tion controls and firm fixed effects, and are weighted by employment.
Standard errors corrected for firm clustering.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
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Conclusion
Although economic analyses of the effects of privatization have largely focused 
on firm performance, the greatest political and social controversies have usu-
ally concerned the consequences for the firm’s employees. In most cases, it is 
assumed that the employment and wage effects will be negative, and workers 
all around the world react to the prospect of privatization, especially when for-
eign owners may become involved, with protests and strikes. Yet there have 
been very few systematic studies of the relationship between privatization and 
outcomes for the firm’s workers, and previous research has been hampered by 
small sample sizes, short time series, and little ability to control for selection 
bias. It has therefore remained unclear whether workers’ and policymakers’ 
fears of privatization are in fact warranted.
In this paper, we have analyzed the effects of privatization on the firm’s 
employment using comprehensive panel data on firms in Hungary and four 
other transition economies that all adopted large-scale privatization pro-
grams but used different methods of privatization. The data for these coun-
tries contain similar measurement concepts for the key variables, and we have 
applied consistent econometric procedures to obtain comparable estimates 
across countries.
Our results provide no evidence for strong negative effects of any form of 
privatization on employment. Estimated by FE&FT, the employment effects 
are seldom both negative and statistically significant, and when they are the 
magnitudes are not large, nearly always remaining under 5 percent. The FE 
results for domestic ownership in the Central European economies contain a 
few more negative coefficients, but none of these are robust to including firm-
specific trends (FT). The estimated coefficients on foreign ownership tend to 
be larger and positive for all countries, except for a few cases of statistical insig-
nificance. It is striking that the absence of large negative employment effects 
of privatization holds consistently across all five of the countries, which span 
the distribution of reform experiences. If we had found large negative effects in 
Ukraine and Russia, towards one end of the spectrum, then we might be able 
to infer that other less-developed economies, perhaps those in Central Asia, 
would face similar problems. Or if we had found large negative effects in Hun-
gary, the Eastern European economy closest to a developed market economy 
at the beginning of the privatization process, then we might deduce that such 
effects are, contrary to expectation, largest where the deviation from market 
outcomes is the least. We do not find any such patterns, however; rather, our 
findings reject the hypothesis of large negative consequences for employment 
in all 5 countries. Thus, while extrapolation always requires caution, it seems 
fair to say that our results carry no implication that privatization would be 
more likely to reduce employment in other contexts.
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To study the wage effects of privatization, we used a Hungarian linked em-
ployer-employee dataset. The large samples of firms within industries, the long 
time series of observations before and after privatization, and the availability 
of state-owned comparison groups enable us to identify privatization effects 
from variation due to deviations from firm-specific means and trends. Domes-
tic privatization decreases wages by about 10 percent in Hungary while foreign 
takeovers raise them by about 12 percent. These wage changes are not uniform 
across worker types. The new domestic and foreign private investors favor young 
skilled workers and females are also better paid than under state ownership. 
Wage differentials arise across occupations as well: in the case of domestic (for-
eign) privatization, the strongest decline (lowest increase) is found for skilled 
manual and service workers. The analysis, therefore, provides some evidence 
that privatization brings about skill-biased technological change and polari-
zation, and this effect is stronger when the firm is acquired by foreign owners.
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4. thE impact oF intErnational tradE on EmploymEnt  
and wagEs
Miklós Koren & Péter Tóth
Introduction
Since the 2008/2009 crisis the positions of anti-globalist and protectionist 
views has been strengthening all over the world. International trade, and more 
importantly, the global supply chains contributed to the fast and worldwide 
spread of the crisis originally limited to a handful of countries (see Békés et al. 
2011). As a response to this, some countries introduced regulations that favor 
domestic firms over foreign companies. Since November 2008 countries of the 
G20 group have taken approximately 1000 policy measures that discriminate 
against foreign economic interests (Global Trade Alert, 2012). The purpose of 
this economic policy is understandable: we should protect the domestic firms 
and the workers from the effects of the global crisis.
However, if these measures become permanent, they will influence economic 
growth in the long run. Especially in such a small, open economy like Hunga-
ry, one cannot disregard the long-term effects of trade protectionism. To un-
derstand these, we should look back to a previous period, to the ten years prior 
to Hungary’s EU accession. Privatization took place during this period, and 
among numerous reforms, international trade became significantly more lib-
eralized. For example, following the trade agreement with the European Eco-
nomic Community in 1992 the average tariff on products in machine manu-
facturing decreased from 10 percent to 1 percent by 1997, and tariffs were lifted 
entirely by 2001.1 Of course the effect of trade liberalization also appears in 
the level of magnitude of the imports and exports (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: the import and export as a percentage of the gdp over time
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.
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reporting significantly as well, 
so our analysis ends with the 
year 2003.
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But what are the effects of this large-scale opening up on the Hungarian la-
bor market? Although most of the theoretical models on international trade 
show that the country as a whole benefits from trade liberalization, certain 
groups within society might be more vulnerable. Opening up to international 
trade necessarily implies a redistribution of wealth. Given the change in the 
production structure, certain factors of production (for example labor or capi-
tal), industries (exporting and import-competing), or even certain firms (large 
and more productive, small and less productive) and workers (for example ac-
cording to education) benefit from the aggregate income to a different extent.
It is important to see that the distributional conflict is not between foreign 
and domestic groups (because in our experience both countries win at the na-
tional level), but between groups within a country. This is especially interest-
ing on the labor market, where the employees having different backgrounds 
(regarding skills and education) have different chances for a higher wage. The 
beneficial macroeconomic effects of international trade might not be present 
in every group. As Figure 4.2 shows, workers with high wages are in a more and 
more favorable position throughout the examined period.
Figure 4.2: the development of income inequalities. the ratio of the 90th and 50th 
percentiles of the wage distribution between 1994 and 2004
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Wage Survey (Bértarifa).
In this chapter we present the effects of the international trade on wages. Be-
sides reviewing the literature we mainly focus on Hungarian firm and worker-
level data between 1994 and 2003. Our central question is: how do the wages 
of the workers change when a firm starts to export or import? The firm and in-
dividual-level data help us to distinguish the effect of international trade from 
the effects of other changes in economic policy in this period. Namely, as we 
will see, not every firm participates in external trade; this way we can make a 
comparison between workers exposed and not exposed to international trade 
who are otherwise from the same occupational group and industry. With this 
we indirectly examine the changes in the firms’ labor demand.2 The drawback 
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of our method of analysis comes with its strength, since we should abstract 
from the aggregate effects of international trade that are related to industry or 
country-level channels. The regression coefficients will not contain those – in 
the long run potentially significant – effects of trade liberalization that work 
by, for example, making the firms increase their quality standards in a whole 
sector affecting the productivity (hence the wages) at the industrial level. This 
is because in the regressions we take out the variation caused by industrial het-
erogeneity (we control for it). Similarly, the – more complicated, still probably 
very important – long term general equilibrium effects will not be identified 
either. An important example for the latter could be that the opening up for 
international trade generated a higher wage premium in the groups of skilled 
workers, which in turn gave an incentive for the younger generation to be-
come better educated, by which they would increase the productivity of the 
economy as a whole, so this effect would appear in every worker’s wage. These 
effects, present on some aggregate level are not identifiable with our method-
ology and data. However, luckily they all belong to the benefits of liberaliza-
tion, so in this sense the results enumerated in this chapter can be regarded as 
lower bounds for the effects of international trade.
One of our main results is that the firms active in external trade are special. 
They are larger, more productive and pay higher wages. As we will see this is par-
tially the result of self-selection, but in part it signals a causal relationship. This 
also means that the average Hungarian worker gains from the opening up to 
international trade, since the ratio of well-paid jobs is increasing in the economy.
A maybe more surprising result is that imports are at least as important as 
exports. The importer firms are also larger, more productive, and pay higher 
wages than the non-importers. It is not true that the “export is good, import 
is bad”. The reason for this is that the importers can produce at a cheaper level 
and become capable of increasing their market share, thus their labor demand 
increases too. Later we will show in detail how the firm’s import can provide 
growth opportunities. An important consequence of this result is that a dis-
criminatory policy against imported goods holds back the demand for Hun-
garian labor.
Of course, as we mentioned earlier, not everybody gains in the same way. 
The middle managers and skilled workers experience the highest increase in 
wage. Furthermore, we show that one can find certain industries and occupa-
tions (for example certain unskilled occupational groups in the food industry), 
where increasing imports lead to a decrease in wages.
Our chapter summarizes several papers written using foreign and Hungar-
ian microdata. Every Hungarian paper (Koren and Csillag, 2011; Halpern, 
Koren and Szeidl, 2011; Tóth, 2011; Halpern et al. 2012 and Pető, 2012) meas-
ures the firm’s export and import behavior based on the Customs Statistics 
(Vámstatisztika). We regard a firm as an exporter if it pursues export activity 
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to any extent; respectively we call it an importer if it is importing goods of any 
value.3 The latter only includes direct imports, but it does not incorporate the 
purchase of imported products through wholesalers or distributors. With this 
we underestimate the level of the actual firm import. Our results, if not stated 
otherwise in the text, are based on manufacturing data. The worker-level data 
come from the Wage Survey (Bértarifa), which contains a 6–10% sample of the 
private sector employees. From this dataset we mainly use the gross monthly 
wage as a dependent variable, but of course we take into account individual-
level control variables too.
At first we present the main characteristics, along which the firms that par-
ticipate in external trade differ from the ones that do not, and we examine if 
these differences are the result of the exporting or the importing activities. Then 
we focus on importing as an important, but so far poorly analyzed trade chan-
nel. We show that the import increases the firm’s productivity, and this way it 
provides the opportunity for the firm to expand. After this we investigate the 
effect of the import on the worker’s wages, separating the certain effect mech-
anisms. Finally, we also explore how the firm’s activity in international trade 
affects wage inequality. We conclude our paper with policy recommendations.
The firms involved in international trade
Until the 1990s the literature on international trade considered countries and 
industries as a unit of analysis, we only have results from the recent period that 
focus on the firm or the worker. This is an important step forward, because it 
is not the countries but rather firms that are trading with each other after all; 
moreover, in this way we can gain an insight into the nature of the wage ine-
quality possibly caused by international trade activity.
Examining data on US firms with trade activity Bernard and Jensen (1999) 
asked if the export or the import increases the productivity of the firm. Al-
though it can be unambiguously established that the importing/exporting 
firms are more productive, it is unclear which is the cause and which is the 
effect. Did the firms commence exporting because they were highly produc-
tive, or did they become more productive than average because of the export 
activity? To be able to abstract from the effects of those characteristics in the 
regressions later, and to have a more accurate view as to what kind of firms 
participate in international trade, in this part of our paper we explore by what 
characteristics exactly are the active firms special.
Why would the trading firms be different? The main argument is (for ex-
ample Melitz, 2003 or Altomonte and Békés, 2009) that the export and im-
port activity has fixed costs. There are costs of entering a market – for example 
searching for trade partners, setting up a distribution network, marketing –, 
which arise even if the firm wants to sell only a small amount in the foreign 
country. These costs can be so significant that starting to sell internationally 
3 Including larger exporters 
and importers leads to the same 
qualitative results.
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(setting up sales channels etc.) or to import (knowledge of the foreign market 
and other information problems etc.) is only profitable for firms having con-
siderable resources. In Hungary we need to add to this the cost of bridging the 
language barrier or the extra uncertainty regarding the future (especially in 
the mid-1990s), for example to assess in the changing institutional environ-
ment whether the German machine that represents cutting-edge technology 
offsets its cost within ten years.
For these reasons we might suspect that the firms engaged in export or im-
port are larger and more productive than the others; following an economies 
of scale argument we can see that it is easier for a larger and more efficient firm 
to outweigh the sunk costs with the possible extra profit from the trade activ-
ity. Furthermore, it follows from the former observations that firms involved 
in international trade probably employ more skilled workers (for example more 
employees need to speak English), and they reach high productivity with a 
more advanced technology and a higher capital-labor ratio.
These are more or less the distinctive factors that Bernard et al. (2007) also 
highlight in their article. Looking at the ratio of the exporter/importer firms 
and the intensity of the activity, the authors establish that trade is very con-
centrated. For example, only 4 percent of the firms in the US were exporters in 
2000. Moreover, they describe the results already mentioned above. The firms 
engaged in international trade are already more productive before starting the 
activity; they use more skilled labor and capital in the production process rela-
tive to the other firms; they are larger, more productive, and grow faster after 
becoming involved in trade.4
We might suspect that the firms involved in international trade have simi-
lar characteristics in Hungary too. It is also likely that the import activity is 
much more present in the automobile industry than in sylviculture, and that 
the internationally active firms are concentrated in Budapest and in the more 
developed counties in West-Hungary, since firms are more productive in gen-
eral there. Békés et al. (2011) gives a detailed descriptive analysis about Hungar-
ian exporting and importing firms, and Altomonte and Békés (2009) describe 
further aspects of the data. These papers confirm that the Hungarian firms 
behave similarly as in other countries described in the literature.
As Table 4.1 shows, the firms engaged in international trade are special in-
deed; the Hungarian data give the same qualitative results along all of the 
variables analyzed by Bernard and Jensen (1999) that we saw in the case of 
American firms. The table presents the important characteristics of the av-
erage firm for the whole 1994–2003 period and for three years (1994, 1998, 
2003) in detail: size (number of employees), the logarithm of the capital-la-
bor ratio, the ratio of the employees with higher education and productivity. 
The last variable is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the revenues and 
the number of employees.
4 These results are partially 
confirmed for other countries 
as well. For example Mayer and 
Ottaviano (2008) for 8 European 
countries, Castellani, Serti and 
Tomasi (2010) for Italy regard-
ing the size and productivity of 
firms. As for developing coun-
tries, Eaton et al. (2007) show 
from Colombian data that ex-
porters are more productive al-
ready before starting to export. 
Furthermore, for example Cas-
tellani, Serti and Tomasi (2010) 
in their paper also add the spatial 
and industrial concentration as 
a new dimension to the original 
list of characteristics regarding 
exporters.
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table 4.1: some average characteristics of firms participating in international trade 
compared to internationally inactive firms
Year
Number of employees Log of capital-labor ratio
Ratio of employees 
with higher education Productivity
active in 
trade
not active 
in trade
active in 
trade
not active 
in trade
active in 
trade
not active 
in trade
active in 
trade
not active 
in trade
1994 465.62 126.23 –0.09 –0.19 0.12 0.10 1.79 –0.29
1998 239.58 58.85 0.38 0.15 0.15 0.09 1.94 1.30
2003 248.19 65.39 1.05 0.68 0.18 0.17 2.56 1.98
1994–2003 302.63 77.81 0.44 0.29 0.15 0.12 2.29 1.64
Note: The main distinctive characteristics of exporting firms stated by Bernard and 
Jensen (1999) are also present among Hungarian firms that participate in interna-
tional trade.
Source: Calculations of the authors based on Hungarian tariff data from 1994–2003.
We can see from the table that the firms active in international trade have on 
average approximately 3.5 times more employees compared to other firms. The 
ratio of the applied capital and labor in the production is also always higher for 
the firms that are either exporters or importers, and the difference is growing 
in time – the capital-labor ratio of the firms that are involved in international 
trade is 110% of the capital-labor ratio of the inactive firms in the first year, and 
approximately 140% in the last year of the data. Similarly, the ratio of employ-
ees with higher education is higher among the firms that are trading, although 
this variable does not distinguish the two groups as clearly as the former ones; 
the aggregate difference is only 3 percentage points, and we can find only a 1 
percentage point difference for 2003 too. However, productivity shows a more 
straightforward picture again; the firms with foreign trade partners have on 
average 82% more revenue per worker, which is a large difference. Figure 4.3 
demonstrates that this difference also appears in the wages.
Figure 4.3: average wages (huF) at firms that participate in international trade  
and in the group of internationally inactive firms
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Wage Survey and Hungarian Tariff Statis-
tics. The average wages are in Hungarian forint (HUF), one euro is worth about 300 
HUF.
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The graph also shows that the positive correlation between international trade 
activity and wages is significant. The difference between the wages paid in the 
two groups was growing throughout the years, and has stabilized at approxi-
mately 30%.
Export or import?
So the firms participating in international trade are special in several ways, and 
their wages are also higher. What is the reason for this? Are importers also 
larger and more productive, just as exporters?
It is commonly believed that the export activity shows the success of a firm, 
industry or even country, since a company is only capable of exporting if its 
product is competitive on the market, if it offers a good quality product at a 
cheap price. On the other hand, imports are believed to crowd out domestic 
producers, so we usually do not associate beneficial aspects to it.
However, the data show that this way of contrasting imports with exports is 
not justified. In Table 4.2 we present average wages paid by firms in different 
categories regarding trade activity (only exporter, only importer, both, none) 
for the year 2003. Both the exporters and the importers pay higher wages on 
average compared to the firms that do not participate in international trade. 
The highest, 45 percent wage difference is between the importer and non-im-
porter firms, while the role of the export seems to be smaller, only 12 percent.
table 4.2: average wages paid by exporter and importer firms (hungarian forint)
Non-importer Importer
Non-exporter 100,100 145,200
N (number of firms) 4,349 1,154
Exporter 111,900 157,300
N (number of firms) 418 2,884
Note: The table shows the average gross monthly wage in manufacturing for the year 
2003. Exporter is the firm that made sales abroad of any value in 2003. Importer is 
the firm that directly bought a product from abroad in 2003.
Source: The authors’ calculations based on the Wage Survey and Hungarian Tariff 
Statistics.
From these wage differences of course it does not follow that international 
trade would directly affect wages. According to the last subsection the inter-
nationally active firms are in many ways different from their inactive coun-
terparts, and it might be the case that the wage difference only reflects these 
differences of the firms. For example perhaps a well-educated, skilled man-
ager who speaks foreign languages makes it possible for the firm to pay higher 
wages through better management practice. At the same time the manager 
also builds international relations and involves the company into external 
trade, but this might not have any effect on the wages in itself. In this case 
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we would observe higher wages at firms that are engaged in export/import 
activities, although there would be no causal relationship between interna-
tional trade and the wages.
To be able to distinguish the effect of self-selection from the real causal ef-
fect on the wages, let us consider the following event study. We examine how 
the wage changes before and after the firm starts to export/import. Figure 4.4 
shows the wage difference from the non-exporter/non-importer firms as a func-
tion of the “event time”. The event time is defined as the number of years which 
have passed since the first export/import. In the case of a negative number the 
event has not happened yet, for example t=–2 means that the firm will start to 
export (or import) two years later.
Figure 4.4: the wage difference through time before and after the start  
of the export/import activity
Note: The figure shows the difference of the log gross monthly wage at the exporter/
importer and the internationally inactive firms. The reference group is the group of 
firms that do not participate in international trade. Exporter is the firm that made 
sales abroad in any value between 1992 and 2003. Importer is the firm that directly 
bought a product from abroad between 1992 and 2003. The estimates are calculated 
after controlling for occupational heterogeneity (4-digit codes) and time effects 
(year dummies).
Source: The authors’ calculations based on the Wage Survey and Hungarian Tariff 
Statistics.
The figure depicts the exporter and importer firms’ wage premium separately. 
The exporters already pay higher wages than the non-exporters four years prior 
to becoming exporters, and this wage difference does not grow after the start 
of the trade activity. We could potentially interpret this as follows: these firms 
are special before the export activity; they are well-managed, employ skilled 
labor, and this is the reason why they pay higher wages. Exporting is rather a 
symptom of their success, not the cause of it.
However, the wage difference calculated for importing firms is continuously 
growing, and it is much higher after becoming an importer than the years be-
fore the start of the activity. Nevertheless, it is interesting that this wage growth 
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is observable before the first importer year, a possible reason for which is that 
the firm employs workers who can better use foreign products and technology.
Although the increasing wage differences are consistent with the idea that 
the import causes the wage growth, it does not prove the causal relationship. 
At the time when the firm starts to import it might also undergo several oth-
er organizational changes, and some of them may cause an increase in paid 
wages (this is true of course for the exporters as well). It might be that the im-
porting firm actually lays off some people, and fires its unskilled workers. Al-
though in Figure 4.4 we controlled for occupation with 4-digit FEOR codes 
(Hungarian code system of occupations), of course even within the same oc-
cupation there might be higher and lower paid workers. Moreover, it is also 
possible that the firm imports machines as an investment, and the increase 
we observe in wages only reflects a higher capital-labor ratio; it is not the ef-
fect of the import activity.
In Figure 4.5 we try to control for these effects by taking out the variation 
caused by individual-level variables (gender, age, education) and certain firm-
level variables (size, fixed assets, foreign ownership). As we can see in the figure, 
the estimates for the wage differences are smaller than earlier, but the tendency 
they show is similar. The export wage differential is positive before the start of 
the actual activity and it is somewhat stable through time, while the import 
wage differential rather increases.
Figure 4.5: the wage differences before and after the start of the trade activity – 
after controlling for individual and firm characteristics
Note: The figure shows the difference of the log gross monthly wage at the exporter re-
spectively importer and the internationally inactive firms. The reference group is the 
group of firms that do not participate in international trade. Exporter is the firm that 
made sales abroad of any value between 1992 and 2003. Importer is the firm that 
directly bought a product from abroad between 1992 and 2003. The estimates are 
calculated after controlling for occupational heterogeneity (4-digit codes), gender, 
age, education, firm size (number of employees), capital-labor ratio, foreign owner-
ship and time effects (year dummies).
Source: The authors’ calculations based on the Wage Survey and Hungarian Tariff 
Statistics.
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How does the import affect the firm and its employees? Why are importer 
firms able to pay higher wages? Since these results do not match our prelimi-
nary expectations, we believe it is worthwhile to examine the effects of the 
import more closely.
The effects of imports and offshoring
Offshoring probably belongs to the most heavily debated questions in the lit-
erature of international trade. The first thought that comes to mind is that the 
firm that outsources parts of its own activities necessarily will employ fewer 
workers. The firm in the textile industry that makes clothes using imported 
materials must have fewer employees than the firm that do more phases of work, 
for example weaving and sewing too.
However, neither the definition of offshoring nor its effect is that straight-
forward. When do we say that the firm is importing goods in order to out-
source one or more phases of work? Is it offshoring if the furniture manufac-
turer buys the wood already processed and painted from abroad? Intuitively, 
we talk about the firm offshoring part of its production process if in a perfect-
ly closed economy the given firm would produce the goods that are imported 
in the open economy. Although this definition is useful in terms of economic 
thinking, it is hard to express or measure it using the data.
So the literature defines the measure of broad offshoring as the value of all 
goods imported by the firm, while the narrow offshoring is the value of import-
ed goods that are the products of the industry the firm belongs to. Intuitively, 
we only want to include those imported goods into the calculations that are 
the substitutes of the goods which would be produced by the firm in the hy-
pothetical closed economy. As also Pető (2012) explains, even the stricter defi-
nition might overstate the extent of offshoring; besides, it is obvious that the 
second measure is sensitive to how narrow we define the industry of the firm.
According to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) this confusion comes 
from the fact that – as the name of the phenomenon would also imply – firms 
are offshoring tasks and activities, not products. This approach, which the 
authors call task trading, throws new light upon the question of drawbacks 
and benefits of offshoring. First of all, as in the case of trading with goods, off-
shoring (task trading) means specialization, and because of the economies of 
scale it increases the firms’ productivities in both countries. Furthermore, by 
delegating certain tasks to partners abroad the firms might be able to procure 
goods that are cheaper and possibly of better quality than the ones they could 
produce on their own.
Both mechanisms increase the market share of the offshoring company, also 
amplifying the demand (and the wages through this) for every type of labor 
applied in the industry. This effect might even dominate the trivial negative 
effect that the offshoring implies. That is, for example the firm that only does 
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sewing may have a higher labor demand than the firm that does weaving as 
well. In this subsection we examine how much labor receives from the possible 
surplus caused by offshoring in the form of wage.
Pető (2012) calls the effect of offshoring that works through the growth of 
productivity the indirect effect of offshoring. Even in this case – just as in the 
models about the trade of goods, where the producers that manufacture the 
imported products are the losers of the trade liberalization – the demand for 
the worker’s labor that would do the delegated task will decrease. Following 
the example in the textile industry, after offshoring the firm does not need 
weavers. Since typically the labor supply is not capable of changing this flex-
ibly, the price of the labor related to this task will be lower in the new equilib-
rium; that is, the relative wage will decrease. Pető (2012) calls this the indirect 
effect of offshoring. This side recieves more attention in the public discourse, 
because in the developed countries it leads to the further marginalization of 
unskilled workers.
So to assess the wage effect of imports, our main question is if it ameliorates 
the growth opportunities of the firm. As we have seen above, in that case the av-
erage worker might win with the possibly increased labor demand. The growth 
and optimal size of a firm is primarily determined by its productivity. So in the 
following subsection we examine the effect that the import activity has on the 
firm’s productivity. We distinguish between the import of general inputs and 
intermediate goods (offshoring in the broad and in the narrow sense) from the 
capital import. While the former ones may allow the firm to produce cheaper, 
the import of capital goods can be seen as a form of technology import.
Offshoring and the productivity of the firm
Why can a firm that uses imported inputs be more productive? The theoretical 
literature (Ethier, 1982, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Feenstra, 1994) dis-
tinguishes two separate effects. On the one hand the imported inputs might 
be of higher quality than their domestically available counterparts at the same 
price. In this case the firm is able to increase its productivity more with the 
input from abroad than with the domestic product. (It is also possible that a 
product of similar quality is much cheaper abroad than at home. From the 
economics point of view it results in the same effect.) On the other hand there 
might be some special inputs that are not available domestically at all, and can 
be substituted only with great loss of efficiency. To give a simple example, a res-
taurant might substitute the Roman cumin with black pepper but by doing 
that it will never achieve the same taste.
What do the data tell us about the effect on productivity? Amiti and Konings 
(2007) showed at first on a sample of Indonesian firms that the decrease of tar-
iffs related to imported inputs significantly increases the productivity of the 
firms. This is consistent with the explanations above, if the decreasing tariffs 
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increase the use of the imported inputs and through this the firms’s produc-
tivity. We see for Indian firms that importing companies do not just become 
more productive, but they also produce a wider variety of products (Goldberg, 
Khandelwal and Pavcnik, 2010). That is, they really increase their size and gain 
access to new markets.
According to the results of Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011) also the Hun-
garian data show that imported inputs significantly increase the firms’ produc-
tivity. Based on the methodology suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) the first 
column of numbers in Table 4.3 presents the estimates of the parameters of a 
production function augmented with import. Beyond the usual factors of pro-
duction (capital, labor, raw materials) the import also influences the productiv-
ity of the firm. The firms that use imported inputs in the optimal proportion 
(according to the authors this is 67 percent) are on average 0.78 × 0.17 = 13 
percent more productive than the ones that do not import at all.
table 4.3: the productivity effects of import – estimates of the average firm’s 
production function
Dependent variable Logarithm of the revenue Logarithm of value added
Capital (log)
0.029*** 0.251***
(0.003) (0.004)
Labor (log)
0.200*** 0.750***
(0.003) (0.005)
Materials (log)
0.788***
(0.003)
Per-product import gain
0.174***
(0.046)
Optimal import share
0.666***
(0.108)
Efficiency of imports
1.116***
(0.080)
R&D share of capital
0.091***
(0.006)
Foreign ownership
0.039*** 0.219***
(0.011) (0.014)
Industry and year dummies Yes
Number of observations 127,374 112,917
R2 0.788
Note: The definition of the import variables and the parameters see in Halpern, Koren 
and Szeidl (2011). The estimation identifies with the method of Olley and Pakes 
(1996) the differences in productivity using the firm’s investment level as proxy. The 
standard errors are in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Based on Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011), and Halpern et al. (2012).
By the results of the estimation, given the same prices the imported inputs rep-
resent 11.6 percent higher quality than the domestic ones on average. The 40 
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percent of the whole productivity effect can be attributed to the higher quality 
of the imported goods, and 60 percent to the imperfect substitution.
Imported machines and firm productivity
How much different is the effect of imported machines? An item of specialized 
industrial equipment incorporates a serious amount of technological knowl-
edge, and depending on its quality usually allows for a more precise, faster and 
better quality production process. For example the computer controlled (CNC) 
lathes are faster and more precise than the manual ones. Moreover, there might 
be quality differences even between CNC lathes. Surveying managers of In-
dian metalworking firms Sutton (2000) finds that CNC machines imported 
from Taiwan and Japan are believed to be more reliable and economically ef-
ficient than the domestically produced ones. So by importing good quality 
equipment it is possible to produce at a higher technological level.
How can we measure the quality and technological level of machines? 
Halpern et al. (2012) distinguish the machines imported to Hungary according 
to the country of origin. Certain countries are very different in the level of re-
search and development in manufacturing and its related industries (Table 4.4).
table 4.4: the hungarian machine import according to country of origin
Country of origin Share of import (percentage) R&D intensity
Germany 35.9 12.1
Austria 8.8 12.1
Japan 7.6 14.6
Italy 5.5 6.3
United States 3.8 18.2
France 3.4 17.8
United Kingdom 2.5 10.0
Belgium 1.8 9.6
Netherlands 1.4 14.4
Spain 1.4 4.7
Hungary – 1.2
Total 72.1 12.3
Note: The R&D intensity is the ratio of the expenditure of the firms on R&D and the 
added value between 1992 and 2003 in the industries with 29–35 NACE codes.
Source: Calculations of Halpern et al. (2012) based on OECD and Eurostat data.
For the highest value Hungarian firms buy machines from Germany, where 
12.1 percent of the value added is spent on research and development. In Italy 
the same statistic is 6.3 percent. To compare these values, the expenditure of 
the Hungarian machine manufacturing sectors on research and development 
is only 1.2 percent of the value added. Although it is obviously not perfect, the 
R&D intensity of the country of origin contains some information about the 
quality of the imported machine.
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Halpern et al. (2012) estimate the effect of the imported machines on the 
productivity of the firm. Since every trade partner of Hungary has higher R&D 
intensity, it is not surprising that imported machines increase productivity to 
a larger extent than the domestically manufactured ones. The second column 
of numbers in Table 4.3 presents the results of this estimation. (As the depend-
ent variable here is the value added by the firm and not the revenue, the coef-
ficients are not comparable with the first column.) Given the same book value 
of applied capital (fixed assets) the firm is more productive if it uses machines 
from countries with a higher R&D intensity. If the average manufacturing 
firm that has only Hungarian machines was to replace them with German 
equipment of the same value, the R&D intensity of which is ten times higher, 
the productivity could increase by 20 percent.
The effect of the imports on wages
So both the import of inputs and capital increases the productivity. The in-
creased productivity allows the firm to expand on the market. To satisfy the 
higher demand, the firm needs more resources; that is, it also demands more 
labor. The increased demand might result in a higher wage rate – this is the 
already mentioned indirect effect. It is also possible that the firm needs a spe-
cial type of labor to operate the foreign machines, to work with the imported 
input, or because of the offshoring the remaining tasks accommodated by the 
firm shifts the proportions of the given types of labor required (for example 
from skilled to unskilled). Either way, the import activity changes the struc-
ture of the labor demand, directly affecting the relative wages. This means 
that the effects induced by capital import and offshoring are different across 
certain groups of workers (occupation, educational group), so that they also 
influence wage inequality.
Based on Pető (2012) in this subsection we examine through the case of 
the Hungarian food industry how the imports that are closely related to the 
company’s commercial activities affect the wages of workers having a certain 
task. The novelty of her approach is that based on 4-digit occupational codes 
(FEOR-4) Pető (2012) is able to identify the effect of offshoring for the differ-
ent occupations. The usual industry- or firm-level approach of the literature 
might be deceiving, since they do not take into account that the wages com-
pared before and after the import activity (if offshoring) potentially belong to 
qualitatively very different parts of the production process.
To enforce an approach that focuses on jobs, Pető (2012) categorizes the 
imported goods of the firms by how closely they are related to the tasks of a 
worker from a certain occupational group. This is possible because she has de-
tailed universal Hungarian tariff data with 6-digit product codes. The paper 
distinguishes between three binary variables related to import, following the 
concepts of narrow and broad offshoring. The first one indicates if the total 
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import of the firm exceeds a threshold (import), the second one signals signifi-
cant importing activity related to the worker’s occupation (related import; for 
example in the case of a butcher any kind of meat), and the third one takes the 
value 1 if the output of the given task (occupation) is imported by the firm to a 
substantial extent (output import, in the case of the butcher processed chicken).
Table 4.5 shows the estimated parameters of two models from Pető (2012). 
The first is a cross-sectional model estimated by pooled OLS [columns (1) and 
(2)], the second one is a firm fixed effects model controlling for unobservable 
characteristics of the firms that are possibly endogeneous. In the latter case we 
can measure the wage effect only from variation within the firm through time 
(the wages change after the beginning of the export activity) and through occu-
pations (for example the meat import affects the butchers but not the bakers).
table 4.5: the effect of imports and offshoring on the wages in the food industry
Logarithm of gross monthly wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Import
0.044** 0.047*** –0.005 –0.009
(0.018) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
Related import
0.039** – –0.031** –
(0.019) (0.007)
Output import
– 0.047*** – –0.014**
(0.017) (0.007)
Firm’s control variables
size (logarithm of number of employ-
ees), logarithm of net revenue, for-
eign ownership dummy, export indi-
cator variable, region, industry dum-
mies, capital-abor ratio
size (logarithm of number of employ-
ees), logarithm of net revenue, for-
eign ownership dummy, export indi-
cator variable, capital-abor ratio, 
productivity
Individual control variables gender, occupation, education, experience, (experience)2
Firm fixed effects no no yes yes
Identified effect total total direct direct
Number of observations 17,443 17,443 17,478 17,478
R2 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77
Number clusters 3,870 3,870 1,285 1,285
Note: The total effect is the sum of the direct and indirect effects. The standard errors 
are in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Based on Tables A3–4. of Pető (2012).
As Table 4.5 shows in columns (1) and (2), the effects of all imports are posi-
tive. However, this is not only the aggregate of the indirect and direct effects 
mentioned above, but includes the effect of the demand shift that follows from 
the changed set of skills required by the remaining tasks done at the firm after 
offshoring. For example if a wine producer makes a decision that they will no 
longer process its plants created by the firm, but rather work with vines cre-
ated by French food engineers, then the wine makers might have to possess up 
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until then atypical skills and special knowledge to design a new production 
process (different timing, temperature, barrels of maturing etc.) that can use 
the advantages of the new technology (the special, imported types of plants). 
If this is the case, then the workers with the special skills might expect to re-
ceive their share from the extra profit. The regression results show that a worker 
earns on average 3.9 percent more if the firm imports a product related to his 
or her task and by 4.7 percent more if some imported goods are the output of 
the workers task (occupation). At first sight we could interpret these results as 
evidence that offshoring is beneficial even for the employees working in the 
directly related occupation. It is necessary to note however, that the wage dif-
ference probably contains the effects of self-selection, since in columns (1) and 
(2) we did not control for firm fixed effects. Also, these coefficients give esti-
mates for the sum of the direct and indirect effects, because this model – un-
like the equations following this – does not control for productivity, which is 
the channel of the direct effect.
Column (3) and (4) in Table 4.5 controls for firm fixed effects. This time we 
compare occupations that are affected by imports in the firms with those that 
are not, as well as wages before and after the start of the import activity. The 
parameters related to offshoring change their signs and are just as significant 
as in the first two models. The workers whose firm imports products related 
to their occupation suffer from a wage loss of between 1.4–3.1 percent. It is 
important to see as well that the employee whose task is not related to the im-
ported goods does not experience a significant wage drop.
To summarize, regarding the signs of the effects the results meet our expec-
tations and are in accordance with the literature (Helpman, 2011): the empiri-
cal results show that the workers in the Hungarian food industry are right to 
be afraid of offshoring in their sector. But this income effect is relatively small, 
and the results are not necessarily true for other industries. According to Pető 
(2012) the same estimates for the Hungarian textile industry show a positive 
wage effect because of the productivity increasing effect of the imported goods.5
These results lead to further questions. We saw that the import increases pro-
ductivity, but who gets the surplus from it? The results presented here suggest 
that the effect of import is heterogeneous regarding different occupational 
groups. Is there another dimension along which we can observe such hetero-
geneity? In the following subsections we examine this question.
The effect of international trade on wage inequality
Based on the results presented above we can state that external trade increases 
the productivity of the firms and that they at least partially share the revenues 
coming from this enhancement with their workers. However, not every em-
ployee is affected by the increased labor demand. In this subsection we examine 
how international trade influences wage differences. Since the firms that are 
5 It is also true that in these re-
gressions we examine the effect 
on the wages, and for example it 
is possible that the firm leaves the 
wages unchanged after offshor-
ing, but terminates jobs; that is, 
it adapts by adjusting its labor 
demand.
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engaged in international trade are different from the others in several aspects, 
it is natural that the composition of their labor demand is also different. If as 
a result of the trade activity the labor demand grows more in those groups of 
workers that already had a relatively high wage before importing, it leads to an 
increase in the wage inequality.
Pavcnik and Goldberg (2007) enumerate several mechanisms through which 
international trade could affect the distribution of wages. We can sort them 
according to the dimensions (variables) along which they create winners and 
losers. The simplest dimension is, as we have already mentioned, the level of 
education. The sign of the effect along education is not that straightforward 
however. The Stolper-Samuelson effect would imply that the trade liberaliza-
tion does not necessarily increase the wage inequality (Stolper and Samuelson, 
1941). This early classical theorem says that as an effect of international trade, 
the relative wage of unskilled workers grows in emerging economies; in this 
way the wage inequality decreases in those economies. The reason for this is 
that in these countries the skilled labor is the scarcer factor, so the economy 
will specialize in the production of those products that require relatively more 
unskilled labor, and this increases the demand for this type of workers. There is 
specialization because it is cheaper to produce the less skill-intensive goods in 
the developing or emerging countries, while because of the relative abundance 
of skilled labor the conditions to produce more skill-intensive goods are more 
favorable in the developed countries (Feenstra, 2004, 1–31. p.). Although the 
Stolper-Samuelson effect is present to a certain degree, according to the larger 
share of the literature the data do not support its primary importance. For ex-
ample while analyzing Argentinean data from the time of the trade liberaliza-
tion related to the creation of Mercosur Bustos (2011) finds a significant effect 
with the opposite sign: as a result of the liberalization the wages of the skilled 
workers grew more than the wages of the unskilled workers.
The model of offshoring from Feenstra and Hanson (1997) might give an ex-
planation for the empirical facts contradicting the classical theorem, because in 
that model the tasks that are not skill-intensive in the developed country (and 
being offshored) belong to the skill-intensive tasks in the developing country 
because of the big technological gap. This way from the point of view of the 
developing country the demand for the skilled workers will increase. Acemoglu 
(2002) and Koren and Csillag (2011) argue that usage of advanced technolo-
gies requires higher education and better skills from the average worker. This 
implies that in mechanisms stressing the connection between trade and tech-
nology import, imports induce skill biased technological growth through their 
effect on productivity. The most straightforward example for such a mecha-
nism is the import of capital goods (machines), since this can be regarded as di-
rect technology import; we will examine this channel in detail below. But the 
earlier example of the wine maker also belongs to this group of mechanisms; 
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when the imported input is of better quality, and the handling of it requires 
a higher level of knowledge during the production process. In the literature 
we can also find examples for the export activity causing an urge to improve 
on the quality of the product, which in turn requires higher skills and level 
of knowledge from the workers (see Verhoogen, 2008 for details). Although 
the results in these papers taken one by one are very plausible, unfortunately 
the econometric identification of the effects of the export/import induced 
skill biased technological growth is very problematic. As Spitz-Oener (2006) 
describes, one of the most important obstacles is that it is vital to enforce the 
above mentioned approach that puts the occupation (the tasks in fact) into the 
focus of the identification strategy (see also in Pető, 2012).
The second dimension along which the heterogeneity in the wage effect of 
import might be significant from the point of view of wage inequality is the 
employee’s place in the firm’s hierarchy; that is, how many managerial tasks 
the employee has. This dimension appears as occupation in the data. The lit-
erature on this topic is much smaller and recent. Here the basis of the hetero-
geneity is that the managers have special tasks, which are inherently different 
from the work of the machine operators for example.
It would not be unrealistic to make the hypothesis that the managers get the 
extra profit from the increased productivity. Tóth (2011) argues that it is also 
possible that we will find the wage surplus related to import at the lower levels 
of management (supervisors) – thanks to their private information regard-
ing the production process as direct supervisors. At the same time Eaton et al. 
(2009) present some evidence that since the top managers initiate the import 
activity, and they also play a decisive role in establishing a trade relationship, 
which task requires their specific skills, they should be the ones who benefit 
from the extra trading profit.
The demand for skills
One criterion that the literature finds important from the point of view of the 
effects of international trade is the quality of the labor force. In the countries 
where human capital is abundant international trade necessarily increases the 
demand for skilled labor. But from the point of view of the classical theoreti-
cal literature it is surprising that according to the results presented the devel-
oping countries experience the same, even though skilled labor there is a rela-
tively scarce resource.
As Koren and Csillag (2011) argues, the increase of the demand is a direct ef-
fect of the import. As we saw already, imported machines represent a higher 
technological level than the domestically produced ones. This means that the 
worker needs more education or more work experience to operate them as well. 
That is, the machine import increases demand exactly for those workers who 
are already valued higher by the labor market.
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Let us consider those workers whose occupation includes operating some in-
dustrial equipment. Machine import might have a very direct effect on them, 
since they come into contact with it through their everyday work, not only 
through the increase of the firm’s productivity. The exact classification of the 
employees’ occupations and the detailed classification of the imported goods 
makes it possible to measure the import exposure more accurately. For example 
“printing machine operators” are directly affected by the import of offset im-
port machinery, but not by the import of “metal lathes”, maybe only indirectly.
We find 99 thousand machine operators in the Wage Survey between 1994 
and 2004. 39 thousand of them have worked for a firm that has imported ma-
chinery earlier that can be linked to their occupation. They earn 20 percent 
more on average compared to other workers who have the same occupation and 
are not exposed to imports (Koren and Csillag, 2011, Table 1 and 2). But this 
wage difference might be attributed to other differences between firms (the 
importers are larger, more likely foreign-owned and more likely to export). To 
identify the effect of machines on labor demand we need to control for more 
firm and individual control variables.
Column (1) in Table 4.6 shows the results of a linear regression that regress-
es the logarithm of the wage on the import variable (now only taking into ac-
count the machine import), besides having the size of the firm, an indicator 
of foreign ownership, occupation (4-digit FEOR) and year dummies, respec-
tively the gender, age and education of the worker as control variables. (We do 
not present the coefficient of the control variables.) After accounting for the 
effect of these variables there only remains a 10.5 percent wage difference be-
tween the wages of the machine operators who work for an importer firm and 
who are employed by a non-importer firm.
In column (2) of Table 4.6 we distinguish the general machine import from 
the machine import related to the individual’s occupation. If for example a print-
ing machine operator works at a company that imported a metal lathe, then the 
worker gets on average a 5.5 percent higher wage than the printing machine op-
erators that work for firms that do not import machines. This can be the result of 
the self-selection of the firms, but also the indirect effect of the import. If on the 
other hand the firm of the worker imports a printing machine, then the operator 
receives a 5.5 + 8.2 = 13.7 percent higher wage compared to other workers with 
the same attributes whose firms do not import industrial equipment. The 8.2 
percent difference is the direct effect of machine import. The wage difference 
can be attributed partly to the different educational background and partly to 
the increasing return to education. The wage premium of secondary education6 
among workers who operate domestically produced machines is 6.9 percent. In 
the group of workers who work on imported machines the same surplus is 11.3 
percent (first column of Table 6. in Koren and Csillag, 2011). That is, the return 
on formal education is higher on the imported equipment.
6 The average wage of high 
school and vocational school 
graduates relative to the wages 
of workers with primary school 
education
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table 4.6: the effect of machine import on the wages of the machine operators
Logarithm of gross wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Machine import related  
to occupation
0.105*** 0.082*** 0.028** 0.032** 0.053*** 0.004
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Import of any machine
– 0.055*** – –0.019 – –
(0.013) (0.017)
Machine import related to occu-
pation, with high levels of R&D
– – – – 0.72*** 0.036**
(0.016) (0.017)
Firm control variables logarithm of number of employees, foreign ownership status
Worker control variables occupation (FEOR-4) and year fixed effects, gender, high school educa-tion indicator variable, age, age-square
Number of observations 543,175 543,175 32,549 32,549 543,175 32,549
R2 0.404 0.409 0.862 0.862 0.404 0.862
Note: We do not present the coefficients of the control variables of the firm and the 
worker. The coefficients of columns (1), (2) and (5) are estimated by pooled OLS, 
models in columns (3), (4) and (6) have panel fixed effects. The brackets contain the 
clustered standard errors (by firms).
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level * 10% level.
Source: Based on Table 4. and 5. in Koren and Csillag (2011).
However, education explains only a small part of the relevant skills of machine 
operators. We cannot measure the effect of on-the-job training, job experience 
or the original differences in skills and abilities. If the marginal revenue pro-
duced by these skills is higher when working on imported machines, then the 
firm obviously will assign the more skilled worker to those machines.7 
Figure 4.6: the marginal product of skills on imported and domestic machines
Source: Based on Figure 1 of Koren and Csillag (2011).
Figure 4.6 demonstrates a framework in which we can think about this issue; 
it depicts the possible wages of workers with different skill levels if they work 
7 See for example about the 
selection of the workers using 
computers DiNardo and Pischke 
(1997) and Entorf, Gollac and 
Kramarz (1999).
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on domestic or imported machines. Workers aim for the highest wage, so they 
will work on the machine that comes with the higher wage curve. The produc-
tivity (and this way the wage) is increasing in conjunction with the skills on 
both types of machinery, but their return is higher on the imported ones. So 
above a given h* skill level every worker works on imported machines, below 
that level everybody operates the domestically produced equipment.
How can we control for the effects of unobservable skills? In the Wage Sur-
vey, due to the lack of a worker identification variable the individuals cannot 
be followed through the years, but they can be assigned into groups based on 
their age, gender, education and occupation; then we can measure the changes 
in the average wages of these groups. We can compare for example the wages 
of a female machine operator in the textile industry with a high school degree 
and born in 1948 within the firm before and after the import activity. Since 
these groups are rather homogeneous (sometimes they contain only one obser-
vation), using the differences calculated above it is possible for the most part 
to control for the effects of unobserved skills.
The results of this within-group estimation is presented in columns (3) and 
(4) of Table 4.6 We find that after the purchase of the imported machine wages 
increase by 3 percent on average in these groups; that is, the causal effect of the 
imported equipment is around this value. The detailed structure of the import 
data makes it possible to take a closer look at the effects on wages. Namely, the 
R&D intensity of the countries of origin might be substantially different. In 
the models (5) and (6) in Table 4.6 we distinguished the imports from coun-
tries with high R&D intensity.8
The wage effect of the import coming from these countries is much higher; 
60–90% percent of the whole wage surplus can be attributed to the high R&D. 
This is consistent with the argument that the machine imports affect the wages 
through the technology they represent.
In a simple model Koren and Csillag (2011) also investigate the general equi-
librium effects of the imported machines. As the price of the machines decreases 
due to the trade liberalization, more and more firms start to import. The pro-
ductivity of the machine operators working at these firms increases, and they 
receive higher wages than before, but those operators who have been working 
on imported machines for some time experience an increase in wages as well. 
The reason for this is that the machine required for their work became cheaper 
and more available, so they too would have more opportunities on the labor 
market. By raising the wage the firm can prevent those skilled machine opera-
tors who have been working with imported machines for a more extensive pe-
riod from quitting. This effect can be easily observed in the data: In the occupa-
tions where the ratio of machine operators working with imported equipment 
grows faster, the wage premium of these workers increases faster as well. If for 
example the ratio of workers using imported machines grows by 10%, it will 
8 Those countries belong to this 
group that are among the top 
ten in the R&D ranking of the 
OECD: Sweden, Norway, Japan, 
Belgium, South Korea, Finland, 
Germany, Denmark, the United 
States and the United Kingdom.
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increase the wages of the machine operators who have already been working 
with imported capital by 0.5 percent compared to employees from the same 
profession (Koren and Csillag, 2011, Table 7, column 2).
The demand for managers and other occupational groups
In this section based on Tóth (2011) we examine if the effect of importing ma-
chines has a different effect on the groups of managers and production work-
ers, and if so, who gets the premium for the import activity. While there are 
many papers on the heterogeneity of wages across educational groups, the lit-
erature pays much less attention to the variation due to workplace hierarchy or 
occupations in general. The topic is especially relevant for Hungary, because 
after the transition to the market economy – with the increasing number of 
firms – the number of management positions rose suddenly and the roles of 
the managers also changed in the production process. In the market economy 
there was an increased need for managers who were able to cope with (new) 
managerial tasks. This period also played an important role in shaping today’s 
wage distribution in Hungary, so it is an interesting question as to how much 
the trade liberalization contributed to the jump in the income of people at the 
top of the hierarchy. Tóth (2011) examines the wage effect of export and im-
port in four groups of employees: top managers, departmental (middle) man-
agers, supervisors and other production workers. (The categorization of the 
employees is based on their 4-digit FEOR code.)
As we argued in the last section, the possible positive wage effect of interna-
tional trade may be attributed to any of the managerial groups. Because either 
the employee plays a vital role in realizing the potential productivity enhanc-
ing effect of international trade (middle manager), or his/her special skills 
and social network is important in establishing a profitable relationship (top 
manager), or simply (s)he can enjoy some sort of informational rent as a direct 
supervisor of the production.
Similarly to the papers mentioned earlier, Tóth (2011) also uses a merged 
data set from the Wage Survey and the Customs Statistics for the years between 
1994 and 2003. Using 4-digit occupation codes the author is able to match the 
employees to the right managerial category. Exporters are the firms whose ex-
port constitutes at least 10% of their revenue, and the indicator variable for 
capital imports takes the value 1 if the firm has ever imported a valuable ma-
chine needed for production. Tóth (2011) estimates the wage effect of the ex-
port and import with a Mincer-equation for each managerial group separate-
ly; the wage premium is the coefficients of the exporter and (capital) importer 
variables. There are firm-level (size, region) and worker-level control variables 
(gender, educational background, experience), and the paper estimates pooled 
OLS and firm fixed effects regressions. In this latter case the coefficients of the 
import and export variables are meant to measure the increase of the wages af-
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ter the start of exporting and importing. Lastly, Tóth (2011) re-estimates the 
regressions for each year. In the following paragraphs we summarize the main 
conclusions drawn by the author from the results.
In order to get comparable results with the literature Tóth (2011) estimates 
the wage effect of the export without including the variables for import activ-
ity and foreign ownership in the regression. The wage premium of export is 
sizable in every managerial category (4–21 percent), and is significant at every 
conventional confidence level (Tóth, 2011, Table 7.1.). According to the regres-
sions the higher the employee is in the managerial hierarchy, the stronger is 
the positive wage effect of the export. These results fit in the picture described 
by Bernard et al. (2007), but they practically collapse if we put the other two 
indicator variables denoting international involvement in the regressions. In 
this case the wage effect of export is not significantly different from zero any-
more (see Table 4.7). This suggests that it is not the export that is related to a 
premium but the import activity. This corresponds to the results cited in the 
previous sections, according to which it is a questionable view that the export 
is the key for technological growth and every import activity is suspicious.
table 4.7: the effect of import and export on the wages  
in various occupational groups (cross-section results)
Log wage
production workers supervisors middle managers top managers
Exporter
–0.00281 –0.0412* –0.0328 –0.00564
(0.0100) (0.0242) (0.0331) (0.0445)
Capital importer
0.0763*** 0.129*** 0.139*** 0.0755**
(0.0115) (0.0213) (0.0418) (0.0359)
Foreign ownership
0.197*** 0.249*** 0.348*** 0.475***
(0.0161) (0.0257) (0.0429) (0.0563)
Worker characteristics yes yes yes yes
Firm characteristics yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects no no no no
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 501,590 33,155 8,712 6,928
R2 0.740 0.663 0.613 0.554
Note: We do not show the coefficients of individual and firm-level control variables. 
The worker-level control variables: occupation (4-digit FEOR), (employment) experi-
ence, experience2, educational background, gender. The firm-level control variables: 
size (number of employees), region. Estimation method: OLS. The firm clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Based on Tóth (2011) Table 7.1.
We can state that the import, if it represents a more advanced technology (for 
example the capital import from the United States), has a positive premium 
not only with respect to productivity but in the wages as well. How does the 
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capital import affect wages in the various occupational groups? As Table 4.7 
shows, the import variable is always significant, its coefficient reaches its peak 
around 13–14 percent in the regressions of supervisors and middle managers, 
while the wage premium of import in the group of top managers and produc-
tion workers is around 7.5 percent. This gives an inverted-U shaped pattern, 
that is, the middle managers and supervisors get more from the surplus gen-
erated by the import activity. We can interpret this as the market rewarding 
the specific skills of these managers, like being able to reshape the production 
process so that the opportunities offered by the imported capital can be real-
ized. This mechanism is emphasized by Tóth (2011) and partly by Mion and 
Opromolla (2011) as well. Another result related to this is from Caliendo, Monte 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). Their model shows that just like the contraction 
or expansion of a firm, international trade activities are also followed by reor-
ganizing the managers’ hierarchy.
Tóth (2011) runs the same regressions separately for each year in the sam-
ple, so that we can have an idea how the wage effect of import evolved over 
time. Figure 4.7 shows the import premium in each managerial group; the 
coefficients are from regressions that – besides the mentioned factors – also 
control for the capital-labor ratio of the firm. Putting this variable in the re-
gression (along with other variables that are correlated with the import sta-
tus) is important to control for endogeneity, but at the same time it can be an 
important channel for the effect of the imports on productivity,9 that is the 
reason why it is not in the baseline model (Table 4.7). Surprisingly, the co-
efficients from these regressions show the above mentioned pattern in wage 
premia even more clearly.
Figure 4.7: the wage effect of export and capital import for each occupational group 
and year (cross-section results)
Note: The estimated premium of capital imports (the coefficient of the capital import 
indicator variable) for each year from 1995–2003; the model of Table 4.7 was used 
without the time fixed effects, but we also controlled for the capital-labor ratio (that 
reinforces our results).
Source: Tóth (2011), Table 6.
9 For example imported ma-
chines are more expensive and 
delicate to handle, so the super-
visor just makes the worker take 
more care during work.
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The results described above are also based on data from the years after 1998; 
until that year it is not straightforward which occupational group profited the 
most (if at all) from the capital import. The 1998 boundary is close to the time 
determined by Kézdi (2002) when the first period of the transition of the Hun-
garian labor market characterized by inter-sectoral reallocation ended. As Tóth 
(2011) explains this phenomenon, probably the reform rush of the transition, 
the effect of the radical institutional changes of the Hungarian economy can be 
seen on the magnitude of the coefficients from the regressions of the first years.
Conclusion
In this paper we showed that international trade – especially import – has 
mostly a positive effect on wages. Not everybody gains equally, and we found 
example of a wage decrease as well, but the primary effect tends to increase 
wages. What is the economic policy that could exploit these opportunities to 
increase income?
First of all, only a small share of the firms participates in international trade, 
despite the fact that this would generate a significant productivity growth on 
the micro-level as well. Especially small firms have limited international con-
nections. With targeted information and financial support campaigns the 
participation rate could be increased. It is important however, that the policy 
should not only focus on helping with the launching of a product on the ex-
ternal market and increasing the competitiveness of export, but also needs 
to help the firms to access the potential partners for import. The majority of 
small firms are probably not aware of the opportunities related to imports, 
how much they could reduce costs and what kind of organizational and tech-
nological changes are needed to realize these gains. In the light of the results 
cited above, we would especially recommend giving firms incentives to import 
machines with more advanced technology.
Secondly, we saw that imports have a particularly sizable effect on the wages 
of skilled labor and lower-level managers such as supervisors and middle man-
agers. Often technology import is the only opportunity for an employee to 
work with cutting-edge technology, and acquire skills related to it. We did not 
study the long-run and general equilibrium effect of import that potentially 
increases the average skill of workers, but we think it is important that the eco-
nomic policy should help this mechanism instead of hindering it. Moreover, 
the negative wage effects that are associated with unskilled workers should be 
mitigated with targeted policy measures not with trade discrimination.
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IntroductIon*
The chapter on the institutional environment of the labour market was pre-
sented in a new format for the first time last year and again this year it will also 
follow a similar structure. Our aim was to describe policy interventions us-
ing the same set of categories – which also allows temporal and international 
comparisons (Busch–Cseres-Gergely, 2012). The categories were based on the 
Labour Market Policy (LMP) classification of Eurostat and the LABREF da-
tabase of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG 
ECFIN), European Commission. Interventions are categorised in the fol-
lowing groups (the numbering of sections throughout this chapter follows 
the numbering below).
Labour market poLIcy (Lmp) InterventIons
Services
1. Employment services
Measures
2. Training
3. Job rotation and job sharing
4. Employment incentives
5. Supported employment and rehabilitation/integration of people with 
partial work capacity
6. Direct job creation
7. Start-up incentives
Supports
8. Out-of-work income maintenance and supports
9. Early retirement
Mixed interventions (complex programmes)
Labour market reLated poLIcy measures, excLudIng 
Labour market poLIcIes
10. Labour taxation
11. Other transfers
12. Contractual terms of employment
13. Old age and disability pensions system – disability supports
14. Wage bargaining and wage regulation
15. Migration and mobility related measures
16. Institutions for the management and evaluation of employment 
policy
* We would like to thank Leó 
Lőrincz, Andrea Tatosné Takács, 
Mrs Gábor János Elekes for their 
helpful comments, Kitti Vara-
dovics for her assistance in or-
ganising the legal references, as 
well as the staff of the National 
Labour Office for providing the 
sources. Any errors or inaccura-
cies are the sole responsibility of 
the authors.
Target groups of labour 
market policies (LMPs)
Policy measures 
with an indirect effect 
on the labour market
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The chapter provides an overview of all labour market policy interventions that 
entered into force in the period studied–the period between September 2011 
and August 2012. The current chapter builds on last year’s overview, therefore 
it does not present the definition of categories or the expected impact of inter-
ventions, and neither does it discuss the status quo in most cases. An exception 
is the section on the revised Labour Code that provides a detailed discussion 
about the significance of the changes. Related legislation is provided in a sep-
arate section with a view to accurate referencing and access – this is especially 
important for the in-depth understanding of changes. Similarly to last year, 
changes are discussed in relation to each of the categories. There is a new addi-
tion to the chapter: a section on the financing of employment policy and this 
is presented at the end of the main text. This section provides an overview of 
the main methodological challenges of estimating the budget of employment 
policy and data for 2011. The objective remains the same: to provide an instru-
ment to those who are seeking to understand and analyse changes rather than 
evaluate the policies. Although a number of policy makers were consulted in 
different areas, the main source of information remains the Hungarian Offi-
cial Journal, as well as the collection of current legislation.
Labour market poLIcy measures
The foundations of the Hungarian labour market policy were laid down by Act 
IV of 1991, commonly known as the Employment Act. The policies set out by 
the Act are commonly referred to as employment policy measures in the Hun-
garian technical terminology.
Services
1. Employment services
A) Services of the National Employment Service (NES, in Hungarian: Nemzeti 
Foglalkoztatási Szolgálat, NFSZ)
There were no changes during the period studied; the government decree 
on the statute of the NES reaffirmed its role in terms of the provision of ser-
vices. All services were available at local job centre offices throughout the pe-
riod studied.
B) Other activities of the National Employment Service
The role of the National Labour Office (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Munkaügyi 
Hivatal) was amended to include, in addition to its existing responsibilities, la-
bour inspection, occupational health and safety and tasks that the Act on Adult 
and Vocational Education and Training originally had delegated to the Adult 
and Vocational Education and Training Body (for changes related to vocation-
al training see Section 2). In parallel to these changes a significant layoffs at the 
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affected institutions took place: the total number of staff was reduced by 239 in 
2012. There were significant changes in the role of the employment service and 
local job centres as well. For example job centres are now responsible for managing 
community service for offenders who have committed misdemeanour offences.
Main legislation
Government decision 1413/2011 (1 December) on the re-structuring of em-
ployment services; Government decree 111/2011 (4 July) amending certain 
government decrees on the role and responsibilities of municipal and county 
government offices; Government decree 323/2011. (28 December) on the 
National Labour Office and the role and responsibilities of the public bodies 
under its management; Government decree 324/2011 (28 December) amend-
ing certain government decrees relating to the establishment of the National 
Labour Office; Ministry for National Economy decree 42/2011 (2 December) 
on the sphere of responsibilities of (Budapest) county job centres; Ministry for 
National Economy (MfNE) decree 3/2012 (10 February) amending certain 
ministerial decrees relating to the establishment of the National Labour Of-
fice; Ministry of National Development decree 19/2012 (26 April) amending 
certain ministerial decrees relating to the establishment of the National La-
bour Office; Government decree 250/2011 (1 December) amending certain 
government decrees relating to the implementation of occupational health and 
safety legislation; Act XXXI of 2012 amending Act II of 2012 and certain re-
lating acts on misdemeanours, misdemeanour procedure and the registration 
of misdemeanour and certain acts relating to disaster protection.
On-line resources: munka.hu
Active labour market policy measures (LMP measures)
2. Training1
The financing and institutional framework for vocational education and train-
ing changed significantly as of January 1, 2012. In the new regulatory frame-
work, contrary to the previous system, employers cannot spend the vocation-
al training contribution on the training of their own employees. At the same 
time, however a significantly larger amount of European Union financing was 
made available for workplace training – see also Section 10 on taxation and 
the section on the financing of employment policy at the end of the chapter. 
Vocational training contribution provides financing for vocational education 
and training as well as vocational-type training programmes in schools or in 
the adult learning system for up to 100% of the costs. The revenues also finance 
public capital investment for vocational education and training (for example 
construction workshops) and stipends for apprentices in shortage occupations. 
The remaining sum is allocated to vocational education and training institu-
tions via a decentralised system of tenders.
1 This section is based mainly 
on Odrobina (2012).
Changing financing 
and institutional arrange-
ments in vocational 
education and training
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The financing of school-based training also changed: the previous cost-based 
system is being replaced by normative block-funding – 440,000 forints per 
student per year in 2012. The rate is to be set by the budgetary act each year.
The rate of the income replacement allowance payable to job seekers taking 
part in training has changed and it will be paid according to the public works 
wage rather than the minimum wage.
The National Register of Qualifications (in Hungarian: Országos Képzési 
Jegyzék, OKJ) was revised. The aim was to streamline the system and elimi-
nate overlapping vocational qualifications as well as creating a solid founda-
tion for basic skills. In line with the modular character of the OKJ, the list 
and content of each module was published in relevant government decrees. 
The content of vocational qualifications is set out by ministerial decrees based 
on these modules.
Main legislation
Act CLXXXVII of 2011 on vocational education and training; Act CLV of 
2011 on the vocational training contribution and the development of vocational 
education; Government decree 280/2011 (20 December) on normative fund-
ing rates for apprenticeships and other discounts that can be used to calculate 
the rate of the vocational training contribution; Government decree 150/2012 
(6 July) on the National Register of Qualifications and governmental proce-
dures for the revision of the National Register of Qualifications; MfNE decree 
27/2012 (27 August) on the vocational and examination requirements of voca-
tional qualifications under the authority of the minister for national economy.
On-line resources: munka.hu; tkki.hu
3. Job rotation and job sharing
There were no changes in the area of job rotation and job sharing.
4. Employment incentives
The most important change in the area of employment incentives was the trans-
formation of the Start schemes, previously financed by the contribution of em-
ployees and offering targeted contribution assistance. Although Start-extra 
and Start-plus cards issued earlier remain valid, after 1 January, 2012 only Start 
Bonus and Start cards can be issued. Eligibility and the claims process for the 
new schemes are similar to those of previous Start schemes.
To be eligible to claim a Start Bonus card individuals must:
– be registered as job seekers for at least three consecutive months leading up 
to their claim, or
– take up paid employment within a year (365 days) after claiming parental 
benefits or carer’s allowance, or
– take up paid employment after the first birthday of their child while still 
claiming child care allowance, and
Renewed OKJ  
– detailed rules  
and content for modules
Changing Start cards
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– be out of work, and
– aged under the retirement age, and
– not be in possession of a valid Start, Start-plus or Start-extra card.
The Start Bonus card provides a tax allowance for employers from the social 
contribution tax that replaced the national insurance contribution. The rate 
of the tax relief is 27% of the pre-tax wage and this can be applied to wages up 
to 150% of the minimum wage in the first year of employment. Employers can 
draw on the tax relief if the employment period is longer than 30 days and the 
working time is no less than four hours per day.
The card is valid for one year after the date of issue, but up to the retirement 
age of the card holder. Individuals who have claimed parental benefits or car-
er’s allowance are eligible to claim a Start Bonus card more than once – under 
certain conditions stipulated by the regulation – after each period they have 
claimed any of these benefits (i.e. if they were on parental leave more than once 
etc.). However people who are using a Start Bonus card while claiming child 
care allowance cannot be issued a new card after its expiry if they remain in 
employment after the payment of their child care allowance had seized.
In terms of wage subsidies, both the scope of eligible employers and employees 
was extended. Social cooperatives are newly eligible employers that can receive 
assistance of up to 70% of the pre-tax wage. Some of the previous restrictions 
on the eligibility of employees were lifted: people under 25 years do not need 
to be new entrants to qualify for wage subsidy, people registered as job seekers 
for six months or longer do not have to undergo a work readiness test and the 
category of long term jobseekers for 24 months has been abolished. However, 
jobseekers who live with their family are only eligible if the other family mem-
bers are not in employment.
A new form of subsidy for workers with partial work capacity introduced in 
2012 was the rehabilitation card that exempts employers from the social con-
tribution tax on wages of up to twice the minimum wage. People who were re-
ceiving group 3 disability pension or regular social assistance on 31 December 
2012, or were assessed as suitable for vocational rehabilitation or employment 
with long-term subsidy after 1 January, 2012 are eligible for the card. People 
within five years from state pension age and those who were receiving group 1 
or 2 disability pension on 31 December, 2012 are not eligible.
As of 1 July, 2012 people with partial work capacity who are self-employed or 
individual members of a business are also exempt from the payment of social 
contribution on their income.2 Its rate is equal to the discount provided by the 
rehabilitation card. It should be noted that as of 2012 the assistance is paid on 
the basis of potential employability for employees, however for employers in 
the latter group it is paid according to the degree of impairment.
As of 2012 employers with a minimum of 25 employees must meet the em-
ployment quota for disabled workers as opposed to the previous limit of 20 
2 And further groups set out by 
the Act as eligible.
Wage subsidies 
– more people will access 
and be eligible for them
Contribution relief 
for people with 
partial work capacity
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employees. Workers with partial work capacity are counted in the quota if 
their loss of work capacity is at least 50% or the degree of their Whole Body 
Impairment is not less than 40%. For any unfilled quota employers must pay 
a penalty of HUF 964,500 per position per year.
There were no changes in the area of job protection and job creation subsidies. 
However a number of new tax credit schemes were created to counter the effect 
of new income tax regulations that can be regarded as a form of job protection 
subsidy because they have a similar effect – although they are implemented 
differently. The intervention protects those already in employment and keeps 
the non-employed out of the labour market through the effect of expected pay 
increase that prevents wage adjustment. This is discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 14 on wage negotiation and wage regulation.
Main legislation
Government decree 69/2012 (6 April) on assistance to maintain the real value 
of wages (wage compensation assistance), and amending the Government De-
cree on the expected rate of wage increase to maintain the real value of wages in 
2012 and the value of non-wage payments that can be included in this.
On-line resources: munka.hu
5. Sheltered employment and vocational rehabilitation
There were changes in both the regulation and institutional framework of vo-
cational rehabilitation and health impairment assistance in the period studied.
People with partial work capacity who have been found suitable for vocational 
rehabilitation by the comprehensive assessment, can qualify for rehabilitation 
assistance. This new form of assistance replaces a range of previous benefits in-
cluding the rehabilitation allowance, disability and accident-related pensions, 
regular social assistance, temporary assistance and the health impairment al-
lowance of miners – see also Section 13 on old age pensions.
The National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (in Hungarian: 
Nemzeti Rehabilitációs és Szociális Hivatal, NRSZH) was established on 1 
January, 2011 and is responsible for the accreditation of companies employing 
people with partial work capacity and the administration of public assistance 
and subsidies (in the case of wage subsidy for vocational rehabilitation this is 
limited to technical assistance).
On 1 July, 2012 a network of new rehabilitation management authorities 
was established under the supervision of the NRSZH and under the scope of 
municipal and county government offices. Their area of competence are identi-
cal with those of government offices (includes Pest county in Budapest). Tasks 
previously carried out by three different authorities (NRSZH, government 
offices and jobcentres) have been delegated to the new rehabilitation manage-
ment authorities from 1 July, 2012. National Pension Insurance directorates 
remain responsible for the payment of rehabilitation benefits.
Job protection and  
creation: no changes. 
Wage compensation
New network of institu-
tions: rehabilitation 
management authorities
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The 19 rehabilitation management authorities operate in approximately 100 
local offices (customer services) with 620 staff. Their main objective is to help 
people receiving rehabilitation assistance to return to the labour market. They 
provide the same range of services that the employment service provides on the 
basis of Ministry of Economy decree 30/2000 (15 September). For job broker-
age services they use the database of job centres.
People claiming rehabilitation assistance must take part in public works if 
their health status allows. Vocational rehabilitation and sheltered employ-
ment are financed from wage subsidy and cost compensation appropriations 
set out in the budget act. These were 11.7 billion forints and 24.5 billion for-
ints respectively in 2012. The NRSZH will be the beneficiary of the new SROP 
Project 1.1.1 that will be implemented in cooperation with the rehabilitation 
management authorities. The other EU-funded programme – that is coming 
to an end – is still managed by the employment service.
Main legislation
Act CXCI of 2011 on assistance for people with partial work capacity and the 
amendment of certain acts; Government decree 327/2011 (29 December) on 
procedural rules for assistance to people with partial work capacity; Ministry 
of Human Resources decree 7/2012 (14 February) on comprehensive assess-
ment; Ministry of Human Resources MHR decree 8/2012 (21 February) on 
vocational rehabilitation experts; Government decree 95/2012 (15 May) on 
the National Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs and the responsi-
bilities and jurisdiction of rehabilitation management authorities under its 
management; Government decree 238/2012 (30 August) amending Govern-
ment decree 177/2005 (2 September) on public assistance to the employment 
of people with partial work capacity.
On-line resources: nrszh.kormany.hu; kormany.hu
6. Direct job creation
The largest active measure of current Hungarian labour market policy – simi-
larly to the previous year – is employment in public works (see also Section 16 
on financing and funding priorities). This includes short- and longer term public 
works, national public works projects and Start-work demonstration projects 
at the level of small regions. The main features of the programme remained 
by-and-large unchanged apart from working time which increased more than 
four hours per day in the majority of projects in 2012 – based on experiences 
from 2011. It also includes mobility assistance for public works as well as assis-
tance for businesses to employ people claiming out-of-work assistance [the ac-
tual Hungarian benefit is called “foglalkoztatást helyettesítő támogatás” (fht), 
translated as Employment Replacement Support]; however neither of these 
has been claimed (in the first case the incomplete regulatory framework might 
have contributed to this). Public works programmes continue to be managed 
The fine tuning 
of the public works scheme 
continued
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by the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry for National Economy is respon-
sible for managing the public works appropriation of the National Employ-
ment Fund (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Alap, NFA; previously 
the Labour Market Fund, LMF in Hungarian: Munkaerő-piaci Alap, MpA) 
and undertaking financial commitments, and job centres are responsible for 
the contracting and payment of public works employers and employees. Fund-
ing comes from the public works appropriations of the National Employment 
Fund, and the appropriations of the SROP 1.1.2/1.1.4 programmes – for re-
lated training programmes. The demonstration programmes that had started 
in 2011 continued in 2012: in the 94 small regional Start-work demonstration 
programmes more than 1,600 settlements and approximately 66,000 workers 
participated in the first eight months of the year (National Labour Office data).
There are seven different types of public works programmes that local coun-
cils can take part in:
1) Agricultural projects – animal husbandry, crop cultivation or both (provi-
sion of machinery, seedlings, polytunnels etc. for participants),
2) Maintenance of dirt roads used for agricultural purposes,
3) Drainage,
4) Clearing up illegal landfill sites,
5) Organic and renewable energy production (for example switch over to bio 
boilers, the production of grass, shrub and log briquettes etc.),
6) Maintenance of public roads,
7) Winter and other “meaningful” employment (for example preservation, 
drying and pickling of vegetables and fruits, making pasta, maintenance of 
local council buildings etc.).
Agricultural programmes run throughout the year while other programmes 
typically last for five months. One person can participate in only one pro-
gramme at a time. The deadline for local councils to set up new Start-work 
demonstration projects was extended until 1 July, 2014.
Changes in legislation make it possible for Start-work demonstration projects 
(mainly agricultural projects) to become self-supporting and establish social 
cooperatives, and under certain conditions equipment purchased in demon-
stration projects can be transferred to social cooperatives. Currently the aim 
is to establish social cooperatives over the next two years; the elaboration of 
details is still underway. There are approximately 300 social cooperatives in 
Hungary and around 40 demonstration projects might become self-sustaining 
and turn into social cooperatives in the future.
Main legislation
Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code; Government decree 375/2010 (31 Decem-
ber) on assistance for public works programmes; Act CVI of 2011 on public 
works and on the amendment of public works related and other legislation; 
Government decree 169/2011 (24 August) on the Employment and Public 
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Works Database; Government decree 170/2011 (24 August) on wage setting 
and guaranteed wage in public works employment.
On-line resources: belugyminiszterium; nfsz
7. Start-up incentives
There were no significant changes in the regulation of start-up incentives.
On-line resources: munka.hu
Supports
8. Unemployment (job seeker’s) benefits and assistance
There were significant changes in the characteristics and rates of job seekers’ and 
social benefits awarded after 1 September, 2011 – this was discussed in detail 
in last year’s volume of the Hungarian Labour Market (Busch–Cseres-Gergely, 
2012, Table 2). Changes in the current period mainly resulted from changes in 
related regulations, such as increases linked to changes in the statutory mini-
mum wage or minimum pension. Nevertheless the rate of out-of-work assis-
tance and regular social assistance (RSA) was reduced and eligibility criteria 
for job seekers’ allowance were tightened. Eligibility criteria for pre-retirement 
job seeker’s allowance were somewhat relaxed. The situation at the end of the 
period is summarised in Table 1.
table 1: main characteristics of job seekers’ and working age benefits, as at 30 august, 2012*
Type of assistance Eligibility criteria Rate
Job seeker’s allowance (paid 
for a minimum of 36 and a 
maximum of 90 days)
At least 360 qualifying days within three years** 10 
qualifying days correspond to one day of benefit pay-
ment
Sixty per cent of the wage on which labour market contribu-
tion is paid but up to 100% of the minimum wage on the 
first day of benefit payment: 93,000 forints/month, 3,100 
forints/day
Pre-retirement job seeker’s 
benefit
Within five years from pensionable age, has received 
job seekers’ allowance for at least 45 days and ex-
hausted entitlement and within three years from eligi-
ble age, has enough qualifying years for old age pen-
sion and is not receiving any pre-retirement benefits, 
perpetuity for retired ballet dancers and benefits for 
ex-miners.
Forty per cent of the minimum wage: 37,200 forints/month, 
1,240 forints/day.
Out-of-work assistance People of working age can qualify for this if they are 
not eligible for regular social assistance. At least 30 
days of employment or participation in labour market 
programmes, accepting any job offers regardless of the 
level of qualification required and keeping their own 
local environment tidy, if required by the local council.
Eighty per cent of the minimum old age pension, 22,800 
forints/month
Regular social assistance No significant changes Depends on family income but up to 42,326 forints/month, 
if family member is receiving out-of-work assistance the 
maximum amount of RSA can be 19,526 forints/month
* Italics indicate changes from 2011.
** Qualifying days are any days in employment, self-employment or as an individual  
member of a business provided that contributions have been duly paid.
Minor changes 
in the conditions 
of job seekers’ benefits
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The following minor changes are entering into force:
1) The period for calculating eligibility for job seekers’ allowance has been re-
duced from five to three years. Claimants must have at least 360 qualifying 
days within this period.
2) In the eligibility criteria for unemployment assistance the term “employ-
ment” is being replaced by the more general “qualifying period”.
3) Any unpaid leave over 30 days for the volunteer military reserve force is 
taken into account when establishing eligibility for job seekers’ allowance. 
The payment of the allowance is suspended for the duration of the volun-
teer military service.
4) Job seekers’ allowance can be paid from the day when the claim was submit-
ted even if the employee terminated the employment or was dismissed for 
misconduct. Previously, payment in these cases could only start after 90 days.
5) If the job seeker is looking for work abroad, the payment of the assistance 
does not need to be terminated. The reason is that this is not possible un-
der current regulations: job seekers are required to inform the employment 
service that they will be looking for work abroad at least 21 days in advance. 
Therefore eligibility will be exhausted within less than three months of their 
stay. This time is not sufficient to get to the first meeting set out in the co-
operation agreement.
6) Temporary assistance for migrant workers can be paid for up to 60 days in-
stead of 180 days.
7) To be eligible for pre-retirement job seekers’ allowance job seekers must have 
received job seekers’ allowance for 45 days rather than 90 days.
8) If a job seeker is not receiving any pre-retirement assistance (previously early 
pension), perpetuity for retired ballet dancers or benefits for ex-miners, they 
are entitled to pre-retirement job seekers’ allowance. The National Employ-
ment Service notifies the pension authority regarding this. In the future these 
payments will no longer be called “assistance” but provision.
9) If the remaining amount of the job seekers’ allowance is paid as a lump-sum 
for job seekers who obtain employment while claiming the allowance, the 
rules that were in force when the allowance was awarded must be applied.
Main legislation
Paragraph 1 Article 44, Paragraph 1 Article 52, points e), f), h), i), j) Article 
53, points g), h) Article 54, Article 48 of Act CXCI of 2011 on assistance for 
people with partial work capacity and the amendment of certain acts, Articles 
25–26 of Act CLXVII of 2011 on the abrogation of early pensions and on pre-
retirement provisions and professional allowance.
On-line resources: munka.hu
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9. Early retirement
Early retirement with state pension is no longer possible in Hungary from 1 
January, 2012. Early retirement pensions were replaced by non-pension ben-
efits – for more details see Section 13 on old age pensions.
Mixed interventions (complex programmes)
This policy combines a range of interventions for participants. These pro-
grammes are typically funded from European Union sources and are im-
plemented under Priority 1 of the Social Renewal Operational Programme 
(SROP) that includes projects 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and project 1.1.4. These are briefly 
summarised by Busch–Cseres-Gergely (2012) and detailed descriptions can be 
found in the Operational Programme’s Action Plan. Legal changes only af-
fected the financing of projects and they are discussed in detail in the section 
on the financing of employment policy at the end of this chapter.
Main legislation
Government decision 1013/2011 (19 February) on the approval of SROP Ac-
tion Plan for 2011–2013; Government decision 1094/2011 (13 April) amend-
ing certain development-related government decisions; Government decision 
1230/2011 (5 July) on involving the National Tax and Customs Administra-
tion (NTCA) as a beneficiary in the implementation of SROP priority pro-
ject 1.2.1 and amending SROP action plans for 2007–2008 and 2009–2010; 
Government decision 1276/2011 (10 August) amending SROP Action Plan 
for 2011–2013 and SROP Action Plan for 2011–2013; Government decision 
1453/2011 (22 December) amending SROP Action Plan for 2011–2013 and 
Social Infrastructure Operational Programme Action Plan for 2011–2013; 
Government decision 1235/2012 (12 July) on Priority 1 and 2 for SROP Action 
Plan 2011–2013; Government decision 1282/2012. (6 August) on the realloca-
tion of resources within priorities 3 and 5 of SROP Action Plan for 2011–2013.
On-line resources: munka.hu
Labour market reLated poLIcy measures
10. Labour taxation
There were various changes in the regulation of personal income tax that could 
potentially affect the labour market. The most important change was that the 
single-rate personal income tax effectively became a dual-rate system. The tax 
rate is 16% if the gross annual income is under 2,424,000 forints. If the gross 
annual income is more than this, then the same 16% rate applies but the taxable 
base is 127% of the gross annual income. Thus, there are de facto two personal 
income tax rates: 16% and 20.3%. The latter corresponds to the universal in-
come tax rate in 2011 so overall the tax rate for people earning less than 2.424 
million forints per year decreased. However, given that tax credits were abol-
De facto two-tiered 
personal income taxation
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ished the tax burden on people on lowest income increased, while it reduced 
progressively for those nearer the upper end of the tax band.
Those who are both letting and renting properties can deduct the rent they 
pay from their rental income. This might promote geographical mobility by re-
ducing the tax burden on people who manage to let their difficult-to-sell prop-
erties. It is difficult to predict the effect of the decision that exempted hous-
ing subsidies from taxation in 2012: if the subsidies will be directed mainly to 
house buyers then it will reduce mobility, however if they support renting, it 
might have a positive effect on mobility.
There were other changes in personal income taxation that were indirectly 
related to the labour market such as the introduction of Széchenyi leisure card 
and Erzsébet voucher schemes.
There were changes in the rules of simplified business tax. The tax rate rose 
from 30% to 37% and now businesses with a maximum revenue of 30 million 
forints per year – previously 25 million forints – can opt into this scheme. Af-
ter these changes the simplified business tax is even more beneficial to slightly 
larger micro-enterprises with a low cost-ratio.
There were various changes in the payment of vocational training contribu-
tion, particularly the different ways to fulfil this obligation. All those who are 
subject to this tax can pay directly – the rate is 1.5% of the taxable income base. 
Since 1 January, 2012 only companies organising practical training for their 
employees can reduce their contributions by 440,000 forints/person/year. It 
is no longer possible for companies to deduct the amount spent on training 
of their employees from the contribution. At the same time more grant fund-
ing was made available to micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises for vo-
cational education and training as well as adult learning in the framework of 
SROP Project 2.1.3.
The top rate of the value added tax increased from 25% to 27% on 1 January, 
2012. On the one hand, this might reduce demand for goods and also labour 
demand. On the other hand it shifts tax burden away from labour to consump-
tion that, on the contrary, might increase demand for labour.
Contributions increased somewhat on 1 January, 2012: the single pension 
contribution rose from 9.5% to 10%, the health services contribution increased 
from 3% to 4% (see Table 2). Employers’ contributions became a social con-
tribution tax – the rates remained the same. The significance of this change 
is that whereas contributions confer an entitlement to receive a social benefit 
or service, taxes are unrequited payments. Tax revenues are general revenues 
and go to the central government budget, while revenues from contributions 
go to earmarked funds.
Health services insurance contribution must be paid by people who are or-
dinarily resident in Hungary and do not have a valid health insurance or are 
not entitled to free health care services; the self-employed and members of 
Tax relief for those  
who are letting  
and renting properties  
at the same time
Increase in simplified 
business tax
Centralised funding 
for vocational edu-
cation and training
VAT increased  
from 25 to 27%
Employer’s contributions 
replaced by a tax
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businesses who are getting a pension. This was 6,390 forints/month or 213 
forints/day in 2012.
table 2: contributions paid by employers and employees, social taxation
Percent
Social security tax and contribution paid by the employer
Social security contribution tax 27.0
Early retirement insurance contribution* 13.0
Paid by the employee
Pension contribution** 10.0
Health care and labour market contributions health services insurance contribution 4.0
health-related benefits insurance contribution 3.0
labour market contribution 1.5
* Twenty-five per cent of the early retirement contribution is paid by the central budget 
therefore the effective rate for employers and the self-employed is 9.75%. Only cer-
tain occupations are subject to this contribution.
** For both members of private pension funds and others. The upper rate of the contri-
bution is 21,700 forints per day.
Income tax rules already favoured higher earners with multiple children in 
2011; however this has been embedded in legislation since 1 January, 2012. The 
definition of family is set out in the law and it is also stipulated that the public 
should share the burden of bringing up children via two main instruments: 
tax reliefs for families and reduced rate contributions for parents returning to 
work after parental leave.
Main legislation
Act CLV of 2011 on vocational training contribution and the development 
of training, amended by Act LXIX of 2012 on taxation. Rules on personal 
income tax, payment of taxes and contributions and simplified business tax 
were amended by Act CLVI of 2011 on the amendment of taxation-related 
laws. Act LXIX on 2012 on taxation provides for the tax exemption of hous-
ing subsidies. The cardinal laws that stipulate the principle of burden sharing 
for families with children are: Act CCXI of 2011 on the protection of fami-
lies and Act CXCIV of 2011 on Hungary’s economic stability. Government 
decision 1067/2012 (20 March) on social cooperatives sets out provisions for 
reduced rate contributions for the employees of social cooperatives.
On-line resource: nav.gov.hu
11. Other transfers
Parental leave arrangements
In addition to taxation, family benefits are also set out in the act on families. 
The law stipulates that the state must contribute to the costs associated with 
pregnancy and caring for children aged less than three years, and to the cost 
of educating children.
Separate act 
on supporting families
Policy statement 
and nursery fees
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The most significant change was that nurseries are allowed to collect fees 
from 15 January, 2012. This fee is intended to cover the difference between 
the income from normative state subsidy and the actual operating cost of the 
nursery; however it is capped at the per capita income for each family.3 Families 
must declare their income and local councils can award exemptions. Families 
with three children or more are exempted from nursery fees by law.
There were no government-funded capital investment programmes to create 
new infrastructure for nurseries, however SROP Project 2.4.5 provided fund-
ing for the development of day care for children below three years of age, and 
regional operational programmes also supported the development of nurseries.
Main legislation
Nursery fees are regulated by Government decree 328/2011 (29 December) 
on fees for child welfare and child protection services and the assessment of 
eligibility.
12. Contractual terms of employment and changes in the Labour Code*
The literature on the sociology of organisations distinguishes two main dimen-
sions of labour flexibility (Atkinson and Meager, 1986):
1) Numerical flexibility: that can be internal or external, or differently, from 
the perspective of labour market transitions, flexible hiring and firing, or 
flexible working time patterns,
2) Functional or organisational flexibility: qualitative changes to the use of la-
bour (for example job rotation for workers with multiple skills, training of 
workers, improved work processes etc.).
In addition to balancing flexibility and security ( flexicurity), that is a key el-
ement of the European Union’s employment strategies, financial or wage 
flexibility is also considered as an important factor in the wage adjustment 
of companies from the perspective of labour economics. Furthermore it is 
worth considering whether flexibility arrangements respond to the needs of 
the employer (as in the above examples) or the needs of workers as well (for 
example family-friend working time arrangements, workforce development, 
work-life balance etc.).
What is their impact on employment?
From a labour market perspective the two main factors of employment legisla-
tion are protection from dismissal and strengthening the position of workers 
in wage bargaining. These two are not unrelated either, and generally the law 
might cover both individual and collective employment rights (and thus have 
an impact on the opportunities of workers’ organisations). Strict employment 
legislation might encourage some employers – those who are negatively affected 
by stricter rules – to take up undeclared employment that is outside the scope 
of labour legislation. At the same time as the increased likelihood of illegal or 
semi-legal employment, weaker sanctions for informal or illegal employment 
3 The actual fee is based on the 
operating cost of the organisa-
tion. There is no statistical data 
on newly introduced fees, news-
paper reports suggest between 
100–220 forints per day, less 
commonly 500 forints.
* Written by: László Neumann
Categories of organisa-
tional flexibility
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practices are themselves sources of flexibility that must be considered in addi-
tion to the analysis of legislation (Tonin, 2009).
Hungarian labour laws were considered as one of the most flexible by Euro-
pean standards or even compared to other countries in Eastern Europe already 
in the mid-2000s (Köllő and Nacsa, 2005). This is also confirmed by compara-
tive analyses of employee protection indicators that mainly focus on protection 
against dismissal of workers (including associated costs and procedural aspects) 
(OECD, 2009, Venn, 2009).4
Situation in August, 2011
Although the Labour Code that was in force until mid-2012 had been adopt-
ed in 1992, regular amendments by successive governments ensured that it 
responded to changing political and economic needs. The range of issues that 
could be regulated by collective or individual agreement according to the needs 
of employers was increasing after 1995, weakening the strong legal protection of 
workers. Minor changes in legislation during the economic crisis also increased 
flexibility (for example the ratification of reduced working time, extending 
the reference period for working time accounts – the period over which the 
number of hours worked can be averaged to calculate the total working time – 
changing the rules on “orderly labour relations”, etc.). These changes aimed to 
protect jobs during the economic downturn as well as facilitate participation 
in public procurement for companies. However, these amendments originally 
intended as transitional measures were made a permanent part of labour leg-
islation by the new Government after 2010.
Before the reform of labour law in 2012 – in a way predicting its future di-
rection – the amendment of the old Labour Code entered into force on 1 Au-
gust, 2011. This allowed the extension of the probationary period to up to six 
months if approved by a collective agreement. There were also changes in the 
regulation of annual leave. If a worker could not fully use their annual leave 
allowance in a given year due to individual circumstances (such as illness) that 
lasted for six months or longer, then the remaining days could be carried over 
to the following year and used within six months – rather than 30 days as in 
the previous system. Also in the previous system, annual leave could be taken 
in more than two instalments only if this was requested by the worker. After 1 
August, employers can also make this decision if it is justified by their business 
interest; although workers are still entitled to at least a continuous period of 
14 days of annual leave each year. The most contested element of the amend-
ment was whether overtime must be paid or can be compensated by time off. 
In the previous system the latter was only allowed if both parties agreed or it 
was set out in relevant regulations (collective agreement), but from 1 August 
– until the new Labour Code came into force – employers had the possibility 
to make a unilateral decision regarding this. Nevertheless the length of time-
off provided must be at least of equal duration to the overtime work.
Labour market flexibility 
was not endangered 
by the protection 
of workers in Hungary
The amendment of the 
old Labour Code entered 
into force on 1 August, 2011
4 Hungary’s ranking on these 
indicators does not suggest at 
all that the level of protection 
would jeopardise labour mar-
ket flexibility. According to the 
OECD’s Employment Protection 
Index in 2008 there were only 10 
countries that had higher overall 
labour market flexibility than 
Hungary. Hungary’s score of 
1.82 is smaller (indicating more 
flexibility) than the OECD aver-
age of 2.11 and Poland’s 2.01, 
Slovakia’s 2.45 or the Czech Re-
public’s 3.0. For detailed flexibil-
ity rankings of Central-Eastern 
European countries by different 
indicators see Tonin (2009).
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On 1 December 2011 the amendments transposing the European Union 
Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work came into effect. The two 
main changes of the Directive concern the temporary nature of agency work 
and the equal treatment of temporary agency workers. These issues were high-
ly controversial and debated for a long time in the EU and the provisions of 
the Directive will have a significant impact on the operation of temporary-
work agencies in Hungary. As regards the temporary nature of agency work, 
the Hungarian legislator took maximum advantage of the provisions and set 
the maximum duration of temporary agency work undertaken by the same 
user at five years including any renewal or new assignment within six months 
from the end of the previous assignment, regardless of the temporary-work 
agency. Temporary agency workers are entitled to the same basic working and 
employment conditions, including pay and other benefits that would apply 
had they been recruited directly by the company to occupy the same job. The 
only exemption from this during the first 184 days of employment is when 
the temporary agency worker has a permanent contract of employment with 
a temporary-work agency and continues to be paid between assignments, or is 
considered absent from the labour market for an extended period of time, or is 
assigned to work for a company with majority ownership by the local council 
or a non-profit public benefit organisation. (The latter essentially covers tem-
porary agency work within public works employment that was re-regulated 
by a government decree in September 2011.)
Situation between September 2011 and September 2012
The main development of this period was, undoubtedly, the adoption of the new 
Labour Code in December 2011. Major work on the re-conceptualisation of 
labour legislation was commissioned by previous governments before the cri-
sis; however, for political reasons this has never reached legislative stage. It was 
argued that the need for a new Code was justified by changes in the structure 
of the economy since 1992 (the dominance of private ownership, the share of 
small- and medium sized enterprises, the spread of atypical forms of employ-
ment, increased demand for flexibility) and the failure to meet the original le-
gal and policy objectives from 1992 (expanding the playing field of collective 
agreements). The new law was also justified by tasks arising from the harmoni-
sation of EU law, and its Preamble even refers to the European Commission’s 
Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law in the 21st century based on the EU’s 
Lisbon Strategy (EC, 2006) as well as academic debates and legal solutions 
in Member States. These highlighted legal measures necessary to create flex-
ible employment conditions while maintaining the social security of workers.
The main direction of the Labour Code that entered into force in 2012 – sim-
ilarly to the amendments of the old Labour Code – is aimed at increasing the 
flexibility of employment; however it also creates a new conceptual framework 
for this. Although the Government published the proposal in June, consulta-
Transposition of the EU 
directive on temporary 
agency work
The main objective  
of the new Labour Code: 
increasing the flexibility 
of employment
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tions with trade unions were protracted.5 The act – that was also amended by 
the act on transitional provisions adopted in June 2012 – entered into force 
on 1 July, 2012, however certain provisions only apply from 1 January, 2013.
In terms of legal theory, the main innovation of the new law is that it shifts 
the approach of the regulation from public to private law. This breaks the tra-
ditional protective function of labour law that aimed to balance out the asym-
metric bargaining positions of the two sides of an employment relationship and 
at protecting workers in the weaker market position. Therefore the new La-
bour Code allows more scope for collective and individual agreements and by 
default these can even be unfavourable for employees. (In the old act this was 
the exception, only in exceptional cases could these agreements be unfavour-
able for employees.) On the other hand, where the act provides for minimum 
standards (for example the limit for compulsory overtime), these standards 
were lowered. Thus in terms of flexibility of employment, the only limitations 
are those provided by Hungary’s international commitments (EU directives, 
ILO agreements). The possibility or prohibition of deviation from the provi-
sions of the law by collective agreement or individual employment contract is 
highlighted in a separate article at the end of each chapter in the Labour Code.6
The detailed overview and interpretation of the Labour Code is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, and there is also an abundance of literature – aimed at 
facilitating the application of the law – published since the new Code entered 
into force.7 (This seems necessary, though the new law from a legal technical 
point is admittedly – even by its critics – better than the old one, it can hardly 
be considered user-friendly. A number of earlier provisions are not set out in 
detail and their applicability can only be inferred from other articles, the justi-
fication of legislation and related legislation – such as the general principles of 
conduct or the Civil Code.) Therefore this analysis concentrates on flexibility 
measures that are relevant from a labour market perspective and follows the 
typology of labour flexibility in the literature on the sociology of organisa-
tions presented earlier. The description highlights only the main elements of 
provisions, it does not aim to provide a detailed description of legal conditions, 
nor does it discuss the potential impact of the implementation of the new law.
With regards to the flexibility of individual employment, the new law makes 
it easier to change the quantity of labour (external and internal numerical flex-
ibility). In terms of recruitment, the already mentioned extension of the pro-
bationary period is a measure – in principle available to both employers and 
employees – that allows the termination of employment without justification 
and consequences. The new Labour Code retained the earlier provision that the 
maximum length of the probationary period allowed by a collective agreement 
can be six months. The employment contract must give details of the length of 
the probationary period, and in the absence of a collective agreement this can 
be up to three months. If the probationary period is shorter than this, it can 
Re-conceptualisation 
of labour law: 
private law approach 
instead of public law
5 The social dialogue process will 
be discussed later (for more de-
tails see Tóth, 2012).
6 The possibility of deviation 
is also pointed out by trade un-
ion commentators (for exam-
ple Czuglerné, 2012, Schnider, 
2012).
7 Various textbooks (Gyulavári, 
2012) and manuals (for example 
Horváth, 2012; Pál et al. 2012; 
Bankó et al. 2012) provide a de-
tailed interpretation of the act. 
The latter can be purchased in an 
electronic format that is regular-
ly updated (Complex labour law 
e-commentary). Furthermore, 
readers with a general interest 
in labour law might find useful 
information on some thematic 
websites such as the blogs of 
Gábor Kártyás and others, and 
publications targeted at specific 
groups – employers, employees 
(Bodnár, 2012; Kártyás and 
Takács, 2012).
The new act mainly 
facilitates quantitative 
changes in the workforce
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be extended – once – by mutual agreement, however the total length of the 
extended probationary period should not exceed three months.
Employment contracts can pertain to full- or part-time, as well as fixed-term 
or permanent employment. The new Labour Code does not state how many 
times a fixed-term employment contract can be extended, however its length 
in total should not exceed five years. A new, family-friendly provision allows 
employees to reduce working hours by half until their children reach the age 
of three. A new feature of the law is the incorporation of atypical forms of em-
ployment (part-time on-call work, job-sharing, working for multiple employers, 
tele-work, home-based work, simplified employment or casual work). The law 
regulates a broader range of these by allowing the parties to agree on a number 
of issues. Temporary agency work remains to be a special type of employment 
where only the nature of the work or job and basic pay must be agreed in ad-
vance, information about the location of work and other working conditions 
can be provided later.
From the perspective of labour market flexibility the revised regulation of 
the termination of employment by the employer is of key importance. It is not 
accidental that during the preparation of the new law this was the area that 
came under attack the most and legislators were forced to change their propos-
als in a number of areas, such as the prohibition and protection from dismissal 
or termination of employment without justification. Groups that were under 
prohibition or protection from dismissal remained in the new law as a result of 
compromises however detailed regulations changed significantly. (For exam-
ple the rule that allows employers to dismiss members of these groups due to 
issues relating to the ability of the employee or the operation of the employer 
might offer loopholes.) At the same time the new law also allows employers to 
dismiss workers during different forms of unpaid leave (illness, parental leave, 
caring for relatives etc.). In these cases the notice period starts after the em-
ployer has returned to work. The statutory notice period is 30 days and it in-
creases according to the length of service. However, a new provision is that if 
the employee initiates the termination of employment, the notice period does 
not increase, it remains 30 days. Although the basic rules of collective dismissal 
did not change, the rights of trade unions in relation to it did change: employ-
ers are not required to consult the trade union even in the absence of a works 
council. For temporary agency workers the notice period was changed to 15 
days as opposed to the previous regulation that provided for 30 days if the du-
ration of employment reached one year.
In addition to the limitations and procedural rules of dismissal, its costs to 
employers are also relevant. Apart from costs associated with the notice peri-
od, the most important cost is redundancy pay. Statutory redundancy pay de-
creased somewhat. The law still stipulates that redundancy pay is three to six 
months’ pay, but the length of service is calculated as the period up to the first 
Separate chapter on  
atypical employment
Less costly and easier  
to dismiss workers
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day of the notice period rather than the last day. Furthermore, while redun-
dancy pay was based on average pay previously, in the current system it is based 
on the absence pay that is often lower because it excludes non-salary payments 
(premiums or bonuses). According to the new law employees are not entitled to 
redundancy pay if they have been dismissed on the basis of discipline or their 
skills and which are unrelated to their health status. The additional redundancy 
pay for older workers was reduced from three months’ pay to between one and 
three months based on the length of employment. As a general rule the length 
of the notice period and the amount of redundancy pay can be increased by 
collective agreement, however this is prohibited in publicly owned companies.
A special aspect of the costs associated with dismissal, although a highly rel-
evant one from the perspective of everyday practice, is the legal consequences 
of unfair dismissal. According to the old law if the court established that the 
dismissal was unfair the employee could be reinstated in their original job. 
This has no longer been a general requirement in the new law since July and it 
is only possible under specific circumstances. The legislators argued that this 
was justified by the general experience that most employees did not want to 
return to their job and asked for compensation instead. Employers who were 
found guilty of unfair dismissal had to pay compensation and salary to em-
ployees up to the entry into force of the court ruling. In practice, due to de-
lays in court procedures, this could amount to years of pay. The new Labour 
Code drastically reduced the amount of pay for unfair dismissal to up to 12 
months’ absence pay.
The new regulation of working time and time off helps the flexible adapta-
tion of employers. On the one hand, the new law extended the possibilities for 
employers to adjust working time in response to changes in demand. There-
fore the new regulation extended the upper limit of compulsory overtime to 
250 hours from 200 hours. A collective agreement – similarly to the previous 
regulation – may allow even more: up to 300 hours. The work schedule must 
still be notified at least a week in advance and given to the employee in writ-
ing. However, the new law allows employers to change the schedule up to four 
days prior to a given day if there are unforeseen circumstances in their opera-
tion. The regulation of the reference period did not change, however irregu-
lar working time patterns can be introduced using “working time banks”, a 
new tool that allow employees – similarly to a reference period of four to 12 
months – to average their weekly working hours over a longer period of time. 
Such reference periods of “working time banks”, however, can be started flex-
ibly, even in consecutive weeks. This creates a flexible working time bank that 
allows employers to manage working hours on a “quasi-rolling” basis. The new 
Labour Code introduced the concept of “unbound” working time that al-
lows employees to set their own working pattern. This must be authorised by 
the employer in writing and justified by the nature or requirements of the job. 
Risks associated with un-
lawful dismissal: com-
pensation instead of con-
tinued employment 
– lower than previously
Reference period 
to facilitate more flexible 
working time management
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“Unbound” working time is when an employee is managing on average at least 
half of their own weekly working time. Employees working in a flexible pat-
tern are not required to fill in time sheets.
The additional annual leave for parents with children was retained in the 
new Labour Code and both fathers and mothers are entitled to this. Fathers 
are also entitled to five days of paid paternity leave that must be used within 
two months of the birth of their child.
In addition to the extent of flexibility, its cost is also an important regula-
tory consideration. Therefore the law changed the regulation of pay rates re-
lated to different working patterns. Flexible working might be disadvanta-
geous to some workers because they are not entitled to compensation or pay 
for overtime. More importantly, new regulations were introduced for night 
and shift work pay rates. According to the new Labour Code additional rates 
must be paid by employers that operate on a multiple shift basis which means 
that they operate for at least 80 hours per week. This means that they must 
employ at least two shifts of full-time (40 hours per week) workforce. Over-
lapping shifts – when two eight-hour-long shifts are overlapping – are not 
considered multiple shifts. In multiple-shift operations workers are entitled 
to a wage supplement of 30% for work between 6pm and 6am, if they work 
regularly in variable shifts. Those who do not work shifts are entitled to a 15% 
wage supplement for any night work if its duration is more than one hour. 
The wage supplement for afternoon shifts was abolished. For work on Sunday 
during regular business hours (for example in the retail sector) workers are 
entitled to a wage supplement of 50% rather than 100%. Organisations that 
operate on a continuous basis are not required to pay a wage supplement for 
work on Sunday. The wage supplement for working on public holidays was 
reduced from 200% to 100%.
The wage supplement for overtime (irregular working time) is 50% and – as 
a step back from a previous amendment – it can only be compensated by time 
off based on individual agreement or specific provisions. The wage supplement 
rate for on-call working is 20%, and for standby work it is 40%. The new La-
bour Code allows parties to agree a flat-rate pay that includes the basic wage 
and supplements for shift work, on-call or standby work. This does not need 
to be set out by a collective agreement; it can be based on an individual agree-
ment between the employer and the employee. This not only reduces the ad-
ministrative burden but also might reduce wage costs. An extreme example 
would be people who are paid the statutory minimum wage working night 
shifts or Sundays. According to the provisions of transitional legislation, un-
der the same working conditions the flat-rate pay must not be lower than the 
monthly average pay of the employer in the previous year. Nevertheless – in 
the long run and in the case of new entrants – this creates a strong bargaining 
opportunity for employers to reduce wage costs.
Lower wage supplements 
– flexibility at a lower cost
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Some other provisions of the new law also offer – limited – opportunities 
for wage adjustment and even a reduction in pay. On the one hand for time 
away from work employees must be paid an absence pay rather than the aver-
age pay. The absence pay might be lower than the average pay because it does 
not include certain elements of pay. On the other hand the new law allows 
employers to withdraw their unilateral written or verbal promise of a wage in-
crease (if it had not been included in a contract) if important changes in their 
operation would make this very difficult to fulfil or would put an unreason-
able burden on the employer.
The legislator also aimed to reduce the financial risk of employers: employees 
who either “take payments or valuables from third parties or pay them money 
or hand over valuables as part of their job” must pay a deposit. This cannot be 
more than one month’s basic pay. The increased liability of workers for dam-
ages arising out of negligence is also intended to minimise employers’ risks. Ac-
cording to the law that was in force on 30 June, 2012 this could be up to 50% 
of the average monthly pay. In the new legislation – as the main rule – this can 
be up to four months’ absence pay but a collective agreement can provide for 
a diversion in both directions and it can be increased to up to eight months’ 
absence pay. The same liability provisions apply for inventory shortages. On 
the other hand the new law reduces employers’ liability towards employees, for 
example they are exempt from liability if they provide evidence that the dam-
age was caused by circumstances outside their control and it would have been 
unreasonable to expect them to avoid or avert the circumstances in which the 
damage has arisen.
The Labour Code has always had provisions for certain forms of functional 
flexibility; nevertheless the new law simplifies work outside the scope of the 
employment contract such as the re-assignment, posting and transfer of work-
ers. The new law uses the concept of employment outside the scope of the work 
contract for work in a different job, location or for a different employer. Under 
certain conditions an employer can order workers to perform work outside the 
scope of their employment contract; however its annual maximum duration 
was reduced by the new law. While in the previous system this could reach 
110 days per year, or even longer under a collective agreement, the new Labour 
Code allows a total of 44 working days or 352 hours, nevertheless a collective 
agreement or individual employment contract might provide differently.
To some extent the different types of employment contract mentioned pre-
viously also facilitate flexibility: job sharing, employment by multiple employ-
ers and part-time on-call work. The last one is particularly interesting because 
the legislator tried to transfer an existing practice of “zero-hour contract” from 
Western Europe to Hungary, thus the new law is not only responding to em-
ployers’ demands but actively tries to promote the introduction of atypical 
forms of employment. Nevertheless forms of employment that are considered 
Indemnity: 
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innovative in the sociology of work literature, organisational learning and 
conditions for in-work training and professional development are somewhat 
neglected by the new law – this was no different in the old Labour Code. In-
work training and professional development is only regulated in relation to 
study agreements and contrary to earlier practice, employers are not required 
to provide leave for workers participating in formal education – except those 
in primary and lower secondary education.8
An inherent characteristic of employment is the hierarchical relationship be-
tween employer and employee. A number of provisions of the new Labour Code 
reinforce this hierarchy. For example employees’ conduct must reflect the trust 
of their employer to perform the duties of the job. According to the justification 
of legislation this is “the new quality measure of work”, a general – therefore 
extending beyond the scope of work – principle of conduct that naturally fol-
lows from the nature of employment based on trust. Alongside this, the legal 
consequences for a breach of the employment contract were revised in the act. 
As a general rule, sanctions can be set out by a collective agreement, however 
if there is no collective agreement, they can be stipulated in the employment 
contract. At the same time the legislator aimed to counterbalance the weaker 
bargaining position of individual employees by prescribing a new requirement 
of conduct for employers: they must take into “reasonable consideration” the 
interest of the employee and should not cause “disproportionate harm”.
The Labour Code – similarly to the old one – allows for sectoral regulations 
in separate acts. These are most likely in transport and health care, however a 
new provision is that they are not limited to the regulation of working time 
and time off but also have provisions for industrial action, i.e. the level of essen-
tial services and the emergency measures that the government can introduce. 
For example in public transport 66% of services on local and commuter routes 
and 50% on national and regional routes must be operated during industrial 
action. The provisions on health care emergency situations were incorporated 
into the act on water supply and adopted in December 2011.
The act on civil servants tries to introduce some flexibility into public sector 
employment. A number of measures facilitate flexible employment: the amend-
ment of appointments, temporary employment outside the scope of appoint-
ment, temporary transfer, assignment, posting, assignment due to government 
interest, permanent transfer etc. are all regulated by the act. The implementing 
decree sets out detailed rules for the working time and time-off of civil servants, 
tele-working, and public holidays. (The scope of the act covers civil servants 
at both the local and central levels of public administration, the armed forces 
and civil servants employed by other authorities. It should be noted that sepa-
rate acts and implementing decrees regulate the employment of judges, pros-
ecutors, professional and contract soldiers but these are not presented here.) 
There is a separate implementing decree on the qualification requirements for 
Employers must take  
employees’ interests  
into “reasonable  
consideration”
8 According to various surveys 
employers in Hungary provide 
less training to their employees 
in comparison to other Euro-
pean countries (Eurofound , 
2012). Apart from the legislative 
framework, workplace training 
is also influenced by financing 
conditions. In this respect, the 
fact that vocational training con-
tribution can no longer be used to 
finance local workplace training 
is clearly a negative development 
because the Government is using 
this to centralise the manage-
ment of vocational education 
and training.
Sectoral rules on essential 
services during industrial 
action
More flexible employment 
also in the public sector
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civil servants and detailed disciplinary rules and procedures. The act stipu-
lates the general rules of employment in civil service, including principles of 
conduct, working time, pay, promotion and conflict of interest and termina-
tion of employment. Among the general principles of conduct, the act states 
that civil servants must refrain from any actions, even outside their working 
hours, that might lead to a loss of confidence. The act also stipulates that the 
employment of a civil servant must be terminated if their performance is not 
adequate or they have lost the confidence of their superior. According to the 
act, the loss of confidence can be related to the actions or work performance 
of the civil servant, it should be factual and evidence should be provided. The 
employer must state the reasons for the termination of employment and in le-
gal disputes the employer has the burden of proof to show that these have been 
real and objective.
There were no new general regulations for public service employees (such as 
workers in public education, health care and social services), who make up the 
majority of the workforce in the public sector. The only – and far from insig-
nificant – exception within public service was health care where new sectoral 
legislation was introduced with a range of sector-specific flexibility provisions: 
on-call working, voluntary overtime etc. After 1 March, 2012 employers can 
unilaterally impose up to 16 hours per week on-call work, however working 
longer than 12 hours per day in the health care sector must always be consid-
ered “voluntary overtime”, though it is paid. On the other hand the act gives 
an exemption from the application of wage supplement regulations of the new 
Labour Code in this sector. Otherwise – according to estimates of a trade un-
ion in the sector – employees in the health sector would see their pre-tax pay 
cut on average by 8,000–12,000 forints per month.
Main legislation
Act CV of 2011 on the amendment of certain labour related and other legisla-
tion for the purpose of legal harmonisation; Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code; 
Act LXXXVI of 2012 on transitional measures and legal amendments in rela-
tion to the entry into force of Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code; Government 
Decree 135/2012 (28 June) amending certain government decrees in relation 
to the entry into force of the new Labour Code; MfNE decree 17/2012 (5 July) 
amending certain ministerial decrees in relation to the entry into force of the 
new Labour Code; Government decree 136/2012 (28 June) amending Gov-
ernment Decree 375/2010 (31 December) on state subsidies for public works 
employment and Government Decree 171/2011 (24 August) amending cer-
tain government decrees in relation to public works employment; Act CXL 
of 2011 amending Act XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public servants; 
Ministry of Interior decree 37/2011 (28 October) implementing provisions 
of the Act XXXIII of 1992 in certain agencies and public bodies under the 
supervision of the Minister of the Interior; Government decree 373/2011 (31 
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December) appointing agencies to perform occupational health and safety 
tasks; Government decree 273/2011 (20 December) on the rates of occupa-
tional health and safety fines and procedures for imposing fines; MfNE decree 
1/2012 (26 January) on orderly labour relations and ways to demonstrate this; 
Act CXCIX of 2011 on civil servants; Government decree 29/2012 (7 March) 
on qualification requirements for civil servants; Government decree 30/2012 
(7 March) on working time and time off for civil servants, administration holi-
days, responsibilities of civil servants and employers and on tele-working; Gov-
ernment decree 31/2012 (7 March) on disciplinary procedures against civil 
servants; Government decree 45/2012 (20 March) on provisions relating to 
personal documents of civil servants, personal documents and labour regis-
tration of other employees in public administration, civil service register, col-
lection of statistical data on civil service, and reserve of civil servants; Act V of 
2012 and transitional legislation and legislation being amended or repealed in 
relation to the act on civil servants; Act CLXXVI of 2011 amending certain 
health care related legislation; Act LXXIX of 2012 amending certain health 
care related legislation; Act CLXII of 2011 on the legal status and remunera-
tion of judges; Act CLXIV of 2011 on the legal status of the chief prosecutor, 
prosecutors and other employees of the prosecution service, and career path 
in the prosecution service; Act CXCII of 2011 amending Act XCV of 2001 
and other acts on the legal status of professional and contract soldiers in the 
Hungarian Army; Act CLXXXIV of 2011 amending Act XLIII of 1996 on 
professional members of the armed forces in relation to the coordination of 
civil service career paths and amending certain labour-related legislation; Act 
CCIX of 2011 on water utilities.
13. Old age and disability pensions – disability supports
Retirement before the statutory pension age was abolished in Hungary after 
1 January, 2012. The relevant act, given its complexity, will not be presented 
here in detail, only the most important provisions will be highlighted. It ad-
dressed three main areas: early retirement, retirement before statutory pension 
age, and other pensions such as artists’ pensions. Retirement before the statu-
tory pension age was available for workers in hazardous occupations or mem-
bers of the armed forces, while early retirement was available for anyone who 
had enough qualifying years. Existing early pensions were re-classified as pre-
retirement benefits – in the armed forces for example early pensions that were 
awarded on the basis of disability were transformed into a service allowance. 
These are paid to those who have already been awarded a pension.
The rights of people in early retirement changed in a number of ways: in terms 
of their legal status, they are no longer pensioners and therefore they are not 
entitled to benefits and tax reliefs available for pensioners, most importantly 
reduced-rate contributions for those who are working. Similarly to people in 
Abolition of early  
retirement
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early retirement in the previous system, they must not work while they are re-
ceiving benefits. However, unlike old age pensioners, they can claim job seekers’ 
assistance but in this case their benefit is suspended. The regulation provides 
for strict penalties for those who work illegally while claiming benefits: they 
must pay back one year’s (or the total amount, whichever is higher) benefit paid 
to them. The benefit will be stopped and cannot be claimed again.
The Government appointed the Minister for National Economy to work 
out the details of the new system of pre-retirement benefits for hazardous and 
special occupations; however this did not happen before the final draft of this 
manuscript was completed.
Pensions and other pension-like benefits increased by 0.5% on 1 January 2012.
Main legislation
Act CLXVII of 2011 repealing early old age pensions and setting out provi-
sions for pre-retirement benefits and service allowance; Government decision 
1356/2011 (21 October) on elaborating the conditions of provisions replacing 
early retirement; Government decree 333/2011 (29 December) on provisions 
before the pension age, procedural regulations for service allowance, perpetu-
ity for retired ballet dancers and benefits for ex-miners, and amending related 
government decree, Government decree 335/2011. (29 December) on the in-
crease of pension and certain other benefits as of January 2012; Government 
decree 354/2011 (30 December) on entitlement to social security provisions 
and private pensions and the amendment of Government decree 195/1997 (5 
November) on the implementation of Act LXXX of 1997; Government de-
cree 60/2012 amending certain government decrees related to pension insur-
ance and social provisions (repealing early pensions). The principles of old age 
pensions are set out in Chapter 6 of (cardinal) Act CXCIV of 2011 on Hun-
gary’s economic stability.
On-line resources: onyf.hu
Disability pensions – disability supports
Alongside the transformation of old age pensions, the system of disability pen-
sions also underwent changes. Disability pensions were replaced by benefits 
for people with partial work capacity. To qualify for these benefits the health 
status of the claimant must be 60% or under and they:
– have had social insurance for at least 1,095 days during the five years prior to 
application,
– are not in employment;
– are not receiving regular financial assistance.
The benefit can take the form of rehabilitation assistance if the claimant has 
been found suitable for vocational rehabilitation (see Section 5 on this) or dis-
ability assistance if they are not recommended for vocational rehabilitation. 
Claimants must be awarded disability assistance even if they are suitable for 
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vocational rehabilitation but they are no more than five years from the old age 
pension age.
Main legislation
Act CXCI of 2011 on assistance for people with partial work capacity and the 
amendment of certain acts; Government decree 327/2011 (29 December) on 
procedural rules for assistance to people with partial work capacity.
14. Wage bargaining, wage regulation and interest representation*
What is their impact on employment?
The impact of wage development on macroeconomic processes – including 
employment – heavily depends on the characteristics of wage bargaining: 
1) the level of collective wage agreement (national, sectoral, or company), 2) 
to what extent collective agreements limit individual wage bargaining (for 
example with pay scale agreements), 3) whether it is possible to deviate from 
higher-level agreements at the local level, 4) the number and characteris-
tics of workers covered by collective agreements, and last but not least, 5) 
where individual market-based agreement is possible independently from 
higher-level agreements. The effect of regulation also depends on whether it 
facilitates or hinders the adjustment of wages in relation to the equilibrium 
– influenced by other factors –, the sectoral structure of the economy or its 
integration into the world economy. Therefore there is no single optimum 
model (Calmfors, 1993).
A special institution of wage regulation is statutory or contractual minimum 
wage that sets the minimum level of pay – even for different groups of workers. 
Generally this has a negative effect on employment, but if the employer has a 
significant market power it can be neutral (Manning, 2003). Another com-
mon type of government intervention is the extension of an autonomous sec-
toral collective agreement to all employers of the sector.
Situation in August 2011
Hungary has a dual system of wage negotiation. Pay for public servants and 
public sector employees – depending on education attainment and years of 
service – is set out in tariff tables in the relevant acts and it is part of the state 
budget. On the contrary, in the business sector wages are set freely – apart from 
the minimum wage already mentioned above – in a decentralised negotiation. 
Trade unions have a low membership in Hungary, and instead of sectoral wage 
negotiations found in several Western European countries, wages are typically 
influenced by company collective agreements (although there are some secto-
ral wage agreements too). However, their impact on wages is not significant 
(Neumann 2001), and they are more common in companies that operate in 
highly concentrated markets or are publicly owned (Kertesi and Köllő, 2003). 
(This topic, among others, is discussed in more detail by Mariann Rigó in the 
section In Focus – II of this volume.)
* Written by: László Neumann
Structural characteristics 
of wage bargaining
InstItutIonal envIronment of the labour market...
301
The lowest level of pay is set by the minimum wage that has been different 
for skilled and unskilled workers since 2006. From 2011 there have been two 
additional lower rates for public works employment. Until 1 January, 2011 the 
minimum wage was set through tripartite (employee, employer and govern-
ment) negotiations in the National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests 
(in Hungarian: Országos Érdekegyeztető Tanács, OÉT). The Council also is-
sued tripartite recommendations for pay increases each year, however after the 
Council was abolished these ceased to exist too.9
Situation between August 2011 and August 2012
Twenty-twelve was the first year when national wage negotiations were entirely 
conducted in the new negotiation structure, in which the Government, fol-
lowing consultations with social partners, decides independently about the 
minimum wage and the minimum wage for skilled workers. Although the new 
Labour Code allows the Government to set different levels of minimum wage 
for certain groups of workers depending on the characteristics of sectoral and 
regional labour markets, this did not happen in 2012. According to the Gov-
ernment decree the lowest basic pay for full-time employees must be no less 
than 93,000 forints per month. The two-tiered minimum wage was retained. 
The guaranteed minimum wage for full-time workers with at least secondary 
education or a secondary vocational qualification must be 108,000 forints per 
month. (The Government Decree also sets out the weekly, daily and hourly 
minimum wage.) The significant rise of pre-tax minimum wages (19.2% and 
14.9%) aimed to offset the effect of changes in labour taxation, nevertheless the 
net value of the minimum wage for skilled workers still declined slightly. (As 
has been mentioned previously, tax credits were abolished on 1 January, 2012 
and the contributions paid by employees went up by one percentage point.)
Pay in public works was also set by a government decree for 2012: for full-
time unskilled work this was 71,800 forints, for skilled work 92,000 forints 
per month. Compared to the previous year the increase was considerable here 
too, and in 2012 the pre-tax public works pay for unskilled workers was 77.2% 
of the relevant minimum wage, and for skilled workers this was 85.2%. (These 
changes meant a net increase of 4.6% of the unskilled public works pay and a 
two per cent decrease of the skilled workers). Overall, although the advantage 
of skilled workers decreased slightly, there was still a wage-tariff type minimum 
wage system with four categories.
Due to changes in labour taxation the nominal net pay of those earning less 
than 216,806 forints per month would decrease. To prevent this, in addition to 
the increase of the minimum wage – and following the previous year’s indirect 
intervention – the Government also set the so-called expected rate of pay in-
crease. The government decree provides a detailed list of the rates of necessary 
pay increase to maintain the net value of wages between 59,000 and 216,805 
forints per month (in a table format, with 37 rows). The expected pay increase 
Four categories 
of minimum wage 
including public 
works employment
The Government set out 
the rate of “expected pay 
increase” for low-paid 
workers in 2012 too
9 According to data on wage 
increases above the rate rec-
ommended by the OÉT – wage 
drift – and wage increases falling 
short of the lower values from 
that period show that tripartite 
recommendations had a signifi-
cant role in “orientating” lower 
level wage negotiations and wage 
setting, thus they were the start-
ing point for the arguments of 
both trade unions and employers 
in collective bargaining (Koltay, 
2000).
busch, cseres-GerGely & neumann
302
includes the increase of the minimum wage and guaranteed minimum pay 
and the increase of non-salary payment; however these can cover up to 25% of 
the expected pay rise. The decree also stipulates that some wage supplements 
must be taken into account, such as the wage supplement for shift work (but 
not the wage supplement for overtime). Employers that employ low-paid work-
ers and implement a pay increase can claim a tax relief on the newly introduced 
social contribution tax; however to qualify for this all permanent employees 
must receive a pay increase. The tax relief was designed in such a way that the 
employers’ burden would only increase by up to five per cent per employee.10
From 1 January, 2012 the labour inspectorate must also check whether a 
company has implemented the wage compensation requirement for at least 
two thirds of the workforce. If the labour inspection finds that the pay in-
crease has not been implemented for employees earning less than 300,000 
forints per month, the inspectorate will issue a decision. Although no fine will 
be imposed, the employer will be placed on the list of companies “without or-
derly labour relations” published on the inspectorate’s website. The employer 
can still implement the expected pay increase. Therefore, even if in a slightly 
weaker form, the previous year’s sanction that threatened employers with a 
ban from public procurement and public subsidies had they not implement-
ed the wage compensation remained in effect. However in 2012 employers 
that implement the pay increase for at least two thirds of the workforce can 
qualify for public subsidies.
In addition to the normative support and sanction, the Government also 
supported employers that implemented the wage compensation through a 
grants system. Funding was available for businesses that were unable to im-
plement the wage increase despite the normative subsidy. The policy targeted 
businesses with a labour intensive operation and a predominantly low-paid 
workforce. According to the relevant government decree employers qualified 
for support to implement the wage compensation for workers earning less than 
215,000 forints per month. The subsidy covered up to three percentage points 
of the expected pay increase and social contribution tax payable on this for 12 
months and it was paid to the employer by the job centre in no more than two 
instalments. Other qualifying conditions included that the average yearly head-
count must not be lower than that in 2011 and that the employer must not im-
plement a reduction of the working time for more than 20% of the workforce 
in 2012. These conditions proved too strict in practice: the programme had 
a budget of 21 billion forints, however only 5.9 billion forints worth of sub-
sidy was claimed. The employment service received 4,094 applications out of 
which 4,006 were funded. According to a communication from the Ministry 
for National Economy the 5.61 billion forints contributed to the pay increase 
of more than 124,000 employees – and helped more than 146,000 workers 
to retain their job.
Subsidies for employers 
that implement wage 
compensation
10 The calculation of wage com-
pensation is based on the same 
logic as that of the tax credit, 
which has just been phased out. 
Up to pre-tax earnings of 75,000 
forints per month, the tax relief 
is 21.5% but no more than 16,125 
forints. For wages over 75,000 
forints, the 16,125 forints should 
be reduced by 14% of the differ-
ence between the actual earning 
and 75,000 forints. Thus, those 
earning more than 185,000 for-
ints per month before tax are no 
longer entitled to the compensa-
tory tax relief in 2012.
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The scope of legislation on expected pay increase does not cover the public 
sector, organisations operated by churches or workers in simplified employ-
ment. Separate regulations set out the requirement of wage compensation for 
public sector and church employers – although to a lesser extent than in the pri-
vate sector because in these cases it should also be taken into account whether 
an employee or their spouse qualifies for family tax credit. Thus, only simpli-
fied employment was left out of wage compensation – and of course the self-
employed who were not entitled to tax credit either. Nonetheless, wage com-
pensation affected millions of employees (based on preliminary data from 
the National Tax and Custom Authority businesses claimed tax relief for ap-
proximately 980,000 employees, approximately half of those potentially eli-
gible by January),11 and its budgetary impact can only be estimated. More reli-
able data was made available by the Hungarian National Asset Management 
Inc. (Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő Zrt.) on companies with majority public 
ownership. In these companies wage compensation affected a total of 80,000 
workers and cost 22 billion forints in 2012. According to tax regulations and 
the new Labour Code the system of wage compensation will continue into the 
coming years. As stipulated by the Labour Code “the Government has got the 
authorisation to issue a decree on the rate of pay increase required to preserve 
the net value of monthly wages under 300,000 forints”.
The increase of the minimum wage and guaranteed wage minimum as well 
as the wage compensation had a significant impact on wage development in 
the public sector. In the public sector basic pay is regulated by the law and pay 
rates for each grade – which depend on qualification and years of service – are 
set out in statutory pay scales. Employers can deviate from pay scales to some 
extent (in the case of public servants for example, only upwards); however 
the majority of organisations in the public sector do not have the financial re-
sources to pay a larger number of their staff higher wages. In the public sector 
a wage increase would predominantly mean the increase of tariff wages; how-
ever this has not happened since 2006 and in the meantime the 13th month 
pay was also taken away. The reason behind a slight nominal increase in pub-
lic sector pay, despite these developments, has been that the minimum wage 
and the guaranteed wage minimum must be ensured in the public sector too. 
This pushed slightly upwards the bottom half of the salary bands. (To a lesser 
extent pay also increased because of automatic promotions between grades 
due to length of service or staff gaining new qualifications.) Among public 
sector employees, who make up the majority of the workforce in the public 
sector, 62 out of the 140 wage tariffs had to be substituted by the minimum 
wage or the guaranteed wage minimum. For example even in Grade E7 that 
is the grade for workers with a tertiary vocational qualification (but higher 
education) someone with less than 20 years of service would only receive the 
guaranteed wage minimum for skilled workers. Therefore it is not surprising 
Public sector: despite a 
pay freeze nominal pay 
rises as a result of the 
minimum wage increases 
and wage compensation
11 Óriásit bukott a büdzsé a bér-
kompenzáción (Huge budget 
losses due to wage compensa-
tion) FN24, 24 March, 2012.
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that both employers and trade unions have been complaining about the com-
pressed pay scale.
Some sectors in the public sector have had their own pay scales for some 
time, for example higher education. A separate pay scale was introduced in 
the health care sector as a new measure in 2012. The reason behind this was 
the wage demand of junior doctors that was accompanied with high profile ac-
tions (for example junior doctors en masse deposited their resignation letter), 
and they successfully used the increasing migration of doctors from Eastern 
Europe to give weight to their demands. (There had been similar actions by 
doctors in the Czech Republic and Slovakia too.) The Government’s reaction 
was twofold: on the one hand they incorporated provisions limiting the pos-
sibility of industrial action in the health care sector into a legislative proposal 
– on a completely different issue – that was being discussed at that time. On the 
other hand, they started negotiations with the representatives of junior doc-
tors. (From the perspective of industrial relations, it was an interesting devel-
opment that instead of the traditional trade unions in the health sector, the 
newly formed Hungarian Association of Junior Doctors (Magyar Rezidens 
Szövetség) – that was originally conceived as a professional body – represented 
the doctors in the negotiations.) As a result the Government published a decree 
in March 2012 on “the possible wage development of certain health care pro-
fessionals in 2012” and then in June the “health care omnibus act” provided 
for “the retrospective and progressive wage increase for health care workers”. 
This introduced a tiered increase for doctors depending on their basic pay. The 
rate of the increase was 65,800 forints per month for those earning less than 
350,000 forints and then progressively reduced to 10,000 forints per month for 
those earning 450,000 forints or more. The law provided for a smaller scale pay 
increase for other health care professionals as well as those with a non-health 
related degree in the specialist care sector; in total approximately 86,000 em-
ployees saw their basic pay increase. Furthermore, the Government pledged 
to increase the self-employed family doctors’ “card fee” – a flat rate fee family 
doctors receive for each patient who is registered with the surgery. However, 
the approximately ten thousand health care professionals in the primary care 
sector and – due to the sectoral scope of the law – those working in similar jobs 
but in social care will not receive a pay increase.
Together with legislation and national agreements – at least in the business 
sector – sectoral and company-level collective wage agreements should have a 
prominent role in wage setting arrangements in principle. Although on paper 
both the old and new labour codes promote collective agreements in the busi-
ness sector, in reality their role in wage setting is increasingly weak. As has been 
highlighted previously, sectoral wage agreements have always been uncommon 
and their coverage of companies and workers remained moderate. In the system 
of collective bargaining that developed in the nineties, company-level agree-
The health care sector 
was an exception: pay 
increase as a result of 
junior doctors’ action
The number and coverage 
of company-level wage 
agreements is declining
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ments had a more dominant role, and yearly wage agreements were predomi-
nantly framework agreements on the rate of pay increase. Tariff agreements 
– similar to collective agreements in Western Europe and North America – 
were rare (Tóth, 2006). Although in the early- and mid-nineties, during times 
of high inflation, wage agreements had a significant role, in the past decade the 
role of company-level agreements that provide a large degree of autonomy and 
flexibility to the management of companies has been declining both in terms 
of numbers and coverage.12 Unfortunately, the main reason behind this has 
been the increasing interventionist wage policy of the Government. Compa-
ny and sectoral wage agreements in low-pay sectors also declined prior to the 
point at which the rise in the minimum wage took up the resources available 
for pay increase (i.e. 2000–2001 and 2006–2008). It was not only the crisis 
that limited the room for manoeuvre for companies, also wage compensation 
introduced as a result of recent changes in labour taxation implied that there 
is hardly anything to agree on locally in low-paid sectors (as well as the public 
sector). There were further factors that reduced the likelihood of local wage 
agreements: first, the restrictive regulation of industrial action introduced in 
2010 (industrial action is typically used to give weight to wage demands), and 
second the stipulation of the new Labour Code declaring that publicly owned 
companies cannot deviate from the provisions of the Labour Code even with 
a collective agreement.
2011 was a turning point in social dialogue in Hungary: the National Coun-
cil for the Reconciliation of Interests (Országos Érdekegyeztető Tanács, OÉT) 
was abolished together with other parallel bodies such as the Economic and 
Social Council (Gazdasági és Szociális Tanács, GSZT) and the Forum for Eco-
nomic Coordination (Gazdasági Egyeztető Fórum, GEF). They were replaced 
by a high-profile body, the National Economic and Social Council (Nemzeti 
Gazdasági és Társadalmi Tanács, NGTT) that clearly did not aim to con-
tinue the intensive social dialogue. From the earlier system of social dialogue, 
only the National Council for Public Sector Dialogue (Országos Közszolgá-
lati Érdekegyeztető Tanács, OKÉT) has been working on a continuous basis, 
although the influence of trade unions was hardly noticeable during the leg-
islative boom of the public sector reform. While the supercharged legislation 
continuously adopted new laws affecting “the world of work”, trade unions 
were losing ground in social dialogue (and to lesser extent, employers’ organi-
sations too). Understandably, trade unions were looking for the opportunity 
of dialogue, and through the International Labour Organisation (ILO) they 
successfully put pressure on the Government in the consultation of the new 
Labour Code. However, despite this, the Government only agreed to consult 
a selected group of social partners: on the side of trade unions they first con-
sulted the League (Liga) and Workers’ Councils and then included the Na-
tional Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions (Magyar Szakszervezetek 
12 See data from the collective 
agreement register operated by 
the National Council for the 
Reconcil iation of Interests, 
National Labour Office (Or-
szágos Érdekegyeztető Tanács, 
Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal).
New platform for 
national social dialogue 
in the business sector 
with fewer partners and 
without legal guarantees
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Országos Szövetsége, MSZOSZ). The employers’ side was also limited to three 
confederations (the National Confederation of Entrepreneurs and Employ-
ers (Vállalkozók és Munkáltatók Országos Szövetsége, (VOSZ), the National 
Confederation of Employers and Industrialists (Munkaadók és Gyáriparosok 
Országos Szövetsége, MGYOSZ), and the National Confederation of Gener-
al Consumer Cooperatives and Trading Companies (Általános Fogyasztási 
Szövetkezetek és Kereskedelmi Társaságok Országos Szövetsége, Áfeosz–Coop 
Szövetség). The first consultation that ended in a compromise was on some of 
the provisions of the new Labour Code that were particularly unfavourable for 
employees and trade unions, and then there were substantive consultations on 
some of the technical aspects of 2012’s wage compensation arrangements (Tóth, 
2012). During the selective, ad hoc consultations the concept of a new, perma-
nent platform – the Business Sector and Government Permanent Consulta-
tive Forum (Versenyszféra és a Kormány Állandó Konzultációs Fórumának, 
VKF) – was born. The members of the new forum were the six social partners 
and the Government. The agreement setting up the new Forum was signed on 
22 February, 2012. The main forum for consultation is the committee meeting 
that takes places as necessary but at least once every six months. Its members 
are the Prime Minister, the state secretary responsible for employment policy, 
the chief representatives of trade unions and employers’ organisations, and the 
head of the Monitoring Committee. The Monitoring Committee is designat-
ed as a standing body to provide technical assistance to the work of the Forum. 
The main objective of the Forum is to discuss issues of national relevance that 
the founding agreement lists in seven categories.13 The Government – accord-
ing to some sources – decided to provide a 100-million-forint operating grant 
to each member to ensure adequate capacities for participation in the Forum’s 
work. The smaller operating grant and the more limited membership – three 
trade union and six employers’ confederations were left out – are not the only 
differences in comparison to the National Council for the Reconciliation of 
Interests. The Forum has no legal status (for example guaranteed participation 
in the legislative process) and institutional background, and despite the ambi-
tious Agreement, it does not seem to discuss all of the issues listed there.14 In 
addition to consultations behind closed doors, it seems that the Prime Min-
ister continued his representative (and presumably informal) meetings with 
two selected trade union chiefs and the president of the Hungarian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (Magyar Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara, MKIK).
Therefore in the new national social dialogue instead of permanent forums 
and broad participation, a routine of ad hoc negotiations was developed with 
the participation of a limited number of actors selected by the Government. 
On the side of the business sector, it seems that the Hungarian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry had a prominent role at the expense of traditional 
employers’ organisations. A new feature was the appearance of alternative in-
Emergence of alternative 
workers’ representations
13 Megállapodás a Verseny-
szféra és a Kormány Állandó 
Konzultációs Fórumának létre-
hozásáról és ügyrendjének meg-
állapításáról. (The agreement 
establishing the Business Sec-
tor and Government Permanent 
Consultative Forum).
14 The work of the Permanent 
Consultative Forum is not public 
either; therefore information can 
only be obtained indirectly from 
participants.
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terest representations for employees. Some of them used adequate tactics to 
create pressure, circumvent traditional forums and successfully negotiated 
with the Government (e.g. Hungarian Association of Junior Doctors). How-
ever the alternative movement launched by the armed forces in 2011 achieved 
nothing with its demonstrations. Furthermore the compulsory quasi-chamber 
system introduced in the public sector (the Hungarian Faculty of Public Ser-
vice and the Hungarian Faculty of Security Forces, Magyar Közszolgálati Kar 
és Magyar Rendészeti Kar) and by the regulation of local trade union activity 
which is even more restrictive than in the business sector (for example employ-
ers are no longer required to deduct the membership fee from members’ pay 
and transfer them to trade unions, they do not have the obligation to provide 
infrastructure for trade unions etc.) the Minister for the Interior effectively 
made the operation of trade unions impossible and it also seems deprived them 
of the majority of their members.
Considering that Hungary has developed a system of decentralised collec-
tive bargaining and collective agreements are also a precondition for increasing 
flexibility, the new regulation of the scope of local trade unions and collective 
agreements is an important development both in the context of employment 
contracts and wage regulation. As far as trade unions are concerned, an im-
portant change was that Act II of 1989 regulating their activity and legal su-
pervision was repealed as of 1 January, 2012. The two new acts that replaced 
it require trade unions to renew their registration and make the necessary 
organisational and procedural changes approved by their membership. The 
most important changes in the life of local trade unions were brought about 
by the new Labour Code: the scope of legal protection and working time al-
lowance for trade union officials were drastically reduced. According to the 
new rules establishments/premises with an average headcount of up to 500 
employees in the previous year can have only one protected trade union offi-
cial, establishments with 500–1,000 employees can have two; establishments 
with 1,000–2,000 employees can have three, four for up to 4,000 and five for 
more than 4,000. Protected trade union officials are entitled to reduced work-
ing time and they are given time off for the duration of consultations with the 
employer. However, according to the new rules they are no longer entitled to 
time off for participation in training for trade union officials. The total year-
ly working time allowance was reduced: they can reduce their working time 
by one hour per month for each two trade union members employed by the 
same employer. These provisions have been in force since 1 July, 2012 there-
fore working time allowances had to be adjusted accordingly for the rest of the 
year. According to the new Labour Code unused time allowances cannot be 
redeemed by the employer therefore local trade unions with larger member-
ship (and indirectly sectoral trade unions and confederations) might suffer a 
significant loss of income.
Revised regulation 
of local trade unions and 
collective bargaining
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The new Labour Code also represents a radical retrograde step in the rights 
of trade unions. They lost their right to information and consultation – the 
right in certain cases and on certain issues now belongs exclusively to works 
councils. Employers are only required to provide information or consult trade 
unions if this has been initiated by the trade union. Trade unions’ right to veto 
was also repealed (that could be used to suspend the implementation of – a 
limited scope of – unlawful measures by employers). In the future, trade un-
ions will not be part of the electoral commission for works council elections. 
The provision that trade unions can only sign collective agreements jointly 
and therefore each employer can have only one collective agreement has not 
changed. The new act stipulates that the membership of the trade union must 
reach 10% of the total workforce so that it can participate in the negotiation 
of a collective agreement. Therefore in larger, predominantly national compa-
nies trade unions representing special groups of the workforce or smaller units 
might be excluded from collective bargaining. The law puts significant limi-
tations on collective bargaining in publicly owned companies: they must not 
deviate from the rules on notice periods and redundancy pay, and the work-
ing time must not be shorter than that set out by the Labour Code unless in 
order to reduce or prevent a health hazard. Overall, the changes weaken the 
local bargaining power of trade unions, particularly in the public sector where 
they had been strongest.
The act – according to its justification – intends to give a greater role to works 
councils in the regulation of employment relationships. Works councils can 
sign works agreements and quasi-collective agreements – the latter only in the 
absence of a sectoral collective agreement or local trade unions. However, such 
quasi-collective company agreements must not regulate pay which is generally 
the most crucial issue in collective bargaining. Furthermore members of works 
councils must remain neutral during industrial action. At the same time works 
councils’ right to co-decision – rather weak in Hungary anyway – has been re-
stricted by the new law and they can no longer prevent the sale of welfare and 
social infrastructure. Sanctions for employers for failure to provide informa-
tion or lack of consultation have been abolished and therefore – according to 
some – the regulation of works councils has become soft and unenforceable. The 
protection of works councils’ members by labour law has become weaker and 
now only the president is entitled to this. However a positive development has 
been the introduction of a holding-level works council for holding companies.
According to the provisions of the act on civil servants a new self-governing 
public body – the Hungarian Faculty of Public Service (Magyar Kormány-
tisztviselői Kar) – was established on the 1st of July to represent the interests 
of civil servants. All civil servants automatically become members of the Fac-
ulty. According to the law its responsibilities include the representation of pro-
fessional interests, upholding the prestige of the civil service, consultation on 
Overall the law weakens 
the bargaining power  
of local trade unions,  
particularly in the public 
sector where they tradi-
tionally have been strongest
Public service: mandatory 
membership in new work-
ers’ representation
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legislation affecting the employment and working conditions of government 
officials, conducting ethics procedures, establishment of a prize, organising 
professional conferences and the provision of welfare, social and other services 
for its members. The operation of the Faculty is overseen by the Prosecution 
Service. Also on the 1st of July the Arbitration Commission for Government 
Officials (Kormánytisztviselői Döntőbizottság) was to resolve employment-
related disputes in the civil service. Similar provisions apply to security forces 
where the Hungarian Faculty of Security Forces was established. Formally the 
legislation does not impact on the existence and rights of trade unions, how-
ever it remains to be seen how the parallel interest representations will work 
alongside each other.
Main legislation
170/2011 (24 August) on wage setting and guaranteed wage in public works 
employment; Government decree 298/2011 (22 December) on statutory mini-
mum pay (minimum wage) and guaranteed minimum pay; Government de-
cree 319/2011 (27 December) amending Government decree 170/2011 (24 
August) on wage setting and guaranteed wage in public works employment, 
Government decree 169/2011 (24 August) on the Employment and Public 
Works Database, and Government decree 355/2009 (30 December) on the per-
mit free employment of third country nationals in the Republic of Hungary; 
Act XCIII of 2011 on the National Economic and Social Council; Act XCIX 
of 2011 amending certain acts promoting the pay increase of low-paid work-
ers; Act CLVI of 2011 on the amendment of taxation-related laws; Govern-
ment decree 213/2011 (14 October) amending Government decree 138/1992 
(8 October) on the implementation of Act XXXIII of 1992 in the public edu-
cation system and Government decree 20/1997 (13 February) on the imple-
menting regulations of Act LXXIX of 1993; Government decree 299/2011 
(22 December) on the expected rate of pay increase to safeguard the net value 
of wages and the rate of non-salary benefits that might be included in this; 
Government decision 1013/2012 (26 January) on the preparation of employers’ 
compensation to facilitate the safeguarding of the net value of wages in 2012; 
Government decree 69/2012 (6 April) on assistance to safeguarding the net 
value of wages and amending Government decree 299/2011 (22 December); 
Government decree 20/2012 (22 February) amending Government decree 
371/2011 (31 December) on the compensation of employees in the public sec-
tor or in services of public interest in church provision in 2012; Act XXI of 
2012 amending certain laws in relation to the implementation of expected pay 
increase and employment; Government decision 1504/2011 (29 December) 
on the provision of additional resources for the one-off payment of health care 
workers entitled to wage supplements; Government decree 371/2011 (31 De-
cember) on the compensation of employees in the public sector or in services of 
public interest in church provision in 2012; Government decision 1071/2012 
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(22 March) on possible directions of wage development for certain health care 
professionals; Act LXXIX of 2012 amending certain health care related acts; 
Act CLXXV of 2011 on the right of association, on public interest and the op-
eration and funding of non-governmental organisations (Non-governmental 
Act); Act CLXXXI of 2011 on the court registration of non-governmental 
organisations and related procedural rules.
On-line sources: munka.hu
15. Measures related to migration and mobility
From December 2011 the basic pay of workers employed holding the EU Blue 
Card must be higher than the minimum wage. The lowest pay must be no less 
than 150% of the previous year’s average pay in the particular sector where the 
third-country national is employed. Only a few professions were exempt from 
this rule where the rate was set at 120%. The result of this rule might be the 
filtering of foreign workers – it is only worthwhile employing foreigners with 
significantly above average performance due to the higher cost. Thus, indirect-
ly, it also means that Blue Card holders are not competing for jobs with low-
skilled workers. However, this only applies to lawful employment. If foreign 
labour is significantly cheaper than locals, then this measure might increase 
the likelihood of illegal employment.15
Main legislation
Ministry of Interior decree 26/2012 (16 May) on the amendment of certain 
migration-related ministerial decrees; Government decree 81/2012 (18 April) 
on the amendment of migration-related government decrees and government 
decrees implementing Act XXVII of 2012.
16. The institutions of management, financing and evaluation  
of employment policy
The transformation of the institutional system of employment policy contin-
ued at a slower rate in 2012 with changes in the tasks and agencies of the Na-
tional Labour Office already discussed above, as well as the expansion of the 
scope of government measures in relation to employment policy.
During this period the Government approved Priority 1 and 2 of SROP that 
finance the majority of employment policy measures. In addition to a num-
ber of other projects, it approved the funding and classification as a “priority 
project” of SROP’s largest project, project 1.1.2. As a result of the 2012 state 
budget and a series of amendments of SROP, the share of passive measures was 
reduced within the budget of employment initiatives while more funding was 
allocated to public works, training and certain complex programmes (this is 
discussed in more detail in the section at the end of the chapter).
There were various events related to active ageing and inter-generational soli-
darity in 2012. The National Strategy for Social Inclusion (Nemzeti Társadal-
Minimum wage for  
EU Blue Card holders
15 The practical relevance of this 
measure is very limited because 
the Blue Card is not very popu-
lar. “In the first half of 2012 no 
EU Blue Cards were issued. On 
30 June, 2012 there was only 
one valid EU Blue Card in the 
register that was issued in Haj-
dú-Bihar county.” (NFSZ, 2012.)
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mi Felzárkóztatási Stratégia) was adopted in 2012; although this is not directly 
an employment policy issue, it is related to employment policy due to the large 
number of disadvantaged people.
In terms of public policy making there were some important conceptual 
changes that might have an impact on employment policies as well. One of 
these is the establishment of the National Office for Economic Planning. Al-
though the activities of the Office are not directly related to employment pol-
icy, they include “providing support for human resources policy development”. 
There was no information about the work of the Office prior to the submission 
of this manuscript.
The new National Reform Programme adopted in the framework of the 
Europe 2020 growth strategy in the spring of 2012 is the latest employment 
policy document of the Government. The document – largely based on Széll 
Kálmán Plan 2.0 – confirms earlier employment targets (75% for 20–64 year 
olds), highlighting the objectives also presented here, such as increasing acti-
vation, the expansion of employment in public works, increasing the flexibil-
ity of employment, strengthening the dual system of vocational education and 
training. Unlike previous programmes, this one has not been approved by a 
Government decision. Reviewing the implementation of the previous Reform 
Programme the European Commission proposed strengthening the capacities 
of the National Employment Service, the development of pathways out of pub-
lic works employment and increasing the share of personalised programmes.
The Big book of reforms – the Hungarian way to growth and employment lead-
ing to sustainable development was published giving an overview of the main 
changes since the Government’s entry into office. Employment policy is dis-
cussed in Chapter 5.
The Government joined the international initiative Open Government Part-
nership and as a result, the public can learn more about the details of govern-
mental decision making. Parliament adopted the act on the re-use of public 
data, informational self-determination and freedom of information. These 
provisions – in theory – will facilitate access to data for governmental impact 
assessment and analysis and also secondary analysis of the data by third par-
ties. Although further details are not known, this is also facilitated by the pro-
gressive set of provisions put forward by the government decree on strategic 
governance. Although, unfortunately, this exempts a number of areas (such 
as budget, spending of EU funding) from the requirement of in-depth impact 
assessment, in general it puts forward clear and progressive principles.
Main legislation
Government decree 248/2011 establishing the National Office for Economic 
Planning; Government decision 1408/2011 on measures related to the estab-
lishment of the National Office for Economic Planning; Government decree 
38/2012. (12 March) on strategic governance; Government decision 1089/2012 
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(2 April) on the Hungarian programme for the European year of active ageing 
and inter-generational solidarity; Government decree 1430/2011 on the Na-
tional Social Inclusion Strategy and governmental action plan for the imple-
mentation of the Strategy in 2012–2014; Government decree 169/2011 (24 
August) on the Employment and Public Works Database; Act XXV of 2012 on 
informational self-determination and amending Act CXII of 2011 on freedom 
of information; Act LXIII of 2012 on re-using public data; Government deci-
sion 1171/2012 on tasks related to re-using public data; Government decision 
1227/2012 (6 July) on Hungary’s participation in the international initiative 
Open Government Partnership; Government decision 1246/2011 (8 July) ap-
proving funding for SROP 1.1.2 priority project “Improving the employabil-
ity of disadvantaged populations (De-centralised programmes in convergence 
regions)”; Government decision 1235/2012 (12 July) setting Priorities 1 and 2 
of the 2011–2013 Action Plan of the Social Renewal Operational Programme.
On-line sources: kormany.hu
Centres of gravity in the financing of employment policy in 2011–2012*
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely
The above has discussed policy changes in Hungary 
without analysing the impact of individual meas-
ures on the development of employment policy. No 
matter how effective a policy instrument is in theory, 
it will only be effective in practice if it receives ade-
quate emphasis in the policy. This is influenced by a 
number of factors in implementation: the actual po-
litical and economic environment, the operation of 
the organisations concerned and the level of fund-
ing [these issues are addressed in detail by Fazekas 
and Scharle (2012) and ÁSZ (2012)]. This section 
aims to explore – to the extent it is possible with the 
use of publicly available data – how the allocation of 
financial resources reflects the emphasis on differ-
ent policy objectives. Only labour market measures 
discussed in sections 1–9 will be addressed here and 
the non-labour market measures presented under 
sections 10–16 will not be included in the analysis, 
even though these might have a larger impact on 
behaviour than employment policy, and their costs 
might also be comparable (a general tax cut would 
be an example of both). This decision is based on 
methodological considerations: there might be dif-
ferent ways of assigning spending to employment 
policy and the method might depend heavily on the 
objectives of the analysis.
The difficulty of identifying sources of finance
Currently, labour market policies can be financed 
exclusively or jointly from national or European Un-
ion development funds. This duality has implica-
tions for planning, monitoring and reporting as well. 
There are interventions that are implemented on 
their own (for example the Start contribution relief 
schemes) while other interventions are implement-
ed as part of a complex programme (for example 
wage subsidies for disadvantaged people). One in-
tervention might have one or more “measures” that 
are identical in terms of content but might differ 
in terms of implementation. This also means that 
one type of intervention might be found at vari-
ous places.
* I would like to thank Irén Busch, Judit Nagy, Balázs 
Romhányi and Sándor Ádám for their comments on 
the draft chapter. Any remaining errors or inaccura-
cies are my sole responsibility.
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Considering that the basic unit of policy is not 
individual measures – which might be numerous – 
but types of measures, costs should also be consid-
ered at this level. To this the reporting of individual 
measures and types of financing should be harmo-
nised, first of all – in order to improve clarity of 
data – to ensure that they refer to the same time 
period and consider to what extent operating costs 
of organisations can be included in the cost of pro-
jects. Basically, the task proposed by Marczell and 
Romhányi (2010) for the goal-oriented reform of the 
state budget should be carried out for employment 
policy. However, it is only possible to cover all rel-
evant areas if all sources of finance are taken into 
account and all types of intervention are identified 
within projects. Although programme evaluations 
are different in terms of their final objectives – that 
is the opposite of what we are trying to do here – 
there are some similar steps involved, for example 
disaggregating programmes into smaller, compara-
ble units. These elements can then be combined into 
more homogenous units. As will be shown, this is 
not possible on the basis of currently available pub-
lic data. Therefore, the main question is what con-
clusions can be drawn on the basis of available data 
using the second best method.
One of the main sources of funding for employ-
ment policy is the central budget of Hungary. The 
budget appropriations are set out in the Budget Act** 
and the actual expenditures are presented by the 
Budgetary Discharge Act. For the real time analysis 
of employment policy only the appropriations can 
be used, however some caution is necessary because 
planned and actual spending might be significantly 
different (as in 2010). Both acts discuss the budget 
in the same detail, and they are the most detailed 
publicly available documents.
The objectives and strategy of employment policy 
are described in various documents as illustrated by 
Figure 1 of ÁSZ (2012). The budget is not structured 
according to policies but according to institutions 
and its relevant sections can complement the Gov-
ernment’s economic policy documents that often 
lack information on spending. Interventions can 
appear in the document on their own or combined 
with other interventions, assigned to institutions 
or separately. Although its structure would allow it 
however the authors of the budget do not seem to be 
interested in improving the transparency of policies. 
Information about the planned and actual expendi-
ture of interventions in the general ledger accounts 
is not available to the public. Generally, the budget 
combines all interventions in a single unit, the Na-
tional Employment Fund (in Hungarian: Nemzeti 
Foglalkoztatási Alap, NFA, previously the Labour 
Market Fund, LMF in Hungarian: Munkaerő-piaci 
Alap, MpA), which is ring-fenced and managed sep-
arately, although there have been some changes here. 
For example the operating costs of the National Em-
ployment Service (NES) were previously part of the 
LMF, but this is no longer the case. This is due to the 
activities of the NES and some management con-
siderations. On the one hand the tasks of the NES 
changed considerably as a result of the merger of 
occupational health and safety as well as the crea-
tion of the new network of rehabilitation authorities. 
On the other hand putting government offices in 
the centre makes it increasingly difficult to identify 
the actual operating cost of the network even in the 
absence of any major changes in work organisation.
The budget for employment in 2011 and 2012
The budget of NFA is presented in Chapter LXIII 
of the budget act. Table A1 presents actual spend-
ing for 2011 from the Budgetary Discharge Bill and 
appropriations for 2012 from the Budget Act, where 
necessary adjusted for minor changes during the 
year.
Some well-known policy instruments can be eas-
ily identified in the table: wage subsidy type employ-
ment incentives (contribution discounts and the 
normative subsidies of SROP 1.2), direct job crea-
tion by public works programmes (Start work), some 
of the training subsidies (vocational training and 
adult learning subsidies), and cash benefits to job 
seekers as part of LMP subsidies (job seekers’ ben-
efits). Further items are however mixed – in the case 
**  The term “2012 budget” refers to Act CLXXXVIII 
of 2011 on Hungary’s budget for 2012.
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of employment and training subsidies even their 
name suggest the duality of objectives. According 
to this table the budget for the employment policy 
was around 300 billion forints in both years.
table a1: nFa (previously mpa) spending in the budget, harmonised data
Amount (billion forints)
Share
Increase
(percentage)
2011 2012 2011 2012 2012/2011
Active measures 30.923 31.600 10.9 10.3 2.2
  Employment and training subsidies 25.775 25.600 9.1 8.3 –0.7
  Reimbursement of contribution discount 5.148 6.000 1.8 2.0 16.6
Vocational training and adult learning subsidies 27.921 23.483 9.8 7.6 –15.9
Expenditure on passive measures 125.765 58.700 44.3 19.1 –53.3
  Job seekers’ assistance 124.543 57.000 43.9 18.5 –54.2
  Transfer to Pension Insurance Fund 1.222 1.700 0.4 0.6 39.2
Wage guarantee payments 5.363 6.000 1.9 2.0 11.9
Operating costs 0.087 0.300 0.0 0.1 246.0
Start Employment Programme (2011: public works) 59.800 132.183 21.1 43.0 121.0
Retention balance and risk management allocation 0.000 2.000 0.0 0.7
EU pre- and co-financing 33.500 53.367 11.8 17.3 59.3
  SROP 1.1 Employment services and assistance 19.754 37.900 7.0 12.3 91.9
  SROP 1.2 Normative employment incentives 9.775 8.500 3.4 2.8 –13.0
  EU co-financing for employability and adaptability 3.971 6.967 1.4 2.3 75.5
Other 0.304 0.0 0.1 0.0
Total 283.662 307.632 100.0 100.0 8.5
Note: 2011 data are final numbers from the budgetary discharge while 2012 indicated planned expenditure at 
current value. In 2011 the Fund was called the Labour Market Fund, in 2012 the National Employment Fund. At 
the end of January, 2013 one euro was equivalent to approximately 290 Hungarian forints.
Source: Bill on the “Implementation of Act CLXIX of 2010 on the 2011 budget of the Republic of Hungary” 
(budgetary discharge, Annex 1) Act CLXXXVIII of 2011, Hungarian Official Gazette, Year 2011, number 161, 
p. 39 337.
Nevertheless the NFA does not include the total 
budget of the employment policy; however based on 
the institutional structure of the employment policy 
other sources can be identified in other parts of the 
state budget. As has already been mentioned, since 
1 January 2011 operating costs have no longer been 
included in the NFA, such as the operating costs of 
the National Employment Service. The appropria-
tion for its central coordination unit, the Nation-
al Labour Office, can be found under Heading 4, 
Chapter 15 of the Ministry for National Economy 
(p 39,313) – the structure is less relevant here, how-
ever the budget of 4.7 billion forints is and should be 
added to the above sum. The implementing bodies 
of the NES are made up of local job centres that now 
operate as part of government offices and thus they 
are not listed separately in the budget. They are part 
of the 107-billion-forint appropriation under Head-
ing 8 (Chapter 10) of the Ministry of Public Admin-
istration and Justice but their share is not known 
and would be difficult to calculate. The budget of 
the former Employment Service, minus the NLO, 
that amounted to approximately 20 billion forints 
might help to estimate their current budget. Simi-
larly the operating cost of the State Secretariat for 
Employment Policy could be included here (if it were 
known, but it is not because it is not listed separately 
in the 6.8 billion forints appropriation under Head-
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ing 1, Chapter 15), or the State Secretariat of Pub-
lic Works in the Ministry of Interior (again cannot 
be identified within the total budget of 3.8 billion 
forints of the Ministry), or the approximately 0.4 
billion budget of the National Employment Public 
Non-profit Ltd. Of course the list could continue 
and include for example the operating grant (0.5 
billion forints) to the Hungarian Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry that plays an important role in 
vocational education and training, or the 4.5-bil-
lion-forint budget of the István Türr Training and 
Research Institute that takes part in the training 
and education of public workers, or more impor-
tantly the National Office for Rehabilitation and 
Social Affairs and related rehabilitation authorities 
with their budget of more than 4 billion forints. Al-
though this is not an exhaustive list – due to the un-
certain status of some institutions, it cannot be ex-
haustive – it identifies the most important missing 
items. If these are all included then the nationally 
financed employment policy budget was approxi-
mately 340 billion forints in 2012.
The share of employment policy within the state 
budget increased only slightly by 2012 but its struc-
ture changed significantly. In 2011 a large part – just 
over 40% – of the budget was made up of passive 
benefits. In second place was public works with ap-
proximately 20% of the budget and lastly the share 
of other active assistance, vocational training and 
EU-funded complex programmes was around 10%. 
This changed in 2012. In addition to a moderate in-
crease in the share of complex programmes and a 
similar decline in the direct financing of vocational 
training, the planned share of passive benefits and 
public works switched places. Nevertheless it would 
be premature to make any final conclusions about 
changes in the weight of vocational training: as will 
be shown, the sum available for similar purposes in 
SROP 2.1.3 increased to a similar extent, and this 
might not be a coincidence.
Although Table A1 and its discussion include the 
EU-funded programmes of the NFA, it does not list 
all of these sources. The spending of EU funds is 
based on operational programmes such as the Social 
Renewal Operational Programme (SROP). Opera-
tional programmes are broken down into priorities 
and each priority includes measures and projects. 
There are a number of projects in the operational 
programmes that have primary or secondary ob-
jectives related to employment policy. This is espe-
cially the case for SROP – Priority 1 and 2 include 
projects that are clearly and directly based on em-
ployment policy instruments. Projects under Prior-
ity 5 combine social policy and employment policy 
objectives. In principle, there might be employment 
policy elements in the Social Infrastructure Oper-
ational Programmes (SIOP) as well, that is closely 
related to SROP.
It is related to the administration of projects, how-
ever it is of key importance here, that two groups can 
be distinguished based on funding. In some projects 
(they are the majority) funding closely follows the 
availability of money, and there are projects that are 
pre-financed by the NFA (MpA) before the availa-
bility of EU funding, therefore the money appears 
in its budget. Although these projects in Priority 
1 are large in terms of their budget, nevertheless 
they do not cover most of the policy budget. When 
considering these, we need to take into account the 
fact that due to the system of pre-financing and the 
reimbursement of money later, appropriations in a 
given year might be related to a completely differ-
ent project phase.
Apart from SROP and SIOP, it is not possible to 
rely on the title of projects, there needs to be some 
form of content analysis to decide whether there are 
employment policy related projects in other opera-
tional programmes as well. Here the simplest meth-
od was used: we searched for the strings “foglal” 
(“empl*”) and “munkahely” (“job”) in the text of 
action plans that set out the content of operational 
programmes at the level of projects and listed the 
projects where the title or the description contained 
either or both of these terms. Of course, this meth-
od has its weaknesses, however for a more detailed 
analysis all calls for proposals should be reviewed in-
dividually. This method revealed that there are pro-
jects with employment policy objectives in Priority 
2 and 3 of the Economic Development Operation-
al Programme (EDOP) and also in regional (plan-
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ning regions) operational programmes. Although 
the latter do not identify employment policy objec-
tives explicitly, they highlight the importance of job 
creation. The Environment and Energy Operational 
Programme (EEOP) and the Transport Operational 
Programme (TOP) do not contain any form of the 
words job or employment. Projects identified using 
the above method are presented in Table A2. The 
first column displays the code of the project and 
the last column provides a brief description. The 
projects of regional operational programmes are 
not included in the table because the share of em-
ployment policy compared to other projects would 
be even more difficult to identify.
table a2: Labour market programmes outside the nFa (mpa) financed by the eu;  
maximum amount of commitment according to indicative resource allocation (billion forints)
OP priority, 
interventions
April 2011 December 
2011, total
August 2012
Abbreviated name/reference in the action plan11 12 13 total 11 12 13 total
Priority 2, EDOP 54.0 54.0 54.0
2.1.3 45.0 45.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 45.0 Complex technology development and employment
2.2.4 9.0 9.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 9.0 SME job creation
Priority 2, EDOP 27.0 27.0 27.0
3.3.2 27.0 27.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 27.0 Competitiveness programme,  
“… wage costs of new workers”
Priority 3, SIOP 6.0 6.0 6.0
3.2.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 “The project aims to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of active labour market policies…”
Priority 1, SROP 118.3 126.7 158.5
1.1.1 21.7 21.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 Rehabilitation and employment of people with 
partial work capacity
1.1.2 60.0 60.0 86.0 86.0 20.0 106.0 Decentralised complex programme for disadvan-
taged people
1.1.4 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 7.0 1.1.2 Central Hungary region equivalent
1.2.1 8.5 8.5 7.4 14.5 14.5 Start Plus and Extra
1.3.1 7.0 7.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 NES development
1.4.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 5.0 6.5 Assistance to community-based employment  
projects
1.4.3 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.7 4.7 4.7 Employment pilot programmes
1.4.5 1.4 1.0 1.0 3.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 Employment pacts
1.4.6 2.0 1.2 1.0 4.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 Transitional employment in the construction  
industry
1.4.7 0.7 0.7 Professional development related to employment 
programmes
Priority 2, SROP 109.8 116.9 130.1
2.1.2 9.0 9.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 Foreign language and IT competencies
2.1.3 2.5 3.3 2.0 7.8 21.0 7.8 13.2 21.0 Workplace training
2.1.6 19.8 19.8 20.1 20.1 20.1 “Studying again”
2.2.1 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.6 5.6 Development of the content of vocational training
2.2.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 Cross-border cooperation
2.2.5 4.5 4.5 Development of vocational training institutions
2.2.6 1.4 1.4 Training and professional development of teachers 
in vocational education and training
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OP priority, 
interventions
April 2011 December 
2011, total
August 2012
Abbreviated name/reference in the action plan11 12 13 total 11 12 13 total
2.2.7 11.4 11.4 Developments related to the dual system of voca-
tional training
2.3.4 20.0 20.0 20.0 60.0 18.0 Supporting hiring in SMEs
2.3.4.A 8.5 8.5 Supporting students with study agreements
2.3.4.B 1.2 1.2 Professional development of tutors
2.3.6. 6.9 6.9 6.9 Supporting business start-up among young people
2.4.3.D 15.0 15.0 15.0 Development of social economy
2.4.3.E 0.8 0.8 Development of non-government organisation in the 
social economy
2.4.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 8.0 10.4 10.4 Development of day care provision for young chil-
dren at the workplace
2.4.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 Health and safety at work
2.5.3 3.9 3.9 3.9 Economic and social cooperation
2.6.2 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 Support to non-governmental service providers
Priority 5, SROP 30.8 32.6 32.6
5.1.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Supporting projects in multiple disadvantaged small 
regions
5.3.1 4.9 4.9 3.3 3.3 Enabling and development of independent living 
skills for people with low employability
5.3.1-B-1 1.5 1.5 Work-based training of Roma people in the social 
care and child welfare system
5.3.1-B-2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 Work-based training of Roma people in the social 
care and child welfare system
5.3.2 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 Technical and methodological assistance to the 
programme “Supporting the social and labour mar-
ket re-integration of homeless people who are 
sleeping rough”
5.3.3. 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 Supporting the social and labour market re-integra-
tion of homeless people who are sleeping rough
5.3.8. 19.4 19.4
5.3.8-A 9.6 9.6 Motivational training and support services to im-
prove the labour market prospects of the most 
disadvantaged
5.3.8-B 7.3 7.3 Motivational training and support services to im-
prove the labour market prospects of the most 
disadvantaged
5.3.9 2.0 2.0 Study partnerships to improve employability
5.3.10 3.3 3.3 Enable/motivational training, support services to 
prepare the most disadvantaged to successfully 
take part in traditional training/employment pro-
grammes
Total without 1.1 and 1.2 250.0 253.0 269.0
Total 346.0 363.0 408.0
Source: April 2011 figures: 1094/2011 (13 April), changes: Government decision 1453/2011 (22 December) and 
Government decision 1235/2012 (12 July), and the Action Plans of the New Széchenyi Programme for the other 
SROP priorities and action plans.
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In order to link Table A2 to the budget, at least the 
planned schedule of spending should be available 
for each identified programme; however this was 
not the case. Although relatively detailed infor-
mation is available about projects funded from EU 
sources and they can also be closely followed up to 
the publication of calls for proposals, very little is 
known about actual spending particularly in the 
disbursement phase. The Action Plans for the peri-
od 2011–2013 set out the indicative annual budget 
for each project – the figures for each amendment 
of the action plan are displayed in the middle col-
umns of Table A2. However, these data do not pro-
vide any information about implementation either. 
On the one hand, this is natural: actual spending 
depends on many unforeseeable factors, including 
the timing of calls for proposals and the submission 
of projects. On the other hand, this is limited by the 
type of documentation that does not record the dis-
bursement following – sometimes years after – con-
tracting. Although actual implementation is closely 
monitored by the National Development Agency, 
the information is not published. According to ex-
perts, this information is not included in Monitor-
ing Reports that are not public documents either. In-
stead, data aggregated by priority are reported. This 
is an additional difficulty for projects that are no 
longer included in the current action plans because 
although payment is still on-going, new contracts 
for implementation are not signed. Thus, there is 
no information about costs of individual projects 
even after their conclusion. Therefore there is lim-
ited knowledge about the implementation of larger 
units. Assuming that the available budget will be 
spent and items carried over are disregarded, one 
might argue that the total budget available for la-
bour market policies is at least 90 billion forints per 
year larger than that estimated on the basis of the 
state budget. This is a considerable sum in itself, but 
compared to the budget of approximately 340 bil-
lion forints, it is very significant: nearly its quarter. 
Therefore the estimated sum for labour market poli-
cies is around 430 billion forints that is 40% higher 
than that based only on NFA sources.
Even if we cannot analyse the schedule and the 
current policy structure– mainly due to items car-
ried over in the budget – the action plan gives an ac-
curate picture of policy changes. Columns 2–5 re-
flect the situation in April 2011***, then two changes 
show the effects of the comprehensive amendment 
of SROP and TIOP in the winter of 2011, and 
amendment of SROP Priority 1 and 2 in the sum-
mer of 2012. The contribution of other operation-
al programmes is set at 87 billion forints. The to-
tal available budget increased by about 50 billion 
forints as a result of these changes which is mainly 
due to the nearly 20 billion forints increase two 
times in the budget of complex project 1.1.2, and 
on the other hand, to a lesser degree, the increase 
in funding available for Start schemes, vocational 
training, workplace training, including addition-
ally some new schemes. Finally there are a fairly 
large number of new schemes in areas related to the 
social economy, day-care for children etc. The sum 
originally available for the modernisation of NES 
was significantly reduced, or rather re-allocated 
to SIOP Priority 3.2.1, and funding available for 
vocational rehabilitation in Project 1.1.1 was also 
reduced. The programme supporting SMEs to hire 
new workers (SROP 2.3.4), which was originally 
allocated 60 billion forints, was scrapped. Also for 
projects that retained all or most of the original 
budget, there was some re-allocation of resources, 
typically from 2011 to 2012 – this might have been 
due to unsuccessful calls for proposals or difficul-
ties of co-financing.
Conclusions
Hopefully the above has shown the type of informa-
tion that would be needed for a detailed overview of 
the budget for labour market policies. Firstly, taking 
stock of labour market spending in the state budget 
*** At the beginning of 2011 SROP had two general 
revisions in January and April as a result of govern-
ment decisions 1013/2011 (9 January) and 1094/2011 
(13 April). Then there were various minor amend-
ments such as changes in priorities 3, 4 and 6. The 
table indicates this version.
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(this is nearly happening), and details on the main 
budget titles. The latter would be partly doable on 
the basis of treasury accounts. Projects funded by 
the EU pose more of a problem. Here a more detailed 
analysis of their content would be necessary, simi-
larly to other types of projects, and of an adequate 
scale so that all potential sources are considered. On 
the other hand, actual figures would be necessary 
that indicate not only the planned but the actual 
cost of projects. This would be the only way to find 
out to what extent employment policy applied dif-
ferent types of measures.
Nonetheless, it is not without purpose to collate 
all available information because it provides an ap-
proximate picture of the role of individual measures 
in employment policy – changing over the years – 
and thus it helps to show the real significance of 
interventions.
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Statistical tables on labour market trends that have been published in The Hungarian 
Labour Market Yearbooks since 2000 can be downloaded in full from the website of the 
Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies: http://adatbank.mtakti.hu/tukor
data SourceS
CIRCA Communication & Information Resource Centre Administrator
KSH Table compiled from regular Hungarian Central Statistical Office  
 publications [Központi Statisztikai Hivatal]
KSH IMS HCSO institution-based labour statistics [KSH intézményi   
 munkaügyi statisztika]
KSH MEF HCSO Labour Force Survey [KSH Munkaerő-felmérés]
KSH MEM HCSO Labour Force Account [KSH Munkaerő-mérleg]
NAV National Tax and Customs Administration [Nemzeti Adó- és  
 Vámhivatal]
NEFMI Ministry of National Resources [Nemzeti Erőforrás Minisztérium]
NEFMI EMMI STAT Ministry of National Resources, Educational Statistics [Nemzeti  
 Erőforrás  Minisztérium, Oktatásstatisztika]
NFA National Market Fund [Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Alap]
NFSZ National Employment Service [Nemzeti Foglalkoztatási Szolgálat]
NFSZ IR NFSZ integrated tracking system [NFSZ Integrált (nyilvántartási)  
 Rendszer]
NFSZ REG National Employment Service Unemployment Register [NFSZ  
 regisztere]
NGM Ministry of National Economy [Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium]
NMH National Labour Office [Nemzeti Munkaügyi Hivatal]
NMH BT National Labour Office Wage Survey [NMH Bértarifa-felvétel]
NMH PROG National Labour Office Short-term Labour Market Projection Survey  
 [NMH Rövid Távú Munkaerőpiaci Prognózis]
NSZ Population Census [Népszámlálás]
NYUFIG Pension Administration [Nyugdíjfolyósító Igazgatóság]
ONYF Central Administration of National Pension Insurance [Országos  
 Nyugdíjbiztosítási Főigazgatóság]
TB Social Security Records [Társadalombiztosítás]
explanation of SymbolS
( – ) Non-occurence.
( .. ) Not available.
( n.a.) Not applicable.
( ... ) Data cannot be given due to data privacy restrictions.
This logo indicates that you can click anywhere on tables/figures for downloading xls 
source files.
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Year GDP
a Industrial 
productionb Export
c Importc Real  earningsd Employment
d Consumer 
price indexd
Unemploy-
ment rate
1990 96.5 90.7 95.9 94.8 94.3 97.2 128.9 ..
1995 101.5 104.6 108.4 96.1 87.8 98.1 128.2 10.2
1996 100.2 103.4 104.6 105.5 95.0 99.1 123.6 9.9
1997 103.1 111.1 129.9 126.4 104.9 100.1 118.3 8.7
1998 104.7 112.5 122.1 124.9 103.6 101.4 114.3 7.8
1999 103.2 110.4 115.9 114.3 102.5 103.2 110.0 7.0
2000 104.2 118.1 121.7 120.8 101.5 101.0 109.8 6.4
2001 103.7 103.7 107.7 104.0 106.4 100.3 109.2 5.7
2002 104.5 103.2 105.9 105.1 113.6 100.1 105.3 5.8
2003 103.9 106.9 109.1 110.1 109.2 101.3 104.7 5.9
2004 104.8 107.8 118.4 115.2 98.9 99.4 106.8 6.1
2005 104.0 106.8 111.5 106.1 106.3 100.0 103.6 7.2
2006 103.9 109.9 118.0 114.4 103.6 100.7 103.9 7.5
2007 100.1 107.9 115.8 112.0 95.4 99.9 108.0 7.4
2008 100.9 100.0 104.2 104.3 100.8 98.8 106.1 7.8
2009 93.2 82.2 87.3 82.9 97.7 97.5 104.2 10.0
2010 101.3 110.6 116.8 115.1 101.8 100.0 104.9 11.2
2011 101.7 105.4 110.2 106.9 102.4 100.8 103.9 10.9
a After 1996 there was a change in the methodology for accounting the undivided service fee 
of financial intermediation. Previous year = 100.
b 1990–2000: those with more than 5 employees, 2001–: without water and waste manage-
ment, including businesses with fewer than 5 employees. Previous year = 100.
c Volume index. Previous year = 100.
d Previous year = 100.
Source: GDP: 1990–2010: STADAT (2011. 09. 30. version), 2011: Statistical Pocketbook; Indus-
trial production index: 2001–: STADAT (2012. 05. 17. version), 2011. year preliminary data; 
Export and import: 2001–: STADAT (2010. 03. 02. version); Employment: 1990: KSH MEM; 
1995–: KSH MEF. Other data: CSO.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent01_01
Figure 1.1: Annual changes of basic economic indicators
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena01_01
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Figure 1.2: Annual GDP time series (2000 = 100%)
Source: Eurostat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena01_02
Figure 1.3: Employment rate of population aged 15-64
Source: Eurostat.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena01_03
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Table 2.1: Populationa
Year
In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual  changes
Population age 
15-64,  
in thousands
Demographic dependency rate
Total  
populationb Old age
c
1990 10,375 100.4 –0.2 6,870.4 0.51 0.20
1995 10,337 99.6 –0.1 6,986.9 0.48 0.21
2000 10,221 98.5 –0.3 6,961.3 0.47 0.21
2001 10,200 98.3 –0.2 6,963.3 0.46 0.22
2002 10,175 98.1 –0.2 6,962.8 0.46 0.22
2003 10,142 97.8 –0.3 6,949.4 0.46 0.22
2004 10,117 97.5 –0.3 6,943.5 0.46 0.23
2005 10,098 97.3 –0.2 6,940.3 0.45 0.23
2006 10,077 97.1 –0.2 6,931.8 0.45 0.23
2007 10,066 97.0 –0.1 6,931.3 0.45 0.23
2008 10,045 96.8 –0.2 6,912.7 0.45 0.24
2009 10,031 96.7 –0.1 6,898.1 0.45 0.24
2010 10,014 96.5 –0.1 6,874.0 0.46 0.24
2011 9,986 96.3 –0.2 6,857.4 0.46 0.24
2012 9,958 96.0 –0.3 6,835.4 0.46 0.25
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
b (population age 0–14 + 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
c (population age 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent02_01
Table 2.2: Population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–64 65+
Total
years old
1990 2,130.5 1,445.5 4,231.4 1,193.5 1,373.9 10,374.8
1995 1,891.7 1,610.1 4,250.6 1,126.2 1,458.0 10,336.7
2000 1,729.2 1,526.5 4,291.4 1,143.4 1,531.1 10,221.6
2001 1,692.0 1,480.1 4,338.5 1,144.7 1,545.0 10,200.3
2002 1,660.1 1,436.9 4,378.0 1,147.9 1,551.9 10,174.9
2003 1,633.7 1,392.5 4,390.8 1,166.1 1,559.2 10,142.4
2004 1,606.1 1,355.0 4,401.6 1,186.9 1,567.1 10,116.7
2005 1,579.7 1,322.0 4,409.1 1,209.2 1,577.6 10,097.6
2006 1,553.5 1,302.0 4,399.8 1,230.0 1,590.7 10,076.6
2007 1,529.7 1,285.9 4,393.9 1,251.5 1,605.1 10,066.1
2008 1,508.8 1,273.3 4,377.1 1,262.3 1,623.9 10,045.4
2009 1,492.6 1,259.9 4,346.1 1,292.0 1,640.3 10,030.9
2010 1,476.9 1,253.4 4,293.7 1,326.9 1,663.5 10,014.4
2011 1,457.2 1,231.7 4,257.7 1,367.8 1,671.3 9,985.7
2012 1,441.8 1,207.3 4,231.8 1,396.3 1,680.6 9,957.7
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent02_02
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Figure 2.1: Age structure of the Hungarian population, 1980, 2012
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena02_01
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Table 2.3: Male population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–59 60–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 1,205.4 749.9 2,475.6 170.5 587.3 5,188.7
1990 1,090.4 740.3 2,366.9 259.9 527.5 4,984.9
1998 916.8 815.4 2,375.5 229.3 564.7 4,901.8
1999 901.5 805.0 2,383.2 226.1 568.6 4,884.4
2000 885.0 780.9 2,403.8 224.8 570.8 4,865.2
2001 865.7 757.0 2,425.2 228.9 574.2 4,851.0
2002 850.1 733.9 2,446.1 233.0 573.8 4,837.0
2003 836.8 711.3 2,456.5 239.9 574.0 4,818.5
2004 823.0 691.9 2,470.3 244.4 574.5 4,804.1
2005 809.5 674.6 2,480.0 252.2 576.8 4,793.1
2006 796.7 664.0 2,493.7 249.3 580.9 4,784.6
2007 784.5 655.4 2,503.7 249.4 586.1 4,779.1
2008 773.9 649.2 2,501.3 252.5 592.8 4,769.6
2009 765.8 642.7 2,497.0 258.4 599.2 4,763.1
2010 757.7 640.4 2,488.8 261.7 608.3 4,756.9
2011 747.6 629.7 2,480.4 274.7 611.5 4,743.9
2012 739.7 618.0 2,475.1 282.9 616.0 4,731.7
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent02_03
Table 2.4: Female population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 1,135.8 714.5 2,232.8 365.3 1,072.4 5,520.8
1990 1,040.1 705.2 2,144.4 327.6 1,172.5 5,389.9
1998 876.0 777.6 2,156.0 324.4 1,243.9 5,378.0
1999 861.0 768.2 2,159.3 326.7 1,253.8 5,369.0
2000 844.3 745.6 2,170.5 334.8 1,261.3 5,356.5
2001 826.3 723.1 2,193.4 330.4 1,276.1 5,349.3
2002 810.0 703.0 2,211.6 328.6 1,284.7 5,337.9
2003 796.9 681.2 2,217.4 330.7 1,297.8 5,323.9
2004 783.1 663.1 2,220.8 338.5 1,307.1 5,312.6
2005 770.2 647.4 2,221.9 341.7 1,323.1 5,304.3
2006 756.8 638.6 2,213.0 356.6 1,327.0 5,292.0
2007 745.1 630.6 2,206.8 369.6 1,335.0 5,287.1
2008 734.9 624.1 2,194.5 373.2 1,349.1 5,275.8
2009 726.8 617.2 2,176.0 381.8 1,366.1 5,267.9
2010 719.2 613.1 2,145.5 396.8 1,382.8 5,257.4
2011 709.6 601.9 2,124.0 404.4 1,401.9 5,241.8
2012 702.0 589.3 2,107.7 408.0 1,419.0 5,226.0
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent02_04
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Table 3.1: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, in thousandsa
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of male above 59  and female above 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 4,887.9 0.0 300.8 370.1 259.0 339.7 1,269.6 6,157.5 570.3 0.0 1,632.1 2,202.4
1990 4,534.3 62.4 284.3 548.9 249.7 297.5 1,380.4 5,977.1 345.7 0.0 1,944.9 2,290.6
1991 4,270.5 253.3 335.6 578.2 259.8 317.1 1,490.7 6,014.5 249.5 0.0 2,045.2 2,294.7
1992 3,898.4 434.9 392.7 620.0 262.1 435.9 1,710.7 6,044.0 184.3 9.8 2,101.7 2,295.8
1993 3,689.5 502.6 437.5 683.9 270.5 480.1 1,872.0 6,064.1 137.5 16.3 2,141.2 2,295.0
1994 3,633.1 437.4 476.5 708.2 280.9 540.7 2,006.3 6,076.8 118.4 11.9 2,163.8 2,294.1
1995 3,571.3 410.0 495.2 723.4 285.3 596.1 2,100.0 6,081.3 107.5 6.4 2,180.6 2,294.5
1996 3,546.1 394.0 512.7 740.0 289.2 599.4 2,141.2 6,081.3 102.1 6.1 2,184.6 2,292.8
1997 3,549.5 342.5 542.9 752.0 289.0 599.9 2,183.8 6,075.8 96.9 6.3 2,189.0 2,292.2
1998 3,608.5 305.5 588.8 697.0 295.5 565.7 2,147.0 6,061.0 89.3 7.5 2,197.6 2,294.4
1999 3,701.0 283.3 534.7 675.6 295.3 549.8 2,055.4 6,039.6 110.4 1.4 2,185.2 2,297.0
2000 3,745.9 261.4 517.9 721.7 281.4 571.4 2,092.4 6,099.7 130.3 2.3 2,268.0 2,400.6
2001 3,742.6 231.7 516.3 717.9 286.6 601.6 2,122.4 6,096.7 140.7 2.4 2,271.8 2,414.9
2002 3,719.6 235.7 507.1 738.3 286.8 593.0 2,125.2 6,080.5 164.1 3.2 2,263.9 2,431.2
2003 3,719.0 239.6 485.0 730.7 286.9 595.0 2,097.6 6,056.2 202.9 4.9 2,245.6 2,453.4
2004 3,663.1 247.2 480.5 739.8 282.4 622.4 2,125.1 6,035.4 237.3 5.7 2,236.1 2,479.1
2005 3,653.9 296.0 449.7 740.8 278.6 590.3 2,059.4 6,009.3 247.6 7.9 2,258.3 2,513.8
2006 3,679.6 308.8 432.9 810.9 270.0 500.7 2,014.5 6,002.9 250.5 8.4 2,268.0 2,526.9
2007 3,676.6 303.7 426.8 832.6 267.2 475.8 2,002.4 5,982.7 249.5 8.2 2,296.1 2,553.8
2008 3,631.4 318.5 408.6 819.6 279.8 493.1 2,001.1 5,951.0 248.1 10.7 2,327.7 2,586.5
2009 3,516.8 406.4 364.5 814.6 278.7 529.3 1,987.1 5,910.3 265.1 14.3 2,348.0 2,627.4
2010 3,485.7 455.2 338.7 814.6 267.0 500.7 1,921.0 5,861.9 295.5 19.6 2,356.0 2,671.1
2011 3,484.2 444.1 290.7 794.4 280.5 519.0 1,884.6 5,813.0 327.7 23.8 2,357.6 2,709.1
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 
the data is updated based on the 2001 population census. Data on ‘employed’ includes con-
scripts and those working while receiving pension or child support. The data on students 
for 1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it includes the institu-
tional population not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH 
MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent03_01
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Table 3.2: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, males, in thousandsa
Year
Population of male 15–59 Population of male 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,750.5 0.0 173.8 196.3 0.0 99.1 469.2 3,219.7 265.3 0.0 491.8 757.1
1990 2,524.3 37.9 188.4 284.2 1.2 80.3 554.1 3,116.3 123.7 0.0 665.5 789.2
1991 2,351.6 150.3 218.7 296.5 1.5 115.0 631.7 3,133.6 90.4 0.0 700.7 791.1
1992 2,153.1 263.2 252.0 302.4 1.7 174.8 730.9 3,147.2 65.1 3.2 722.1 790.4
1993 2,029.1 311.5 263.2 346.9 2.0 203.3 815.4 3,156.0 47.9 4.5 735.7 788.1
1994 2,013.4 270.0 277.6 357.1 3.7 239.6 878.0 3,161.4 41.6 3.8 740.0 785.4
1995 2,012.5 259.3 282.2 367.4 4.9 237.8 892.3 3,164.1 37.1 2.1 742.6 781.8
1996 2,007.4 242.4 291.9 372.8 3.3 248.3 916.3 3,166.1 28.9 1.3 746.3 776.5
1997 2,018.0 212.2 306.0 377.6 1.5 251.6 936.7 3,166.9 25.5 1.9 743.5 770.9
1998 2,015.5 186.5 345.4 350.4 1.0 264.2 961.0 3,163.0 26.2 2.8 737.3 766.3
1999 2,068.4 170.3 312.7 338.8 4.2 261.5 917.2 3,155.9 34.7 0.4 727.2 762.3
2000 2,086.0 158.2 315.2 358.2 4.1 261.7 939.2 3,183.4 39.8 0.7 758.8 799.3
2001 2,087.6 141.6 311.0 353.4 4.3 283.2 951.9 3,181.1 41.1 0.9 763.0 805.0
2002 2,080.4 137.3 307.5 370.3 5.0 273.4 956.2 3,173.9 45.2 0.7 764.4 810.3
2003 2,073.5 137.6 293.6 367.9 4.3 288.1 953.9 3,165.0 53.0 0.9 762.5 816.4
2004 2,052.7 136.2 293.5 371.2 4.6 300.2 969.5 3,158.4 64.6 0.6 758.8 824.0
2005 2,050.7 158.2 278.8 375.4 5.8 288.8 948.8 3,157.7 65.4 0.9 763.9 830.2
2006 2,076.5 163.6 268.1 404.1 7.0 239.3 918.5 3,158.4 60.5 1.0 770.9 832.8
2007 2,082.6 163.2 267.7 412.3 3.8 225.2 909.0 3,154.8 60.4 1.0 779.0 840.4
2008 2,052.0 173.4 266.3 408.2 4.8 240.4 919.7 3,145.1 58.8 0.9 791.7 851.4
2009 1,983.6 232.3 241.8 410.8 4.6 261.6 918.8 3,134.4 61.6 1.3 800.7 863.6
2010 1,960.1 262.5 228.3 410.2 4.6 254.0 897.1 3,119.7 62.6 1.9 813.6 878.1
2011 1,987.3 250.4 198.8 399.6 3.8 261.6 863.8 3,101.6 70.0 2.9 819.6 892.5
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 
the data is updated based on the 2001 population census. Data on ‘employed’ includes con-
scripts and those working while receiving pension or child support. The data on students for 
1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it includes the institutional 
population not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH 
MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent03_02
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Table 3.3: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, females, in thousandsa
Year
Population of female 15–54 Population of female 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,137.4 0.0 127.0 173.8 259.0 240.6 800.4 2,937.8 305.0 0.0 1,140.3 1,445.3
1990 2,010.0 24.5 95.8 264.7 248.5 217.3 826.3 2,860.8 222.0 0.0 1,279.4 1,501.4
1991 1,918.9 103.1 116.9 281.8 258.3 201.9 858.9 2,880.9 159.1 0.0 1,344.5 1,503.6
1992 1,745.3 171.7 140.8 317.6 260.4 261.1 979.9 2,896.9 119.2 6.6 1,379.6 1,505.4
1993 1,660.4 191.1 174.3 337.0 268.5 276.8 1,056.6 2,908.1 89.6 11.8 1,405.5 1,506.9
1994 1,619.7 167.4 198.9 351.1 277.2 301.1 1,128.3 2,915.4 76.8 8.1 1,423.8 1,508.7
1995 1,558.8 150.7 213.0 356.0 280.4 358.3 1,207.7 2,917.2 70.4 4.3 1,438.0 1,512.7
1996 1,538.7 151.6 220.7 367.2 285.9 351.1 1,224.9 2,915.2 73.2 4.8 1,438.3 1,516.3
1997 1,531.5 130.3 236.9 374.4 287.5 348.3 1,247.1 2,908.9 71.4 4.4 1,445.3 1,521.1
1998 1,593.0 119.0 243.4 346.6 294.5 301.5 1,186.0 2,898.0 63.1 4.7 1,460.3 1,528.1
1999 1,632.6 113.0 222.0 336.8 291.1 288.3 1,138.2 2,883.8 75.8 1.0 1,458.0 1,534.8
2000 1,659.9 103.2 202.7 363.5 277.3 309.7 1,153.2 2,916.3 90.5 1.6 1,509.2 1,601.3
2001 1,655.0 90.1 205.3 364.5 282.3 318.3 1,170.4 2,915.5 99.6 1.5 1,508.8 1,609.9
2002 1,639.2 98.4 199.6 368.0 281.8 319.6 1,169.0 2,906.6 118.9 2.5 1,499.5 1,620.9
2003 1,645.6 102.0 191.4 362.8 282.6 306.9 1,143.7 2,891.2 149.9 4.0 1,483.2 1,637.1
2004 1,610.2 111.0 186.8 368.6 277.8 322.2 1,155.4 2,876.6 172.8 5.1 1,477.3 1,655.2
2005 1,603.2 137.8 170.9 365.4 272.8 301.5 1,110.6 2,851.6 182.2 7.0 1,494.4 1,683.6
2006 1,603.1 144.8 164.8 406.8 263.0 262.0 1,096.6 2,844.5 189.6 7.4 1,497.1 1,694.1
2007 1,594.0 140.5 159.1 420.3 263.4 250.6 1,093.4 2,827.9 189.1 7.2 1,517.1 1,713.4
2008 1,579.4 145.1 142.3 411.4 276.0 252.7 1,082.4 2,806.9 189.3 9.8 1,536.0 1,735.1
2009 1,533.5 174.1 122.7 403.8 274.1 267.7 1,068.3 2,775.9 203.5 13.0 1,547.3 1,763.8
2010 1,525.6 192.8 110.4 404.4 262.4 246.6 1,023.8 2,742.2 233.0 17.7 1,542.3 1,793.0
2011 1,496.9 193.7 91.9 394.8 276.7 257.4 1,020.8 2,711.4 257.7 20.9 1,538.0 1,816.6
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 
the data is updated based on the 2001 population census. Data on ‘employed’ includes con-
scripts and those working while receiving pension or child support. The data on students for 
1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it includes the institutional 
population not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH 
MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent03_03
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Table 3.4: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of male above 59  and female above 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 79.4 0.0 4.9 6.0 4.2 5.5 20.6 100.0 25.9 0.0 74.1 100.0
1990 75.9 1.0 4.8 9.2 4.2 5.0 23.1 100.0 15.1 0.0 84.9 100.0
1995 58.7 6.7 8.1 11.9 4.7 9.8 34.5 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 58.3 6.5 8.4 12.2 4.8 9.9 35.2 100.0 4.5 0.3 95.3 100.0
1997 58.4 5.6 8.9 12.4 4.8 9.9 35.9 100.0 4.2 0.3 95.5 100.0
1998 59.5 5.0 9.7 11.5 4.9 9.3 35.4 100.0 3.9 0.3 95.8 100.0
1999 61.3 4.7 8.9 11.2 4.9 9.1 34.0 100.0 4.8 0.1 95.1 100.0
2000 61.4 4.3 8.5 11.8 4.6 9.4 34.3 100.0 5.4 0.1 94.5 100.0
2001 61.4 3.8 8.5 11.8 4.7 9.9 34.8 100.0 5.8 0.1 94.1 100.0
2002 61.2 3.9 8.3 12.1 4.7 9.8 35.0 100.0 6.7 0.1 93.1 100.0
2003 61.4 4.0 8.0 12.1 4.7 9.8 34.6 100.0 8.3 0.2 91.5 100.0
2004 60.7 4.1 8.0 12.3 4.7 10.3 35.2 100.0 9.6 0.2 90.2 100.0
2005 60.8 4.9 7.5 12.3 4.6 9.8 34.3 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.8 100.0
2006 61.3 5.1 7.2 13.5 4.5 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.9 0.3 89.8 100.0
2007 61.5 5.1 7.1 13.9 4.5 7.9 33.5 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.9 100.0
2008 61.0 5.3 6.9 13.8 4.7 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.6 0.4 90.0 100.0
2009 59.5 6.9 6.2 13.8 4.7 9.0 33.6 100.0 10.1 0.5 89.4 100.0
2010 59.5 7.8 5.8 13.9 4.6 8.5 32.8 100.0 11.1 0.7 88.2 100.0
2011 59.9 7.6 5.0 13.7 4.8 8.9 32.4 100.0 12.1 0.9 87.0 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent03_04
Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990-91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena03_01
Figure 3.1: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59  
and female 15–54, total
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Table 3.5: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, males, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 Population of male 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other  
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other  
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 85.4 0.0 5.4 6.1 0.0 3.1 14.6 100.0 35.0 0.0 65.0 100.0
1990 81.0 1.2 6.0 9.1 0.0 2.6 17.8 100.0 15.7 0.0 84.3 100.0
1995 63.6 8.2 8.9 11.6 0.2 7.5 28.2 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 63.4 7.7 9.2 11.8 0.1 7.8 28.9 100.0 3.7 0.2 96.1 100.0
1997 63.7 6.7 9.7 11.9 0.0 7.9 29.6 100.0 3.3 0.2 96.4 100.0
1998 63.7 5.9 10.9 11.1 0.0 8.4 30.4 100.0 3.4 0.4 96.2 100.0
1999 65.5 5.4 9.9 10.7 0.1 8.3 29.1 100.0 4.6 0.1 95.4 100.0
2000 65.5 5.0 9.9 11.3 0.1 8.2 29.5 100.0 5.0 0.1 94.9 100.0
2001 65.6 4.5 9.8 11.1 0.1 8.9 29.9 100.0 5.1 0.1 94.8 100.0
2002 65.5 4.3 9.7 11.7 0.2 8.6 30.1 100.0 5.6 0.1 94.3 100.0
2003 65.5 4.3 9.3 11.6 0.1 9.1 30.1 100.0 6.5 0.1 93.4 100.0
2004 65.0 4.3 9.3 11.8 0.1 9.5 30.7 100.0 7.8 0.1 92.1 100.0
2005 64.9 5.0 8.8 11.9 0.2 9.1 30.0 100.0 7.9 0.1 92.0 100.0
2006 65.7 5.2 8.5 12.8 0.2 7.6 29.1 100.0 7.3 0.1 92.6 100.0
2007 66.0 5.2 8.5 13.1 0.1 7.1 28.8 100.0 7.2 0.1 92.7 100.0
2008 65.2 5.5 8.5 13.0 0.2 7.6 29.2 100.0 6.9 0.1 93.0 100.0
2009 63.3 7.4 7.7 13.1 0.1 8.3 29.3 100.0 7.1 0.2 92.7 100.0
2010 62.8 8.4 7.3 13.1 0.1 8.1 28.8 100.0 7.1 0.2 92.7 100.0
2011 64.1 8.1 6.4 12.9 0.1 8.4 27.9 100.0 7.8 0.3 91.8 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent03_05
Figure 3.2: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59
Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990-91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena03_02
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Table 3.6: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, females, per cent
Year
Population of female 15–54 Population of female 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other in-
active
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other in-
active
Inactive 
total
1980 72.8 0.0 4.3 5.9 8.8 8.2 27.2 100.0 21.1 0.0 78.9 100.0
1990 70.3 0.9 3.3 9.3 8.7 7.6 28.9 100.0 14.8 0.0 85.2 100.0
1995 53.4 5.2 7.3 12.2 9.6 12.3 41.4 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.1 100.0
1996 52.8 5.2 7.6 12.6 9.8 12.0 42.0 100.0 4.8 0.3 94.9 100.0
1997 52.6 4.5 8.1 12.9 9.9 12.0 42.9 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1998 55.0 4.1 8.4 12.0 10.2 10.4 40.9 100.0 4.1 0.3 95.6 100.0
1999 56.6 3.9 7.7 11.7 10.1 10.0 39.5 100.0 4.9 0.1 95.0 100.0
2000 56.9 3.5 7.0 12.5 9.5 10.6 39.5 100.0 5.7 0.1 94.2 100.0
2001 56.8 3.1 7.0 12.5 9.7 10.9 40.1 100.0 6.2 0.1 93.7 100.0
2002 56.4 3.4 6.9 12.7 9.7 11.0 40.2 100.0 7.3 0.2 92.5 100.0
2003 56.9 3.5 6.6 12.5 9.8 10.6 39.6 100.0 9.2 0.2 90.6 100.0
2004 56.0 3.9 6.5 12.8 9.7 11.2 40.2 100.0 10.4 0.3 89.3 100.0
2005 56.2 4.8 6.0 12.8 9.6 10.6 38.9 100.0 10.8 0.4 88.8 100.0
2006 56.4 5.1 5.8 14.3 9.2 9.2 38.6 100.0 11.2 0.4 88.4 100.0
2007 56.4 5.0 5.6 14.9 9.3 8.9 38.7 100.0 11.0 0.4 88.6 100.0
2008 56.3 5.2 5.1 14.7 9.8 9.0 38.6 100.0 10.9 0.6 88.5 100.0
2009 55.2 6.3 4.4 14.5 9.9 9.6 38.5 100.0 11.5 0.8 87.7 100.0
2010 55.6 7.0 4.0 14.7 9.6 9.0 37.5 100.0 13.0 1.0 86.0 100.0
2011 55.2 7.1 3.4 14.6 10.2 9.5 37.6 100.0 14.2 1.2 84.7 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: NFSZ REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent03_06
Figure 3.3: Labour force participation of population at female 15–54
Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990-91: NFSZ REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena03_03
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Table 3.7: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), in thousands
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Together
In work 3,778.9 3,827.4 3,827.1 3,843.6 3,834.4 3,852.2 3,864.1 3,857.2 3,800.7 3,715.3 3,709.8 3,746.7
Unemployed 448.1 414.5 410.4 431.8 451.0 488.2 468.1 448.3 481.4 592.5 676.0 678.7
Student, pupils 749.9 739.9 763.1 767.7 783.8 792.0 847.8 870.4 868.9 864.5 861.8 848.3
Pensioner 991.8 990.8 940.4 856.4 800.3 755.6 617.8 568.6 611.0 600.9 579.3 570.3
Disabled 223.8 251.0 284.4 338.3 370.4 359.7 520.4 560.3 530.0 495.5 482.1 448.4
On child care leave 272.4 272.3 278.3 281.7 274.7 272.4 273.5 279.7 292.4 290.5 280.5 288.3
Dependent 165.9 170.7 160.4 135.1 133.3 134.6 116.1 111.9 106.2 105.6 100.4 110.5
Out of work for other 
reason 133.6 184.7 185.7 181.7 178.4 160.0 108.0 103.3 103.6 106.4 79.3 83.8
Total 6,764.4 6,851.3 6,849.8 6,836.3 6,826.3 6,814.7 6,815.8 6,799.7 6,794.2 6,771.2 6,769.2 6,775.0
Males
In work 2,075.4 2,089.5 2,090.2 2,087.3 2,082.8 2,088.3 2,105.0 2,108.9 2,074.0 2,013.1 1,989.1 2,026.4
Unemployed 270.4 255.2 239.3 244.2 247.7 265.2 251.6 241.9 257.5 334.2 376.5 373.4
Student, pupils 371.4 363.6 380.9 383.7 391.1 398.5 418.9 430.2 431.5 432.9 431.2 425.5
Pensioner 388.6 386.3 368.1 337.4 322.5 304.5 236.0 205.2 233.8 235.1 240.4 243.4
Disabled 120.4 134.2 148.1 169.9 184.5 178.7 250.4 269.9 259.4 237.1 231.0 212.7
On child care leave 3.8 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.9 6.1 5.5 4.1 5.8 6.0 6.7 4.7
Dependent 5.3 6.3 5.1 5.3 6.0 7.0 5.8 6.6 7.2 7.3 10.3 10.0
Out of work for other 
reason 77.6 100.8 101.2 97.5 89.6 80.1 54.9 52.1 52.1 50.1 36.1 37.5
Total 3,312.9 3,339.9 3,337.8 3,330.0 3,329.1 3,328.4 3,328.1 3,318.9 3,321.3 3,315.8 3,321.3 3,333.6
Females
In work 1,703.5 1,737.9 1,736.9 1,756.3 1,751.6 1,763.9 1,759.1 1,748.3 1,726.6 1,702.2 1,720.7 1,720.4
Unemployed 177.7 159.3 171.1 187.6 203.3 223.0 216.5 206.4 223.8 258.3 299.5 305.4
Student, pupils 378.5 376.3 382.2 384.0 392.7 393.5 428.9 440.2 437.4 431.6 430.6 422.8
Pensioner 603.2 604.5 572.3 519.0 477.8 451.1 381.8 363.4 377.2 365.7 338.9 326.9
Disabled 103.4 116.8 136.3 168.4 185.9 181.0 270.0 290.4 270.6 258.4 251.1 235.7
On child care leave 268.6 268.3 273.4 277.0 269.8 266.3 268.0 275.6 286.7 284.5 273.9 283.6
Dependent 160.6 164.4 155.3 129.8 127.3 127.6 110.3 105.3 99.1 98.3 90.1 100.4
Out of work for other 
reason 56.0 83.9 84.5 84.2 88.8 79.9 53.1 51.2 51.4 56.3 43.1 46.3
Total 3,451.5 3,511.4 3,512.0 3,506.3 3,497.2 3,486.3 3,487.7 3,480.8 3,472.8 3,455.3 3,447.9 3,441.5
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent03_07
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Table 3.8: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), per cent
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Together
In work 54.7 55.9 55.9 55.9 56.2 56.2 56.5 56.7 56.7 55.9 54.9 54.8 55.3
Unemployed 7.0 6.6 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.1 8.8 10.0 10.0
Student, pupils 11.1 11.1 10.8 11.1 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.4 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.7 12.5
Pensioner 15.9 14.7 14.5 13.7 12.5 11.7 11.1 9.1 8.4 9.0 8.9 8.6 8.4
Disabled 2.9 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.9 5.4 5.3 7.6 8.2 7.8 7.3 7.1 6.6
On child care leave 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.3
Dependent 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6
Out of work for other 
reason 1.7 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Males
In work 61.6 62.6 62.6 62.6 62.7 62.6 62.7 63.2 63.5 62.4 60.7 59.9 60.8
Unemployed 8.6 8.2 7.6 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.6 7.3 7.8 10.1 11.3 11.2
Student, pupils 11.3 11.2 10.9 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.6 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.0 12.8
Pensioner 12.9 11.7 11.6 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.1 7.1 6.2 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3
Disabled 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.5 5.4 7.5 8.1 7.8 7.2 7.0 6.4
On child care leave 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Dependent 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Out of work for other 
reason 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Females
In work 48.1 49.4 49.5 49.5 50.1 50.1 50.6 50.4 50.2 49.7 49.3 49.9 50.0
Unemployed 5.4 5.1 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.4 6.2 5.9 6.4 7.5 8.7 8.9
Student, pupils 10.9 11.0 10.7 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 12.3 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.5 12.3
Pensioner 18.8 17.5 17.2 16.3 14.8 13.7 12.9 10.9 10.4 10.9 10.6 9.8 9.5
Disabled 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.9 4.8 5.3 5.2 7.7 8.3 7.8 7.5 7.3 6.8
On child care leave 8.2 7.8 7.6 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.2 7.9 8.2
Dependent 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.9
Out of work for other 
reason 1.3 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent03_08
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Table 4.1: Employment
Year In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual changes Employment ratioa
1980 5,458.2 133.7 .. 65.3
1990 4,880.0 119.5 .. 59.0
1991 4,520.0 110.7 –7.4 54.4
1992 4,082.7 100.0 –9.7 49.0
1993 3,827.0 93.7 –6.3 45.8
1994 3,751.5 91.9 –2.0 44.8
1995 3,678.8 90.1 –1.9 43.9
1996 3,648.2 89.4 –0.8 43.6
1997 3,646.4 89.3 0.0 43.6
1998 3,697.8 90.6 1.4 44.3
1999 3,811.4 93.4 3.1 45.7
2000 3,849.1 94.3 1.0 46.2
2001 3,883.3 95.1 0.3 45.6
2002 3,883.7 95.1 0.0 45.6
2003 3,921.9 96.1 1.2 46.2
2004 3,900.4 95.5 –0.5 45.8
2005 3,901.5 95.6 0.0 45.7
2006 3,930.1 96.3 0.7 46.0
2007 3,926.2 96.2 0.0 46.0
2008 3,879.4 95.0 –1.2 45.4
2009 3,781.9 92.6 –2.4 44.3
2010 3,781.2 92.6 0.0 44.3
2011 3,811.9 93.4 1.0 44.7
a Per cent of the population above 14 year.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_01
Figure 4.1: Employed
Source: 1990-91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena04_01
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Table 4.2: Employment by gender
Year
Males Females Share of females 
(%)In thousands 1992 = 100 In thousands 1992 = 100
1980 3,015.8 136.0 2,442.4 131.0 44.7
1990 2,648.0 119.4 2,232.0 119.7 45.7
1991 2,442.0 110.1 2,078.0 111.5 46.0
1992 2,218.2 100.0 1,864.5 100.0 45.7
1993 2,077.0 93.6 1,750.0 93.9 45.7
1994 2,055.0 92.6 1,696.5 91.0 45.2
1995 2,049.6 92.4 1,629.2 87.4 44.3
1996 2,036.3 91.8 1,611.9 86.5 44.2
1997 2,043.5 92.1 1,602.9 86.0 44.0
1998 2,041.7 92.0 1,656.1 88.8 44.8
1999 2,103.1 94.8 1,708.4 91.6 44.8
2000 2,122.4 95.7 1,726.7 92.6 44.9
2001 2,128.7 96.0 1,754.6 94.1 45.2
2002 2,125.6 95.8 1,758.1 94.3 45.3
2003 2,126.5 95.6 1,795.4 96.2 45.8
2004 2,117.3 95.5 1,783.1 95.6 45.7
2005 2,116.1 95.4 1,785.4 95.8 45.8
2006 2,137.4 96.4 1,792.7 96.1 45.6
2007 2,143.0 96.6 1,783.2 95.6 45.5
2008 2,110.8 95.2 1,768.6 94.9 45.6
2009 2,044.9 92.2 1,737.0 93.2 45.9
2010 2,022.6 91.2 1,758.6 94.4 46.5
2011 2,057.3 92.7 1,754.6 94.1 46.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_02
Figure 4.2: Employment by gender
Source: 1990–91: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena04_02
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Table 4.3: Composition of the employed by age groups, males, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 5.1 12.6 55.4 10.2 8.0 8.7 100.0
1990 5.0 10.8 64.1 8.6 6.8 4.7 100.0
1998 2.3 13.4 67.6 10.3 5.1 1.3 100.0
1999 1.9 13.2 67.1 10.5 5.6 1.6 100.0
2000 1.5 12.4 67.3 10.6 6.4 1.8 100.0
2001 1.2 10.4 68.6 11.1 6.7 2.0 100.0
2002 0.9 9.4 69.4 11.3 6.9 2.1 100.0
2003 0.7 8.6 69.1 11.8 7.3 2.5 100.0
2004 0.7 7.4 69.5 12.0 7.3 3.0 100.0
2005 0.6 6.8 68.9 12.7 7.9 3.1 100.0
2006 0.6 6.6 68.5 13.0 8.4 2.9 100.0
2007 0.5 6.5 68.7 13.0 8.5 2.8 100.0
2008 0.5 6.3 69.0 13.1 8.3 2.8 100.0
2009 0.4 5.6 69.6 12.2 9.2 3.0 100.0
2010 0.3 5.7 69.3 12.0 9.6 3.1 100.0
2011 0.3 5.5 69.5 11.5 9.7 3.4 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_03
Table 4.4: Composition of the employed by age groups, females, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55+
Total
years old
1980 5.3 9.7 61.8 10.7 12.5 100.0
1990 5.2 8.6 66.2 10.0 10.0 100.0
1998 2.3 12.2 71.2 10.5 3.8 100.0
1999 1.7 12.1 70.2 11.6 4.4 100.0
2000 1.4 11.1 69.6 12.7 5.2 100.0
2001 1.1 9.6 70.5 13.1 5.7 100.0
2002 0.8 9.2 69.4 13.8 6.8 100.0
2003 0.5 8.2 68.8 14.0 8.5 100.0
2004 0.5 7.1 68.2 14.6 9.7 100.0
2005 0.4 6.4 67.6 15.4 10.2 100.0
2006 0.4 6.1 66.8 16.2 10.6 100.0
2007 0.3 5.8 67.3 16.0 10.6 100.0
2008 0.3 5.5 67.4 16.1 10.7 100.0
2009 0.3 5.4 67.2 15.4 11.7 100.0
2010 0.3 5.3 66.3 14.8 13.2 100.0
2011 0.3 5.4 66.0 13.8 14.5 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_04
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Table 4.5: Composition of the employed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less Vocational school Secondary school College, university Total
1980 40.8 32.3 18.2 8.7 100.0
1990 37.6 30.5 20.1 11.8 100.0
1998 20.3 39.4 25.7 14.7 100.0
1999 16.8 41.5 26.8 14.9 100.0
2000 16.1 41.6 26.7 15.6 100.0
2001 15.6 42.8 26.0 15.6 100.0
2002 14.6 43.2 26.4 15.8 100.0
2003 14.0 41.3 27.7 17.0 100.0
2004 13.0 40.4 28.0 18.6 100.0
2005 13.0 40.8 27.7 18.5 100.0
2006 12.3 40.8 28.3 18.6 100.0
2007 11.8 40.8 28.7 18.7 100.0
2008 11.7 39.4 29.0 19.8 100.0
2009 10.9 38.6 30.1 20.3 100.0
2010 10.7 38.2 30.6 20.5 100.0
2011 10.6 37.1 30.4 21.9 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999, 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_05
Table 4.6: Composition of the employed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less Vocational school Secondary school College, university Total
1980 53.1 12.3 27.5 7.2 100.0
1990 43.4 13.4 31.4 11.8 100.0
1998 23.6 20.2 38.2 18.0 100.0
1999 20.6 20.3 40.6 18.5 100.0
2000 19.1 20.9 40.8 19.2 100.0
2001 19.1 21.3 40.3 19.3 100.0
2002 18.5 21.5 40.2 19.8 100.0
2003 16.4 21.5 40.9 21.2 100.0
2004 15.9 20.5 40.2 23.4 100.0
2005 15.4 20.2 40.0 24.4 100.0
2006 14.3 20.7 40.1 24.9 100.0
2007 13.6 21.2 40.1 25.1 100.0
2008 13.3 20.3 39.3 27.1 100.0
2009 12.5 19.9 39.2 28.4 100.0
2010 12.4 20.2 38.7 28.7 100.0
2011 11.5 20.0 38.3 30.1 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999, 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1998–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_06
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Table 4.7: Employed by employment status, in thousands
Year
Employees Member  of cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1996 2,961.2 79.0 151.8 413.1 3,605.1
1997 2,989.7 68.9 137.4 414.3 3,610.3
1998 3,088.5 55.8 132.5 397.9 3,674.7
1999 3,201.3 42.5 111.8 435.9 3,791.5
2000 3,255.5 37.1 129.4 407.1 3,829.1
2001 3,313.6 31.4 118.9 404.4 3,868.3
2002 3,337.2 22.5 109.9 401.0 3,870.6
2003 3,399.2 8.6 114.7 399.4 3,921.9
2004 3,347.8 8.1 136.6 407.8 3,900.3
2005 3,367.3 5.8 146.7 381.7 3,901.5
2006 3,431.4 4.8 126.7 367.2 3,930.1
2007 3,439.7 4.4 123.2 358.9 3,926.2
2008 3,405.1 2.3 122.5 349.5 3,879.4
2009 3,309.9 2.0 136.8 333.2 3,781.9
2010 3,317.5 3.0 140.0 320.7 3,781.2
2011 3,352.4 1.9 134.3 323.3 3,811.9
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Conscripts 
are excluded.
Source: 1996–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_07
Table 4.8: Composition of the employed persons by employment status, per cent
Year
Employees Member  of cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1996 82.1 2.2 4.2 11.5 100.0
1997 82.8 1.9 3.8 11.5 100.0
1998 84.0 1.5 3.6 10.8 100.0
1999 84.4 1.1 2.9 11.5 100.0
2000 85.0 1.0 3.4 10.6 100.0
2001 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.5 100.0
2002 86.2 0.6 2.8 10.4 100.0
2003 86.7 0.2 2.8 10.3 100.0
2004 85.8 0.2 3.5 10.5 100.0
2005 86.3 0.1 3.8 9.8 100.0
2006 87.3 0.1 3.2 9.4 100.0
2007 87.6 0.1 3.1 9.2 100.0
2008 87.7 0.1 3.2 9.0 100.0
2009 87.5 0.1 3.6 8.8 100.0
2010 87.7 0.1 3.7 8.5 100.0
2011 87.9 0.0 3.5 8.5 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Conscripts 
are excluded.
Source: 1996–: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_08
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Table 4.9: Composition of employed persons by sectora, by gender, per cent
2009 2010 2011
Males Females Together Males Females Together Males Females Together
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5.0 1.8 3.5 5.0 1.6 3.4 5.6 2.0 3.8
Mining and quarrying 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.3
Manufacturing 26.8 18.3 22.7 26.1 18.3 22.3 27.0 18.6 23.0
Electricity, gas, steam and air condition-
ing supply 1.7 0.6 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.1 1.6 0.6 1.1
Water supply; sewerage, waste manage-
ment and remediation activities 2.0 0.6 1.3 2.3 0.6 1.4 2.2 0.8 1.5
Construction 12.3 1.2 7.0 11.7 1.2 6.6 11.0 0.9 6.2
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of mo-
tor vehicles and motorcycles 11.4 15.9 13.6 11.4 16.1 13.6 11.5 15.8 13.6
Transportation and storage 9.6 4.1 6.9 10.1 3.8 7.1 9.5 4.1 6.9
Accommodation and food service activi-
ties 3.1 4.8 3.9 3.2 5.0 4.1 3.1 5.3 4.1
Information and communication 2.8 1.7 2.3 3.0 1.7 2.4 2.9 1.6 2.3
Financial and insurance activities 1.5 3.6 2.5 1.3 3.6 2.4 1.5 3.3 2.4
Real estate activities 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Professional, scientific and technical ac-
tivities 2.2 3.4 2.8 2.4 3.4 2.9 2.1 3.3 2.6
Administrative and support service activi-
ties 3.4 2.7 3.1 3.3 2.8 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.0
Public administration and defence; com-
pulsory social security 8.3 10.2 9.2 8.5 9.8 9.1 8.7 9.6 9.2
Education 4.0 15.3 9.4 4.1 15.0 9.4 4.0 14.9 9.2
Human health and social work activities 2.6 11.5 6.9 2.8 12.2 7.3 2.8 11.8 7.1
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.6
Other services 1.1 2.0 1.6 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.2 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a By TEÁOR’08.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_09
Table 4.10: Employed in their present job since 0–6 months, per cent
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Hungary 8.2 8.5 6.8 7.2 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.9 7.3
Source: KSH MEF, IV. quarterly waves.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_10
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Table 4.11: Distribution of employees in the competitive sectora by firm size, per cent
Year
Less than 20 20-49 50–249 250–999 1000 and more
employees
2000 20.2 7.0 23.5 22.5 26.8
2001 18.5 7.5 24.3 23.0 26.7
2002 21.6 14.0 21.5 20.1 22.9
2003 23.0 15.3 20.5 19.3 21.8
2004 23.6 14.8 21.3 18.3 22.0
2005 27.0 15.0 20.5 17.5 20.0
2006 15.7 10.7 25.7 24.3 23.6
2007 25.2 14.2 20.0 18.4 22.2
2008 26.0 15.7 20.7 18.9 18.6
2009 23.4 15.7 19.7 18.4 22.8
2010 23.5 15.7 18.6 18.0 24.2
2011 24.9 15.6 18.5 17.7 23.4
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_11
Table 4.12: Employees of the competitive sectora  
by the share of foreign ownership, per cent
Share of foreign ownership 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
100% 19.0 17.7 16.5 17.7 18.6 19.0 19.4 20.4 17.5 19.2 20.2
Majority 11.0 9.2 8.8 7.8 8.5 7.5 7.4 6.4 6.3 5.4 5.7
Minority 4.9 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.1 2.2 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.9 1.6
0% 65.1 69.5 70.8 70.7 69.8 71.3 70.3 71.0 74.6 73.5 72.4
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_12
Figure 4.3: Employees of the corporate sector by firm size and by the share of foreign ownership
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena04_03
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Table 4.13: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, males, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 14.6 64.7 82.8 71.8 48.7 17.1 9.9 58.9
1998 11.4 59.9 78.8 66.0 38.3 10.0 3.2 54.4
1999 10.6 60.3 80.5 69.0 44.0 10.4 3.8 56.2
2000 8.4 58.9 80.9 69.6 49.6 11.8 3.8 56.8
2001 7.9 56.7 81.6 68.2 51.3 13.1 3.1 57.1
2002 5.6 53.1 81.9 68.6 52.8 14.4 3.4 57.1
2003 4.8 51.8 82.2 69.7 55.2 16.8 3.8 57.6
2004 4.5 46.5 82.7 69.7 54.0 20.1 4.3 57.5
2005 4.0 43.6 82.5 70.1 56.6 20.9 4.2 57.4
2006 4.2 43.9 83.3 70.3 58.6 19.2 4.3 58.0
2007 3.7 43.8 83.7 70.7 58.2 18.9 4.7 58.0
2008 3.5 42.2 83.1 71.2 55.1 16.8 4.9 57.2
2009 2.5 36.6 80.5 70.5 57.1 17.2 5.0 55.5
2010 2.1 36.8 79.6 69.6 57.4 16.9 4.8 54.9
2011 2.2 35.9 81.0 72.0 58.1 17.9 5.9 55.8
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_13
Table 4.14: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group,  
females, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 16.0 54.0 72.2 58.4 18.2 10.7 5.3 46.6
1998 10.7 47.5 66.3 52.3 13.6 5.0 1.2 41.0
1999 8.7 48.1 67.3 59.4 16.2 5.5 1.6 42.3
2000 8.0 45.9 67.8 62.5 20.0 5.1 1.8 43.0
2001 6.3 44.2 68.0 62.1 23.2 5.5 1.3 43.1
2002 4.3 44.2 67.0 64.0 28.3 6.0 1.5 43.3
2003 3.1 41.9 67.8 65.8 35.1 7.3 2.0 44.3
2004 2.7 37.4 67.2 66.0 39.8 9.0 1.9 44.1
2005 2.6 34.7 67.4 66.6 41.7 9.6 1.5 44.2
2006 2.5 33.9 67.5 67.9 42.6 8.9 1.6 44.4
2007 2.1 32.5 67.8 68.3 40.0 9.7 2.1 44.3
2008 1.9 31.0 67.7 68.7 38.7 10.0 2.3 44.0
2009 1.5 30.0 66.6 68.5 41.1 10.0 2.2 43.4
2010 1.9 30.3 66.5 69.7 46.9 9.8 2.5 43.9
2011 1.6 30.2 66.1 68.9 50.7 11.1 2.6 44.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_14
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Table 4.15: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less Vocational school Secondary school College, university Total
1993 35.6 75.8 71.8 86.3 60.0
1998 35.0 75.3 67.0 84.9 60.4
1999 33.6 76.8 68.3 86.8 62.4
2000 33.6 77.4 67.9 87.1 63.1
2001 33.0 77.6 67.3 87.4 62.9
2002 32.0 77.6 67.1 85.8 62.9
2003 32.4 76.5 67.8 86.4 63.4
2004 31.0 75.7 67.3 87.1 63.1
2005 31.6 74.7 66.9 86.9 63.1
2006 31.5 75.2 67.5 85.7 63.8
2007 31.6 74.6 67.5 85.9 64.0
2008 31.3 72.6 66.5 84.7 63.0
2009 29.0 69.9 65.1 83.1 61.1
2010 28.7 68.1 64.6 82.1 60.4
2011 29.6 68.4 64.6 83.8 61.2
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_15
Table 4.16: Employment rate of population aged 15–64 by level of education,  
females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less Vocational school Secondary school College, university Total
1993 30.8 65.0 64.0 79.2 49.3
1998 26.6 60.5 58.1 76.9 47.3
1999 26.1 61.4 59.0 77.5 49.0
2000 26.0 61.0 59.3 77.8 49.7
2001 26.1 60.8 59.2 77.8 49.8
2002 26.0 60.4 58.6 77.9 49.8
2003 25.3 59.7 59.5 78.3 50.9
2004 25.0 58.8 58.1 78.1 50.7
2005 25.1 57.6 57.9 78.9 51.0
2006 24.5 58.2 57.5 77.6 51.1
2007 24.0 57.8 57.2 75.4 50.9
2008 23.9 55.5 56.4 75.5 50.6
2009 23.0 54.3 54.9 74.4 49.9
2010 23.6 56.4 54.3 74.6 50.6
2011 22.5 56.4 54.2 74.4 50.6
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent04_16
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Figure 4.4: Activity rate by age groups, males aged 15-64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena04_04
Figure 4.5: Activity rate by age groups, females aged 15-64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena04_05
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Table 5.1: Unemployment rate by gender and share of long term unemployed, per cent
Year
Unemployment rate Share of long term 
unemployedaMales Females Total
1992 10.7 8.7 9.8 ..
1993 13.2 10.4 11.9 ..
1994 11.8 9.4 10.7 43.2
1995 11.3 8.7 10.2 50.6
1996 10.7 8.8 9.9 54.4
1997 9.5 7.8 8.7 51.3
1998 8.5 7.0 7.8 48.8
1999 7.5 6.3 7.0 49.5
2000 7.0 5.6 6.4 49.1
2001 6.3 5.0 5.7 46.7
2002 6.1 5.4 5.8 44.9
2003 6.1 5.6 5.9 43.9
2004 6.1 6.1 6.1 45.0
2005 7.0 7.5 7.2 46.2
2006 7.2 7.8 7.5 46.8
2007 7.1 7.6 7.4 48.2
2008 7.6 8.1 7.8 47.6
2009 10.3 9.7 10.0 43.0
2010 11.6 10.7 11.2 50.9
2011 11.0 10.9 10.9 49.6
a Long term unemployed are those who have been without work for 12 months or more, the 
denominator does not include those starting new jobs.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_01
Figure 5.1: Unemployment rates by gender
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena05_01
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Table 5.2: Unemployment rate by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less Vocational school Secondary school College, university Total
1993 20.3 15.0 9.7 2.9 13.5
1998 14.6 9.1 5.9 2.2 8.5
1999 14.3 8.2 5.0 1.5 7.5
2000 13.4 7.7 4.8 1.6 7.0
2001 13.6 6.4 4.3 1.2 6.3
2002 14.1 6.2 4.0 1.4 6.1
2003 13.6 6.6 3.9 1.6 6.1
2004 14.3 6.4 4.1 1.7 6.1
2005 15.6 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.0
2006 17.3 7.0 5.2 2.7 7.2
2007 18.4 6.8 5.1 2.4 7.1
2008 19.8 7.6 5.3 2.3 7.6
2009 24.4 10.6 7.7 3.8 10.3
2010 26.9 12.1 8.4 4.9 11.6
2011 25.0 12.0 8.2 4.3 11.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_02
Table 5.3: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less Vocational school Secondary school College, university Total
1993 39.0 40.8 17.3 2.8 100.0
1996 37.6 44.0 15.1 3.3 100.0
1997 38.9 43.7 15.4 2.0 100.0
1998 37.4 42.0 17.2 3.4 100.0
1999 34.5 45.3 17.4 2.8 100.0
2000 32.9 45.8 17.9 3.4 100.0
2001 36.5 43.2 17.5 2.8 100.0
2002 36.7 43.3 16.7 3.3 100.0
2003 34.0 44.7 17.2 4.1 100.0
2004 33.9 42.6 18.6 4.9 100.0
2005 32.1 43.1 19.0 5.8 100.0
2006 33.4 40.0 20.0 6.6 100.0
2007 34.9 38.8 20.3 6.0 100.0
2008 35.2 39.4 19.8 5.6 100.0
2009 31.0 40.1 21.9 7.0 100.0
2010 30.1 40.2 21.5 8.2 100.0
2011 28.8 41.2 22.1 7.9 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_03
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Table 5.4: Unemployment rate by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less Vocational school Secondary school College, university Total
1993 14.6 12.8 8.1 3.2 10.4
1998 11.6 7.8 5.8 1.8 7.0
1999 10.5 8.0 5.2 1.3 6.3
2000 9.1 7.4 4.9 1.5 5.6
2001 8.4 6.4 4.0 1.6 5.0
2002 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.4 5.4
2003 10.5 7.2 4.4 1.9 5.6
2004 10.3 8.0 5.3 2.9 6.1
2005 13.0 9.8 6.7 3.1 7.5
2006 15.8 10.1 6.4 2.8 7.8
2007 16.0 9.4 6.2 3.3 7.6
2008 17.5 9.5 6.9 3.2 8.1
2009 21.6 12.4 7.7 4.1 9.7
2010 22.8 12.6 9.5 4.5 10.7
2011 24.3 12.6 9.9 4.6 10.9
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_04
Table 5.5: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less Vocational school Secondary school College, university Total
1993 45.8 22.6 27.4 4.2 100.0
1996 38.2 24.9 31.6 5.4 100.0
1997 44.2 23.2 28.4 4.2 100.0
1998 41.6 22.7 31.4 4.3 100.0
1999 36.2 26.2 33.8 3.8 100.0
2000 31.8 28.2 35.0 5.0 100.0
2001 33.7 28.0 32.2 6.1 100.0
2002 33.2 26.0 32.2 8.5 100.0
2003 32.7 28.3 32.0 7.0 100.0
2004 27.8 27.4 34.2 10.6 100.0
2005 28.2 27.1 35.2 9.5 100.0
2006 31.5 27.5 32.5 8.5 100.0
2007 31.2 26.6 31.7 10.5 100.0
2008 32.2 24.3 33.3 10.2 100.0
2009 32.1 26.1 30.3 11.4 100.0
2010 30.5 24.3 34.0 11.2 100.0
2011 30.2 23.6 34.4 11.8 100.0
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. Since 1999 
slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest education level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_05
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Figure 5.2: Intensity of quarterly flows between labour market status, population between 15–64 years
 Employment Unemployment Inactivity
Employment
Unemployment
Inactivity
Note: The calculations were carried out for the age group between 15-64 based on KSH labour 
force survey microdata. The probability of transition is given by the number of people who 
transitioned from one status to the other in the quarter, divided by the initial size of the 
group in the previous quarter, which were then corrected to preserve the consistency of 
stock flows. The light curves show the trend smoothed using a 4th degree polynomial.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena05_02
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Table 5.6: The number of unemployeda by duration of job search, in thousands
Year
Length of job search, weeks [month]
Total1–4  
[<1]
5–14  
[1–3]
15–26 
[4–6]
27–51 
[7–11]
52  
[12]
53–78 
[13–18]
79–104 
[19–24]
105– 
[>24]
1992 43.9 90.9 96.4 110.7 10.6 41.7 38.4 n.a. 432.6
1993 36.2 74.8 87.9 120.5 14.7 75.1 83.7 n.a. 492.9
1994 30.5 56.5 65.0 91.9 8.4 63.0 73.8 40.4 429.5
1995 23.0 51.0 56.5 69.4 20.2 57.2 34.3 93.2 404.8
1996 19.9 46.4 49.3 61.5 18.2 56.1 37.1 100.2 388.7
1997 16.1 43.7 45.9 54.4 15.7 44.5 31.1 77.3 328.7
1998 12.9 44.2 44.5 45.7 16.0 39.0 27.6 63.5 293.4
1999 15.4 44.1 38.8 46.0 13.2 38.1 26.8 62.3 284.7
2000 16.7 38.5 35.1 42.8 12.7 36.9 23.6 55.4 261.3
2001 14.9 37.0 33.2 38.6 11.5 31.6 20.9 44.2 231.9
2002 15.5 39.4 34.8 40.7 11.6 32.7 19.8 42.5 237.0
2003 15.9 42.1 38.9 42.0 14.5 27.6 17.6 43.0 241.6
2004 13.0 42.0 39.9 41.8 13.5 33.4 19.6 47.2 250.4
2005 14.8 48.9 44.1 51.3 14.1 41.0 27.4 54.3 295.9
2006 13.3 50.7 48.3 51.9 17.4 41.5 26.6 58.8 308.5
2007 13.8 49.4 44.3 50.1 12.7 43.3 26.0 64.9 304.5
2008 13.7 50.4 47.8 53.5 13.4 39.6 27.2 74.8 320.4
2009 18.8 71.9 67.0 77.4 18.1 51.2 19.8 88.4 412.6
2010 16.9 64.9 63.1 84.3 23.6 75.9 43.3 95.4 467.4
2011 28.7 70.7 62.8 70.1 18.3 64.6 40.4 105.3 460.8
a Not including those unemployed who will got a new job within 30 days; since 2003: within 
90 days.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_06
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment rate by age groups, males aged 15-59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena05_03
Figure 5.4: Unemployment rate by age groups, females aged 15-59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena05_04
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Table 5.7: Registered unemployeda and LFS unemployment
Year
Registered unemployed LFS unemployed, total LFS unemployed, age 15-24
in thousands rate in % in thousands rate in % in thousands rate in %
1990 47.7 – .. .. .. ..
1991 227.3 4.1 .. .. .. ..
1992 557.0 10.3 444.2 9.8 120.0 17.5
1993 671.8 12.9 518.9 11.9 141.3 21.3
1994 568.4 11.3 451.2 10.7 124.7 19.4
1995 507.7 10.6 416.5 10.2 114.3 18.6
1996 500.6 11.0 400.1 9.9 106.3 17.9
1997 470.1 10.5 348.8 8.7 95.8 15.9
1998 423.1 9.5 313.0 7.8 87.6 13.4
1999 409.5 9.7 284.7 7.0 78.6 12.4
2000 390.5 9.3 262.5 6.4 70.7 12.1
2001 364.1 8.5 232.9 5.7 55.7 10.8
2002 344.7 8.0 238.8 5.8 56.5 12.3
2003 357.2 8.3 244.5 5.9 54.9 13.4
2004 375.9 8.7 252.9 6.1 55.9 15.5
2005 409.9 9.4 303.9 7.2 66.9 19.4
2006 393.5 9.0 316.8 7.5 64.1 19.1
2007 426.9 9.7 311.9 7.4 57.6 18.0
2008 442.3 10.0 329.2 7.8 61.0 19.9
2009 561.8 12.8 420.7 10.0 79.2 26.4
2010 582.7 13.3 474.8 11.2 79.2 26.6
2011 582.9 13.2 467.9 10.9 79.1 27.8
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
Note: The denominator of registered unemployment/jobseekers’ rate in the economically 
active population on 1st January the previous year.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: NFSZ; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_07
Figure 5.5: Registered and LFS unemployment rates
Note: Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: NMH; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena05_05
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Table 5.8: Composition of the registered unemployeda  
by educational attainment, yearly averages, per cent
Educational attainment 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
8 grades of primary 
school or less 40.8 40.6 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.4 42.7 42.3 41.9 42.0 42.4 43.3 40.1 39.3 40.3
Vocational school 35.6 36.0 35.7 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.9 32.3 32.4 32.1 31.5 30.9 32.5 31.4 29.8
Vocational secondary 
school 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.1 14.4 15.0 14.9
Grammar school 8.0 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.5 9.1 9.5
College 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.8
University 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the 
definition of registered unemployees to registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_08
Table 5.9: The distribution of registered unemployed school-leaversa  
by educational attainment, yearly averages, per cent
Educational attainment 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
8 grades of primary 
school or less 20.2 23.4 25.3 26.8 31.1 33.7 34.7 35.2 36.1 38.2 40.1 41.3 37.7 35.2 35.6
Vocational school 35.7 34.1 30.9 27.8 23.7 20.6 20.4 20.2 20.5 19.7 18.1 17.3 18.9 18.9 18.5
Vocational secondary 
school 23.9 24.2 25.0 25.4 25.3 25.5 23.2 22.1 21.5 20.3 20.7 21.2 23.1 23.9 23.6
Grammar school 15.5 14.0 13.6 13.7 12.6 11.6 10.8 10.7 10.8 11.7 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.3 15.0
College 3.5 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.2 7.7 8.1 7.8 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.5 4.8 4.2
University 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.8 3.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered school-leaver jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act 
changed the definition of registered unemployees to registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_09
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Table 5.10: Registered unemployeda by economic activity as observed in the LFS, per cent
Year Employed LFS-unemployed Inactive Total Year Employed LFS-unemployed Inactive Total
1992 5.1 71.6 23.3 100.0 2002 4.4 47.4 48.2 100.0
1993 10.0 63.6 26.4 100.0 2003 9.4 44.1 46.5 100.0
1994 14.4 54.5 31.1 100.0 2004 3.0 53.5 43.5 100.0
1995 11.8 53.7 34.5 100.0 2005 2.3 59.7 38.0 100.0
1996 13.7 51.8 34.5 100.0 2006 3.9 58.7 37.5 100.0
1997 18.7 44.1 37.2 100.0 2007 3.7 62.6 33.7 100.0
1998 24.8 35.1 40.1 100.0 2008 3.7 63.1 33.2 100.0
1999 6.7 55.8 37.5 100.0 2009 3.7 67.5 28.8 100.0
2000 4.7 54.3 41.0 100.0 2010 3.0 71.1 25.9 100.0
2001 6.5 45.2 48.3 100.0 2011 3.3 67.2 29.5 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 
2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered 
jobseekers.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census. The data per-
tain to those who consider themselves registered jobseekers in the KSH MEF. From 1999 
those who reported that their last contact with the employment center was more than two 
months ago were filtered from among those who reported themselves as registered unem-
ployed.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_10
Table 5.11: Selected time series of registered unemployment, monthly averages, in thousands and per cent
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Registered unemploymenta 568.4 507.7 500.6 470.1 423.1 409.5 390.5 364.1 344.7
Of which: School-leavers 62.1 54.5 46.2 42.4 32.5 29.9 26.0 26.8 28.5
Non school-leavers 506.2 453.2 454.4 427.7 390.6 379.6 364.4 337.4 316.2
Male 333.0 293.8 284.1 267.1 233.4 221.4 209.7 196.4 184.6
Female 235.3 213.8 216.5 203.0 189.7 188.1 180.8 167.7 160.1
25 years old and younger 153.3 134.2 124.0 105.8 89.9 85.4 79.1 75.6 71.1
Manual workers 467.6 414.3 407.4 386.3 349.0 336.8 321.2 302.0 286.3
Non manual workers 100.7 93.4 93.2 83.8 74.1 72.7 69.3 62.1 58.4
Unemployment benefit recipientsb 228.9 182.8 171.7 141.7 130.7 140.7 131.7 119.2 114.9
Unemployment assistance recipientsc 190.3 210.0 211.3 201.3 182.2 148.6 143.5 131.2 113.4
Unemployment rated 11.3 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0
Shares within registered unemployed, %
School-leavers 10.9 10.7 9.2 9.0 7.7 7.3 6.7 7.3 8.3
Male 58.6 57.9 56.7 56.8 55.2 54.1 53.7 53.9 53.5
25 years old and younger 27.0 26.4 24.8 22.5 21.3 20.9 20.3 20.8 20.6
Manual workers 82.3 81.6 81.4 82.2 82.5 82.3 82.2 82.9 83.1
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 42.3 45.7 52.8 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0
Of which: school-leavers 7.8 8.0 7.5 9.2 9.8 9.3 8.0 7.8 7.8
Outflow from the Register 51.7 47.6 54.3 57.3 60.4 57.2 56.8 59.4 55.8
Of which: school-leavers 7.9 8.5 8.9 9.0 11.0 9.4 8.2 7.7 7.5
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Registered unemploymenta 357.2 375.9 409.9 393.5 426.9 442.3 561.8 582.7 582.9
Of which: School-leavers 31.3 33.8 40.9 38.7 40.4 41.4 49.3 52.6 52.9
Non school-leavers 325.9 342.2 369.1 354.7 386.5 400.9 512.5 530.1 529.9
Male 188.0 193.3 210.4 200.9 219.9 228.3 297.9 305.0 297.1
Female 169.2 182.6 199.5 192.5 207.0 214.0 263.9 277.7 285.8
25 years old and younger 71.6 71.4 78.9 75.8 80.3 75.9 104.3 102.8 102.3
Manual workers 296.2 308.5 336.2 321.9 .. .. .. .. ..
Non manual workers 61.0 67.4 73.7 71.6 .. .. .. .. ..
Unemployment benefit recipientsb 120.0 124.0 134.4 151.5 134.6 136.5e 202.1 187.7 159.9
Unemployment assistance recipientsc 116.2 120.4 133.4 121.8 133.0 147.5 156.0 167.8 182.1
Unemployment rated 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8 13.3 13.2
Shares within registered unemployed, %
School-leavers 8.8 9.0 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.4 8.8 9.0 9.1
Male 52.6 51.4 51.3 51.1 51.5 51.6 53.0 52.3 51.0
25 years old and younger 20.0 19.0 19.2 16.5 18.8 17.2 18.6 17.6 17.5
Manual workers 82.9 82.1 82.0 81.8 .. .. .. .. ..
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0 65.3 70.9
Of which: school-leavers 7.7 7.6 8.2 7.0 6.2 6.3 7.5 7.9 8.2
Outflow from the Register 53.5 54.4 59.8 51.4 48.4 51.3 58.4 66.4 74.2
Of which: school-leavers 7.6 7.1 7.9 7.1 6.0 6.2 6.7 7.5 8.1
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. (The data concern the closing date of 
each month.) From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition 
of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: jobseeker benefit recepients. From 2011. September 1st, the 
system of jobseeking support changed.
c Only recipients who are in the NMH register. Those receiving the discontinued income sup-
port supplement were included in the number of those receiving income support supplement 
up to 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular social assistance from 2005 to 2008. 
From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, the on call 
support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from 2011. January 
1st, then from 2011. September 1st, the name was changed to employment substitution sup-
port.
d Relative index: registered unemployment rate in the economically active population. From 
1st of November, 2005, registered jobseekers’ rate in the economically active population.
e The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes pos-
sible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those enter-
ing or leaving the different types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are 
work for short time periods, receipt of child support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in 
training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first 
accounting of the jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
2008 data, comparable to 2009: 141.5 thousand people.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_11
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Table 5.12: Monthly entrants to the unemployment registera, monthly averages, in thousands
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
First time entrants 17.0 13.4 12.8 11.2 11.2 10.4 10.0 10.5 10.8 8.6 8.0 7.1 8.3 7.2 6.6
Previously registered 39.2 42.0 44.4 42.9 45.8 45.6 44.8 47.3 50.0 42.2 43.4 46.9 60.7 58.1 64.3
Together 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0 65.3 70.9
a Since 1st of November, 2005: database of jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the 
Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_12
Figure 5.6: Entrants to the unemployment register, monthly averages, in thousands
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena05_06
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Table 5.13: Benefit recepients and participation in active labour market programs
Year
Unemploy-
ment benefita
Regular social 
assistanceb
UA for school-
leavers
Do not receive 
provision
Public 
workc Retraining
c Wage  
subsidyc
Other pro-
grammesc Total
1990 In thousands 42.5 – – 18.6 .. .. .. .. 61.0
Per cent 69.6 n.a. n.a. 30.4 .. .. .. .. 100.0
2000 In thousands 117.0 139.7 0.0 106.5 26.7 25.3 27.5 73.5 516.2
Per cent 22.7 27.1 0.0 20.6 5.2 4.9 5.3 14.2 100.0
2001 In thousands 111.8 113.2 0.0 105.2 29.0 30.0 25.8 37.2 452.2
Per cent 24.7 25.0 0.0 23.3 6.4 6.6 5.7 8.2 100.0
2002 In thousands 104.8 107.6 – 115.3 21.6 23.5 21.2 32.8 426.8
Per cent 24.6 25.2 – 27.0 5.1 5.5 5.0 7.7 100.0
2003 In thousands 105.1 109.5 – 125.0 21.2 22.5 20.1 36.6 440.0
Per cent 23.9 24.9 – 28.4 4.8 5.1 4.6 8.3 100.0
2004 In thousands 117.4 118.4 – 132.3 16.8 12.6 16.8 28.5 442.8
Per cent 26.5 26.7 – 29.9 3.8 2.8 3.8 6.4 100.0
2005 In thousands 125.6 127.8 – 140.2 21.5 14.7 20.8 31.0 481.6
Per cent 26.1 26.5 – 29.1 4.5 3.1 4.3 6.4 100.0
2006 In thousands 117.7 112.9 – 146.4 16.6 12.3 14.6 13.8 434.3
Per cent 27.1 26.0 – 33.7 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.2 100.0
2007 In thousands 128.0 133.1 – 151.8 19.3 14.6 23.4 6.8 477.0
Per cent 27.6 28.7 – 32.7 2.7 2.3 3.7 2.3 100.0
2008 In thousands 120.7d 145.7 – 158.2 21.2 21.2 25.0 14.1 506.1
Per cent 23.8 28.8 – 31.3 4.2 4.2 4.9 2.8 100.0
2009 In thousands 202.8 151.9 – 215.0 135.3 13.6 17.8 54.1 790.5
Per cent 25.7 19.2 – 27.2 17.1 1.7 2.3 6.8 100.0
2010 In thousands 159.6 163.5 – 222.4 164.5 17.8 26.7 40.3 794.8
Per cent 20.1 20.6 – 28.0 20.7 2.2 3.4 5.1 100.0
2011 In thousands 122.8 168.2 – 239.8 91.6 13.6 20.4 39.9 696.3
Per cent 17.6 24.2 – 34.4 13.2 2.0 2.9 5.7 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: jobseeker benefit recepients. From 2011. September 1st, the system of jobseeking support 
changed.
b Only recipients who are in the NFSZ register. Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were includ-
ed in the number of those receiving income support supplement up to 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular 
social assistance from 2005 to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, the 
on call support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from 2011. January 1st, then from 2011. 
September 1st, the name was changed to employment substitution support.
c Up to 2008 the number financed from the MPA Decentralized Base, since 2009 the number financed from MPA, TAMOP.
Public-type employment: community service, public service, public work programmes.
Wage subsidy: wage subsidy, wage-cost subsidy, work experience acquisition assstance to career-starters, support for employ-
ment of availability allowance recipients, part-time emplolyment, wage support for those losing their job due to the crisis.
Other support: job preservation support, support to would-be entrepreneurs, contribution to costs related to commuting to 
work, job creation support, jobseeker’s clubs.
d The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the different 
types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child support 
(GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the jobseeking 
support was delayed due to missing documentation.
2008 data, comparable to 2009: 134.1 thousand people.
Note: The closing numbers from October of each year. For the percentage data, the sum of those registered and those tak-
ing part in labour market programs ≈100.0.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_13
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Table 5.14: The number of registered unemployeda who became employed  
on subsidised and non-subsidised employmentb
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
persons per cent persons per cent persons per cent persons per cent persons per cent persons per cent
Subsidised employment 130,081 37.4 104,842 32.7 118,703 34.0 170,464 40.0 198,974 38.5 282,673 48.5
Non-subsidised employment 217,606 62.6 215,686 67.3 230,558 66.0 255,356 60.0 317,622 61.5 299,716 51.5
Total 347,687 100.0 320,528 100.0 349,261 100.0 425,820 100.0 516,596 100.0 582,389 100.0
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the 
definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Annual totals, the number of jobseekers over the year who were placed. It reflects the placements at the time of their exit 
from the registry.
Source: NMH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_14
Table 5.15: The ratio of those who are employed among the former participants of ALMPs, per cent
Active labour market 
programmes 1996
a 1997a 1998a 1999a 2000a 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a 2009b 2010b 2011b
Suggested training 
programmesc 44.5 46.3 46.8 46.8 48.4 45.4 43.3 43.0 45.5 43.8 41.1 37.5 42.2 40.4 49.4 33.7
Accepted training 
programmesd 50.2 51.1 51.5 50.0 52.0 49.3 45.8 46.0 45.6 51.4 50.9 47.6 48.0 41.9 48.8 39.5
Retrainig of those 
who are employede 92.8 90.4 94.7 94.8 94.9 94.2 92.7 93.3 92.1 90.4 .. 92.3 93.9 .. 59.9 53.4
Support for self-em-
ploymentf 90.2 88.1 91.7 90.5 89.4 89.2 90.7 89.6 90.7 89.6 86.4 87.6 83.6 73.1 76.4 67.6
Wage subsidy pro-
grammesg 70.1 66.3 59.1 59.7 62.3 59.7 62.9 62.0 64.6 62.6 62.3 63.4 65.0 72.4 90.9 79.5
Work experience pro-
grammesh – 65.7 59.1 55.8 57.9 64.5 66.9 66.1 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.3 74.6 .. .. 96.9
Further employment 
programmei – 72.1 75.1 68.5 73.8 71.6 78.4 78.2 71.5 70.9 65.0 77.5 – – – –
a Three months after the end of programmes.
b Six months after the end of programmes.
c Suggested training: group traning programmes for jobseekers organized by the NFSZ.
d Accepted training: participation in programmes initiated by the jobseekers and accepted by NFSZ for full or partial support.
e Training for employed persons: training for those whose jobs are at risk of termination, if new knowledge allows them to 
adapt to the new needs of the employer.
f Support to help entrepeneurship: support of jobseekers in the amount of the monthly minimum wage or maximum HUF 3 
million lumpsum support (to be repaid or not), aimed at helping them become individual entrepreneurs or self-employed.
g Wage support: aimed at helping the employment of disadvantaged persons, who would not be able to, or would have a 
harder time finding work without support.
h Work experience-gaining support: the support of new entrants with no work experience for 6-9 months, the amount of 
the support is equal to 50-80% of the wage costs. The instrument was discontinued after 2006. December 31. In 2009 they 
reintroduced the work experience gaining support for skilled new entrants, for employers who ensure employment of at 
least 4 hours a day and 365 days. The amount of the support is 50-100% of the wage cost. Monitoring for the first exiters 
are available from 2011.
i Further employment programmes: to support the continued employment of new entrants under the age of 25 for 9 
months. Discontinued from December 31, 2006.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_15
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Table 5.16: Distribution of registered unemployeda, unemployment benefit recipientsb  
and unemployment assistance recipientsc by educational attainment
Educational attainment 1995 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008e 2009 2010 2011
Registered unemployed
8 grades of primary school or less 43.6 42.3 42.7 41.8 41.5 42.8 43.8 – 40.0 39.2 39.9
Vocational school 34.5 34.2 32.2 32.6 32.3 31.5 30.7 – 33.1 31.4 29.8
Vocational secondary school 11.7 13.0 13.4 13.6 13.6 13.2 12.8 – 14.4 15.0 15.0
Grammar school 7.9 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.1 – 8.3 9.1 9.7
College 1.5 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.2 – 3.0 3.7 3.9
University 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 1.1 1.5 1.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0 100.0 100.0
482.7 359.6 350.7 388.1 359.6 402.7 415.6 – 549.0 546.0 553.3
Unemployment benefit recipientsd
8 grades of primary school or less 36.9 29.7 28.9 28.2 25.4 25.4 24.4 26.3 25.7 24.1 23.4
Vocational school 36.6 40.7 39.2 39.3 39.5 37.4 37.0 39.2 39.4 36.2 34.5
Vocational secondary school 14.9 16.7 17.7 17.9 18.7 19.2 19.3 18.3 18.5 19.7 20.1
Grammar school 8.3 9.0 9.3 9.5 10.1 10.9 11.0 10.6 10.1 11.6 12.3
College 2.2 2.9 3.6 3.7 4.5 5.0 6.0 5.7 4.5 5.8 6.7
University 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.7 2.6 3.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
164.1 110.3 100.3 104.9 91.5 119.3 92.5 126.9 200.5 165.8 145.9
Unemployment assistance recipientsc
8 grades of primary school or less 56.8 55.5 61.1 60.4 60.1 60.3 60.3 – 59.4 56.4 56.1
Vocational school 30.6 30.0 27.6 27.8 27.7 27.1 26.5 – 26.6 27.4 26.1
Vocational secondary school 6.9 7.4 6.1 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.8 – 7.5 8.6 9.0
Grammar school 4.5 5.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.7 – 4.8 5.6 6.3
College 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 – 1.2 1.5 1.8
University 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 – 0.4 0.5 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0 100.0 100.0
220.7 136.9 114.6 127.8 116.5 130.9 145.8 – 144.1 161.7 174.7
a Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the 
definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: those receiving jobseeking support. From 2011. September 1st, the system of jobseeking 
support changed.
c Only recipients who are in the NFSZ register. Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were included 
in the number of those receiving income support supplement up to 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular 
social assistance from 2005 to 2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, the 
on call support. This allowance was replaced by the wage replacement support from 2011. January 1st, then from 2011. 
September 1st, the name was changed to employment substitution support.
d After 1st of November, 2005: jobseeking support. Does not contain those receiving unemployment aid prior to pension in 
2004. From 2011. September 1st, the system of jobseeking support changed.
e The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the different 
types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child support 
(GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the jobseeking 
support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The right-hand column of 2008 contains the 2008 data in a form comparable to the 2009 data.
Note: Data from the closing date of June in each year.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_16
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Table 5.17: Outflow from the Register of Beneficiaries
Year
Total number of 
outflows
Of which:
Year
Total number of 
outflows
Of which:
became  
employed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
became  
employed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
1993 580,880 32.1 .. 2003 297,640 26.7 65.2
1994 485,045 27.8 .. 2004 308,027 27.4 64.6
1995 370,941 27.7 .. 2005 329,738 27.2 63.0
1996 408,828 24.2 58.4 2006 234,273 33.2 53.7
1997 327,486 26.8 58.7 2007 251,889 33.4 46.9
1998 322,496 26.5 64.5 2008 232,151 40.0 48.7
1999 320,132 26.0 67.4 2008a 261,573 43.4 48.9
2000 325,341 28.1 64.6 2009 345,216 37.9 56.0
2001 308,780 27.2 65.1 2010 352,535 38.9 55.8
2002 303,288 27.6 66.7 2011 329,728 39.2 55.7
a The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes pos-
sible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those enter-
ing or leaving the different types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are 
work for short time periods, receipt of child support (GYES) or TGYÁS, or involvement in 
training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first 
accounting of the jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The row of 2008a contains the data from 2008 in the form comparable to the 2009 data.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_17
Table 5.18: The distribution of the total number of labour market training participantsa
Groups of training participants 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Participants in suggested training 35,486 44,988 48,558 52,045 52,198 53,447 46,802 45,261
Participants in accepted training 31,167 26,522 26,906 28,311 30,949 32,672 31,891 28,599
One Step Forward (OFS) programme – – – – – – – –
Non-employed participants together 66,725 71,509 75,465 80,356 83,147 86,211 78,693 73,859
Of which: school-leavers 16,843 21,658 24,359 25,260 22,131 20,592 19,466 18,320
Employed participants 5,255 4,484 4,139 4,408 5,026 5,308 4,142 9,036
Total 71,980 75,993 79,604 84,764 88,173 91,519 82,835 82,895
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Participants in suggested training 33,002 29,252 36,212 32,747 48,561 41,373 50,853 32,172
Participants in accepted training 19,406 9,620 7,327 5,766 4,939 8,241 6,853 2,495
One Step Forward (OFS) programme – – – 270 59,347 11,169 2,316 –
Non-employed participants together 52,407 38,872 43,539 38,783 112,847 60,783 57,706 34,667
Of which: school-leavers 12,158 9,313 1,365 1,111 18,719 21,103 12,030 7,935
Employed participants 7,487 4,853 3,602 3,467 37,466 12,496 336 908
Total 59,894 43,725 47,141 42,250 150,313 73,279 60,358 35,575
a The data contain the number of those financed from the NFA decentralized employment 
base, as well as those involved in training as a part of the HEFOP 1.1 and the TÁMOP 1.1.2 
programs.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_18
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Table 5.19: Employment ratio of participants ALMPs by gender, age groups  
and educational attainment for the programmes finished in 2011, per cent
Non-employed participants Supported 
self-employmenta
Wage subsidy  
programmesuggested training accepted training total
By gender
Males 35.4 37.5 35.6 68.2 79.7
Females 31.6 41.3 32.7 67.0 79.4
By age groups
–20 16.5 14.8 16.4 22.6 23.8
20–24 38.3 40.0 38.4 65.0 82.9
25–29 35.3 37.8 35.5 64.4 79.7
–29 together 34.2 36.1 34.3 62.7 74.4
30–34 33.4 45.0 34.7 70.1 83.6
35–39 32.9 41.9 33.9 69.1 82.9
40–44 34.9 40.7 35.6 68.8 80.7
45–49 32.2 43.0 33.4 67.2 70.5
50–54 32.1 36.8 32.7 69.5 83.4
55+ 35.4 36.3 35.5 70.8 83.4
By educational attainment
Less than primary school 36.4 0.0 35.1 11.1 67.7
Primary school 29.2 37.3 29.9 57.4 78.2
Vocational school for skilled workers 35.5 40.8 36.0 69.0 79.1
Vocational school 29.1 47.7 31.2 59.3 79.6
Special vocational school – – – – –
Vocational secondary school 37.7 41.6 38.1 70.1 82.4
Technicians secondary school 36.9 47.5 37.9 77.4 80.2
Grammar school 32.4 41.9 33.1 66.3 80.0
College 33.7 36.4 34.2 65.5 82.5
University 35.0 25.8 33.2 71.4 81.6
Total 33.7 39.5 34.3 67.6 79.5
a Survival rate.
Note: 6 months after the end of each programme.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_19
Table 5.20: Distribution of the average annual number of those with no employment status  
who participate in the training by the type of training, percentage
Types of training 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Approved qualifi-
cation 80.4 77.9 79.8 79.6 78.8 78.7 77.6 78.3 75.1 72.9 71.5 69.0 65.8 63.6 65.2 68.6
Non-approved 
qualification 15.8 16.0 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.0 13.6 12.6 15.0 14.5 16.9 19.9 22.8 26.4 25.4 21.1
Foreign language 
learning 3.8 6.1 5.7 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.9 12.6 11.5 11.1 11.4 10.0 9.4 10.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_20
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Table 5.21: The distribution of those entering into the training programmes  
by age groups and educational level
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total number of entrants 45,092 25,760 27,727 26,459 25,353 42,710 37,467 39,780 18,464a
By age groups, %
–20 10.4 9.0 9.7 8.7 7.0 8.1 4.9 3.8 4.0
20–24 24.1 22.3 23.1 23.0 24.7 26.9 25.1 23.9 27.2
25–44 54.7 54.9 52.3 52.0 51.3 48.3 51.5 52.4 46.5
45–49 6.5 7.9 7.8 7.8 8.0 7.0 8.5 8.8 8.3
50+ 4.3 5.9 7.1 8.4 9.2 9.7 10.0 11.0 14.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
By level of education, %
Less than primary school 1.3 1.7 2.3 1.2 1.6 2.1 7.5 3.0 0.7
Primary school 23.1 23.8 26.3 25.1 24.0 28.1 22.8 24.5 28.2
Vocational school 26.9 26.6 25.7 26.8 24.5 21.9 22.0 25.5 24.8
Vocational and technical 
secondary school 25.7 24.5 23.3 23.5 23.9 22.6 24.8 23.7 24.2
Grammar school 15.5 14.2 14.4 15.0 16.3 15.9 15.3 15.8 15.7
College, university 7.6 9.2 8.1 8.4 9.8 9.4 7.6 7.5 6.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a The drastic decrease in the number of training programs offered was due to the centraliza-
tion of decision-making regarding the financing of training programs, and the concurrent 
new requirement according to which only training programs with a verifiable direct effect 
on employment were approved. Due to these, the number of preventative and general knowl-
edge training programs among those supported decreased. The majority of training partici-
pants were enrolled within the framework of EU programs.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent05_21
 Wages
363
Table 6.1: Nominal and real earnings
Year
Gross earnings Net earnings Gross earnings index
Net earnings 
index
Consumer 
price index
Real earnings 
index
HUF previous year = 100
1989 10,571 8,165 117.9 116.9 117.2 99.7
1990 13,446 10,108 128.6 121.6 128.9 94.3
1991 17,934 12,948 130.0 125.5 135.0 93.0
1992 22,294 15,628 125.1 121.3 123.0 98.6
1993 27,173 18,397 121.9 117.7 122.5 96.1
1994 33,939 23,424 124.9 127.3 118.8 107.2
1995 38,900 25,891 116.8 112.6 128.2 87.8
1996 46,837 30,544 120.4 117.4 123.6 95.0
1997 57,270 38,145 122.3 124.1 118.3 104.9
1998 67,764 45,162 118.3 118.4 114.3 103.6
1999 77,187 50,076 116.1 112.7 110.0 102.5
2000 87,645 55,785 113.5 111.4 109.8 101.5
2001 103,553 64,913 118.0 116.2 109.2 106.4
2002 122,482 77,622 118.3 119.6 105.3 113.6
2003 137,193 88,753 112.0 114.3 104.7 109.2
2004 145,520 93,715 106.0 105.6 106.8 98.9
2005 158,343 103,149 108.8 110.1 103.6 106.3
2006 171,351 110,951 108.2 107.6 103.9 103.6
2007 185,017 114,282 108.0 103.0 108.0 95.4
2008 198,964 122,267 107.5 107.0 106.1 100.8
2009 199,837 124,116 100.6 101.8 104.2 97.7
2010 202,525 132,604 101.3 106.8 104.9 101.8
2011 213,054 141,127 105.2 106.4 103.9 102.4
Source: KSH IMS (earnings) and consumer price accounting (STADAT, 2012. 03. 26. version).
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent06_01
Figure 6.1: Annual changes of gross and net real earnings
Source: KSH IMS (earnings) and consumer price accounting (STADAT, 2012. 03. 26. 
version).
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena06_01
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Table 6.2.a: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, HUF/person/month
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 59,362 72,261 84,542 89,446 97,219 103,190 112,388 122,231 133,570 137,101 143,861 153,300
Mining and quarrying 109,046 124,755 135,770 142,882 158,945 171,465 190,530 202,985 225,650 244,051 233,985 254,607
Manufacturing 88,031 100,964 113,707 123,914 136,354 145,997 158,597 172,277 183,081 190,331 200,748 213,145
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply
133,658 153,100 176,269 198,733 223,541 243,039 265,912 294,241 321,569 345,035 363,900 379,711
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management 
and remediation activi-
ties
83,938 95,214 108,585 119,341 129,486 140,699 151,912 164,572 178,049 181,818 193,605 207,614
Construction 64,288 79,368 86,324 94,193 100,124 106,608 117,626 136,301 146,475 152,204 153,003 156,574
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcy-
cles
78,417 91,303 106,709 115,922 122,538 131,068 145,243 158,077 171,780 175,207 185,695 196,953
Transportation and stor-
age 87,473 100,148 112,577 124,419 137,526 149,068 162,091 173,776 186,376 196,350 200,111 210,146
Accommodation and 
food service activities 55,276 66,358 77,756 87,115 90,089 95,823 102,908 112,222 120,600 122,561 122,691 125,757
Information and commu-
nication 169,984 203,466 234,040 250,308 273,606 288,876 306,792 328,902 358,217 366,752 368,115 392,974
Financial and insurance 
activities 189,818 217,018 241,654 274,081 324,295 349,809 401,580 390,511 431,601 427,508 433,442 456,942
Real estate activities 89,468 94,671 111,627 122,087 126,388 134,409 145,550 159,225 169,845 177,747 182,747 184,829
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 110,626 136,522 149,544 167,758 182,970 200,830 212,963 244,998 281,150 292,974 297,559 303,365
Administrative and sup-
port service activities 73,108 89,575 102,693 107,250 113,276 119,555 128,486 139,127 147,125 149,131 145,574 149,690
Public administration 
and defence; compul-
sory social security
104,288 131,731 167,856 180,866 184,357 207,356 223,009 253,335 267,657 234,696 243,401 252,848
Education 81,160 97,580 128,536 162,293 159,803 181,444 191,211 193,250 204,600 194,958 195,928 192,984
Human health and so-
cial work activities 68,372 78,796 103,149 129,995 130,509 144,100 151,889 160,050 169,977 161,265 142,337 153,832
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 75,318 87,630 112,894 137,826 141,957 154,312 161,416 183,898 183,813 179,199 179,981 192,407
Other service activities 66,946 80,752 91,198 103,554 127,136 133,846 140,893 153,512 157,950 160,375 150,045 162,093
National economy, total 87,750 103,554 122,481 137,193 145,523 158,343 171,351 185,018 198,741 199,837 202,576 213,054
Of which:
Business sector 88,424 102,834 116,596 127,032 138,926 148,555 162,531 177,415 192,044 200,304 206,848 217,878
Budgetary institutions 86,573 105,944 136,844 160,844 161,559 182,185 193,949 206,225 219,044 201,632 196,186 203,516
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 
2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent06_02a
 Wages
365
Table 6.2.b: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, per cent
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Agriculture, forestry and fish-
ing 67.6 69.8 69.0 65.2 66.8 65.2 65.6 66.1 67.2 68.6 71.0 72.0
Mining and quarrying 124.3 120.5 110.8 104.1 109.2 108.3 111.2 109.7 113.5 122.1 115.5 119.5
Manufacturing 100.3 97.5 92.8 90.3 93.7 92.2 92.6 93.1 92.1 95.2 99.1 100.0
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply 152.3 147.8 143.9 144.9 153.6 153.5 155.2 159.0 161.8 172.7 179.6 178.2
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and re-
mediation activities
95.7 91.9 88.7 87.0 89.0 88.9 88.7 88.9 89.6 91.0 95.6 97.4
Construction 73.3 76.6 70.5 68.7 68.8 67.3 68.6 73.7 73.7 76.2 75.5 73.5
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles
89.4 88.2 87.1 84.5 84.2 82.8 84.8 85.4 86.4 87.7 91.7 92.4
Transportation and storage 99.7 96.7 91.9 90.7 94.5 94.1 94.6 93.9 93.8 98.3 98.9 98.6
Accommodation and food 
service activities 63.0 64.1 63.5 63.5 61.9 60.5 60.1 60.7 60.7 61.3 60.6 59.0
Information and communica-
tion 193.7 196.5 191.1 182.4 188.0 182.4 179.0 177.8 180.2 183.5 181.7 184.4
Financial and insurance activ-
ities 216.3 209.6 197.3 199.8 222.8 220.9 234.4 211.1 217.2 213.9 214.0 214.5
Real estate activities 102.0 91.4 91.1 89.0 86.9 84.9 84.9 86.1 85.5 88.9 90.2 86.8
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities 126.1 131.8 122.1 122.3 125.7 126.8 124.3 132.4 141.5 146.6 146.9 142.4
Administrative and support 
service activities 83.3 86.5 83.8 78.2 77.8 75.5 75.0 75.2 74.0 74.6 71.9 70.3
Public administration and de-
fence; compulsory social se-
curity
118.8 127.2 137.0 131.8 126.7 131.0 130.1 136.9 134.7 117.4 120.2 118.7
Education 92.5 94.2 104.9 118.3 109.8 114.6 111.6 104.4 102.9 97.6 96.7 90.6
Human health and social 
work activities 77.9 76.1 84.2 94.8 89.7 91.0 88.6 86.5 85.5 80.7 70.3 72.2
Arts, entertainment and rec-
reation 85.8 84.6 92.2 100.5 97.5 97.5 94.2 99.4 92.5 89.7 88.8 90.3
Other service activities 76.3 78.0 74.5 75.5 87.4 84.5 82.2 83.0 79.5 80.3 74.1 76.1
National economy, total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Of which:
Business sector 100.8 99.3 95.2 92.6 95.5 93.8 94.9 95.9 96.6 100.2 102.1 102.3
Budgetary institutions 98.7 102.3 111.7 117.2 111.0 115.1 113.2 111.5 110.2 100.9 96.8 95.5
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent06_02b
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Table 6.3: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Male 0.1600 0.1620 0.1410 0.1480 0.1490 0.1500 0.1520 0.1810 0.1720 0.1480 0.1470 0.1540
Less than primary 
school –0.5740 –0.4870 –0.4550 –0.4110 –0.3900 –0.4800 –0.4090 –0.4350 –0.4030 –0.5650 –0.3770 –0.5270
Primary school –0.4120 –0.3650 –0.3640 –0.3550 –0.3670 –0.3730 –0.3830 –0.4160 –0.4050 –0.4480 –0.3760 –0.4180
Vocational school –0.2780 –0.2530 –0.2730 –0.2550 –0.2650 –0.2750 –0.2840 –0.2940 –0.2800 –0.3000 –0.2460 –0.2610
College, university 0.5570 0.5310 0.5400 0.6190 0.5870 0.5900 0.5790 0.5620 0.5560 0.6180 0.5760 0.6190
Estimated labour 
market experience 0.0250 0.0212 0.0213 0.0216 0.0237 0.0238 0.0254 0.0256 0.0250 0.0261 0.0230 0.0256
Square of estimated 
labour market ex-
perience
–0.0004 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004
Public sector –0.1230 –0.1140 –0.0581 0.1120 0.1600 0.1130 0.0918 0.0031 0.0224 –0.1270 –0.0589 –0.1690
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the refer-
ence group in log points (approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at 
the 0.01 level. The region parameters can be seen in Table 9.6.
Reference categories: female, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), not in the 
public sector, working in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent06_03
Figure 6.2: The percentage of low paid workers by gender, per cent
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena06_02
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Table 6.4: Percentage of low paid workersa by gender, age groups, level of education and industries
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
By gender
Males 18.1 18.1 18.8 22.1 20.7 22.3 24.8 25.1 25.4 26.7 21.9 21.2 21.1 21.2 21.2
Females 25.7 25.9 26.4 26.8 25.0 22.5 21.6 22.8 22.9 21.9 21.3 20.8 21.7 21.2 21.2
By age groups
–24 39.1 37.7 37.9 37.0 35.5 37.6 39.9 43.9 44.2 46.3 40.1 34.6 38.9 38.2 38.2
25–54 20.2 20.6 21.3 22.8 21.9 21.8 22.3 23.6 24.0 24.2 21.4 20.6 21.0 20.9 20.9
55+ 11.8 12.7 17.2 19.8 18.1 16.2 15.3 16.5 16.5 16.4 15.8 15.5 17.6 18.1 18.1
By level of education
8 grades of primary school or less 40.6 42.9 43.9 43.4 40.4 38.3 37.1 39.6 41.2 40.1 41.4 41.3 47.4 43.4 43.4
Vocational school 27.0 26.9 28.6 31.2 29.4 32.1 35.4 35.7 36.8 37.9 32.9 32.1 33.5 33.3 33.3
Secondary school 14.0 14.2 15.4 18.8 18.0 16.5 17.7 18.6 18.6 19.7 16.1 15.4 16.4 17.3 17.3
Higher education 3.0 3.4 3.2 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.9
By industriesb
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 36.7 36.7 38.1 38.0 34.3 37.9 37.3 37.1 37.5 41.6 37.9 36.6 36.7 34.6 34.6
Manufacturing 18.5 18.9 18.9 20.0 19.1 19.4 25.4 24.7 22.1 24.1 20.8 23.5 23.0 20.5 20.5
Construction 32.7 32.6 36.7 42.9 41.7 44.8 49.8 51.2 50.2 55.2 43.1 37.5 38.1 43.0 43.0
Trade, repairing 36.0 37.7 36.8 42.8 41.3 44.0 49.0 49.3 51.5 49.4 40.9 35.9 35.2 36.4 36.4
Transport, storage, communication 8.8 8.8 9.0 11.3 10.6 10.5 13.6 12.6 13.8 15.1 13.2 14.6 11.2 13.3 13.3
Financial intermediation 19.9 19.9 21.1 25.3 22.6 20.7 23.1 23.9 24.6 26.2 20.9 20.0 20.5 20.7 20.7
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security 19.0 15.5 16.0 13.7 13.8 9.3 6.6 8.2 6.0 6.3 7.4 6.7 8.7 8.8 8.8
Education 21.7 23.2 23.8 21.5 22.6 16.0 4.8 6.9 8.8 6.1 9.0 7.2 11.9 10.6 10.6
Health and social work 24.1 25.8 28.0 26.7 19.9 16.1 6.3 8.4 10.3 8.6 12.6 11.1 14.5 13.8 13.8
Total 21.9 22.0 22.7 24.4 22.8 22.4 23.2 24.0 24.2 24.3 21.6 21.0 21.4 21.2 21.2
a Percentage of those who earn less than 2/3 of the median earning.
b 1997–2008: by TEÁOR’03, 2009: by TEÁOR’08.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent06_04
Figure 6.3: The dispersion of gross monthly earnings
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena06_03
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Figure 6.4: Age-income profiles by education level in 1998 and 2011, women and men
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena06_04
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Figure 6.5: The dispersion of the logarithm of gross real earnings (2011 = 100%)
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena06_05
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Table 7.1: School-leavers by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 119,809 49,232 43,167 14,859
1989 170,891 53,724 52,573 15,699
1990 164,614 54,933 53,039 15,963
1991 158,907 59,302 54,248 16,458
1992 151,287 66,261 59,646 16,201
1993 144,200 66,342 68,607 16,223
1994 136,857 62,902 68,604 18,041
1995 122,333 57,057 70,265 20,024
1996 120,529 54,209 73,413 22,128
1997 116,708 46,868 75,564 24,411
1998 113,651 42,866 77,660 25,338
1999 114,302 38,822 73,965 27,049
2000 114,250 35,500a 72,200a 29,843a
2001 114,200a 33,500a 70,441 29,746
2002 113,923 26,941 69,612 30,785
2003 117,747 26,472 71,944 31,911
2004 113,179 26,620 76,669 31,633
2005 115,626 25,519 77,025 32,732
2006 114,240 24,427 76,895 29,871
2007 108,889 17,967 77,527 29,059
2008 106,426 19,289 68,453 28,957
2009 102,798 20,138 78,004 36,064
2010 103,643 20,693 77,930 38,456
2011 96,825 20,720 76,354 35,433
a Estimated data.
Note: Primary school: completed the 8th grade. Other levels: received certificate. Excludes 
special schools. College, university: from 2007 includes those completing basic higher edu-
cation, combined, and masters programs.
Source: NEFMI EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent07_01
Figure 7.1: Full time studens as a percentage of the different age groups
Source: NEFMI EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena07_01
0
20
40
60
80
100
2011
1993
2221201918171615
%
Age
education
371
Table 7.2: Pupils/students entering the school system by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 171,347 60,865 57,213 17,886
1990 125,665 87,932 83,939 22,662
1995 123,997 65,352 82,665 42,433
1996 124,554 58,822 84,773 44,698
1997 127,214 53,083 84,395 45,669
1998 125,875 39,965 86,868 48,886
1999 121,424 33,570 89,184 51,586
2000 117,000 33,900a 90,800a 54,100a
2001 112,144 34,210 92,393 56,709
2002 112,345 33,497 94,256 57,763
2003 114,020 33,394 92,817 59,699
2004 101,021 32,645 93,469 59,783
2005 97,810 33,114 96,181 61,898
2006 95,954 32,732 95,989 61,231
2007 98,766 31,897 92,957 55,789
2008 97,345 32,774 90,667 52,755
2009 97,083 34,177 87,731 61,948
2010 95,469 35,177 88,644 68,715
2011 96,455 35,420 83,025 70,954
a Estimated data.
Source: NEFMI EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent07_02
Source: NEFMI EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena07_02
Note: Primary school: completed the 
8th grade. Other levels: received certifi-
cate. Excludes special schools. College, 
university: from the 2005/2006 school-
year, includes those completing basic 
higher education, combined, and mas-
ters programs.
Figure 7.2: Flows of the educational system by level
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Table 7.3: The number of full time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1990/91 1,130,656 222,204 291,872 76,601
1997/98 963,997 143,911 368,645 152,889
1998/99 964,248 128,203 376,626 163,100
1999/00 960,601 117,038 386,579 171,612
2001/02 905,932 124,615 420,889 184,071
2002/03 893,261 123,069 426,384 193,155
2003/04 874,296 123,206 437,909 204,910
2004/05 854,930 123,008 438,496 212,292
2005/06 828,594 121,815 441,002 217,245
2006/07 800,635 119,520 443,166 224,616
2007/08 783,948 122,973 441,886 227,118
2008/09 765,822 123,640 439,957 224,894
2009/10 752,896 128,479 443,078 222,564
2010/11 736,977 129,076 438,892 218,057
2011/12 729,000 129,250 428,122 218,304
Note: Excludes special education schools. Beginning with the 2001/2002 schoolyear, students 
in grades 5-8 who attend a 6 or 8 year high school are included in the number of high school 
students. The reason for the missing data in 2000/01 is that the NEFMI was unable to carry 
out the analysis based in the source data due to technical difficulties. College, university: 
from the 2005/2006 schoolyear, includes those completing basic higher education, com-
bined, and masters programs.
Source: NEFMI EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent07_03
Table 7.4: The number of pupils/students not in full time by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1990/91 11,536 – 68,162 25,786
1997/98 3,165 – 78,292 80,768
1998/99 3,016 – 84,862 95,215
1999/00 3,146 – 88,462 107,385
2000/01 2,940 1,070 91,700 118,994
2001/02 2,793 2,453 95,231 129,167
2002/03 2,785 3,427 93,172 148,032
2003/04 3,190 3,216 93,322 162,037
2004/05 2,766 3,505 90,321 166,174
2005/06 2,543 4,049 89,950 163,387
2006/07 2,319 4,829 91,035 151,203
2007/08 2,245 5,874 83,008 132,273
2008/09 2,083 4,983 74,008 115,957
2009/10 2,035 6,594 70,124 105,511
2010/11 1,997 8,068 76,404 99,962
2011/12 2,264 10,383 74,204 98,081
Note: College, university: from the 2005/2006 schoolyear, includes those completing basic 
higher education, combined, and masters programs.
Source: NEFMI EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent07_04
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Table 7.5: Number of high school applicants, full time
Year
Applied Admitted Admitted as a per-centage of applied
Applied Admitted
as a percentage of the secondary 
school graduates in the given year
1980 33,339 14,796 44.4 77.2 34.3
1989 44,138 15,420 34.9 84.0 29.3
1990 46,767 16,818 36.0 88.2 31.7
1991 48,911 20,338 41.6 90.2 37.5
1992 59,119 24,022 40.6 99.1 40.3
1993 71,741 28,217 39.3 104.6 41.1
1994 79,805 29,901 37.5 116.3 43.6
1995 86,548 35,081 40.5 123.2 49.9
1996 79,369 38,382 48.4 108.1 52.3
1997 81,924 40,355 49.3 108.4 53.4
1998 81,065 43,629 53.8 104.4 56.2
1999 82,815 44,538 53.8 112.0 60.2
2000 82,957 45,546 54.9 114.9 63.1
2001 84,380 49,874 59.1 119.8 70.8
2002 88,978 52,552 59.1 127.8 75.5
2003 87,110 52,703 60.5 121.1 73.3
2004 95,871 55,179 57.6 125.0 72.0
2005 91,583 52,863 57.7 118.9 68.6
2006 84,262 53,983 64.1 109.6 70.2
2007 74,849 50,941 68.1 96.5 65.7
2008 66,963 52,081 77.8 97.8 76.1
2009 90,878 61,262 67.4 116.5 78.5
2010 100,777 65,503 65.0 129.3 84.1
2011 101,835 66,810 65.6 133.4 87.5
Note: Including those applying to and accepted to basic higher education, combined, and 
masters programs. From 2008, includes the number of those accepted during late and cross-
semester admissions.
Source: NEFMI EMMI STAT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent07_05
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Table 8.1: The number of vacanciesa reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Year
Number of vacancies  
at closing day
Number of registered unem-
ployedb at closing date
Vacancies per  
100 registered unemployedb
1991 14,343 227,270 6.3
1992 21,793 556,965 3.9
1993 34,375 671,745 5.1
1994 35,569 568,366 6.3
1995 28,680 507,695 5.6
1996 38,297 500,622 7.6
1997 42,544 470,112 9.0
1998 46,624 423,121 11.0
1999 51,438 409,519 12.6
2000 50,000 390,492 12.8
2001 45,194 364,140 12.4
2002 44,603 344,715 12.9
2003 47,239 357,212 13.2
2004 48,223 375,950 12.8
2005 41,615 409,929 10.2
2006 41,677 393,465 10.6
2007 29,933 426,915 7.0
2008 25,386 442,333 5.7
2009 20,739 561,768 3.7
2010 22,241 582,664 3.8
2011 41,123 582,868 7.1
a Monthly average stock figures.
b Since 1st of November, 2005: registered jobseekers.
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent08_01
Figure 8.1: The number of vacancies reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Source: NFSZ.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena08_01
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Table 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staffa, per cent
Year
Intending  
to decrease
Intending  
to increase Year
Intending  
to decrease
Intending  
to increase
1993 I. 34.7 23.6 2001 I. 25.3 40.0
II. 28.5 22.3 II. 28.6 32.6
1994 I. 24.5 29.1 2002 I. 25.6 39.2
II. 21.0 29.7 II. 27.9 35.4
1995 I. 30.1 32.9 2003 I. 23.6 38.5
II. 30.9 27.5 II. 32.1 34.3
1996 I. 32.9 33.3 2004 30.0 39.8
II. 29.4 30.4 2005 25.3 35.0
1997 I. 29.6 39.4 2006 26.6 36.2
II. 30.7 36.8 2007 20.4 27.0
1998 I. 23.4 42.7 2008 26.9 23.2
II. 28.9 37.1 2009 18.4 26.8
1999 I. 25.8 39.2 2010 15.4 26.0
II. 28.8 35.8 2011 17.2 25.5
2000 I. 24.4 41.0
II. 27.2 36.5
a In the period of the next half year after the interview date, in the sample of NMH PROG, 
since 2004: 1 year later from the interview date.
Source: NMH PROG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent08_02
Figure 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff
Source: NMH PROG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena08_02
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Table 9.1: Regional inequalities: Employment ratea
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1992 62.3 57.7 62.0 57.2 52.2 52.5 57.9 58.0
1993 58.4 55.2 60.5 52.9 49.3 48.4 53.4 54.5
1994 57.2 54.4 59.9 52.4 47.7 47.5 53.0 53.5
1995 57.1 53.1 58.5 48.8 46.3 46.4 53.0 52.5
1996 56.8 52.7 59.3 50.3 45.7 45.6 52.8 52.4
1997 56.8 53.6 59.8 50.0 45.7 45.2 53.6 52.5
1998 57.7 56.0 61.6 51.5 46.2 46.4 54.2 53.7
1999 59.7 58.5 63.1 52.8 48.1 48.8 55.3 55.6
2000 60.5 59.2 63.4 53.5 49.4 49.0 56.0 56.3
2001 60.6 59.3 63.1 52.3 49.7 49.5 55.8 56.2
2002 60.9 60.0 63.7 51.6 50.3 49.3 54.2 56.2
2003 61.7 62.3 61.9 53.4 51.2 51.6 53.2 57.0
2004 62.9 60.3 61.4 52.3 50.6 50.4 53.6 56.8
2005 63.3 60.2 62.0 53.4 49.5 50.2 53.8 56.9
2006 62.7 61.4 62.8 53.6 50.4 51.1 54.3 57.3
2007 62.7 61.8 63.4 51.2 50.8 50.5 55.2 57.3
2008 62.7 60.3 62.1 51.0 49.5 49.9 54.5 56.7
2009 61.6 57.8 59.7 52.1 48.6 48.1 53.2 55.4
2010 60.3 57.3 59.0 53.1 48.7 49.3 54.4 55.4
2011 60.2 59.9 60.2 51.8 48.7 50.3 54.5 55.8
a Age: 15–64.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent09_01
Figure 9.1: Regional inequalities: Labour force participation rates,  
gross monthly earnings and gross domestic product in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: Employment rate: KSH MEF; gross domestic product: KSH; earnings: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena09_01
0
50
100
150
200
Gross domestic product (2010)
Labour force participation rate (2011)
Southern Great Plain
Nothern Great Plain
Nothern Hungary
Southern Transdanubia
Western Transdanubia
Central Transdanubia
Central Hungary
% HUF
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
Gross monthly earnings (2011)
regional inequalities
377
Table 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment ratea
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1997 7.0 8.1 6.0 9.9 14.0 12.0 7.3 8.8
1998 5.7 6.8 6.1 9.4 12.2 11.1 7.1 7.8
1999 5.2 6.1 4.4 8.3 11.6 10.2 5.8 7.0
2000 5.3 4.9 4.2 7.8 10.1 9.3 5.1 6.4
2001 4.3 4.3 4.1 7.7 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2002 3.9 5.0 4.0 7.9 8.8 7.8 6.2 5.8
2003 4.0 4.6 4.6 7.9 9.7 6.8 6.5 5.9
2004 4.5 5.6 4.6 7.3 9.7 7.2 6.3 6.1
2005 5.2 6.3 5.9 8.8 10.6 9.1 8.2 7.2
2006 5.1 6.1 5.7 9.0 11.0 10.9 7.8 7.5
2007 4.7 5.0 5.0 10.0 12.3 10.8 7.9 7.4
2008 4.6 5.8 5.0 10.3 13.4 12.0 8.8 7.8
2009 6.6 9.3 8.6 11.0 15.2 14.2 10.9 10.0
2010 8.9 10.3 9.2 12.1 16.0 14.5 10.6 11.2
2011 8.8 9.3 7.4 12.7 16.7 14.5 10.6 10.9
a Age: 15–74.
Note: Up to 2000 data are weighted on the basis of the 1990 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent09_02
Table 9.3: Regional differences: The share of registered unemployeda  
relative to the economically active populationb, per cent
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1997 5.6 9.9 7.3 13.1 16.8 16.4 11.0 10.5
1998 4.7 8.6 6.1 11.8 16.0 15.0 10.1 9.5
1999 4.5 8.7 5.9 12.1 17.1 16.1 10.4 9.7
2000 3.8 7.5 5.6 11.8 17.2 16.0 10.4 9.3
2001 3.2 6.7 5.0 11.2 16.0 14.5 9.7 8.5
2002 2.8 6.6 4.9 11.0 15.6 13.3 9.2 8.0
2003 2.8 6.7 5.2 11.7 16.2 14.1 9.7 8.3
2004 3.2 6.9 5.8 12.2 15.7 14.1 10.4 8.7
2005 3.4 7.4 6.9 13.4 16.5 15.1 11.2 9.4
2006 3.1 7.0 6.3 13.0 15.9 15.0 10.7 9.0
2007 3.5 6.9 6.3 13.6 17.6 16.6 11.7 9.7
2008 3.6 7.1 6.3 14.3 17.8 17.5 11.9 10.0
2009 5.4 11.5 9.5 17.8 20.9 20.2 14.4 12.8
2010 6.6 11.8 9.3 17.1 21.5 20.9 15.2 13.3
2011 6.8 10.9 8.0 16.6 21.5 22.0 14.5 13.2
a Since 1st of November, 2005: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Em-
ployment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of the previous year.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent09_03
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Figure 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment rates in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: KSH MEF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena09_02
Figure 9.3: Regional inequalities: The share of registered unemployed  
relative to the economically active population, per cent, in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena09_03
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Table 9.4: Annual average registered unemployment ratea by counties, per cent
County 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Budapest 0.1 5.7 5.7 4.8 4.0 3.7 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 4.6 5.9 6.2
Baranya 1.1 11.8 12.2 13.3 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.9 11.6 13.4 13.3 12.9 13.6 14.7 17.1 16.6
Bács-Kiskun 1.1 11.0 10.9 10.7 9.7 10.0 10.0 9.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.2 11.4 12.0 17.9 15.6 14.8
Békés 1.1 14.0 14.0 13.5 13.0 13.0 13.1 11.9 11.2 11.5 12.0 13.0 13.5 15.0 14.8 17.3 18.1 17.8
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 2.3 16.7 18.0 19.0 17.9 19.5 20.3 19.0 19.1 19.6 18.3 18.9 18.0 19.9 20.1 23.1 23.7 23.5
Csongrád 1.0 9.9 9.3 9.2 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.5 9.7 10.7 8.8 9.2 9.3 11.6 12.4 11.5
Fejér 1.0 10.6 10.4 9.4 8.4 8.3 7.2 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.5 11.5 12.4 12.1
Győr-Moson-Sopron 0.5 6.8 7.4 6.4 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.4 4.6 4.1 4.1 6.9 6.8 5.7
Hajdú-Bihar 0.9 14.2 15.6 15.0 14.0 15.6 14.7 13.6 12.8 13.1 12.9 14.0 13.9 15.6 16.5 19.1 20.3 20.7
Heves 1.6 12.5 13.6 12.1 11.7 12.3 12.0 10.6 9.8 10.0 10.6 11.3 11.1 12.2 12.7 15.8 16.1 16.1
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 1.6 14.6 14.8 14.8 13.5 13.7 13.4 11.5 10.2 10.7 11.2 12.0 11.4 11.8 12.2 15.5 16.4 18.1
Komárom-Esztergom 1.0 11.3 12.0 11.4 9.8 10.1 8.3 7.0 6.7 6.0 5.8 6.8 5.8 5.4 5.5 10.2 10.4 9.5
Nógrád 2.4 16.3 17.0 16.3 15.6 16.2 14.9 14.3 13.8 14.6 14.6 16.1 16.1 17.7 17.8 21.2 22.0 22.9
Pest 0.5 7.6 7.8 7.3 6.3 6.0 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.4 6.7 7.7 7.6
Somogy 1.4 11.2 12.5 12.7 11.3 12.2 11.9 11.6 11.5 12.2 13.4 14.5 14.6 16.2 16.9 19.4 18.9 18.3
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 2.6 19.3 19.7 18.9 17.2 18.7 19.5 17.8 16.7 17.7 17.5 18.6 18.8 21.0 22.4 24.7 24.8 26.0
Tolna 1.6 12.2 13.4 13.5 12.3 12.9 11.8 11.0 10.0 10.7 11.6 11.8 10.5 11.5 12.1 15.2 14.7 14.2
Vas 0.4 7.2 7.2 6.7 5.6 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1 9.8 9.6 7.7
Veszprém 0.9 10.0 9.9 9.2 7.9 8.2 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 8.0 7.7 8.0 8.2 12.6 12.3 10.8
Zala 0.8 9.2 9.8 9.2 8.1 7.7 7.2 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.4 9.3 9.0 9.3 9.4 13.0 12.9 11.7
Total 1.0 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8 13.3 13.2
a Since 1st of November, 2005: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act 
changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers. The denominator of the ratio is the economi-
cally active population on January 1st of the previous year.
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent09_04
Figure 9.4: Regional inequalities: Means of registered unemployment rates in the counties, 2011
Source: NFSZ REG.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ena09_04
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Table 9.5: Regional inequalities: Gross monthly earningsa
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1997 70,967 56,753 52,934 51,279 51,797 50,021 50,245 58,022
1998 86,440 68,297 64,602 60,736 60,361 58,208 58,506 69,415
1999 101,427 77,656 74,808 70,195 70,961 68,738 68,339 81,067
2000 114,637 87,078 83,668 74,412 77,714 73,858 73,591 90,338
2001 132,136 100,358 96,216 86,489 88,735 84,930 84,710 103,610
2002 149,119 110,602 106,809 98,662 102,263 98,033 97,432 117,672
2003 170,280 127,819 121,464 117,149 117,847 115,278 113,532 135,472
2004 184,039 137,168 131,943 122,868 128,435 124,075 121,661 147,111
2005 192,962 147,646 145,771 136,276 139,761 131,098 130,406 157,770
2006 212,001 157,824 156,499 144,189 152,521 142,142 143,231 171,794
2007 229,897 173,937 164,378 156,678 159,921 153,241 153,050 186,229
2008 245,931 185,979 174,273 160,624 169,313 160,332 164,430 198,087
2009 254,471 187,352 182,855 169,615 169,333 160,688 164,638 203,859
2010 258,653 194,794 183,454 171,769 173,696 162,455 169,441 207,456
2011 264,495 197,774 184,311 181,500 185,036 173,243 177,021 214,540
a Gross monthly earnings (HUF/person), May.
Note: The data refer to full-time employees in the budgetary sector and firms employing at 
least 10 workers (1997–99), and at least 5 workers (2000–), respectively.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent09_05
Table 9.6: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
Year
Central  
Hungary
Western  
Transdanubia
Southern  
Transdanubia
Northern  
Hungary
Northern  
Great Plain
Southern  
Great Plain
1997 0.0730 –0.0473 –0.1050 –0.1010 –0.1160 –0.1170
1998 0.0759 –0.0501 –0.1120 –0.1250 –0.1500 –0.1350
1999 0.1000 –0.0175 –0.1120 –0.1070 –0.1340 –0.1220
2000 0.0729 –0.0067 –0.1610 –0.1320 –0.1500 –0.1660
2001 0.0739 –0.0200 –0.1500 –0.1400 –0.1550 –0.1630
2002 0.0903 –0.0378 –0.1120 –0.0950 –0.1170 –0.1070
2003 0.0493 –0.0542 –0.1220 –0.1220 –0.1400 –0.1410
2004 0.0648 –0.0313 –0.1410 –0.0953 –0.1400 –0.1270
2005 0.0291 –0.0372 –0.1310 –0.1010 –0.1450 –0.1390
2006 0.0691 –0.0191 –0.1430 –0.0856 –0.1300 –0.1130
2007 0.0659 –0.0826 –0.1380 –0.1260 –0.1570 –0.1440
2008 0.0467 –0.0926 –0.1820 –0.1380 –0.1930 –0.1640
2009 0.0829 –0.0457 –0.1280 –0.1190 –0.1410 –0.1450
2010 0.0589 –0.0769 –0.1450 –0.1240 –0.1700 –0.1580
2011 0.1040 –0.0290 –0.0712 –0.0031 –0.0875 –0.0939
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the refer-
ence group in log points (approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at 
the 0.01 level.
Reference category: female, with leaving certificate (general education certificate), not in the 
public sector, working in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent09_06
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Table 9.7: Regional inequalities: Gross domestic product
Year
Central  
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
Thousand HUF/person/month
1998 1,474 969 1,083 754 662 660 742 983
1999 1,710 1,051 1,275 859 731 707 819 1,113
2000 2,014 1,255 1,468 957 827 815 918 1,290
2001 2,311 1,372 1,539 1,074 947 965 1,031 1,458
2002 2,701 1,462 1,703 1,204 1,050 1,062 1,136 1,648
2003 2,940 1,719 2,001 1,321 1,186 1,213 1,254 1,841
2004 3,237 1,953 2,143 1,468 1,366 1,351 1,439 2,021
2005 3,564 2,056 2,169 1,517 1,439 1,390 1,483 2,185
2006 3,921 2,127 2,359 1,591 1,505 1,487 1,563 2,359
2007 4,105 2,300 2,430 1,691 1,587 1,563 1,643 2,485
2008 4,335 2,401 2,575 1,813 1,652 1,664 1,782 2,644
2009 4,291 2,126 2,384 1,762 1,562 1,659 1,692 2,556
2010 4,479 2,319 2,519 1,810 1,620 1,690 1,723 2,675
Per cent
1998 147.8 98.1 110.5 77.2 68.0 67.7 76.3 100.0
1999 151.1 93.7 114.9 77.7 66.3 64.1 74.5 100.0
2000 152.2 97.3 113.9 74.8 64.6 63.4 71.8 100.0
2001 158.5 94.1 105.6 73.7 64.9 66.2 70.7 100.0
2002 163.9 88.7 103.4 73.0 63.7 64.4 68.9 100.0
2003 161.1 92.4 107.6 71.6 64.0 65.3 68.0 100.0
2004 157.9 95.3 104.5 71.6 66.6 65.9 70.2 100.0
2005 163.2 94.0 99.2 69.4 65.9 63.6 67.8 100.0
2006 166.2 90.2 100.0 67.4 63.8 63.0 66.3 100.0
2007 165.2 92.6 97.8 68.0 63.9 62.9 66.1 100.0
2008 164.0 90.8 97.4 68.6 62.5 62.9 67.4 100.0
2009 167.9 83.2 93.3 68.9 61.1 64.9 66.2 100.0
2010 167.4 86.7 94.2 67.7 60.6 63.2 64.4 100.0
Source: KSH.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent09_07
Table 9.8: Commutinga
Year
Working in the residence Commuter
in thousands per cent in thousands per cent
1980 3,848.5 76.0 1,217.2 24.0
1990 3,380.2 74.7 1,144.7 25.3
2001 2,588.2 70.1 1,102.1 29.9
2005 2,625.1 68.2 1,221.3 31.8
2008 2,645.2 70.9 1,085.1 29.1
a For methodological notes see Dr. Lakatos Miklós – Váradi Rita: A foglalkoztatottak napi 
ingázásának jelentősége a migrációs folyamatokban (The role of daily commuting in geo-
graphical mobility). Statisztikai Szemle. (87), 2009. 7–8., 763–794.
Source: 1980-2005 NSZ, microcensus, 2008 MEF ad-hoc modul.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent09_08
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Table 10.1: Strikes
Year Number of strikes Number of involved persons Hours lost, in thousands
1995a 7 172,048 1,708.0
1996 8 4,491 19.0
1997 5 853 15.0
1998 7 1,447 3.0
1999 5 16,685 242.0
2000 5 26,978 1,192.0
2001 6 21,128 61.0
2002 4 4,573 9.0
2003 7 10,831 19.0
2004 8 6,276 116.0
2005 11 1,425 7.0
2006 16 24,665 52.0
2007 13 64,612 186.0
2008 8 8,633 ..
2009 9 3,134 8.6
2010 7 3,263 133.1
2011 1 … …
a Teachers strikes number partly estimated.
Source: KSH strike statistics.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent10_01
Table 10.2: National agreements on wage increase recommendationsa
Year
OÉT Recommendations Actual indexes
Minimum Average Maximum Budgetary sector Competitve sector
1997 114.0 .. 122.0 123.2 121.8
1998 113.5 .. 116.0 118.0 118.5
1999 112.0 .. 115.0 119.2 114.8
2000 108.5 .. 111.0 112.3 114.2
2001 .. .. .. 122.9 116.3
2002 108.0 .. 110.5 129.2 113.3
2003 .. 4.5 % real wage growth .. 117.5 108.9
2004 .. 107.0–108.0 .. 100.4 109.3
2005 .. 106.0 .. 112.8 106.9
2006 .. 104.0–105.0 .. 106.4 109.3
2007 .. 105.5–108.0 .. 106.4 109.1
2008 .. 105.0–107.5 .. 106.2 108.4
2009 .. 103.0–105.0 .. 92.1 104.3
2010 .. real wage preservation .. 100.5b 102.6b
2011 .. 104.0–106.0 .. 103.8 105.3
a Average increase rates of gross earnings from recommendations by the National Interest 
Reconciliation Council (OÉT). Previous year = 100.
b Mean real wage index.
Source: KSH, NGM.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent10_02
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Table 10.3: Single employer collective agreements in the business sector
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of agreements 1,358 1,333 1,277 1,272 1,295 1,025 1,033 1,032 1,027 962 966 959
Number of persons 
 covered 730,107 698,262 667,634 649,861 637,508 513,118 489,568 532,065 467,964 432,086 448,138 448,980
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent10_03
Table 10.4: Single institution collective agreements in the public sector
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of agreements 2,079 2,077 2,019 2,026 2,020 1,750 1,435 1,711 1,710 1,737 1,751 1,744
Number of persons  
covered 272,051 268,139 251,849 251,352 250,492 228,080 203,497 224,246 222,547 225,434 224,651 222,136
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent10_04
Table 10.5: Multi-employer collective agreements in the business sector
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of agreements 70 68 66 71 79 71 75 74 78 80 82 81
Number of persons  
covered 246,734 213,443 206,729 261,848 263,752 92,196 86,079 83,117 80,506 222,236 221,627 202,005
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent10_05
Table 10.6: Multi-institution collective agreements in the public sector
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of agreements 12 10 9 9 10 5 4 2 1 1 1 1
Number of persons  
covered 2,357 2,081 2,045 2,042 2,072 403 360 238 .. .. .. 320
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent10_06
Table 10.7: The number of firm wage agreements, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of employees covered
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of agreements 572 471 531 545 515 298 302 214 202 785 905 888
Number of persons  
covered 334,056 259,033 279,753 316,585 347,223 169,639 151,022 171,259 100,206 377,677 414,522 416,562
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent10_07
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Table 10.8: The number of multi-employer wage agreements, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of covered companies and employees
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of agreements 23 19 18 22 19 40 44 40 45 62 68 68
Number of companies 211 181 172 243 145 145 162 147 150 2,350 2,460 2,199
Number of persons 
covered 125,327 68,882 76,129 88,855 25,175 35,039 42,817 33,735 40,046 191,258 211,753 180,131
Source: NMH, Employment Relations Information System.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent10_08
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Table 11.1: Family benefits
Year
Tax credit for familiesa Child benefitb Regular child protection allowancec
Wage related  
maternity benefitd
Flat rate  
maternity benefitsd
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount per 
family, HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
2001 6,547 1,172,862 8,617 1,295,800 4,193 780,000 39,274 62,904 17,828 234,221
2002 6,588 1,069,911 10,034 1,277,900 4,338 758,000 44,901 70,167 19,842 222,104
2003 6,841 1,009,660 11,283 1,292,000 4,705 704,000 48,742 77,942 22,091 214,640
2004 6,941 969,512 11,971 1,290,200 5,236 670,000 54,322 83,678 24,174 210,509
2005 6,979 924,263 12,597 1,264,500 5,619 663,000 58,484 87,172 25,706 208,708
2006 9,392 122,883 21,637 1,269,000 – – 62,684 91,678 27,102 212,741
2007 .. .. 23,031 1,224,000 – – 68,394 93,973 28,496 207,608
2008 .. .. 24,521 1,246,600 – – 73,902 94,515 30,880 208,652
2009 .. .. 24,524 1,245,900 – – 78,725 95,050 30,328 214,416
2010 .. .. 24,442 1,224,000 – – 81,356 94,682 30,041 217,807
2011 .. .. 24,528 1,190,707 – – 84,929 87,615 .. 207,550
a Introduced in 1999. Beginning in 2006, this became a part of family benefits, only families with 3 or more children are 
entitled to tax credits in the amount of 4,000 HUF per child.
b Annual mean. From 1999 to 2002. November 8, the child care benefit includes the family allowance and schooling sup-
port. Beginning in 2002, the benefits paid in the 13th month are included as well.
c Annual average. Was in use from 1998 to 2005.
d Annual average.
Source: NAV, KSH Welfare Statistics.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_01
Table 11.2: Unemployment benefits and average earnings
Year
Insured unemployment benefit and 
other non-means tested benefitsa
Means tested unemployment  
assistanceb Net monthly earnings, HUF
c
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients Male Female Together
2001 25,677 119,210 14,749 142,001 69,910 59,059 64,750
2002 30,113 114,934 14,869 132,895 82,745 72,036 77,770
2003 34,762 107,226 15,010 138,127 94,612 84,632 89,906
2004 37,107 109,654 15,864 144,853 98,101 87,710 93,233
2005 39,593 111,732 16,991 158,565 108,139 98,625 103,727
2006 43,344 109,095 23,771 160,426 .. .. 110,951
2007 46,208 96,463 25,703 194,716 .. .. 114,282
2008 49,454 97,047 27,347 213,436 .. .. 122,267
2009 51,831 152,197 26,817 71,816 .. .. 124,116
2010 50,073 125,651 .. .. .. .. 132,628
2011 52,107 110,803 .. .. .. .. 141,127
a Average of headcount at the end of the month. Includes the pre-pension allowance (2001–2002).
b This scheme changed substantially in July 2006, therefore figures for 2006 are given for the period July-December 2006.
c The average net wage refers to the entire economy, competitive sector after 2001: firms with at least 4 employees.
Source: NFSZ: Labour Market Report, 2001. KSH: Welfare systems 2007, Welfare Statistics, Yearbook of Demographics. KSH 
Social Statistics Yearbooks.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_02
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Table 11.3: Number of those receiving self-entitled pension, and the mean sum of the provisions  
they received in January of the given year
Year
Old age pension Disability pension under and above retirement age
Number of  
recipients
Average amount  
before increase, HUF
Average amount  
after increase, HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average amount  
before increase, HUF
Average amount  
after increase, HUF
2000 1,671,090 33,258 35,931 762,514 29,217 31,556
2001 1,667,945 37,172 41,002 772,286 32,381 35,705
2002 1,664,062 43,368 47,561 789,544 37,369 40,972
2003 1,657,271 50,652 54,905 799,966 43,185 46,801
2004 1,637,847 57,326 60,962 806,491 48,180 51,220
2005 1,643,409 63,185 67,182 808,107 52,259 55,563
2006 1,658,387 69,145 72,160 806,147 56,485 58,935
2007 1,676,477 74,326 78,577 802,506 59,978 63,120
2008 1,716,315 81,975 87,481 794,797 65,036 69,160
2009 1,731,213 90,476 93,256 779,130 70,979 73,166
2010 1,719,001 94,080 98,804 750,260 73,687 77,500
2011 1,700,800 99,644 104,014 721,973 77,945 81,367
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_03
Table 11.4: Number of those receiving social annuities for people with damaged health,  
and the mean sum of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Temporary annuity Regular social annuity Health damage annuity for miners Total
Number of  
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average amount, 
HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
2000 15,491 18,309 196,689 14,435 2,852 48,581 215,032 15,167
2001 15,640 20,809 198,820 15,610 3,304 53,379 217,764 16,556
2002 11,523 26,043 200,980 17,645 3,348 59,558 215,851 18,744
2003 12,230 30,135 203,656 19,907 3,345 65,380 219,231 21,171
2004 11,949 33,798 207,300 21,370 2,950 69,777 222,199 22,681
2005 13,186 36,847 207,091 22,773 2,839 74,161 223,116 24,259
2006 14,945 40,578 195,954 23,911 2,786 77,497 213,685 25,776
2007 19,158 42,642 184,845 25,050 2,693 80,720 206,696 27,406
2008 21,538 46,537 170,838 27,176 2,601 85,805 194,977 30,096
2009 21,854 46,678 159,146 27,708 2,533 86,165 183,533 30,774
2010 20,327 47,060 148,704 27,645 2,448 86,252 171,479 30,783
2011 16,448 47,096 139,277 27,588 2,371 86,411 158,096 30,500
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_04
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Table 11.5: The number of those receiving a disability annuity and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Disability annuity
Year
Disability annuity
Number of recipients Average amount, HUF Number of recipients Average amount, HUF
2004 27,923 25,388 2008 30,677 32,709
2005 28,738 27,257 2009 31,263 33,434
2006 29,443 28,720 2010 31,815 33,429
2007 30,039 30,219 2011 32,314 33,429
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_05
Table 11.6: The median age for retirement and the number of pensioners
Pension
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons
Females
Old age and similar 56.8 25,730 58.8 13,591 57.6 36,806 57.7 45,115 57.5 46,093
Disability and accident-related disability 48.1 23,649 48.5 21,507 48.7 19,901 49.1 19,250 49.3 18,488
Total 52.6 49,379 52.5 35,098 54.5 56,707 55.1 64,365 55.2 64,581
Males
Old age and similar 60.1 30,217 59.7 32,611 60.1 36,111 59.9 30,560 59.9 33,134
Disability and accident-related disability 49.7 29,013 50.0 27,115 50.1 24,915 50.5 24,565 50.6 23,045
Total 55.0 59,230 55.3 59,726 56.0 61,026 55.7 55,125 56.1 56,179
Together
Old age and similar 58.6 55,947 59.5 46,202 58.9 72,917 58.6 75,675 58.5 79,227
Disability and accident-related disability 49.0 52,662 49.3 48,622 49.5 44,816 49.9 43,815 50.0 41,533
Total 53.9 108,609 54.3 94,824 55.3 117,733 55.4 119,490 55.6 120,760
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011a
Females
Old age and similar 57.8 62,015 57.3 39,290 59.9 15,243 60.7 13,617 58.5 84,550
Disability and accident-related disability 49.8 15,837 50.5 8,565 51.1 9,065 50.8 10,478 50.6 8,512
Rehabilitation annuity – – 44.1 1,604 44.9 6,574 47.6 6,789 47.1 4,374
Total 56.2 77,852 55.7 49,459 54.1 30,882 54.4 30,884 57.3 97,436
Males
Old age and similar 59.7 50,878 59.8 25,749 59.7 37,116 60.2 37,219 60.4 42,708
Disability and accident-related disability 51.1 19,032 51.9 11,069 52.3 11,992 52.1 13,345 51.9 10,452
Rehabilitation annuity – – 44.5 1,556 44.8 6,278 47.4 6,123 47.0 4,085
Total 57.4 69,910 56.9 38,374 56.4 55,386 56.9 56,687 57.9 57,245
Together
Old age and similar 58.7 112,893 58.3 65,039 59.7 52,359 60.3 50,836 59.0 127,258
Disability and accident-related disability 50.5 34,869 51.3 19,634 51.8 21,057 51.5 23,823 51.3 18,964
Rehabilitation annuity – – 44.3 3,160 44.9 12,852 47.5 12,912 47.1 8,459
Total 56.8 147,762 56.2 87,833 55.6 86,268 56.0 87,571 57.5 154,681
a 2011 data are preliminary.
Note: The source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so these 
do not include the data for the armed forces and the police. Data on MÁV is included from 2008.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_06
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Table 11.7: Newly determined disability pension claims and detailed data  
on the number of newly determined old-age pension claims
Year
Disability and  
accident-related  
disability pension
Old-age and old-age type pensionsa From the total: at the age limit From the total: under the age limit
Total Male Female Together Male Female Together Male Female Together
1996 59,967 31,770 59,939 91,709 9,893 20,073 29,966 18,681 31,857 50,538
1997 48,262 37,886 32,614 70,500 10,630 1,138 11,768 24,308 28,154 52,462
1998 42,975 12,908 17,841 30,749 385 882 1,267 11,461 15,244 26,705
1999 46,701 15,181 24,418 39,599 2,601 5,808 8,409 11,494 16,922 28,416
2000 55,558 18,071 29,526 47,597 613 813 1,426 16,089 26,859 42,948
2001 54,645 28,759 14,267 43,026 2,200 4,882 7,082 25,175 7,396 32,571
2002 52,211 30,209 25,719 55,928 2,593 646 3,239 26,346 23,503 49,849
2003 48,078 32,574 13,574 46,148 3,058 5,098 8,156 28,064 6,537 34,601
2004 44,196 35,940 36,684 72,624 3,842 989 4,831 30,234 33,817 64,051
2005 41,057 33,175 48,771 81,946 4,035 6,721 10,756 27,719 40,142 67,861
2006 36,904 34,207 47,531 81,738 4,013 732 4,745 29,025 45,675 74,700
2007 34,991 51,037 62,168 113,205 3,722 6,660 10,382 45,731 54,177 99,908
2008 19,832 25,912 39,423 65,335 3,154 288 3,442 22,180 38,761 60,941
2009 21,681 37,468 15,468 52,936 4,193 6,692 10,885 32,452 8,289 40,741
2010 24,094 37,394 13,719 51,113 6,350 7,213 13,563 29,990 5,801 35,791
2011b 18,964 42,708 84,550 127,258 8,934 7,855 16,789 32,205 75,849 108,054
a Old-age type pensions include: old-age pensions given with a retirement age threshhold 
allowance (early retirement), artists’ pensions, pre-pension up until 1997, miners’ pensions.
b 2011 data are preliminary.
Note: Pensions disbursed in the given year (determined according to the given year’s rules). 
The source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF 
(NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the data for the armed forces and the police.
Source: ONYF.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_07
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Table 11.8: Retirement age threshhold
Birth year
Calendar year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
1948 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76
1949 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
1950 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
1951 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73
1952 I. 57 58 59 60 61 62.5 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
1952 II. 57 58 59 60 60 62 62.5 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
1953 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
1954 I. 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63.5 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
1954 II. 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 63.5 65 66 67 68 69 70
1955 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
1956 I. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64.5 65 66 67 68
1956 II. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 64.5 66 67 68
1957 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
1958 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
1959 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
1960 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
Those are entitled to receive old age pension who have are at least of the age of the old age 
pension threshold indicated in the legislature – marked grey in the table – relevant to them 
(uniform for men and women), who have fulfilled the required number of years of service, 
and who are not insured. In the case of full old age pension, the minimum service time is 20 
years, for partial pension it is 15 years. The table displays the old age pension age threshold 
in the case of a „representative person”. The cells show the age, based on the calendar year, of 
a person born in the given year.
Women who have accumulated at least 40 years towards entitlement (which is not necessarily 
the same as 40 years of service) are entitled to old age pension, regardless of their age.
According to the 2011 legislature number CLXVII, following December 31st, 2011, no pen-
sion can be determined prior to the age threshold. At the same time, the legislature ensures 
allowances that had been determined earlier to be continued under different legal titles (pre-
retirement age pension is replaced by pre-retirement age provision, service pension by ser-
vice salary), as well as closure of acquisitions, and the opportunity for the enforcement of 
acquired rights.
Pre-retirement age pension: early and reduced amount early old age pension, pensions with 
age preference, miner’s pension, artist’s pension, pre-retirement age old age pension of par-
liamentary and European parliamentary representatives and mayors, pre-pension, service 
pension of professional members of the armed forces.
Source: 1997. legislature number LXXXI.; 2011. legislature number CLXVII., http://www.
jozsefvaros.hu/dokumentumok/234_korhatar_elotti_nyudij_ellatasok.pdf.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent11_08
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Table 12.1: The mean, minimum, and maximum value  
of the personal income tax key, per cent
Year
Mean tax burden, per cent
The personal income tax key  
projected on the gross wage
minimum maximum
1988 .. 0 60
1989 .. 0 56
1990 .. 0 50
1991 .. 0 50
1992 .. 0 40
1993 .. 0 40
1994 .. 0 44
1995 .. 0 44
1996 .. 20 48
1997 .. 20 42
1998 .. 20 42
1999 .. 20 40
2000 .. 20 40
2001 .. 20 40
2002 .. 20 40
2003 .. 20 40
2004 .. 18 38
2005 18.89 18 38
2006 19.03 18 36
2007 18.63 18 36
2008 18.86 18 36
2009 18.10 18 36
2010a 16.34 21.59 40.64
2011a 13.78 20.32 20.32
2012b .. 16.00 20.32
a In 2010 the nominal tax key was 17% up to 5 000 000 HUF, above 5 000 001 HUF it was 32% 
of the part above 850 000 HUF and 5 000 000 HUF. In 2011, the nominal tax key was 16%. 
The joint tax base is the amount of income appended with the tax base supplement (equal to 
27%).
b In 2012 the nominal tax key was 16%. The joint tax base is the amount of income appended 
with the tax base supplement.
The amount of the tax base supplement:
– does not need to be determined for the part of the income included in the joint tax base that 
does not surpass 2 million 424 thousand HUF,
– should be determined as 27 % of the part of the income included in the joint tax base that is 
over 2 million 424 thousand HUF.
Source: Mean tax burden: http://nav.gov.hu/nav/szolgaltatasok/adostatisztikak/szemelyi_jo-
vedelemado/szja_2011.html. Other data: http://nav.gov.hu/nav/szolgaltatasok/adokulcsok_
jarulekmertekek/adotablak.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent12_01
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Table 12.2: Changes in the magnitude of the tax wedge in the case of minimum wage  
and the temporary work booklet (AMK)
Year
Minimum wage
Total wage cost in 
the case of mini-
mum wage
Mini-
mum 
wage tax 
wedge, 
%
AMK public burdena, 
HUF/day
Total wage costa, 
HUF/day AMK tax wedge, %
a
gross, 
HUF/
month
gross, 
HUF/day
net, 
HUF/
month
net, 
HUF/day
HUF/
month HUF/day general
regis-
tered un-
em-
ployed
general
regis-
tered un-
em-
ployed
general
regis-
tered un-
em-
ployed
1997 17,000 783 15,045 693 26,450 1,196 43.1 500 500 1,193 1,193 41.9 41.9
1998 19,500 899 17,258 795 30,297 1,369 43.0 500 500 1,295 1,295 38.6 38.6
1999 22,500 1,037 18,188 838 34,538 1,546 47.3 500 500 1,338 1,338 37.4 37.4
2000 25,500 1,175 20,213 931 38,963 1,746 48.1 800 800 1,731 1,731 46.2 46.2
2001 40,000 1,843 30,000 1,382 58,400 2,638 48.6 1,600 1,600 2,982 2,982 53.6 53.6
2002 50,000 2,304 36,750 1,694 71,250 3,226 48.4 1,000 500 2,694 2,194 37.1 22.8
2003 50,000 2,304 42,750 1,970 70,200 3,191 39.1 1,000 500 2,970 2,470 33.7 20.2
2004 53,000 2,442 45,845 2,113 74,205 3,376 38.2 1,000 500 3,113 2,613 32.1 19.1
2005 57,000 2,627 49,305 2,272 79,295 3,572 37.8 700 500 2,972 2,772 23.6 18.0
2006 62,500 2,880 54,063 2,491 85,388 3,910 36.7 700 700 3,191 3,191 21.9 21.9
2007 65,500 3,018 53,915 2,485 89,393 4,095 39.7 700 700 3,185 3,185 22.0 22.0
2008 69,000 3,180 56,190 2,589 94,065 4,310 40.3 900 900 3,489 3,489 25.8 25.8
2009 71,500 3,295 57,815 2,664 97,403b 4,464 40.6 900 900 3,564 3,564 25.3 25.3
2010 73,500 3,387 60,236 2,776 94,448 4,352 36.2 900 900 3,676 3,676 24.5 24.5
Minimum wage
Total wage cost in 
the case of mini-
mum wage Mini-
mum 
wage tax 
wedge, 
%
Simplified employ-
mentc, Ft/day
Total wage cost, 
HUF/day
Tax wedge, simpli-
fied employment, %
gross, 
HUF/
month
gross, 
HUF/day
net, 
HUF/
month
net, 
HUF/day
HUF/
month HUF/day
tempo-
rary work
seasonal 
agricul-
tural/
tourism 
work
tempo-
rary work
seasonal 
agricul-
tural/
tourism 
work
tempo-
rary work
seasonal 
agricul-
tural/
tourism 
work
2011 78,000 3,594 60,600 2,793 100,230 4,619 39.5 1,000 500 3,793 3,293 26.4 15.2
2012 93,000 4,280 60,915 2,803 119,505 5,500 49.0 1,000 500 3,803 3,303 26.3 15.1
a Wage paid in the amount in accordance with the gross daily minimum wage column and in case of work performed with a 
temporary work booklet. The basis for the comparison with the minimum wage is the assumption that employers pay 
temporary workers the smallest possible amount.
b According to regulations pertaining to the first half of 2009.
c From April 1st, 2010 the temporary work booklets and the public contribution tickets were discontinued, these were re-
placed by simplified employment.
Note: The tax wedge is the quotient of the total public burden (tax and contribution) and the total wage cost, it is calculated 
as: tax wedge = (total wage cost – net wage)/total wage cost.
Source: Minimum wage: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_qli041.html. Public contribution ticket: 
1997. legislation number LXXIV. Simplified employment: 2010. legislation number LXXV. Based on calculations of Ágo-
ta Scharle.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent12_02
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Table 12.3: The monthly amount of the minimum wage, the guaranteed wage minimum, 
and the minimum pension, in thousands of current-year HUF
Date
Monthly amount 
of the minimum 
wage, HUF
As a percentage 
of mean gross 
earnings
As a ratio of APW, 
%
Guaranteed wage 
minimum, HUF
Minimum  
pension, HUF
1990. II. 1. 4,800 .. 40.9 – 4,300
1991. IV.1. 7,000 .. .. – 5,200
1992. I. 1. 8,000 35.8 41.4 – 5,800
1993. II. 1. 9,000 33.1 39.7 – 6,400
1994. II. 1. 10,500 30.9 37.8 – 7,367
1995. III. 1. 12,200 31.4 37.0 – 8,400
1996. II. 1. 14,500 31.0 30.1 – 9,600
1997. I. 1. 17,000 29.7 35.1 – 11,500
1998. I. 1. 19,500 28.8 34.4 – 13,700
1999. I. 1. 22,500 29.1 34.6 – 15,350
2000. I. 1. 25,500 29.1 35.0 – 16,600
2001. I. 1. 40,000 38.6 48.3 – 18,310
2002. I. 1. 50,000 40.8 54.5 – 20,100
2003. I. 1. 50,000 36.4 51.5 – 21,800
2004. I. 1. 53,000 37.2 50.7 – 23,200
2005. I. 1. 57,000 33.6 49.2 – 24,700
2006. I. 1. 62,500 36.5 52.3 68,000 25,800
2007. I. 1. 65,500 35.4 49.2 75,400 27,130
2008. I. 1. 69,000 34.7 49.5 86,300 28,500
2009. I. 1. 71,500 35.8 50.0 87,500 28,500
2010. I. I. 73,500 36.3 49.5 89,500 28,500
2011. I. I. 78,000 36.6 49.8 94,000 28,500
2012. I. I. 93,000 .. .. 108,000 28,500
Notes: Up to 1999, sectors employing unskilled labour usually received an extension of a few 
months for introducing the new minimum wage. The guaranteed wage minimum applies to 
skilled employees. The minimum wage is exempt from the personal income tax from Sep-
tember 2002. This policy resulted in a 15,9% increase in the net minimum wage. APW: mean 
wage of workers in the processing industry, based on the NMH BT. In 1990, the data is the 
previous year’s data, indexed (since there was no NMH BT conducted in 1990).
Source: Minimum wage: 1990–91: http://www.mszosz.hu/files/1/64/345.pdf, 1992–: KSH. 
Guaranteed wage minimum: http://www.nav.gov.hu/nav/szolgaltatasok/adokulcsok_jarule-
kmertekek/minimalber_garantalt. Minimum pension: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xtab-
la/nyugdij/tablny11_03.html. APW: NMH BT.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent12_03
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Table 12.4: The tax burden on work as a ratio of tax revenue and earnings
Year
Tax burden on work 
as a ratio of tax  
revenuea, %
Implicit tax keyb
Tax wedge on 67% 
level of mean  
earnings
Tax wedge on the 
minimum wagec
1990 .. .. 38.2
1991 52.4 .. .. 40.4
1992 54.8 .. .. 40.9
1993 54.4 .. .. 42.3
1994 53.7 .. .. 41.2
1995 52.1 42.3 .. 44.2
1996 52.5 42.1 .. 41.8
1997 54.2 42.5 .. 43.1
1998 53.1 41.8 .. 43.0
1999 51.5 41.9 .. 47.3
2000 51.8 41.4 51.4 48.1
2001 53.1 40.9 50.9 48.6
2002 53.7 41.2 48.2 48.4
2003 51.8 39.3 44.5 39.1
2004 50.1 38.3 44.8 38.2
2005 51.1 38.4 43.1 37.8
2006 51.7 38.8 43.3 36.7
2007 52.0 41.0 46.0 39.7
2008 53.0 42.3 46.7 40.3
2009 51.4 40.8 46.3 40.6d
2010 49.7 39.4 43.6 36.2
a Tax burden on work and contributions as a ratio of tax revenue from all tax forms.
b The implicit tax key is the quotient of the revenue from taxes and contributions pertaining 
to work and the income derived from work.
c The tax wedge is the quotient of the total public burden (tax and contribution) and the total 
wage cost, it is calculated as: tax wedge = (total wage cost – net wage)/total wage cost.
d The tax wedge of the minimum wage is the 2009 annual mean (the contributions decreased 
in June).
Source: 1991–1995: estimate of Ágota Scharle based on Ministry of Finance (PM) balance 
sheet data. 1996–2009: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/econom-
ic_analysis/tax_structures/index_en.htm. 2010: Eurostat online database. Implicit tax key: 
Eurostat online database (gov_a_tax_itr). Tax wedge on the 67 percent level of the mean 
wage: OECD: Taxing wages 2010, Paris 2011, tax wedge at the level of the minimum wage: 
calculations of Ágota Scharle.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent12_04
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Table 13.1: Employment and unemployment rate of population aged 15–64  
by gender in the EU, 2011
Country
Employment rate Unemployment rate
males females together males females together
Austria 77.8 66.5 72.1 4.0 4.3 4.2
Belgium 67.1 56.7 61.9 7.1 7.2 7.2
Denmark 75.9 70.4 73.1 7.7 7.5 7.6
United Kingdom 74.5 64.5 69.5 8.7 7.3 8.0
Finland 70.6 67.4 69.0 8.4 7.1 7.8
France 68.1 59.7 63.8 8.8 9.8 9.3
Greece 65.9 45.1 55.6 15.0 21.4 17.7
Netherlands 79.8 69.9 74.9 4.5 4.4 4.4
Ireland 63.1 55.4 59.2 17.5 10.6 14.4
Luxembourg 72.1 56.9 64.6 3.8 6.3 4.9
Germany 77.3 67.7 72.5 6.2 5.6 5.9
Italy 67.5 46.5 56.9 7.6 9.6 8.4
Portugal 68.1 60.4 64.2 12.7 13.2 12.9
Spain 63.2 52.0 57.7 21.2 22.2 21.7
Sweden 76.3 71.8 74.1 7.6 7.5 7.5
EU-15 71.2 59.7 65.5 9.5 9.7 9.6
Hungary 61.2 50.6 55.8 11.0 10.9 10.9
Bulgaria 60.9 56.2 58.5 12.3 10.0 11.2
Cyprus 74.7 61.6 68.1 7.9 7.7 7.8
Czech Republic 74.0 57.2 65.7 5.8 7.9 6.7
Estonia 67.7 62.8 65.1 13.1 11.8 12.5
Poland 66.3 53.1 59.7 9.0 10.5 9.7
Latvia 62.9 60.8 61.8 17.6 13.1 15.4
Litenania 60.9 60.5 60.7 17.8 13.0 15.4
Malta 73.6 41.0 57.6 6.1 7.1 6.5
Romania 65.0 52.0 58.5 7.9 6.8 7.4
Slovakia 66.3 52.7 59.5 13.5 13.6 13.5
Slovenia 67.7 60.9 64.4 8.2 8.2 8.2
EU-25 70.5 58.8 64.6 9.6 9.8 9.7
EU-27 70.1 58.5 64.3 9.5 9.7 9.6
Source: CIRCA.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent13_01
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Table 13.2: Employment composition of the countries in the EUa, 2011
Country Self employed Part time Fix term contr. Service Industry Agriculture
Austria 11.3 24.3 9.6 69.0 26.3 4.8
Belgium 12.8 24.7 8.9 75.5 23.3 1.2
Denmark 8.4 25.1 8.9 77.7 20.1 2.2
United Kingdom 13.1 25.5 6.0 79.6 19.3 1.1
Finland 12.2 14.1 15.5 72.9 23.1 4.0
France 10.9 17.6 15.2 74.8 22.3 2.9
Greece 30.4 6.6 11.6 70.2 18.0 11.8
Netherlands 13.7 48.5 18.2 80.1 17.2 2.7
Ireland 15.1 22.9 9.9 76.9 19.2 3.9
Luxembourg 7.7 18.0 7.1 85.6 13.2 1.2
Germany 10.5 25.7 14.8 70.0 28.5 1.5
Italy 22.5 15.2 13.4 67.8 28.6 3.5
Portugal 16.5 10.1 22.2 65.0 28.7 6.4
Spain 15.5 13.7 25.4 73.9 21.9 4.2
Sweden 9.4 14.7 15.9 78.1 20.1 1.8
EU-15 14.0 21.7 14.2 73.4 23.9 2.8
Hungary 11.4 6.4 8.9 64.3 30.9 4.8
Bulgaria 10.9 2.2 4.1 61.4 32.0 6.7
Cyprus 15.1 8.7 13.7 75.4 21.7 2.9
Czech Republic 17.2 4.7 8.0 58.4 38.7 3.0
Estonia 8.0 9.3 4.5 63.0 32.8 4.3
Poland 18.5 7.3 26.9 56.9 30.9 12.2
Latvia 10.2 8.8 6.5 67.1 23.6 9.4
Litenania 8.9 8.2 2.8 66.9 24.7 8.4
Malta 13.0 12.4 6.5 74.0 25.0 1.1
Romania 17.9 9.3 1.5 44.4 30.0 25.5
Slovakia 15.8 3.9 6.5 59.4 37.5 3.1
Slovenia 11.9 9.5 18.0 60.7 32.3 7.0
EU-25 14.3 19.4 14.6 71.2 25.2 3.7
EU-27 14.4 18.8 14.0 70.0 25.4 4.6
a All employed = 100.
Source: Eurostat (Newcronos) Labour Force Survey.
Online data source in xls format: http://www.bpdata.eu/mpt/2013ent13_02
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deScription of the main data SourceS
The data have two main sources in terms of who gath-
ered them: the regular institutional and population 
surveys of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
(CSO, in Hungarian: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 
KSH), and the register and surveys of the National 
Labour Office (in Hungarian: Nemzeti Munkaügyi 
Hivatal, NMH).
main data SourceS of KSh
Labour Force Survey – KSH MEF
The KSH has been conducting a new statistical survey 
since January 1992 to obtain ongoing information on 
the labour force status of the Hungarian population. 
The MEF is a household survey which provides quar-
terly information on the non-institutional population 
aged 15–74. The aim of the survey is to observe employ-
ment and unemployment according to international 
statistical recommendations based on the concepts and 
definitions recommended by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), independently from existing na-
tional labour regulations or their changes.
In international practice, the labour force survey is 
a widely used statistical tool to provide simultaneous, 
comprehensive, and systematic monitoring of employ-
ment, unemployment, and underemployment. The sur-
vey techniques minimise the subjective bias in classi-
fication (since people surveyed are classified by strict 
criteria), and provide freedom to also consider national 
characteristics.
In the MEF, the surveyed population is divided into 
two main groups according to the economic activity 
performed by them during the reference week (up to 
2003, this was always on the week containing the 19th 
of the month): economically active persons (labour 
force), and economically inactive persons.
The group of economically active persons consists of 
those in the labour market either as employed or unem-
ployed persons during the reference week.
The definitions used in the survey follow ILO rec-
ommendations. According to these, those designated 
employed are persons who, during the reference week 
worked one hour or more earning some form of income, 
or had a job from which they were only temporarily ab-
sent (on leave, illness, etc.).
Work providing income includes all activities that:
– result in monetary income, payment in kind, or
– that were carried out in the hopes of income realized 
in the future, or
– were performed without payment in a family business 
or on a farm (i.e. unpaid family workers).
From the survey’s point of view the activities below are 
not considered as work:
– work done without payment for another household or 
institution (voluntary work),
– building or renovating of an own house or flat, intern-
ships tied to education (not even if it is compensated),
– housework, including work in the garden. Work on 
own land is only considered to generate income if 
the results are sold in the market, not produced for 
self-consumption.
Persons on child-care leave are classified – based on 
the 1995 ILO recommendations for transitional coun-
tries determined in Prague – according to their activity 
during the survey week.
Since the according to the system of national ac-
counting, defense activity contributes to the national 
product, conscripts are generally considered as eco-
nomically active persons, any exceptions are marked in 
the footnotes of the table. The data regarding the num-
ber of conscripts comes from administrative sources.
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15–74 who:
– were without work, i.e. neither had a job nor were at 
work (for one hour or more) in paid employment or 
self-employment during the reference week,
– had actively looked for work at any time in the four 
weeks up to the end of the reference week,
– were available for work within two weeks following 
the reference week if they found an appropriate job.
Those who do not have a job, but are waiting to start 
a new job within 30 days (since 2003 within 90 days) 
make up a special group of the unemployed. They are 
not subject to all three criteria.
Active job search includes: contacting a public or 
private employment office to find a job, applying to an 
employer directly, inserting, reading, answering adver-
tisements, asking friends, relatives or other methods.
The labour force (i.e. economically active population) 
comprises employed and unemployed persons.
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Persons are defined economically inactive (i.e. not in 
the labour force) if they were neither employed in regu-
lar, income-earning jobs, nor searching for a job, or, if 
they searched, they could not have started work. Pas-
sive unemployed are included here, who desire a job, but 
have given up any active search for work, because they 
do not believe that they have a chance of finding any.
The MEF is based on a multi-stage stratified sample 
design. The stages of sampling are defined as follows: 
primary sampling units (PSUs) are enumeration dis-
tricts (EDs) and secondary sampling units (SSUs) are 
dwellings in settlements with 15,000 or more inhabit-
ants, while PSUs are settlements, SSUs are EDs and ul-
timate sampling units are dwellings in all other cases. 
In the MEF sample design strata are defined in terms 
of geographic units, size categories of settlements and 
area types such as city centres, outskirts, etc.
The size of the sample means that the main indica-
tors of the labour market are representative in terms 
of regions (NUTS2) as well. The quarterly MEF sam-
ple includes a sample of three randomly selected dwell-
ings, and labour market information is collected from 
one household each month. From 1998, the quarterly 
sample contains about 33,000 households and 66,000 
persons. The sample has a simple rotation pattern: any 
household entering the sample at some time is expected 
to provide labour market information for six consecu-
tive quarters, then leave the sample permanently. The 
intersection of the samples of two consecutive periods 
tend to be less than the 5/6th that would be obtained 
at a 100 per cent response rate.
Since 2003, the weights used to make the sample rep-
resentative are based on the 2001 census population re-
cord base. At the same time, the 2001–2002 data was 
recalculated and replaced as well. The sampling weights 
for 1992–2000 data are based on the 1990 census.
Institution-Based Labour Statistics – KSH IMS
The source of the earnings data is the monthly (annual) 
institutional labour statistical survey. The sample frame 
covers enterprises with at least 5 employees, and public 
and social insurance and non-profit institutions irre-
spective of the staff numbers of employees.
The earnings data relate to the full-time employees 
on every occasion. The potential elements of the pre-
vailing monthly average earnings are: base wage, al-
lowances (including the miner’s loyalty bonus, and the 
Széchenyi and Professor’s scholarships), supplementary 
payments, bonuses, premiums, and wages and salaries 
for the 13th and further months.
Net average earnings are calculated by deducting 
from the institution’s gross average earnings the em-
ployer’s contributions, the personal income tax, the em-
ployee’s social security contributions, etc., according to 
the actual rates (i.e. taking into account the threshold 
concerning the social security contributions and em-
ployee deductions). The personal income tax is calcu-
lated based on the actual withholding rate applied by 
the employers when disbursing monthly earnings in 
the given year, the net values are calculated at the in-
stitutional and monthly level.
The size and direction of the difference between the 
gross and the net (after-tax) income indexes depends 
on actual annual changes in the tax table (tax brack-
ets) and in the tax allowances. Thus the actual size of 
the differences are also influenced by the share of indi-
viduals at given firms that fall outside the bracket for 
employee allowances.
The indexes pertain to the comparable sample, tak-
ing changes in the definitions, and of the sample frame 
into account. The KSH traditionally publishes the 
main average index as the earnings growth measure. 
Thus the indicator of change in earnings reflects both 
the changes in the number of observations and the 
actual earnings changes simultaneously. The change 
of net real earnings is calculated from the ratio of net 
income index and the consumer price index in the 
same period.
Non-manual workers are persons with occupa-
tions classified by the standardized occupational code 
(FEOR, version since January 1, 1994) in major groups 
1–4., manual workers are persons with occupations 
classified in major groups 5–9.
Labour Force Accounting Census – KSH MEM
Before the publication of the MEF, the annual MEM 
gave account of the total labour force in the time pe-
riod between the two censuses.
The MEM, as its name shows, is a balance-like ac-
count that compares the labour supply (human resourc-
es) to the labour demand at an ideal moment (1 Janu-
ary). Population is taken into account by economic 
activity, with a differentiation between statistical data 
those of working age, and the population outside of the 
working age. Source of data: Annual labour survey on 
employment since 1992 of enterprises and of all gov-
ernment institutions, labour force survey, census, na-
tional healthcare records, social security records, and 
company registry. Data on unemployment comes from 
the registration system of the NMH.
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Other data sources
Census data were used for the estimation of the employ-
ment data in 1980 and 1990. The aggregate economic 
data are based on national account statistics, the con-
sumer’s and producer’s price statistics and industrial 
surveys. A detailed description of the data sources are 
to be found in the relevant publications of the KSH.
main data SourceS of nmh
Unemployment (Jobseekers’) Register Database – 
NFSZ-REG
The other main source of unemployment data in Hun-
gary – and in most of the developed countries – is the 
huge database containing so called administrative re-
cords which are collected monthly and include the in-
dividual data of the registered unemployed/jobseekers.
The register actually includes all jobseekers, but out 
of them, at a given point of time, only those are regard-
ed as registered unemployed/jobseekers, who:
– had themselves registered with a local office of the 
NFSZ as unemployed/jobseekers (i. e. he/she has no 
job but wishes to work, for which they seek assistance 
from the labour market organisation).
– at the time of the examination (on the final day of any 
month), the person is not a pensioner or a full-time 
student, and is ready to co-operate with the local 
employment office in order to become employed (i. e. 
he/she accepts the suitable job or training offered to 
him/her, and keeps the appointments made with the 
local employment office’s placement officer/counsel-
lor/benefit administrator).
If a person included in the register is working under 
any subsidised employment programme on the clos-
ing day, or is a participant of a labour market training 
programme, her/his unemployed/jobseeker status is 
suspended.
If the client is not willing to co-operate with the lo-
cal office, he/she is removed from the register of the 
unemployed/jobseekers.
The data – i. e. the administrative records of the reg-
ister – allow not only for the identification of date-re-
lated stock data, but also for monitoring flows, inflows 
as well as outflows, within a period.
The database contains the number of decrees pertain-
ing to the removal or suspension of jobseeking benefits, 
the number of those receiving monetary support based 
on accounting items, support transactions, the exact 
date of entry and exit and the reason for the exit (for ex-
ample, job placement, the end of entitlement, disquali-
fication, entry into subsidized employment programme, 
etc.), as well as the financial data of jobseeking benefits 
(for example, average monthly amount, average support 
paid for the number of participants on the closing date, 
for exiters, and those who found placement).
The jobseeking benefit register can also monitor 
the average duration of the period of benefit alloca-
tion and the average monthly amount of the benefits 
allocated.
For the period between 1991 and 1996, the register 
also contains the stock and flow data of the recipients 
of new entrant’s unemployment benefit. Between 1997–
2005, the system also contained the recipients of pre-
retirement unemployment benefit.
Jobseeking allowance recipients: from September 1, 
2011 the conditions for determining and disbursing the 
jobseeking allowance changed. The two phases of the 
jobseeking allowance were discontinued, the period of 
entitlement decreased from 270 days to 90 days. Job-
seekers needed to have at least 360 days of worktime 
counting towards entitlement in the 5 years prior to 
becoming a jobseeker (prior to September 1, 2011, this 
was 365 days in the prior 4 years). Its amount is 60% of 
the allowance base, but maximum the amount of the 
smallest mandatory wage on the first day of the enti-
tlement (allowance base: the monthly average amount 
from the four calendar quarters preceding the submis-
sion of the application).
Jobseeking assistance recipients: from September 1, 
2011 the conditions for determining and disbursing the 
jobseeking assistance changed. The “a” and “b” type of 
benefit were discontinued, jobseekers can still request 
the “c” type of benefit under the title of pre-retirement 
jobseeking benefit, but the period of entitlement (and 
depletion) of at least 140 days decreased to 90 days.
Regular social assistance recipients: those from 
among the regular registered jobseekers who are of ac-
tive age and are in a disadvantaged labour market posi-
tion, and who receive social assistance to complement or 
substitute their income. From January 1st, 2009, those 
receiving regular social assistance were included in two 
categories: regular social assistance recipients, and re-
cipients of on call support. This support was replaced 
by a new type of assistance, the wage replacement sup-
port from 2011. January 1st, then from 2011. September 
1st, the name was changed to employment substitution 
support. (Legislation III. of 1993 pertaining to social 
management and social assistance.
Based on the records of labour demand needs re-
ported to the NFSZ, the stock and flow data of vacan-
cies are also processed and published for each month.
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Furthermore, detailed monthly statistics of partici-
pation in the different active programmes, number of 
participants, and their inflows and outflows are also 
prepared based on the disbursed assistance.
The very detailed monthly statistics – in a breakdown 
by country, region, county, local employment office ser-
vice delivery area and community – build on the sec-
ondary processing of administrative records that are 
generated virtually as the rather important and useful 
“by-products” of the accomplishment of the NFSZ’s 
main functions (such as placement services, payment 
of benefits, active programme support, etc.).
The NMH (and its predecessors, i. e. OMK – Na-
tional Labour Centre, OMMK and OMKMK) has pub-
lished the key figures of these statistics on a monthly 
basis since 1989. The denominators of the unemploy-
ment rates calculated for the registered unemployed/
jobseekers are the economically active population data 
published by the KSH MEM.
The figures of the number of registered unem-
ployed/jobseekers and the registered unemployment 
rate are obviously different from the figures based on 
the KSH MEF. It is mainly the different conceptual 
approach, definition, and the fundamentally differ-
ent monitoring/measuring methods that account for 
this variance.
Short-Term Labour Market Projection Surveys – 
NMH PROG
At the initiative and under the co-ordination of the 
NMH (and its legal predecessors), the NFSZ conduct-
ed the so-called short term labour market projection 
since 1991, twice a year, in March and September, by 
interviewing over 7500 employers. Since 2004 the 
survey is conducted once a year, in the month of Sep-
tember.
The interviews focus on the companies’ projections 
of their material and financial processes, their devel-
opment and human resource plans, and they are also 
asked about their concrete lay-off or recruitment plans, 
as well as their expected need for any active labour mar-
ket programmes.
The surveys are processed from bottom up, from the 
service delivery areas, through counties, to the whole 
country, providing useful information at all levels for 
the planning activities of the NFSZ.
The survey provides an opportunity and possibility 
for the regions, the counties and Budapest to analyse 
in greater depth (also using information from other 
sources) the major trends in their respective labour mar-
kets, to make preparations for tackling problems that 
are likely to occur in the short term, and to effectively 
meet the ever-changing needs of their clients.
The forecast is only one of the outputs of the survey. 
Further very important “by-products” include regular 
and personal liaison with companies, the upgraded 
skills of the placement officers and other administra-
tive personnel, enhanced awareness of the local circum-
stances, and the adequate orientation of labour market 
training programmes in view of the needs identified 
by the surveys.
The prognosis surveys are occasionally supplemented 
by supplementary questions and sets of questions to ob-
tain some further useful information that can be used 
by researchers and the decision-makers of employment 
and education/ training policy.
From 2005, the surveys are conducted in cooperation 
with the Institute for Analyses of the Economy and En-
trepreneurship of the Hungarian Chamber of Industry 
and Commerce (in Hungarian: Magyar Kereskedelmi 
és Iparkamara Gazdaság- és Vállalkozáskutató Intézet, 
MKIK GVI), with one additional benefit being that 
with the help of the surveyors of the Institute, the sam-
ple size has increased to nearly 8000.
Wage Survey Database – NMH BT
The NMH (and its legal predecessors) has conducted 
since 1992, once a year, a representative survey with a 
huge sample size to investigate individual wages and 
earnings, at the request of the Ministry of National 
Economy (and its legal predecessors).
The reference month of data collection is the month 
of May in each year, but for the calculation of the 
monthly average of irregularly paid benefits (beyond 
the base wage/salary), 1/12th of the total amount of 
such benefits received during the previous year is used.
In the competitive sector, the data collection initially 
only covered companies of over 20 persons; it was in-
cumbent on all companies to provide information, but 
the sample includes only employees born on certain 
dates in any month of any year.
Data collection has also covered companies of 10–19 
since 1995, and companies of 5–9 have been covered 
since 2000, where the companies actually involved in 
data collection are selected at random (ca. 20 per cent), 
and the selected ones have to provide information about 
all of their full-time employees.
Data on basic wages and earnings structure can only 
be retrieved from these surveys in Hungary, thus it is 
practically these huge, annually generated databases 
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that can serve as the basis of the wage reconciliation 
negotiations conducted by the social partners.
In the budgetary sector, all budgetary institutions 
provide information, regardless of their size, in such a 
way that the decisive majority of the local budgetary 
institutions – the ones that are included in the TAKEH 
central payroll accounting system – provide fully com-
prehensive information, and the remaining budgetary 
institutions provide information only about their em-
ployees who were born on certain days (regarded as 
the sample).
Data has only been collected on the professional 
members of the armed forces since 1999.
Prior to 1992, such data collection took place in every 
third year, thus we are in possession of an enormous 
data base for the years of 1983, 1986 and 1989 too.
Of the employees included in the sample, the follow-
ing data are available:
– the sector the employer operates in, headcount, em-
ployer’s local unit, type of entity, ownership structure
– employee’s wage category, job occupation, gender, 
age, educational background.
Based on the huge databases which include the data 
by individual, the data is analysed every year in the 
following ways:
– Standard data analysis, as agreed upon by the social 
partners, used for wage reconciliation negotiations 
(which is received by every confederation participat-
ing in the negotiations).
– Model calculations to determine the expected impact 
of the rise of the minimum wage.
- Analyses to meet the needs of the Wage Policy De-
partment, Ministry of National Resources, for the 
analysis and presentation of wage ratios
- Analyses for the four volume statistical yearbook (to-
tal national economy, competitive sector, budgetary 
sector, and regional volumes).
The entire database is adopted every year by the KSH, 
which enables the Office to also provide data for cer-
tain international organisations, (e. g. ILO and OECD). 
The NMH also regularly provides special analyses for 
the OECD.
The database containing the data by individual al-
lows for a) the analysis of data for groups of people de-
termined by any combination of pre-set criteria, b) the 
comparison of basic wages and earnings, with special 
regard to the composition of the different groups ana-
lysed, as well as c) the analysis of the dispersion of the 
basic wages and earnings.
Since 2002, the survey of individual wages and earn-
ings was substantially developed to fulfill all require-
ments of the EU, so from this time on it serves also 
for the purposes of the Structure of Earnings Survey 
(SES), which is obligatory for each member state in eve-
ry fourth year. One important element of the changes 
was the inclusion of part-time employees in the sam-
ple since 2002.
SES 2002 was the first, and recently the database 
of SES 2006, 2010 was also sent to the Eurostat in an-
onymized form in accordance with EU regulations.
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